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Volumn 71, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 387-390

Optimal contracts when enforcement is a decision variable: A comment

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SIMULATION; DECISION THEORY; ECONOMICS; FINANCE; INVESTMENTS; OPTIMIZATION; PARETO PRINCIPLE; PROBLEM SOLVING;

EID: 0037273293     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00403     Document Type: Note
Times cited : (6)

References (3)
  • 1
    • 0000110106 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Optimal contracts when enforcement is a decision variable
    • Krasa, S., and A. Villamil (2000): "Optimal Contracts When Enforcement is a Decision Variable," Econometrica, 60, 119-134.
    • (2000) Econometrica , vol.60 , pp. 119-134
    • Krasa, S.1    Villamil, A.2
  • 2
    • 0009424011 scopus 로고
    • Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
    • Townsend, R. M. (1979) "Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State Verification," Journal of Economic Theory, 21, 1-29.
    • (1979) Journal of Economic Theory , vol.21 , pp. 1-29
    • Townsend, R.M.1
  • 3
    • 4243476045 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Optimal renegotiation-proof debt contracts
    • Working Paper, CIE, ITAM
    • Sharma, T. (2000): "Optimal Renegotiation-proof Debt Contracts," Working Paper, CIE, ITAM.
    • Sharma, T.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.