Safety regulation and monitor liability

Review of Economic Design

Volumn 7, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 173-185

  Feess, Eberhard ^a   Hege, Ulrich ^b  

^a RWTH AACHEN UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b HEC PARIS   (France)

Author keywords

Bayesian mechanism; Multiple monitors; Safety regulation

Indexed keywords

EID: 48249111446     PISSN: 14344742     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s100580200075     Document Type: Article

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