To fight or not to fight? An analysis of submission, struggle, and the design of contests

Public Choice

Volumn 88, Issue 3-4, 1996, Pages 381-392

  Körber, Achim ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 23544449540     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/bf00153239     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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3. Dasgupta, P. and Stiglitz, J. (1980). Industrial structure and the nature of innovative activity. Economic Journal 90: 266-293.
4. Dasgupta, P. (1986). The theory of technological competition. In J.E. Stiglitz and G.F. Mathewson (Eds.), New developments in the analysis of market structure, 519-547. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
5. Dixit, A. (1987). Strategic behavior in contests. American Economic Review 77: 891-898.
6. Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J. (1993). Game theory, 3rd print, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
7. Gialloretto, (1989). Selective regulation: A trend of the '90s. The Avmark Aviation Economist Dec. 1989: 15-17.
8. Hillman, A.L. and Riley, J.G. (1989). Politically contestable rents and transfers. Economics and Politics 1: 17-39.
9. Hillman, A.L. and Samet, D. (1987). Dissipation of contestable rents by a small number of contenders. Public Choice 54: 63-82.
10. Hirshleifer, J. (1989). Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success. Public Choice 63: 101-112.