Escaping the enlargement trap in NATO-Russian relations

Survival

Volumn 41, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 145-164

  Dannreuther, Roland ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0038831466     PISSN: 00396338     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/713869437     Document Type: Article

References (52)

1. Even President Boris Yeltsin was not averse to making such statements. For example, at the CSCE Summit in December 1994, Yeltsin warned that 'Europe, which has not had time to rid itself of the legacy of the cold war, runs the risk of plunging into a "cold peace"', Rossiiskaia gazeta, 7 December 1994.
2. See, for example, the comments by Defence Minister Igor Rodionov who argued that 'we might objectively face the task of increasing tactical nuclear weapons in the Western regions', reported in Komsomolskaia pravda, 29 September 1995.
3. Segodnya, 18 August 1995; and Obshchaia gazeta, 28 September-4 October 1995.
4. Segodnya, 18 August 1995; and Obshchaia gazeta, 28 September-4 October 1995.
5. The full text of the decree can be found in Rossiiskaia gazeta, 23 September 1995.
6. For a report on Sino-Russian relations and the NATO issue, see Moskovskoe novosti 51, 22-29 September 1995, p. 5.
7. The full text of the National Security Concept can be found in Rossiiskaia gazeta, 26 December 1997 and in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/3114 S2.
8. Primakov warned explicitly that a 'second wave' including the Baltic states would be 'completely unacceptable' and that 'as soon as the Baits took such a path in Brussels, our dealings with NATO would be over': Nezavisimaia gazeta, 5 March 1997.
9. For an analysis of how the China factor promotes the logic of NATO-Russian rapprochement, see G. Chudayov et al., 'Russia's Interests and Approaches Towards the System of Interlocking European Institutions', in B. Von Plate, Europa auf dem Wege zur Kollektiven Sicherheit (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1994).
10. A. Pushkov, 'National Interests in Russian Foreign Policy', International Affairs, vol. 42, no. 2, 1996, p. 21.
11. It is notable that China has been much more reticent than Russia in describing their bilateral relations as 'strategic'.
12. GUUAM includes Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Armenia and Moldova. To underline its distance from Russia, and its corresponding desire for closer relations with the West, the GUUAM group met in Washington in the context of the NATO Summit in May 1999. For the origins of the group, see Liz Fuller, 'Introducing the "Other" Guam', RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 1, no. 169, 1 December 1997.
13. 'Fleet Accord Paves Way to Russia-Ukraine Treaty', Rossiiskie Vesti, 30 May 1997.
14. 'Agreement on Division of the Caspian Sea', Nezavisimaia gazeta, 10 April 1998. See also Vladimir Batyuk, 'Russia and the CIS; Does the CIS Exist Any More?', in Tracey German (ed.), Moscow, the Regions and Russia's Foreign Policy (Camberley: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 1999), p. 34.
15. 'Agreement on Division of the Caspian Sea', Nezavisimaia gazeta, 10 April 1998. See also Vladimir Batyuk, 'Russia and the CIS; Does the CIS Exist Any More?', in Tracey German (ed.), Moscow, the Regions and Russia's Foreign Policy (Camberley: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 1999), p. 34.
16. Anatol Lieven, 'Russia's Military Nadir: The Meaning of the Chechen Debacle', National Interest, Summer 1996, pp. 24-33.
17. Henry E. Hale, The Rise of Russian Anti-Imperialism', Orbis, Winter 1999, p. 120.
18. For example, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium where Russian and Kazak oil companies are cooperating with the US company Chevron in the construction of a pipeline to Novorossiisk. This type of economic cooperation is termed 'micro-integration' by Abraham S. Becker in 'Russia and Economic Integration in the CIS', Survival, vol. 38, no. 4, Winter 1996-97, pp. 117-36.
19. For a good overview of the CIS, see Richard Sakwa and Mark Webber, 'The Commonwealth of Independent States, 1991-1998: Stagnation and Survival', Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 51, no. 3, 1999, pp. 379-416.
20. For examples of the official Western orthodoxy, see Madeleine Albright, 'Enlarging NATO: Why Bigger Is Better', The Economist, 15 February 1997, pp. 21-23; and Strobe Talbot, 'Why NATO Should Grow', New York Review of Books, 10 August 1995 .
21. For examples of the official Western orthodoxy, see Madeleine Albright, 'Enlarging NATO: Why Bigger Is Better', The Economist, 15 February 1997, pp. 21-23; and Strobe Talbot, 'Why NATO Should Grow', New York Review of Books, 10 August 1995 .
22. It was notable that, while Viktor Chernomyrdin called eastward enlargement 'the worst and biggest mistake since the end of the Cold War', he was enthusiastic and uncritical about the European Union. See Interfax, 19 April 1999.
23. Alexei Arbatov notes that apart from the small and now insignificant group of 'super-liberals', there is an overwhelming consensus 'from democrats to communists, patriots and great power advocates who consider the enlargement of NATO to be contrary to the interests of Russia': see Nezavisimaia gazeta, 14 March 1997.
24. Reuters, 1 October 1993. For the full text of Yeltsin's letter, see Sipri Yearbook, 1994 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 249-50.
25. Reuters, 1 October 1993. For the full text of Yeltsin's letter, see Sipri Yearbook, 1994 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 249-50.
26. Quoted in Anatol Lieven, 'Russian Opposition to NATO Expansion', World Today, October 1995, p. 198.
27. For the best account of the negotiations leading to German unification, see Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). Zelikow, who was part of the US negotiating team, has also subsequently confirmed that no commitment excluding NATO enlargement was made: see Zelikow, 'NATO Expansion Was Not Ruled Out', International Herald Tribune, 10 August 1995.
28. For the best account of the negotiations leading to German unification, see Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). Zelikow, who was part of the US negotiating team, has also subsequently confirmed that no commitment excluding NATO enlargement was made: see Zelikow, 'NATO Expansion Was Not Ruled Out', International Herald Tribune, 10 August 1995.
29. Boris Kazantsev, 'First Steps Towards Russia's Partnership with NATO', International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 41, no. 3, 1994, p. 17.
30. A condensed version of the NATO Enlargement Study can be found in 'NATO Rationalises Its Eastward Enlargement', Transition, 15 December 1995. For a more extensive analysis of the study, see Roland Dannreuther, Eastward Enlargement: NATO and the EU (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 1997), pp. 37-41.
31. A condensed version of the NATO Enlargement Study can be found in 'NATO Rationalises Its Eastward Enlargement', Transition, 15 December 1995. For a more extensive analysis of the study, see Roland Dannreuther, Eastward Enlargement: NATO and the EU (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 1997), pp. 37-41.
32. Nezavisimaia gazeta, 14 March 1997.
33. The full text of the NATO-Russia Founding Act can be found on the NATO website (www.nato.int/docu/ basictxt/fndact-a.htm). A good analysis of the Founding Act is given in Karl-Heinz Kamp, 'The NATO-Russia Founding Act: Trojan Horse or Milestone of Reconciliation?', Aussenpolitik, vol. 4, 1997, pp. 315-34.
34. On Russia's perceptions of exclusion from the Middle East, see Roland Dannreuther, 'Is Russia Returning to the Middle East?', Security Dialogue, vol. 29, no. 3, September 1998, pp. 345-58.
35. Interfax, 21 April 1997.
36. Zbigniew Brezezinski, 'The Premature Partnership', Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 2, March/April 1994, pp. 67-82. Brezezinski defines the principal objective of 'geopolitical pluralism' as seeking to ensure that Russia would not succeed in its 'proto-imperial' ambition of becoming a 'mighty supranational state and a truly global power' through the 'economic and military integration of the once-Soviet states'.
37. 'NATO Distraction', Transition, 21 March 1997.
38. See Anatol Lieven, 'The Weakness of Russian Nationalism', Survival, vol. 41, no. 2, Summer 1999, pp. 53-70.
39. Alexei Arbatov, 'NATO: The Main Problem for European Security', Nezavisimaia gazeta, 16 April 1999.
40. For a detailed analysis of the prospects for European defence in the aftermath of Kosovo, see Charles Grant, European Defence after Kosovo (London: Centre for European Reform, 1999).
41. A constant advocate of this view is David Calleo: see his 'An Era of Overstretch: American Policy in Europe and Asia', World Policy Journal, Spring 1998 . See also, his earlier warnings of US over-extension in Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance (New York: Basic Books, 1987).
42. A constant advocate of this view is David Calleo: see his 'An Era of Overstretch: American Policy in Europe and Asia', World Policy Journal, Spring 1998 . See also, his earlier warnings of US over-extension in Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance (New York: Basic Books, 1987).
43. William E. Odom, who has been a forceful advocate for enlargement, concedes that such a strengthening of the OSCE would be advantageous: see Odom, 'Russia's Several Seats at the Table', International Affairs, vol. 74, no. 4, October 1998, p. 814.
44. For the details of the proposed European Security Charter, see Sipri Yearbook, 1998 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 164-66.
45. The most notable example here was the OSCE mission to Chechnya. For an analysis of the role played by the OSCE, see Gail W. Lapidus, 'Contested Sovereignty: The Tragedy of Chechnya', International Security, vol. 23, no. 1, Summer 1998, pp. 38-41.
46. This was reflected in the US Senate where, after an overwhelming ratification of the three new NATO members, an amendment seeking to prevent any more additions for three years was only narrowly defeated: see 'NATO Celebrates Its Fiftieth Birthday', Strategic Survey, 1998/99 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the IISS, 1999), p. 35.
47. For example, the period from original application to accessions for the UK, Denmark and Ireland was 12 years; for Spain and Portugal it was over nine years. See Christopher Preston, Enlargement and Integration in the European Union (London: Routledge, 1997).
48. For a detailed overview of the negotiations for EU enlargement, see Karen E. Smith, The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999).
49. For the full text of the 'Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia', see European Report, no. 2414, 9 June 1999, pp. 18-26.
50. For an extended analysis of the provisions of the PCA, see Heinz Timmermann, 'Relations Between the EU and Russia: The Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 12, no. 2, June 1996, pp. 196-223.
51. For the details of these talks, and the difficulties they have encountered, see European Report, no. 2416, 16 June 1999.
52. Robert D. Blackwill et al., Engaging Russia: A Report of the Trilateral Commission (New York: The Trilateral Commission, 1995), p. 25.