Optimal contracts when enforcement is a decision variable: A reply

Econometrica

Volumn 71, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 391-393

  Krasa, Stefan ^a   Villamil, Anne P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SIMULATION; DECISION THEORY; INVESTMENTS; OPTIMIZATION; RANDOM PROCESSES;

COSTLY STATE VERIFICATION MODEL; DEBT CONTRACT; INVESTMENT PROJECTS; OPTIMAL CONTRACTS; PROJECT RETURN; STOCHASTIC MONITORING;

CONTRACTS;

EID: 0037276036     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00404     Document Type: Note

References (6)

1. Gale, D., and M. Hellwig (1985): "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One Period Problem," Review of Economic Studies, 52, 647-663.
2. Krasa, S., and A. P. Villamil (2000): "Optimal Contracts When Enforcement is a Decision Variable," Econometrica, 68, 119-134.
3. Mookherjee, D., and I. Png (1989): "Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 399-415.
4. Sharma, T. (2002): "Optimal Contracts When Enforcements is a Decision Variable: A Comment," Econometrica, 71, 387-390.
5. Townsend, R. M. (1979). "Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State Verification," Journal of Economic Theory, 21, 1-29.
6. Williamson, S. (1986): "Costly Monitoring, Financial Intermediation, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing," Journal of Monetary Economics, 18, 159-179.