Generating random weak orders and the probability of a Condorcet winner

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 19, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 517-532

  Maassen, Hans ^a   Bezembinder, Thom ^b  

^a RADBOUD UNIVERSITY NIJMEGEN   (Netherlands)

^b RADBOUD UNIVERSITY NIJMEGEN   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036629396     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550100129     Document Type: Article

References (26)

1. Bailey RW (1998) The number of weak orderings of a finite set. Soc Choice Welfare 15:559-562
2. Black D (1971) The theory of committees and elections. University Press, Cambridge
3. Barthelemy JP (1980) An asymptotic equivalent for the number of total preorders on a finite set. Discrete Math 29:311-313
4. Condorcet M de. (1785) Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité des decisions rendues à la pluralités des voix. In: Condorcet (1986)
5. Condorcet M de (1789) Sur la forme des élections. In: Condorcet (1986)
6. Condorcet M de (1986) Sur les élections et autres textes. Librairie Arthème Fayard, Paris
7. DeMeyer F, Plott CR (1970) The probability of a cyclical majority. Econometrica 38: 345-354
8. Fishburn PC (1973) The theory of social choice. University Press, Princeton
9. Fishburn PC, Gehrlein WV, Maskin E (1979) Condorcet proportions and Kelly's conjectures. Discrete Appl Math 1:229-252
10. Garman MB., Kamien MI (1968) The paradox of voting: Probability calculations. Behav Sci 13:306-316
11. Gehrlein WV, Fishburn PC (1976) The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution. J Econ Theory 13:14-25
12. Gehrlein WV (1983) Condorcet's paradox. Theory Decision 15:161-197
13. Gillett R (1977) Collective indecision. Behav Sci 22:383-390
14. Jones B, Radcliff B, Taber C, Timpone R (1995) Condorcet winners and the paradox of voting: probability calculations for weak preference orders. Amer J Polit Sci Rev 89:137-144
15. Kelly JS (1987) Social choice theory: An introduction. Springer, Berlin Heidelberg New York
16. Krantz DH, Luce RD, Suppes P, Tversky A (1971) Foundations of measurement, vol. 1. Academic Press, New York
17. May RM (1971) Some mathematical remarks on the paradox of voting. Behav Sci 16: 143-151
18. Michell J (1990) An introduction to the theory of psychological measurement. Erlbaum, Hillsdale
19. Niemi RG, Weisberg HF (1968) A mathematical solution for the probability of the paradox of voting. Behav Sci 13:317-323
20. Riker WH (1961) Voting and the summation of preferences: an interpretive bibliographical review of selected developments during the last decade. Amer Polit Sci Rev 55:900-911
21. Roberts FS (1979) Measurement theory: with applications to decision making, utility, and the social sciences. Addison-Wesley, Reading
22. Sen A (1970) Collective choice and social welfare. Holden-Day, San Francisco
23. Timpone RJ, Taber CS (1998) Analytic and algorithmic analyses of Condorcet's paradox - variations on a classical theme. Soc Sci Computer Rev 16:72-95
24. Young HP (1988) Condorcet's theory of voting. Amer Polit Sci Rev 82:1231-1244
25. Van Deemen AMA (1997) Coalition formation and social choice. Kluwer, Boston
26. Van Deemen AMA (1999) The probability of the paradox of voting for weak preference orderings. Soc Choice Welfare 16:171-182