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Journal of Economic Theory
Volumn 90, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 39-61
Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with One Public Good
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EID: 0003073208     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2579     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (32)
References (17)
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    • Berga, D.1
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    • (1998) J. Econ. Theory , vol.78 , pp. 157-166
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.