Ruminations on challenges to prediction with rational choice models

Rationality and Society

Volumn 15, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 136-147

  De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Applied models; Bounded rationality; Common conjectures; Common knowledge; Game theory; Multiple equilibria; Prediction; Preference aggregation; Social choice theory; Spatial models

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037282054     PISSN: 10434631     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1043463103015001076     Document Type: Article

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