Holdups, simple contracts and information acquisition

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 42, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 549-560

  Zhu, Tian ^a  

^a HONG KONG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

D23; D82; Holdups; Incomplete contract; Information acquisition; L22; Simple contract; Specific investment

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038269732     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00103-7     Document Type: Article

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