Selection effects and world politics research

International Interactions

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 1-3

  Reed, William ^a  

^a RICE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036991026     PISSN: 03050629     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/03050620210392     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. Achen, Christopher H., and Duncan Snidal (1989). "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies." World Politics, Vol. 41, pp. 143-169.
2. Fearon, James D. (1994). "Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model." Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 38(2), pp. 236-269.
3. Gartner, Scott Sigmund, and Randolph M. Siverson (1996). "War Expansion and War Outcome." Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 40(1), pp. 4-15.
4. Morrow, James D. (1989). "Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining." American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, pp. 941-972.
5. Reed, William (2000). "A Unified Statistical Model of Conflict Onset and Escalation." American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, pp. 84-93.
6. Reed, William, and David H. Clark (2000). "War Initiators and War Winners: The Consequences of Linking Theories of Democratic War Success." Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 44(3), pp. 378-395.
7. Signornio, Curtis (1998). "Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict." American Political Science Review, Vol. 93(2), pp. 279-298.
8. Smith, Alastair (1996). "To Intervene or Not to Intervene: A Biased Decision." Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 40, pp. 16-40.
9. Smith, Alastair (1998). "A Summary of Political Selection: The Effect of Strategic Choice of the Escalation of International Crises." American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 42, pp. 698-701.