Religion and the state: The singularity of the Jordanian religious experience

International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society

Volumn 15, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 527-568

  Moaddel, Mansoor ^a,b  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

^b EASTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Fundamentalism; Ideological state; Secularization; Social classes; World religion

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038673044     PISSN: 08914486     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1015388803216     Document Type: Article

References (148)

1. See Rex Brynen, "Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of Jordan," Canadian Journal of Political Science XXV: 1 (March 1992): 69-97.
2. For an informative analysis of the rise of Arab nationalism and Arab revolt, see C. Ernest Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1973);
3. Zeine N. Zeine The Emergence of Arab Nationalism (Delmar, NY: Caravan Books, 1973);
4. and Philop S. Khoury, Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus 1860-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
5. Valerie Yorke, Domestic Politics and Regional Security: Jordan, Syria and Israel (Gower: Aldershot, England, 1988), p. 7;
6. and Kamal Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co., 1993), p. 88.
7. Mary C. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the making of Jordan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 3.
8. Wilson, King Abdullah, p. 59;
9. Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan, p. 89.
10. Wilson, King Abdullah, p. 62.
11. Wilson, King Abdullah, pp. 72-9;
12. Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan, pp. 114-7,
13. and Yorke, Domestic Politics, p. 10.
14. Wilson, King Abdullah, p. 90.
15. Robert B. Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 6.
16. Nasser H. Aruri, Jordan: A Study in Political Development (1921-1965) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), pp. 31-2.
17. Uriel Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan 1955-1967 (Oxford: Oxford U Press, 1989), p. 9.
18. Uriel Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism, p. 10.
19. Raphael Patai, The Kingdom of Jordan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), pp. 57.
20. Satloff, p. 168.
21. Yorke, Domestic Politics, p. 18.
22. See also Nasser H. Aruri, Jordan: A Study in Political Development (1921-1965) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), p. 30.
23. Asher Susser, On Both Banks of the Jordan: A Political Biography of Wasfi all Tall (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 1994), p. 5.
24. See also Linda L. Layne, 'Tribesmen as Citizens: "Primordial Ties" and Democracy in Rural Jordan,' in Linda L. Layne (ed.), Elections in the Middle East: Implications of Recent Trends (Boulder: Westview, 1987), pp. 113-51.
25. Cited in Linda L. Layne, "The Dialogics of Tribal Self-Representation in Jordan," American Ethnologist (February 1989), p. 28.
26. See Also The Jordan Times (January 28, 1985).
27. Layne, "The Dialogics," p. 27.
28. Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism, p. 72.
29. Hourani et al, Islamic Action Front Party, p. 9;
30. and Obaidi, The Muslim Brotherhood, p. 41.
31. See Hani Hourani, Taleb Awad, Hamed Dabbas, and Sa'eda Kilani, Islamic Action Front Party (Amman, Jordan: al-Urdun al-JadiD, 1993), p. 10);
32. and Awni Obaidi, The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and Palestine, 1945-1970 (Jordan, 1991), p. 40.
33. Hourani et al, Islamic Action Front Party, p. 9;
34. and Obaidi, The Muslim Brotherhood, p. 37.
35. Mishal, "Conflictual," p. 175.
36. Mishal, "Conflictual," p. 178.
37. Yorke, Domestic Politics, p. 50.
38. Hani Hourani, Hamed Dabbas, Taleb Awad, and Omar Shniekat, Jordanian Political Parties (Amman, Jordan: al-Urbun al-Jadid Research Center, 1993), pp. 29-30.
39. Jordan Diary 1997, p. 40.
40. See John Lewis Burckhardt, Travels in Syria and the Holy Land (London: John Murray, 1822), pp. 350-4.
41. Eugene L. Rogan. "Bringing the State Back: The Limits of Ottoman Rule in Jordan, 1840-1910." In Village, Steppe and State: The Social Origins of Modern Jordan, edited by Eugene L. Rogan and Tariq Tell (London: British Academic Press, 1994), pp. 51-2.
42. Abla M. Amawi, "The Consolidation of the Merchant Class in Transjordan during the Second World War," in Village, Steppe and State: The Social Origins of Modern Jordan, edited by Eugene L. Rogan and Tariq Tell (London: British Academic Press, 1994), pp. 163-66.
43. Amawi, "The Consolidation of the Merchant Class," pp. 174-75.
44. Wilson, King Abdullah, p. 165.
45. See also Doreen Warriner, Land and Poverty in the Middle East (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948), p. 80;
46. Marcus Mackenzie, "Transjordan," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 33 (July-October 1946), p. 263;
47. James Baster, "The Economic Problems of Jordan," International Affairs 31 (January 1955), p. 27.
48. Wilson, King Abdullah, p. 57)
49. Timothy J. Piro, The Political Economy of Market Reform in Jordan (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), p. 23.
50. See also Benjamin Schwadran, Jordan: A State of Tension (New York: Council for Middle East Affairs, 1959).
51. John Bagot Glubb, Britain and the Arabs. A Study of Fifty Years 1908-1950 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1959), p. 173.
52. See also Michael R. Fischbach, "British Land Policy in Transjordan," In Village, Steppe and State, edited by Eugene L. Rogan and Tariq Tell (London: British Academic Press, 1994), pp. 80, 106.
53. See Fischbach, "British Land Policy in Transjordan," p. 106;
54. IBRD, Economic Development of Jordan, pp. 130-1;
55. Edgar Barton Worthington, Middle East Science: A Survey of Subjects Other than Agriculture (London: H.M. Stationery off., 1946), p. 15;
56. and Warriner, Land and Poverty in the Middle East, p. 79.
57. Fischbach, "British Land Policy in Transjordan," p. 107.
58. Fischbach, "British Land Policy in Transjordan," p. 106.
59. Similarly, Gerber has noted the connection between Hashemite longevity and land tenure. See Haim Gerber, The Social Origins of the Modern Middle East (Boulder Colo.: L. Rienner, 1987), p. 159.
60. Naseer H. Aruri, Jordan: A Study in Political Development (1921-1965) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), p. 50, table 5.
61. Piro, The Political Economy of Market Reform, p. 40.
62. Onn Winckler, Population Growth and Migration in Jordan, 1950-1994 (Sussex: Academic Press, 1997), pp. 43, 48, 72.
63. See also M. G. Quibria, 'Migrant Workers and Remittances: Issues for Asian Developing Countries,' Asian Development Review, vol. 4, no. 1 (1986), p. 82, table 1.
64. Winckler, Population Growth and Migration in Jordan, p. 79, table 2.5.
65. Winckler, Population Growth and Migration in Jordan, pp. 70-1.
66. Winckler, Population Growth and Migration in Jordan, p. 91.
67. See Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, p. 268.
68. Through much of his life, Banna seems not to have lost his loyalty to the monarchy. However, the forces turned loose in the movement inevitably worked against the palace. The works of Muhammad Gazali, the first of which appeared in 1948, could be regarded as indirect assaults on monarchical authority and reflections of the spirit of the membership, if not of the leaders. This fact seems to have been clear to the palace, as the 1948 decree of dissolution shows. See Mitchell, The Society, p. 220.
69. See Ammon Cohen, Political Parties in the West Bank under the Jordanian Regime, 1949-1967 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), pp. 163-65.
70. Abu Qurah was the first leader of the MB. See Ibrahim Gharaibih, Jama'a al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen fil Urdun: 1946-1996 (The Society of Muslim Brothers in Jordan: 1946-1996, Amman, Jordan: al-Urdun al-Jadid, 1997), pp. 48-9, 51.
71. Author's Interview with Ibrahim Gharaibih, a Member of the Jordanian MB and IAFP (April 1998).
72. Cohen, Political Parties in the West Bank under the Jordanian Regime, pp. 179, 182.
73. Author's Interview with Ibrahim Gharaibih.
74. Gharaibih, Jama'a al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen fil Urdun, p. 59. There is no record of any military activity on the part of the Jordanian MB during the period because the MB did not want to clash with the regime, contrary to the Egyptian branch (p. 63).
75. Author's Interview with Ibrahim Gharaibih. Juwaifel, however, left Jordan for Egypt in 1954 to support Nasser.
76. Interview with Interview with Yaya Shaqra, Secretary of Mr. Thunibat, Comptroller General, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (September 6, 1999).
77. Interview with Interview with Mr. Yaya Shaqra, Secretary of Mr. Thunibat, Comptroller General, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (September 6, 1999).
78. Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate, pp. 20-21.
79. For analyses of the origin of Arab nationalism see C. Ernest Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essay on the Origins of Arab Nationalism (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1973);
80. George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1961);
81. and Zeine, N. Zeine The Emergence of Arab Nationalism (Delmar, NY: Caravan Books, 1973).
82. See C. Ernest Dawn, "The Formation of Pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar Years," International Journal of Middle East Studies (20): 67-91.
83. See Sylvia G. Haim, "Islam and the Theory of Arab Nationalism," in The Middle East in Transition, edited by Walter Z. Laqueur (New York: Praeger, 1958).
84. Naseer H. Aruri, Jordan: A Study in Political Development, pp. 136-37.
85. Hussein, King of Jordan, Uneasy Lies the Head (London: Heinemann, 1962), p. 78.
86. Hussein, King of Jordan, Uneasy Lies the Head, pp. 74-75.
87. Ali Abdul Kazem, "The Muslim Brotherhood: The Historie Background and the Ideological Origins," in Islamic Movements in Jordan, edited by Julian Schwedler (Amman, Jordan: Al-Urdun al-Jadid, 1997), pp. 13-4.
88. Cohen, Political Parties in the West Bank under the Jordanian Regime, p. 152.
89. See also Hanna Y. Freij and Leonard C. Robinson, "Liberalization, the Islamists and the Stability of the Arab State: Jordan as a Case Study," The Muslim World, vol. Lxxxvi, number 1 (January 1996), pp. 1-2;
90. and Sami al-Khazendar, Jordan and the Palestine Question: The Role of Islamic and Left Forces in Foreign Policy-Making (Berkshire, UK: Ithaca Press, 1997), pp. 146-7.
91. Artilleries used to explode on the Egyptian soldiers before reaching the enemy. Interview with Musa Kilani.
92. The rise in the popularity of the Muslim Brothers in Jordan was contingent upon the decline of Arab nationalism and the left as the dominant discourse and cannot solely be attributed to the political freedom they enjoyed in Jordan. As Gharaibih has indicated, the prohibition of political parties in 1957 did not affect the activities of the Brothers. Freedom, however, did not increase their political success. Nor did the prohibition prevent nationalists and leftists from controlling the media and dominating political trends, public opinion, and the unions. See Gharaibih, Jama'a al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen fit Urdun, p. 12.
93. Jordan Diary 1997 (Amman, Jordan: International Press Office, The Royal Hashemite Court, 1997), pp. 25, 76.
94. Gharaibih Jama'a al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen fil Urdun, p. 76. Increase in petrodollars in oil-rich Arab countries is believed to have contributed to financing the Muslim Brothers. According to Nadir Sharif, the Brothers' major sources of support comes from the poor areas in refugee camps. Membership dues are not enough to cover all their expenses. When one of their leaders, who was also a member of Parliament, died of cancer, the MB paid off all his debts, which were way more that $100,000. They paid it very quickly. The major source of finance come from the Persian Gulf states, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, not from the governments of these countries, but from rich Muslims, people such as Ben Ladin from Saudi Arabia (interview with author).
95. Kazem, "The Muslim Brotherhood," p. 23.
96. Gharaibih Jama'a al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen fil Urdun, p. 80. Abd al-Majid Thunibat, Controller General of the Muslim Brothers (Muraqib al-Aam), indicated that "Sayyid Qutb was a thinker of the Muslim Brothers. But we are not obliged to follow his ideas. Some of our members may find his ideas acceptable while others think otherwise. There are different trends within our movement. Nevertheless, all members and trends are obliged to kneel to the resolutions of the Shura Council and its Executive Bureau. These resolutions are of course based on the considerations of all the trends within our movement and the articulation of Islam with the current situations. The circumstances in which Sayyid Qutb developed his ideas do not coincide with ours. His ideas were the results of years of imprisonment, torture, and the particular conditions of Egypt. Al-jahili-yeh wat takfir did not take root in Jordan, because our movement had quite a different political experience. Moreover, even the Egyptian branch of the Muslim Brothers went against this movement. For example, Hasan Hudaibi, the leader to the Egyptian branch, attacked al-jahilyeh wat takfir, arguing that we are preachers not judges." Author's interview with Thunibat.
97. Gharaibih Jama'a al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen fit Urdun, pp. 80-81.
98. Gharaibih Jama'a al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen fit Urdun, pp. 81.
99. Jordan Diary, p. 43.
100. The democratic reforms were also a response to the deteriorating economic conditions of the country and the social upheavals of 1988-89.
101. Jordan Diary, p. 44.
102. Since its aim is consensus building, the Charter naturally overlooks the domestic sources of political instability and the realization of Arab-Islamic objectives. "This is particularly evident in its description of the political events following the country's first parliamentary elections in 1956. It simply stated that the "period proved to be short-lived and the democratic process was interrupted for a variety of internal and external reasons" (Jordan Diary, p. 317). The bloody conflict between the Jordanian State and the PLO in September 1970 is simply referred to as "the painful events."
103. The vaguest element among these principles is the notion that Islam is the source of legislation. It is unclear how Islamic law could be reconciled with the policies of a secular state. Jordan's constitution does not call for a body of Islamic jurists to oversee the process of legislation in order to ensure its conformity with Islam. Nor does this principle bestow legitimacy to the call of the Muslim Brothers and other Islamic groups to Islamize society.
104. See Hourani, et al, Islamic Action Front Party, p. 36.
105. The Political Party Law restricted political activities to political parties, which were required to disclose their sources of income and banned from having links with parties outside the country. See "Law No 32 For The Year 1992: Political Parties Law," pp. 331-335, Jordan's Diary, Article 6f and Article 19. The MB claimed that they were not a political party but a world-wide Islamic movement based on the teaching of Egyptian scholar and the founder of the brotherhood in Egypt, Hassan al-Banna, and therefore the law was not applicable to them.
106. The Star, June 24, 1993.
107. The Star, June 24, 1993.
108. The Star, June 24, 1993.
109. Hamzah Mansour, interview with author.
110. Francesca Ciriaci, "Muslim Brotherhood continues to expand popular appeal despite setbacks," Jordan Times, April 16-17, 1998.
111. According to Article 46B of "Law No. 22 For the Year 1986: Law of Election to the House of Deputies," "The voter shall write the names of the candidates he wishes to elect on the Ballot Paper given to him by the Chairman of the Balloting Paper and shall return to the Ballot Box to deposit the Ballot Paper therein . . ." The Article 2B of the "Law Amending the Law of Election to the House of Deputies for the Year 1993" stated that The voter shall write the name of the Candidate he wishes to elect on the Ballot paper given to him by the Chairman of the Balloting Panel and shall return to the Ballot box to deposit the Ballot Paper therein." See Jordan Diary, pp. 335-352. This law thus ended the previous voting system, whereby voters were entitled to as many votes as the number of parliamentary seats allocated for their district.
112. Interview with author.
113. See Hourani and Abu-Rumman, The Democratic Process in Jordan, pp. 105-106. Hamzeh Mansour criticized the government on the undemocratic nature of the law. He said, in America, everybody has representation, everybody is equal in the election process. In Jordan, there is no proper criterion for dispensing that equality. What we have here is something like that every 20,000 people have the same representation as every 100,000. Districts with 100,000 and 20,000 are treated the same and are represented equally. If people in Jordan are all equal, then why do we have quotas for Circassians, Christians, the Bedouins? If we are going to have quota, why should it not be proportional to their population? Presently, eleven percent of the parliamentary seats are reserved for Christian minorities, while they constitute only three percent of the total population.
114. For an interesting commentary on this law see Rami G. Khouri, "State and press: mutual irresponsibility on the dizzying road to Arab liberalism," Jordan Times, October 21, 1997.
115. According to Hamzeh Abbas Mansour, a member of the IAFP's Executive Bureau, "the idea of one-person, one-vote was formed and implemented under the influence of the United States. There was a commonality of purpose between Jordanian and American governments to combat Islamic movement. The government has in the past disturbed and disorganized the IAFP's electoral campaigns." Interview with author (spring 1996). Many other leading members of the MB and IAFP's shared Mansour's assessment.
116. Pro-boycott groups released a "national salvation plan" for political, social, and economic reforms. They opposed the Arab-Israeli peace process, insisted on the abolition of the one-person, one-vote law, and demanded the total independence of the judiciary from the executive branch of the government. Jordan Times, October 21, 1997, p. 3.
117. Why does the Muslim Brotherhood boycott the 1997 parliamentary elections: A statement to the people (Amman, Jordan: Muslim Brotherhood Headquarters, July 13, 1997). The pragmatic nature of this statement is even more evident, considering that although the MB fiercely opposed the 1994 peace treaty with Israel, its leadership did not include its abrogation among the conditions to participate in the elections (see Ciriaci, "Muslim Brotherhood," Jordan Times, April 16-17, 1998).
118. I argue that these issues have been invariant features of ideological conflicts in several Islamic countries since the second part of the nineteenth century. They are not limited to Jordan, and certainly some of these issues featured more prominently in some context than another.
119. In Islamic orthodoxy, after the solidification of the methodology of the Islamic jurisprudence into four schools of thoughts (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali), the gate of ijtihad (independent reasoning) was considered closed in Islam and all jurisprudents were instructed to follow the rulings of one of these schools.
120. Ishaq Farhan, interview with author.
121. Interview with author (April 1997).
122. Ishaq Farhan, interview with author.
123. Ishaq Farhan, interview with author.
124. Author's interview of Thunibat.
125. For the Muslim Brotherhood the Palestine problem was central. It has described the Jews as "dishonest," "the defiler of the prophets," "liars," "God;s adversaries," "corrupt," and a "deadly enemy" (Sami al-Khazendar, Jordan and the Palestine Question: The Role of Islamic and Left Forces in Foreign Policy-Making, Berkshire, UK: Ithaca Press, 1997, p. 139).
126. According to Musa Kilani, the turning point in the MB was 1948, when Hajj Amin visited al-Banna and told him that they were losing Jerusalem to be the capital of a new state called Israel. Banna mobilized his followers to collect money and arms to sent to Palestine to fight Zionism. Interview with author. Some of the general goals of the Islamic Action Front Party includes "the preparation of the nation for armed conflict (Jihad) against the Zionist and imperialist enemies. . . . Exerting efforts toward achieving national unity and liberty as well as confronting imperialist and foreign influence" (Hourani et al., Islamic Action Front Party, p. 30).
127. Anti-American attitudes and distrust of the U.S. permeated virtually all levels and tendencies in the MB. Akailah believed that foreign powers would not allow the formation of an Islamic state. Hamza Mansour went even a step further by arguing that the government implemented one-person, one-vote law as a result of an order from the U.S. (interview with author).
128. For example, Uwaideh indicated that "as for the way in which we approach the West and the need to change our style in addressing the West, I think that this is a very good idea and I am wholly for it." See Hourani and Abu-Rumman, The Democratic Process in Jordan, p. 354.
129. This conception is prevalent among the "hawks" wings of the MB. Hamam Said advanced a traditionalist and literal interpretation of gender relations in Islam when he simply reiterated the Quranic verse that al-mar'u qavvamuna il-an-nissa' [men have authority over women] (interview with author).
130. Cited in Lisa Taraki, "Jordanian Islamists and the Agenda for Women: Between Discourse and Practice," Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 32, no. 1 (January 1996), p. 144.
131. Cited in Taraki, "Jordanian Islamists," p. 145.
132. Toujan Faisal, a leading Jordanian woman activist and former member of parliament, got herself into a serious trouble when she sarcastically said that if have more than one wife was good for men, why not having more than one husband for women. The Islamic groups raised in anger and charged her with apostasy. With the late King's intervention, her case was thrown out of court. "I was totally misunderstood," she said. "I am against polygamy. It is like a kind of disease. More than one wife or husband is sickness. In Islam, it is forbidden. The Islamic groups did not like me saying that polygamy is prostitution." Interview with author.
133. Cited in Hourani, et al. Islamic Action Front Party, p. 32.
134. Hourani, et al. Islamic Action Front Party, p. 21.
135. Thunibat stressed that women were barred to protect them from being harassed by the state's security forces. Interview with author (spring 2000).
136. Hourani and Abu-Rumman, The Democratic Process in Jordan, p. 318.
137. Hourani and Abu-Rumman, The Democratic Process in Jordan, p. 323.
138. Hourani and Abu-Rumman, The Democratic Process in Jordan, p. 323.
139. Thunibat, interview with author, April 1998.
140. Ishaq Farhan, interview with author.
141. See Raphael Patai, The Kingdom of Jordan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 230.
142. It is not only the Brothers who have taken democracy seriously. Virtually all opposition parties are demanding the government's adherence to the National Charter and transparency.
143. See Roger Finke and Rodney Stark, "Religious Economies and Sacred Canopies," American Sociological Review, 53 (1988): 41-49,
144. "Evaluating the Evidence: Religious Economies and Sacred Canopies," American Sociological Review 54 (1989): 1054-1056;
145. and Roger Finke and Rodney Stark, "Religious Choice and Competition: A Reply to Olson," American Sociological Review, 63, 5 (1998): 761-66;
146. L. R. Iannaccone, "The Consequences of Religious Market Structure: Adam Smith and the Economics of Religion," Rationality Sociology, 3. 2(1991): 156-77;
147. and William Sim Bainbridge, "Social Influence and Religious Pluralism," Advanced in Group Processes, vol. 12 (1995), pp. 1-18, JAI Press.
148. And for an excellent overview of recent theoretical development in the sociology of religion, see Darren E. Sherkat and Christopher G. Ellison, "Recent Developments and Current Controversies in the Sociology of Religion," Annual Review of Sociology, 25 (1999): 363-94.