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Volumn 157, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 487-498

Group contracting and enforcement

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords


EID: 0035528338     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1628/0932456012974549     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (6)

References (14)
  • 1
    • 0343384268 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • On the design of a credit agreement with peer monitoring
    • ARMENDARIZ DE AGHION, B. [1999], "On the Design of a Credit Agreement with Peer Monitoring," Journal of Development Economics, 60, 79-104.
    • (1999) Journal of Development Economics , vol.60 , pp. 79-104
    • De Armendariz Aghion, B.1
  • 2
    • 0003231024 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Peer group formation in an adverse selection model
    • - AND C. GOLLIER [2000], "Peer Group Formation in an Adverse Selection Model," The Economic Journal, 110, 632-643.
    • (2000) The Economic Journal , vol.110 , pp. 632-643
    • Gollier, C.1
  • 3
    • 0029482618 scopus 로고
    • Group lending, repayment incentives, and social collateral
    • BESLEY, T., AND S. COATE [1995], "Group Lending, Repayment Incentives, and Social Collateral," Journal of Development Economics, 46, 1-18.
    • (1995) Journal of Development Economics , vol.46 , pp. 1-18
    • Besley, T.1    Coate, S.2
  • 4
    • 0004128192 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Working Paper, Center for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford, Oxford
    • FAFCHAMPS, M., AND B. MINTEN [1999], "Property Rights in a Flea Market Economy," Working Paper, Center for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford, Oxford.
    • (1999) Property Rights in a Flea Market Economy
    • Fafchamps, M.1    Minten, B.2
  • 5
    • 6244247321 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Screening by the company you keep: Joint liability lending and the peer selection effect
    • GHATAK, M. [2000], "Screening by the Company you Keep: Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect," The Economic Journal, 110, 601-631.
    • (2000) The Economic Journal , vol.110 , pp. 601-631
    • Ghatak, M.1
  • 6
    • 0033371874 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The economics of lending with joint liability: Theory and practice
    • - AND T. GUINNANE [1999], "The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability: Theory and Practice," Journal of Development Economics, 60, 195-228.
    • (1999) Journal of Development Economics , vol.60 , pp. 195-228
    • Guinnane, T.1
  • 7
    • 0342384713 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Working Paper, Institut d'Economie Industrielle, University of Toulouse I, Toulouse, France
    • LAFFONT, J. J. [1999], "Collusion and Group Lending with Adverse Selection," Working Paper, Institut d'Economie Industrielle, University of Toulouse I, Toulouse, France.
    • (1999) Collusion and Group Lending with Adverse Selection
    • Laffont, J.J.1
  • 9
    • 33750373625 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Working Paper, Atelier de Recherche Quantitative Appliquée aux Développement Economique, University of Toulouse I, Toulouse, France
    • - AND M. MELEU [2000], "Enforcement of Contracts with Adverse Selection in LDCs," Working Paper, Atelier de Recherche Quantitative Appliquée aux Développement Economique, University of Toulouse I, Toulouse, France.
    • (2000) Enforcement of Contracts with Adverse Selection in LDCs
    • Meleu, M.1
  • 10
    • 0034088210 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Group lending with adverse selection
    • - AND T. N'GUESSAN [2000], "Group Lending with Adverse Selection," European Economic Review, 44, 773-784.
    • (2000) European Economic Review , vol.44 , pp. 773-784
    • N'Guessan, T.1
  • 11
    • 0007236514 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Working Paper, Institut d'Economie Industrielle, University of Toulouse I, Toulouse, France
    • - AND P. REY [2000], "Collusion and Group Lending with Moral Hazard," Working Paper, Institut d'Economie Industrielle, University of Toulouse I, Toulouse, France.
    • (2000) Collusion and Group Lending with Moral Hazard
    • Rey, P.1
  • 12
    • 0004104785 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Working Paper, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
    • RAI, A., AND T. SJÖSTRÖM [2000], "Efficient Lending in Village Economies," Working Paper, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.
    • (2000) Efficient Lending in Village Economies
    • Rai, A.1    Sjöström, T.2
  • 13
    • 0025662698 scopus 로고
    • Peer monitoring and credit markets
    • STIGLITZ, J. [1990], "Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets," World Bank Economic Review, 4, 351-366.
    • (1990) World Bank Economic Review , vol.4 , pp. 351-366
    • Stiglitz, J.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.