Sequential contests

Public Choice

Volumn 116, Issue 1-2, 2003, Pages 1-18

  Morgan, John ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038463688     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1024252514806     Document Type: Review

References (13)

1. Amegashie, J. (1999). The design of rent-seeking competitions: Committees, preliminary, and final contests. Public Choice 99: 63-76.
2. Baik, K. and Shogren, J. (1992). Strategic behavior in contests: Comment. American Economic Review 82: 359-362.
3. Corcoran, W. and Karels, G. (1985). Rent-seeking behavior in the long-run. Public Choice 46: 227-246.
4. Clark, D. and Riis, C. (1998). Contest success functions: An extension. Economic Theory 11: 201-204.
5. Dixit, A. (1987). Strategic behavior in contests. American Economic Review 77: 891-898.
6. Gradstein, M. (1998). Optimal contest design: Volume and timing of rent seeking in contests. European Journal of Political Economy forthcoming.
7. Gradstein, M. and Konrad, K. (1999). Orchestrating rent seeking contests. Economic Journal 109: 536-545.
8. Johnson, P. (1996). Corporate political offices in rent-seeking society. Public Choice 88: 309-331.
9. Leininger, W. (1993). More efficient rent-seeking A Münchhausen solution. Public Choice 75: 433-462.
10. Michaels, R. (1988). The design of rent-seeking competition. Public Choice 56: 17-29.
11. Nitzan, S. (1994). Modeling rent seeking contests. European Journal of Political Economy 10: 41-60.
12. Skaperdas, S. (1996). Contest success functions. Economic Theory 7: 283-290.
13. Tullock, G. (1980). Efficient rent-seeking. In J.M. Buchanan et al. (Eds.), Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society, College Station: Texas A&M Press.