Crowd out or crowd in?: The effects of commom interest developments on political participation in California

Annals of Regional Science

Volumn 37, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 203-234

  Gordon, Tracy M ^a  

^a PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION; ELECTION; POLITICAL PARTICIPATION; VOTING BEHAVIOR;

UNITED STATES;

EID: 0038605848     PISSN: 05701864     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001680300147     Document Type: Article

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