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Volumn 71, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 387-390
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Optimal contracts when enforcement is a decision variable: A comment
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Author keywords
[No Author keywords available]
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Indexed keywords
COMPUTER SIMULATION;
DECISION THEORY;
ECONOMICS;
FINANCE;
INVESTMENTS;
OPTIMIZATION;
PARETO PRINCIPLE;
PROBLEM SOLVING;
COSTLY ENFORCEMENT;
COSTLY STATE VERIFICATION MODELS;
DECISION VARIABLE;
MOST PREFERRED SIMPLE DEBT CONTRACT;
OPTIMAL CONTRACTS;
PERFECT BAYESIAN NASH EQUILIBRIUM;
CONTRACTS;
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EID: 0037273293
PISSN: 00129682
EISSN: None
Source Type: Journal
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00403 Document Type: Note |
Times cited : (6)
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References (3)
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