Russia's several seats at the table

International Affairs

Volumn 74, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 809-822

  Odom, William E ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0039375141     PISSN: 00205850     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2346.00046     Document Type: Review

References (26)

1. See Jonathan Haslam, 'Russia's seat at the table: a place denied or a place delayed?', International Affairs 74: 1, January 1998, pp. 119-30.
2. For example, George Kennan opposed the creation of NATO in 1949 and wanted to withdraw US forces from Germany in 1957; Henry Kissinger unleashed a deluge of technology transfers to the Soviet Union in the 1970s that allowed the Soviet military to shift the theatre balance against NATO in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but the Carter administration cut back those transfers sharply; German politicians were upset that President Carter levied sanctions on the Soviet Union after its invasion of Afghanistan; and many groups in Europe opposed the US decision to deploy INF weapons in the early 1980s. The most dangerous of these was probably Kennan's, but in the cases of INF and the invasion of Afghanistan, had the United States backed down, the impact on the alliance could have been fatal. Some approaches to arms control, such as the nuclear freeze movement, could also have undercut Western power considerably.
3. See e.g. F. Roy Willis, France, Germany, and the new Europe, 1945-67 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968). Willis shows the French obsession with Germany to the exclusion of everything else. Michael M. Harrison, in The reluctant ally: France and Atlantic security (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 13-14, reviews France's tactics for excluding Germany from NATO membership and its insistence that the treaty be amended to require parliamentary ratification for new members. Edward Fursdon, The European Defense Community: a history (NewYork: St Martins Press, 1980), reminds one of how little France really cared about the Soviet threat and how hostile to Germany it remained as Paris finally had to bow to German membership in NATO. Hans-Peter Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer: a German politician and statesman in a period of war, revolution, and reconstruction, Vol. I (Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1995), is instructive on German motives for NATO membership. Though Schwarz tries to portray him as a loyal and faithful supporter of the defence of the West against Soviet imperialism, the impression that emerges is that Adenauer was not noticeably concerned with the Soviet military threat, but was centrally concerned with his political opponents, the German Social Democrats, as he pressed for NATO membership. For the British view, Lord Ismay's blunt remark about NATO's purpose probably captures its essence: 'to keep the Americans in, the Germans down, and the Russians out'. The Russians come last in his priorities while American presence in Europe comes first. British leaders were probably much less concerned about Soviet military power in the late 1940s and early 1950s than about using their 'special relationship' with the United States to leverage their influence in Europe. For anyone familiar with the petty quarrels and diplomacy surrounding NATO military doctrine and force deployments over the postwar decades, it is clear that domestic and west European intraregional politics took priority over military effectiveness in all capitals but Washington. 'Forward defense', as developed in MC 14/3, made little military sense but was deemed imperative for German domestic politics and Ostpolitik. For Americans, especially those in the military, European NATO members' concern with the Soviet military threat often seemed secondary to west European intramural rivalries.
4. See e.g. F. Roy Willis, France, Germany, and the new Europe, 1945-67 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968). Willis shows the French obsession with Germany to the exclusion of everything else. Michael M. Harrison, in The reluctant ally: France and Atlantic security (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 13-14, reviews France's tactics for excluding Germany from NATO membership and its insistence that the treaty be amended to require parliamentary ratification for new members. Edward Fursdon, The European Defense Community: a history (NewYork: St Martins Press, 1980), reminds one of how little France really cared about the Soviet threat and how hostile to Germany it remained as Paris finally had to bow to German membership in NATO. Hans-Peter Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer: a German politician and statesman in a period of war, revolution, and reconstruction, Vol. I (Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1995), is instructive on German motives for NATO membership. Though Schwarz tries to portray him as a loyal and faithful supporter of the defence of the West against Soviet imperialism, the impression that emerges is that Adenauer was not noticeably concerned with the Soviet military threat, but was centrally concerned with his political opponents, the German Social Democrats, as he pressed for NATO membership. For the British view, Lord Ismay's blunt remark about NATO's purpose probably captures its essence: 'to keep the Americans in, the Germans down, and the Russians out'. The Russians come last in his priorities while American presence in Europe comes first. British leaders were probably much less concerned about Soviet military power in the late 1940s and early 1950s than about using their 'special relationship' with the United States to leverage their influence in Europe. For anyone familiar with the petty quarrels and diplomacy surrounding NATO military doctrine and force deployments over the postwar decades, it is clear that domestic and west European intraregional politics took priority over military effectiveness in all capitals but Washington. 'Forward defense', as developed in MC 14/3, made little military sense but was deemed imperative for German domestic politics and Ostpolitik. For Americans, especially those in the military, European NATO members' concern with the Soviet military threat often seemed secondary to west European intramural rivalries.
5. See e.g. F. Roy Willis, France, Germany, and the new Europe, 1945-67 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968). Willis shows the French obsession with Germany to the exclusion of everything else. Michael M. Harrison, in The reluctant ally: France and Atlantic security (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 13-14, reviews France's tactics for excluding Germany from NATO membership and its insistence that the treaty be amended to require parliamentary ratification for new members. Edward Fursdon, The European Defense Community: a history (NewYork: St Martins Press, 1980), reminds one of how little France really cared about the Soviet threat and how hostile to Germany it remained as Paris finally had to bow to German membership in NATO. Hans-Peter Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer: a German politician and statesman in a period of war, revolution, and reconstruction, Vol. I (Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1995), is instructive on German motives for NATO membership. Though Schwarz tries to portray him as a loyal and faithful supporter of the defence of the West against Soviet imperialism, the impression that emerges is that Adenauer was not noticeably concerned with the Soviet military threat, but was centrally concerned with his political opponents, the German Social Democrats, as he pressed for NATO membership. For the British view, Lord Ismay's blunt remark about NATO's purpose probably captures its essence: 'to keep the Americans in, the Germans down, and the Russians out'. The Russians come last in his priorities while American presence in Europe comes first. British leaders were probably much less concerned about Soviet military power in the late 1940s and early 1950s than about using their 'special relationship' with the United States to leverage their influence in Europe. For anyone familiar with the petty quarrels and diplomacy surrounding NATO military doctrine and force deployments over the postwar decades, it is clear that domestic and west European intraregional politics took priority over military effectiveness in all capitals but Washington. 'Forward defense', as developed in MC 14/3, made little military sense but was deemed imperative for German domestic politics and Ostpolitik. For Americans, especially those in the military, European NATO members' concern with the Soviet military threat often seemed secondary to west European intramural rivalries.
6. See e.g. F. Roy Willis, France, Germany, and the new Europe, 1945-67 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968). Willis shows the French obsession with Germany to the exclusion of everything else. Michael M. Harrison, in The reluctant ally: France and Atlantic security (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 13-14, reviews France's tactics for excluding Germany from NATO membership and its insistence that the treaty be amended to require parliamentary ratification for new members. Edward Fursdon, The European Defense Community: a history (NewYork: St Martins Press, 1980), reminds one of how little France really cared about the Soviet threat and how hostile to Germany it remained as Paris finally had to bow to German membership in NATO. Hans-Peter Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer: a German politician and statesman in a period of war, revolution, and reconstruction, Vol. I (Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1995), is instructive on German motives for NATO membership. Though Schwarz tries to portray him as a loyal and faithful supporter of the defence of the West against Soviet imperialism, the impression that emerges is that Adenauer was not noticeably concerned with the Soviet military threat, but was centrally concerned with his political opponents, the German Social Democrats, as he pressed for NATO membership. For the British view, Lord Ismay's blunt remark about NATO's purpose probably captures its essence: 'to keep the Americans in, the Germans down, and the Russians out'. The Russians come last in his priorities while American presence in Europe comes first. British leaders were probably much less concerned about Soviet military power in the late 1940s and early 1950s than about using their 'special relationship' with the United States to leverage their influence in Europe. For anyone familiar with the petty quarrels and diplomacy surrounding NATO military doctrine and force deployments over the postwar decades, it is clear that domestic and west European intraregional politics took priority over military effectiveness in all capitals but Washington. 'Forward defense', as developed in MC 14/3, made little military sense but was deemed imperative for German domestic politics and Ostpolitik. For Americans, especially those in the military, European NATO members' concern with the Soviet military threat often seemed secondary to west European intramural rivalries.
7. Harrison, The reluctant ally, pp. 13-14.
8. Ibid.
9. Fursdon, The European Defense Community, Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer.
10. Fursdon, The European Defense Community, Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer.
11. Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe between the wars, 1918-41, 3rd edn (Hamden, CT:Archon Books, 1962); Joseph Rothschild, East central Europe between the two world wars (Seattle, WA: University ofWashington Press, 1990), offer basic accounts of these developments.
12. Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe between the wars, 1918-41, 3rd edn (Hamden, CT:Archon Books, 1962); Joseph Rothschild, East central Europe between the two world wars (Seattle, WA: University ofWashington Press, 1990), offer basic accounts of these developments.
13. Several diplomats from these countries actually approached me at conferences during these years, asking me why the French were behaving in this fashion.
14. Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, US Congress, Benjamin Gilman reported these figures in his 'Stop coddling Russia', Washington Post, 19 June 1998, p. A25.
15. Joel Hellman, 'Winners take all: the politics of partial reform in postcommunist transitions', World Politics 50: 2, 1998, pp. 203-34, spells out the logic of this argument and provides considerable comparative data to prove its validity.
16. See W. E. Odom,'NATO expansion: why the critics are wrong', The National Interest 39, spring 1995, p.46; W. E. Odom, 'Testimony', Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 20 June 1996 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996), pp. 26-8.
17. See W. E. Odom,'NATO expansion: why the critics are wrong', The National Interest 39, spring 1995, p.46; W. E. Odom, 'Testimony', Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 20 June 1996 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996), pp. 26-8.
18. See Wm. E. Odom, On Internal War (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992), pp. 60-64, 152, 192-93, for discussions of foreign aid in the form of capital transfers to government. See Kiren Chaudhry Aziz, The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), for a comparative examination of capital inflows to the private sector and to the state sector and the differing consequences. Capital inflows from large oil exports have some of the same consequences as aid transfers to governments but also several particular ones. For a few examples of them, George Grayson, The Politics of Mexican Oil (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989); Moustafa Elm, Oil, Power and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1992); Laura Randall, The Political Economy of Venezuelan Oil (New York: Praeger, 1987).
19. See Wm. E. Odom, On Internal War (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992), pp. 60-64, 152, 192-93, for discussions of foreign aid in the form of capital transfers to government. See Kiren Chaudhry Aziz, The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), for a comparative examination of capital inflows to the private sector and to the state sector and the differing consequences. Capital inflows from large oil exports have some of the same consequences as aid transfers to governments but also several particular ones. For a few examples of them, George Grayson, The Politics of Mexican Oil (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989); Moustafa Elm, Oil, Power and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1992); Laura Randall, The Political Economy of Venezuelan Oil (New York: Praeger, 1987).
20. See Wm. E. Odom, On Internal War (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992), pp. 60-64, 152, 192-93, for discussions of foreign aid in the form of capital transfers to government. See Kiren Chaudhry Aziz, The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), for a comparative examination of capital inflows to the private sector and to the state sector and the differing consequences. Capital inflows from large oil exports have some of the same consequences as aid transfers to governments but also several particular ones. For a few examples of them, George Grayson, The Politics of Mexican Oil (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989); Moustafa Elm, Oil, Power and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1992); Laura Randall, The Political Economy of Venezuelan Oil (New York: Praeger, 1987).
21. See Wm. E. Odom, On Internal War (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992), pp. 60-64, 152, 192-93, for discussions of foreign aid in the form of capital transfers to government. See Kiren Chaudhry Aziz, The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), for a comparative examination of capital inflows to the private sector and to the state sector and the differing consequences. Capital inflows from large oil exports have some of the same consequences as aid transfers to governments but also several particular ones. For a few examples of them, George Grayson, The Politics of Mexican Oil (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989); Moustafa Elm, Oil, Power and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1992); Laura Randall, The Political Economy of Venezuelan Oil (New York: Praeger, 1987).
22. See Wm. E. Odom, On Internal War (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992), pp. 60-64, 152, 192-93, for discussions of foreign aid in the form of capital transfers to government. See Kiren Chaudhry Aziz, The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), for a comparative examination of capital inflows to the private sector and to the state sector and the differing consequences. Capital inflows from large oil exports have some of the same consequences as aid transfers to governments but also several particular ones. For a few examples of them, George Grayson, The Politics of Mexican Oil (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989); Moustafa Elm, Oil, Power and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1992); Laura Randall, The Political Economy of Venezuelan Oil (New York: Praeger, 1987).
23. See Murray Feshbach and Alfred Friendly, Jr, Ecocide in the USSR (New York: Basic Books, 1992), for a description of the size and depth of this problem.
24. See Douglass C. North, Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), for a Nobel Prize-winning economist's view of why this is true.
25. See Alfred Rieber, ed., The politics of autocracy (The Hague: Mouton, 1966), pp. 22ff. To quote Rieber, 'Thus, when the army failed to hold its own on native soil against Western European powers, Alexander saw clearly that his duty was to reorganize the army so that it could fight on equal terms against a European coalition.' And, citing Dmitri Milyutin's recommendation for reform, 'Three peculiarities of the Russian Empire blocked the road to reform: the size of the country, its multinational character, and serfdom. Of these, clearly only serfdom could be altered by state action, and it was serfdom which above all prolonged the outdated military system.'
26. W. E. Odom, 'After NATO enlargement: challenges and changes', The Polish Review 52: 4, 1997, pp. 387-94.