Independent safety controls with moral hazard

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 158, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 408-419

  Feess, Eberhard ^a   Nell, Martin ^a  

^a RWTH AACHEN UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036756517     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1628/0932456022975303     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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