Analysing Terrorism and Counter-terrorism: A Communication Model

Terrorism and Political Violence

Volumn 14, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 77-122

  Crelinsten, Ronald D ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0036389836     PISSN: 09546553     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/714005618     Document Type: Article

References (91)

1. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments that stimulated me to strengthen and clarify some of my arguments. This also gave me the opportunity to update the article to include references to the attacks of 11 September 2001 and some of the subsequent developments in the counter-terrorism response that helped to illustrate some aspects of the model presented here.
2. I am currently working on expanding this model to include economic and environmental activity as well.
3. For earlier versions of this model, see Ronald D. Crelinsten, 'Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Democracy: The Assessment of National Security Threats', Terrorism and Political Violence 1/2 (1989) pp.242-69; 'Terrorism as Political Communication: The Relationship Between the Controller and the Controlled' in Paul Wilkinson and A. M. Stewart (eds.), Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen: U. of Aberdeen Press 1987), pp.3-23.
4. For earlier versions of this model, see Ronald D. Crelinsten, 'Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Democracy: The Assessment of National Security Threats', Terrorism and Political Violence 1/2 (1989) pp.242-69; 'Terrorism as Political Communication: The Relationship Between the Controller and the Controlled' in Paul Wilkinson and A. M. Stewart (eds.), Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen: U. of Aberdeen Press 1987), pp.3-23.
5. The distinction between controller and controlled is not clear-cut, especially in an era of partnership between government, the private sector and society at large. There can also be movement between the top and the bottom, whereby people leave government (move down) or join government (move up). At the social end of the spectrum, as we shall see, controllers are not in government, per se, nor are they necessarily part of state agencies, but they perform a control function nonetheless.
6. For more on the issue of democratic acceptability and human rights in the area of counter-terrorism, see the special issue of Australian Journal of Politics and History 44/3 (1998) edited by April Carter and Peter Chalk, entitled 'Threats to Liberal Democracy', especially Fernando Reinares, 'Democratic Regimes, Internal Security Policy and the Threat of Terrorism', pp.351-71; Peter Chalk, 'The Response to Terrorism as a Threat to Liberal Democracy', pp.373-88; and Ronald D. Crelinsten, 'The Discourse and Practice of Counter-terrorism in Liberal Democracies', pp.389-413. See also Ronald D. Crelinsten and Iffet Özkut, 'Counter-terrorism Policy in Fortress Europe: Implications for Human Rights', in Fernando Reinares (ed.), European Democracies Against Terrorism (Aldershot: Ashgate 2000) pp.245-70.
7. For more on the issue of democratic acceptability and human rights in the area of counter-terrorism, see the special issue of Australian Journal of Politics and History 44/3 (1998) edited by April Carter and Peter Chalk, entitled 'Threats to Liberal Democracy', especially Fernando Reinares, 'Democratic Regimes, Internal Security Policy and the Threat of Terrorism', pp.351-71; Peter Chalk, 'The Response to Terrorism as a Threat to Liberal Democracy', pp.373-88; and Ronald D. Crelinsten, 'The Discourse and Practice of Counter-terrorism in Liberal Democracies', pp.389-413. See also Ronald D. Crelinsten and Iffet Özkut, 'Counter-terrorism Policy in Fortress Europe: Implications for Human Rights', in Fernando Reinares (ed.), European Democracies Against Terrorism (Aldershot: Ashgate 2000) pp.245-70.
8. For more on the issue of democratic acceptability and human rights in the area of counter-terrorism, see the special issue of Australian Journal of Politics and History 44/3 (1998) edited by April Carter and Peter Chalk, entitled 'Threats to Liberal Democracy', especially Fernando Reinares, 'Democratic Regimes, Internal Security Policy and the Threat of Terrorism', pp.351-71; Peter Chalk, 'The Response to Terrorism as a Threat to Liberal Democracy', pp.373-88; and Ronald D. Crelinsten, 'The Discourse and Practice of Counter-terrorism in Liberal Democracies', pp.389-413. See also Ronald D. Crelinsten and Iffet Özkut, 'Counter-terrorism Policy in Fortress Europe: Implications for Human Rights', in Fernando Reinares (ed.), European Democracies Against Terrorism (Aldershot: Ashgate 2000) pp.245-70.
9. For more on the issue of democratic acceptability and human rights in the area of counter-terrorism, see the special issue of Australian Journal of Politics and History 44/3 (1998) edited by April Carter and Peter Chalk, entitled 'Threats to Liberal Democracy', especially Fernando Reinares, 'Democratic Regimes, Internal Security Policy and the Threat of Terrorism', pp.351-71; Peter Chalk, 'The Response to Terrorism as a Threat to Liberal Democracy', pp.373-88; and Ronald D. Crelinsten, 'The Discourse and Practice of Counter-terrorism in Liberal Democracies', pp.389-413. See also Ronald D. Crelinsten and Iffet Özkut, 'Counter-terrorism Policy in Fortress Europe: Implications for Human Rights', in Fernando Reinares (ed.), European Democracies Against Terrorism (Aldershot: Ashgate 2000) pp.245-70.
10. For more on the issue of democratic acceptability and human rights in the area of counter-terrorism, see the special issue of Australian Journal of Politics and History 44/3 (1998) edited by April Carter and Peter Chalk, entitled 'Threats to Liberal Democracy', especially Fernando Reinares, 'Democratic Regimes, Internal Security Policy and the Threat of Terrorism', pp.351-71; Peter Chalk, 'The Response to Terrorism as a Threat to Liberal Democracy', pp.373-88; and Ronald D. Crelinsten, 'The Discourse and Practice of Counter-terrorism in Liberal Democracies', pp.389-413. See also Ronald D. Crelinsten and Iffet Özkut, 'Counter-terrorism Policy in Fortress Europe: Implications for Human Rights', in Fernando Reinares (ed.), European Democracies Against Terrorism (Aldershot: Ashgate 2000) pp.245-70.
11. For more on the issue of legitimacy and counter-terrorism, see Crelinsten, 'Terrorism as Political Communication' (note 3); Crelinsten and Özkut, 'Counter-terrorism Policy in Fortress Europe' (note 5); and Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid, 'Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet', in Alex P. Schmid and Ronald D. Crelinsten (eds.), Western Responses to Terrorism (London: Frank Cass 1993), pp.307-40.
12. For more on the issue of legitimacy and counter-terrorism, see Crelinsten, 'Terrorism as Political Communication' (note 3); Crelinsten and Özkut, 'Counter-terrorism Policy in Fortress Europe' (note 5); and Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid, 'Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet', in Alex P. Schmid and Ronald D. Crelinsten (eds.), Western Responses to Terrorism (London: Frank Cass 1993), pp.307-40.
13. For more on the issue of legitimacy and counter-terrorism, see Crelinsten, 'Terrorism as Political Communication' (note 3); Crelinsten and Özkut, 'Counter-terrorism Policy in Fortress Europe' (note 5); and Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid, 'Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet', in Alex P. Schmid and Ronald D. Crelinsten (eds.), Western Responses to Terrorism (London: Frank Cass 1993), pp.307-40.
14. David Garland, Punishment and Modern Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1990), p.283.
15. Elsewhere, I have argued that if terrorists ever did engage in mass-casualty terrorism, the response would be unprecedented in scale and magnitude. The response to the attacks of 11 September has proven me right. While I also argued that it was unlikely that terrorists would resort to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the events of 11 September and subsequent discoveries concerning al-Qaeda's research into chemical and biological weapons have proved me wrong on this point. While I may have been technically correct, in that the 11 September attacks did not make use of WMD as traditionally conceived, the combination of plane hijackings and suicide attacks, whereby large quantities of jet fuel turned the hijacked planes into quasi-superbombs, can be considered an innovative form of WMD attack. See Ronald D. Crelinsten, 'Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in a Multi-Centric World: Challenges and Opportunities', Terrorism and Political Violence 11/4 (Winter 1999), pp.170-96.
16. For more on this balance, see Crelinsten and Schmid, 'Western Responses to Terrorism' (note 6).
17. See Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid (eds.), The Politics of Pain: Torturers and Their Masters (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1995).
18. Crelinsten, 'The Discourse and Practice of Counter-terrorism' (note 5).
19. For more on the relationship between terrorism and the mass media, see Ronald D. Crelinsten, 'Terrorism and the Media: Problems, Solutions and Counter-problems', Political Communication and Persuasion 6 (1989), pp.311-39. See also David L. Paletz and Alex P. Schmid (eds.), Perspectives on Terrorism and the Media (Newbury Park, CA: Sage 1992).
20. For more on the relationship between terrorism and the mass media, see Ronald D. Crelinsten, 'Terrorism and the Media: Problems, Solutions and Counter-problems', Political Communication and Persuasion 6 (1989), pp.311-39. See also David L. Paletz and Alex P. Schmid (eds.), Perspectives on Terrorism and the Media (Newbury Park, CA: Sage 1992).
21. Of course, even traditional warfare has its terroristic component, such as the bombing of cities during World War II. The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were also indiscriminate bombings aimed specifically at the civilian population in order to coerce the Japanese government and its people to sue for peace. What makes them terroristic is primarily this indiscriminate targeting of non-combatants. For a similar view, see Peter Alan Sproat, 'Can the State Commit Acts of Terrorism?: An Opinion and Some Qualitative Replies to a Questionnaire', Terrorism and Political Violence 9/4 (Winter 1997), pp.117-50, at p.126, although Sproat insists on differentiating between acts of war and acts of terrorism, without admitting that the two can blur into one another as in the case cited here. This is why the concept of grey zones and a graded spectrum or continuum of phenomena seems a more heuristic analytic tool.
22. John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini use the term 'netwar' to encompass the wide range of cyber-activities conducted by hackers, terrorists and social activists. They use the term 'social netwar' to describe the internet activity of the Mexican Zapatistas. See John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini, 'Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism', in Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini, Countering the New Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, Project Air Force 1999), pp.39-84. This terminology also introduces definitional problems, since the term 'war' is clearly inappropriate in cases of international protest and social activism. Terms such as 'netactivism' - I've also seen the term 'hacktivism' used - or 'netprotest' would be more accurate. In fact, a cyber-version of Figure 1 would simply prefix all terms in the model with 'cyber' or 'net'. For an informative discussion of which, why and how terrorists would use the internet, see Lorenzo Valeri and Michael Knights, 'Affecting Trust: Terrorism, Internet and Offensive Information Warfare', Terrorism and Political Violence 12/1 (Spring 2000), pp.15-36.
23. John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini use the term 'netwar' to encompass the wide range of cyber-activities conducted by hackers, terrorists and social activists. They use the term 'social netwar' to describe the internet activity of the Mexican Zapatistas. See John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini, 'Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism', in Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini, Countering the New Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, Project Air Force 1999), pp.39-84. This terminology also introduces definitional problems, since the term 'war' is clearly inappropriate in cases of international protest and social activism. Terms such as 'netactivism' - I've also seen the term 'hacktivism' used - or 'netprotest' would be more accurate. In fact, a cyber-version of Figure 1 would simply prefix all terms in the model with 'cyber' or 'net'. For an informative discussion of which, why and how terrorists would use the internet, see Lorenzo Valeri and Michael Knights, 'Affecting Trust: Terrorism, Internet and Offensive Information Warfare', Terrorism and Political Violence 12/1 (Spring 2000), pp.15-36.
24. See Crelinsten, 'The Discourse and Practice of Counter-terrorism', (note 5).
25. See Crelinsten and Schmid, 'Western Responses to Terrorism', pp.333-34 (note 6).
26. Ami Pedahzur and Magnus Ranstorp propose what they call an 'expanded criminal justice model' which, they claim, constitutes a 'tertiary model' that explains 'all those "gray" areas that are so commonly practiced in the war against terrorism yet are not accounted for in either the "war" or the "criminal justice" models' (p.4). This claim suggests a misreading of my model, which in effect maps out exactly all those grey areas (what I call the 'grey zone') by creating a continuum from criminal justice (the criminal justice model) to political justice, to state terrorism, to counter-insurgency and finally to internal war (the war model). As such, what Pedahzur and Ranstorp call an 'expanded criminal justice model' parallels in many ways what I call 'political justice'. But it also includes elements of what I call 'counter-insurgency', including the use of military courts and states of emergency, for example. In fact, many of the provisions they list on pages 10 and 11 from Israel's 1945 security regulations would fall under 'counter-insurgency' in Figure 2. What is interesting and valuable about their approach is their focus on institutionalization of deviations from either of the two traditional models (criminal justice or war), to the point of the emergence of a new 'model', as well as their attempt to identify causal factors in the transitions along the continuum. The fact that they identify a 'politicization factor' to explain in part the transition in Israel from a war to an 'expanded criminal justice model' suggests a close parallel to what I call 'political justice' or the politicization of the criminal justice model. See Ami Pedahzur and Magnus Ranstorp, 'A Tertiary Model for Countering Terrorism in Liberal Democracies: The Case of Israel', Terrorism and Political Violence 13/2 (Summer 2001), pp.1-26.
27. See, for example, NTV-MSNBC (Istanbul), 'Another prison hunger striker dies: 25 prisoners or their supporters have died in the protest against prison reforms', 27 June 2001, NTV-MSNBC, News In English, 〈www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/91111.asp?cpl=l〉. See also Scott Anderson, 'The Hunger Warriors', The New York Times Magazine, 21 Oct. 2001.
28. See, for example, NTV-MSNBC (Istanbul), 'Another prison hunger striker dies: 25 prisoners or their supporters have died in the protest against prison reforms', 27 June 2001, NTV-MSNBC, News In English, 〈www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/91111.asp?cpl=l〉. See also Scott Anderson, 'The Hunger Warriors', The New York Times Magazine, 21 Oct. 2001.
29. A similar phenomenon is occurring in the area of international peacekeeping, whereby military forces perform what is essentially a policing role.
30. The US proposal to use military courts to try foreign nationals suspected of terrorist crimes in the wake of 11 September is so controversial precisely because no formal state of war exists, neither has martial law been invoked. Instead, the proposal was part of a Presidential Executive Order, thereby bypassing debate by legislators in the House and Senate completely - something which would not normally be expected in times of peace. Of course, the US administration did declare 'war' on terrorism even while insisting that the primary aim of this war, including the military campaign in Afghanistan, was to apprehend those responsible for planning and helping in the implementation of the 11 September attacks and 'bringing them to justice'. The blurring and even merging of criminal justice and war goals here is unmistakable and highlights the kind of 'horizontal' interaction that I referred to previously.
31. Former US Senator Joseph R. (Bob) Kerrey used a similar argument in defending his involvement in an alleged massacre by US Navy Seals under his command in Thanh Phong, Vietnam in February 1969. Interviewed by Dan Rather on 60 Minutes, he claimed that civilians were always caught in the middle and that the people (old men, women and children) who were killed were 'at the very least sympathetic to the Viet Cong. And at the very most, were supporting their efforts to kill us.' Cited in CounterPunch, 'The apologia of Christopher Hitchens: Liberals Rush to Defend Democrat War Criminal', 8 May 2001, 〈http://www.counterpunch.org/kerreyhitch.html〉.
32. This kind of protest first achieved widespread attention, though similar protests had occurred earlier, at the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Seattle, Washington, which was held between 29 November and 3 December 1999. The protests then spread to the joint International Monetary Fund/World Bank (IMF/WB) meetings held in Washington, DC in May 2000 and in Prague in September 2000. On 1 May 2000, anti-globalization protests broke out in major cities around the world, including violent clashes in London, Sydney and Berlin. Other venues that experienced mass protests coupled with violence by anarchists and other trouble-makers included the Biotechnology conference, BIO 2000, held in Boston in March 2000, the World Petroleum Congress, held in Calgary in June 2000, the annual World Economic Forum, held in Davos, Switzerland in January 2001, the Summit of the Americas, held in Quebec City in April 2001, the EU Summit, held in Göteborg, Sweden in June 2001 and the G7/G8 summit held in Genoa, Italy in July 2001. At the second to last event, police fired live ammunition at protesters, seriously injuring one person, while at the last event, one Italian protester was shot dead by police. For a radical perspective on the Genoa summit and related violence, see 〈www.undercurrents.org/ g8.htm〉.
33. For an analysis of the anti-globalization movement from an intelligence point of view, see Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), 'Anti-Globalization - A Spreading Phenomenon', Report # 2000/08, Perspectives, 22 Aug. 2000. Available at 〈www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/miscdocs/200008_e.html〉. For a policy-oriented analysis, see Raimo Väyrynen, 'Anti-Globalization Movements at the Cross-Roads', Policy Brief No. 4 (November 2000), The Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame. Available at 〈www.nd.edu/∼krocinst/polbriefs/pbrief4.html〉.
34. For an analysis of the anti-globalization movement from an intelligence point of view, see Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), 'Anti-Globalization - A Spreading Phenomenon', Report # 2000/08, Perspectives, 22 Aug. 2000. Available at 〈www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/miscdocs/200008_e.html〉. For a policy-oriented analysis, see Raimo Väyrynen, 'Anti-Globalization Movements at the Cross-Roads', Policy Brief No. 4 (November 2000), The Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame. Available at 〈www.nd.edu/∼krocinst/polbriefs/pbrief4.html〉.
35. Amusingly, Pedahzur and Ranstorp, citing my work, erroneously reproduce the term 'proactive policing' as 'provocative policing'. This error continues throughout their article. See Pedahzur and Ranstorp, 'A Tertiary Model for Countering Terrorism' (note 17), p.11 et seq. Their mistake is ironically fitting, however, in that proactive policing is indeed 'provocative' in the sense that it is much more conducive to deviations from the rule of law and the genesis of human rights violations than its counterpart, reactive policing. See Crelinsten and Özkut, 'Counter-terrorism Policy in Fortress Europe' (note 5).
36. Amusingly, Pedahzur and Ranstorp, citing my work, erroneously reproduce the term 'proactive policing' as 'provocative policing'. This error continues throughout their article. See Pedahzur and Ranstorp, 'A Tertiary Model for Countering Terrorism' (note 17), p.11 et seq. Their mistake is ironically fitting, however, in that proactive policing is indeed 'provocative' in the sense that it is much more conducive to deviations from the rule of law and the genesis of human rights violations than its counterpart, reactive policing. See Crelinsten and Özkut, 'Counter-terrorism Policy in Fortress Europe' (note 5).
37. This example derives from an actual case described by one of the participants at the 1997 annual meeting of the California Police Chiefs' Association, held in Sacramento.
38. See Gary T. Marx, Undercover: Police Surveillance in America (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1988).
39. In April 2001, the Canadian government tabled a bill that would protect police officers from criminal liability when committing otherwise illegal acts in the course of investigating or infiltrating outlaw organizations, such as those engaged in organized crime. The proposed law would allow police to take illegal action that was 'reasonable and proportional' in relation to the crime being investigated and the circumstances at hand. Some police boards found this 'reasonable and proportional' test too vague: one officer who is writing a Master's thesis on ethics in police undercover operations found the test 'complicated and highly subjective and thus open to challenge'. See Jim Bronskill, 'Even Police Wary of New Powers: Detective Warned Government about Bill Allowing Officers to Break the Law', The Ottawa Citizen, 11 April 2001.
40. Lode Van Outrive, La police grise (The Grey Police). Lecture presented to the Department of Criminology, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada, 21 March 1996.
41. Crelinsten, 'The Discourse and Practice of Counter-terrorism' (note 5). See also Crelinsten and Özkut, 'Counter-terrorism Policy in Fortress Europe' (note 5). As mentioned previously, the policing of immigrants and refugees has become a major issue in the wake of 11 September.
42. Crelinsten, 'The Discourse and Practice of Counter-terrorism' (note 5). See also Crelinsten and Özkut, 'Counter-terrorism Policy in Fortress Europe' (note 5). As mentioned previously, the policing of immigrants and refugees has become a major issue in the wake of 11 September.
43. See Crelinsten, 'Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Democracy' (note 3), pp.254-55.
44. See Laurence Lustgarten and Ian Leigh, In From the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994), Chapter 11, for a more detailed discussion of the kinds of techniques used in prosecutions and trials to balance the rights of the defence with the needs of national security.
45. See Crelinsten, 'The Discourse and Practice of Counter-terrorism' (note 5) for more details.
46. For a classic analysis of this trend, see Edwin M. Schur, The Politics of Deviance: Stigma Contests and the Uses of Power (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1980).
47. For an analysis of Palestinian school textbooks and their role in promoting anti-Jewish, anti-Israel and anti-Western sentiments, see Raphael Israeli, 'Education, Identity, State Building and the Peace Process: Educating Palestinian Children in the Post-Oslo Era', Terrorism and Political Violence 12/1 (Spring 2000), pp.79-94. The issue of education has also arisen in the wake of 11 September, particularly in the context of charges that the Saudi-funded Madrasas (religious schools) throughout the Islamic world are breeding grounds for anti-Western and anti-American sentiment.
48. Ronald D. Crelinsten. 'The Impact of Television on Terrorism and Crisis Situations: Implications for Public Policy', Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 2/2 (1994), pp.61-72; 'Television and Terrorism: Implications for Crisis Management and Policy-Making', Terrorism and Political Violence 9/4 (1997), pp.8-32. More generally, see, for example, Gaye Tuchman, Making News: a Study in the Construction of Reality (New York: Free Press 1978); Stanley Cohen and Jock Young (eds.), The Manufacture of News: Social Problems, Deviance and the Mass Media, revised edition (London: Constable 1981); Richard V. Ericson, Patricia M. Baranek and Janet B.L. Chan, Visualizing Deviance: A Study of News Organizations (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1987); Richard V. Ericson, Patricia M. Baranek and Janet B. L. Chan, Negotiating Control: A Study of News Sources (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1989).
49. Ronald D. Crelinsten. 'The Impact of Television on Terrorism and Crisis Situations: Implications for Public Policy', Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 2/2 (1994), pp.61-72; 'Television and Terrorism: Implications for Crisis Management and Policy-Making', Terrorism and Political Violence 9/4 (1997), pp.8-32. More generally, see, for example, Gaye Tuchman, Making News: a Study in the Construction of Reality (New York: Free Press 1978); Stanley Cohen and Jock Young (eds.), The Manufacture of News: Social Problems, Deviance and the Mass Media, revised edition (London: Constable 1981); Richard V. Ericson, Patricia M. Baranek and Janet B.L. Chan, Visualizing Deviance: A Study of News Organizations (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1987); Richard V. Ericson, Patricia M. Baranek and Janet B. L. Chan, Negotiating Control: A Study of News Sources (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1989).
50. Ronald D. Crelinsten. 'The Impact of Television on Terrorism and Crisis Situations: Implications for Public Policy', Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 2/2 (1994), pp.61-72; 'Television and Terrorism: Implications for Crisis Management and Policy-Making', Terrorism and Political Violence 9/4 (1997), pp.8-32. More generally, see, for example, Gaye Tuchman, Making News: a Study in the Construction of Reality (New York: Free Press 1978); Stanley Cohen and Jock Young (eds.), The Manufacture of News: Social Problems, Deviance and the Mass Media, revised edition (London: Constable 1981); Richard V. Ericson, Patricia M. Baranek and Janet B.L. Chan, Visualizing Deviance: A Study of News Organizations (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1987); Richard V. Ericson, Patricia M. Baranek and Janet B. L. Chan, Negotiating Control: A Study of News Sources (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1989).
51. Ronald D. Crelinsten. 'The Impact of Television on Terrorism and Crisis Situations: Implications for Public Policy', Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 2/2 (1994), pp.61-72; 'Television and Terrorism: Implications for Crisis Management and Policy-Making', Terrorism and Political Violence 9/4 (1997), pp.8-32. More generally, see, for example, Gaye Tuchman, Making News: a Study in the Construction of Reality (New York: Free Press 1978); Stanley Cohen and Jock Young (eds.), The Manufacture of News: Social Problems, Deviance and the Mass Media, revised edition (London: Constable 1981); Richard V. Ericson, Patricia M. Baranek and Janet B.L. Chan, Visualizing Deviance: A Study of News Organizations (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1987); Richard V. Ericson, Patricia M. Baranek and Janet B. L. Chan, Negotiating Control: A Study of News Sources (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1989).
52. Ronald D. Crelinsten. 'The Impact of Television on Terrorism and Crisis Situations: Implications for Public Policy', Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 2/2 (1994), pp.61-72; 'Television and Terrorism: Implications for Crisis Management and Policy-Making', Terrorism and Political Violence 9/4 (1997), pp.8-32. More generally, see, for example, Gaye Tuchman, Making News: a Study in the Construction of Reality (New York: Free Press 1978); Stanley Cohen and Jock Young (eds.), The Manufacture of News: Social Problems, Deviance and the Mass Media, revised edition (London: Constable 1981); Richard V. Ericson, Patricia M. Baranek and Janet B.L. Chan, Visualizing Deviance: A Study of News Organizations (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1987); Richard V. Ericson, Patricia M. Baranek and Janet B. L. Chan, Negotiating Control: A Study of News Sources (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1989).
53. Ronald D. Crelinsten. 'The Impact of Television on Terrorism and Crisis Situations: Implications for Public Policy', Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 2/2 (1994), pp.61-72; 'Television and Terrorism: Implications for Crisis Management and Policy-Making', Terrorism and Political Violence 9/4 (1997), pp.8-32. More generally, see, for example, Gaye Tuchman, Making News: a Study in the Construction of Reality (New York: Free Press 1978); Stanley Cohen and Jock Young (eds.), The Manufacture of News: Social Problems, Deviance and the Mass Media, revised edition (London: Constable 1981); Richard V. Ericson, Patricia M. Baranek and Janet B.L. Chan, Visualizing Deviance: A Study of News Organizations (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1987); Richard V. Ericson, Patricia M. Baranek and Janet B. L. Chan, Negotiating Control: A Study of News Sources (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1989).
54. The term 'state' is of course an ambiguous one, given the fact that the United States uses the term for its subnational governments (states), while the term also refers to 'nation states'. In Figure 4, the term 'state' refers to the subnational usage - equivalent to the term 'province' in other (national) states.
55. Big business can also be the object of social control, particularly government regulation. Expansion of the model to include economic control will address this possibility.
56. Crelinsten, 'The Discourse and Practice of Counter-terrorism' (note 5). For an analysis of how media reports in Western Europe have played a role in promoting moral panics about religious minorities, including vigilante violence against perceived 'cults', see Massimo Introvigne, 'Moral Panics and Anti-Cult Terrorism in Western Europe', Terrorism and Political Violence 12/1 (Spring 2000), pp.47-59.
57. Crelinsten, 'The Discourse and Practice of Counter-terrorism' (note 5). For an analysis of how media reports in Western Europe have played a role in promoting moral panics about religious minorities, including vigilante violence against perceived 'cults', see Massimo Introvigne, 'Moral Panics and Anti-Cult Terrorism in Western Europe', Terrorism and Political Violence 12/1 (Spring 2000), pp.47-59.
58. For more on this communicative complexity, see Crelinsten, 'Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in a Multi-Centric World' (note 8).
59. Crelinsten, 'The Discourse and Practice of Counter-terrorism' (note 5). See also Didier Bigo, 'Security(s): Internal and External, the möbius ribbon', paper presented at the International Studies Association annual meeting, Toronto, 18-22 March 1997; Malcolm Anderson, Monica den Boer, Peter Cullen, William Gilmore, Charles Raab and Neil Walker, Policing the European Union (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1995), esp. Chapter 5, 'The Merging of Internal and External Security', pp.156-80.
60. Crelinsten, 'The Discourse and Practice of Counter-terrorism' (note 5). See also Didier Bigo, 'Security(s): Internal and External, the möbius ribbon', paper presented at the International Studies Association annual meeting, Toronto, 18-22 March 1997; Malcolm Anderson, Monica den Boer, Peter Cullen, William Gilmore, Charles Raab and Neil Walker, Policing the European Union (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1995), esp. Chapter 5, 'The Merging of Internal and External Security', pp.156-80.
61. Crelinsten, 'The Discourse and Practice of Counter-terrorism' (note 5). See also Didier Bigo, 'Security(s): Internal and External, the möbius ribbon', paper presented at the International Studies Association annual meeting, Toronto, 18-22 March 1997; Malcolm Anderson, Monica den Boer, Peter Cullen, William Gilmore, Charles Raab and Neil Walker, Policing the European Union (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1995), esp. Chapter 5, 'The Merging of Internal and External Security', pp.156-80.
62. Crelinsten, 'The Discourse and Practice of Counter-terrorism' (note 5). See also Didier Bigo, 'Security(s): Internal and External, the möbius ribbon', paper presented at the International Studies Association annual meeting, Toronto, 18-22 March 1997; Malcolm Anderson, Monica den Boer, Peter Cullen, William Gilmore, Charles Raab and Neil Walker, Policing the European Union (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1995), esp. Chapter 5, 'The Merging of Internal and External Security', pp.156-80.
63. Bigo, 'Security(s)' (note 40), p.18.
64. See Bigo, 'Security(s)' (note 40), pp.13-18, for a more detailed description of these two kinds of security.
65. See Dennis Pluchinsky, 'Ethnonational Terrorism: Themes and Variations', paper delivered at conference on 'Counter-terrorism: Analytic Methodologies', organized by the US Defense Intelligence Agency and The George Washington University, Washington, DC, November 1997.
66. Trans-governmental relations are interactions between sub-units of governments that are not controlled by the national executives and transnational relations are interactions between non-state actors or international interactions that are not directed by states. Louise Richardson, 'Terrorists as Transnational Actors', Terrorism and Political Violence 11/4 (Winter 1999), pp.209-19, at p.210, citing Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (eds.), Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1970).
67. Trans-governmental relations are interactions between sub-units of governments that are not controlled by the national executives and transnational relations are interactions between non-state actors or international interactions that are not directed by states. Louise Richardson, 'Terrorists as Transnational Actors', Terrorism and Political Violence 11/4 (Winter 1999), pp.209-19, at p.210, citing Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (eds.), Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1970).
68. Crelinsten, 'Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Democracy' (note 3).
69. See Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Across Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1998) for a detailed analysis of such networks and their role in international politics.
70. The international global communications surveillance network, Echelon, that purportedly is shared by the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand and that the European Union, especially France, accuses of being used to benefit industries and corporations in those countries, is an example. See, for example, Steve Gold, 'Criminal charges filed against "Echelon"', Newsbytes News Network, 17 Oct. 2000; Richard Barry and Will Knight, 'France blasts Britain over Echelon: space-based spy system threatens commercial and personal privacy', ZDNet (UK), 15 Oct. 2000.
71. The international global communications surveillance network, Echelon, that purportedly is shared by the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand and that the European Union, especially France, accuses of being used to benefit industries and corporations in those countries, is an example. See, for example, Steve Gold, 'Criminal charges filed against "Echelon"', Newsbytes News Network, 17 Oct. 2000; Richard Barry and Will Knight, 'France blasts Britain over Echelon: space-based spy system threatens commercial and personal privacy', ZDNet (UK), 15 Oct. 2000.
72. The most common scenarios for WMD proliferation involve the former Soviet Union and the danger of nuclear smuggling, whereby state officials might sell weapons or material to transnational terrorist groups, or the fear that disgruntled nuclear scientists might offer their services to rogue states. In both scenarios, there is interaction between state and non-state actors.
73. R. J. Vincent, 'Introduction', in Lawrence Freedman et al., Terrorism and International Order (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1986), pp.1-6, at p.2.
74. W. B. Groves and G. Newman, in their attempt to forge a new direction for criminological inquiry, have suggested that interdisciplinarity, methodological pluralism, theoretical pluralism and multiple levels of analysis are necessary to achieve this goal. See W. B. Groves and G. Newman, 'Criminology and Epistemology: The Case for a Creative Criminology', in D. M. Gottfredson and R. V. Clarke (eds.), Policy and Theory in Criminal Justice (Aldershot: Avebury 1990), pp.91-112. I suggest that their approach also applies to the analysis of terrorism and counter-terrorism. The only difference is that I use the term 'multidisciplinarity' instead of 'interdisciplinarity' in recognition of the difficulty of conducting true interdisciplinary research. It is probably sufficient to be aware of and to apply the lessons from a variety of disciplines without actually integrating all of them, although true interdisciplinary analysis is certainly an ideal worth striving for.
75. For an excellent discussion of analytic methods, and particularly the need to combine quantitative and qualitative approaches in the study of political violence, see Robert W. White, 'Issues in the Study of Political Violence: Understanding the Motives of Participants in Small Group Political Violence', Terrorism and Political Violence 12/1 (Spring 2000), pp.95-108. White focuses in particular on the Northern Ireland conflict and his analytical approach is similar to the one taken here.
76. This issue has already surfaced in the wake of II September 2001, at least in the realm of media discourse, whereby certain commentators on both sides of the political spectrum have raised the issue of whether torture or ill-treatment of detainees who refuse to co-operate with authorities is justifiable, particularly if they are withholding information about further terrorist attacks. See Jonathan Alter, 'Time to Think About Torture', Newsweek, 5 Nov. 2001, p.53; Jim Rutenberg, 'Torture Seeps Into Discussion by News Media', The New York Times, 5 Nov. 2001, available at 〈www.nytimes.com/2001/11/05/business/media/05TORT.html〉.
77. This issue has already surfaced in the wake of II September 2001, at least in the realm of media discourse, whereby certain commentators on both sides of the political spectrum have raised the issue of whether torture or ill-treatment of detainees who refuse to co-operate with authorities is justifiable, particularly if they are withholding information about further terrorist attacks. See Jonathan Alter, 'Time to Think About Torture', Newsweek, 5 Nov. 2001, p.53; Jim Rutenberg, 'Torture Seeps Into Discussion by News Media', The New York Times, 5 Nov. 2001, available at 〈www.nytimes.com/2001/11/05/business/media/05TORT.html〉.
78. For an analysis of how revolutionary states can be socialized by the international system, see David Armstrong, Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1993). Armstrong looks at the American, French and Russian revolutions in detail, and also examines Indonesia under Sukarno, Cuba under Castro, China under Mao Zedong, Libya under Gaddafi and Iran under Khomeini. His analysis underscores the close interplay between domestic politics and foreign policy that is depicted in Figure 5. For a study of how the national interests of states are often defined by international regimes, see Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1996).
79. For an analysis of how revolutionary states can be socialized by the international system, see David Armstrong, Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1993). Armstrong looks at the American, French and Russian revolutions in detail, and also examines Indonesia under Sukarno, Cuba under Castro, China under Mao Zedong, Libya under Gaddafi and Iran under Khomeini. His analysis underscores the close interplay between domestic politics and foreign policy that is depicted in Figure 5. For a study of how the national interests of states are often defined by international regimes, see Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1996).
80. For the first time in more than two decades, officials in Germany have begun to recognize the fact that the country needs immigrants and is, contrary to official dogma, an immigration state, requiring at least 50,000 immigrants per year to prevent a socially disruptive drop in population. See Roger Cohen, 'Germany Ponders Opening Door, Just a Crack, to Immigration', The New York Times, 5 July 2001, 〈www.nytimes.com/2001/ 07/05/world/05GERM.html?todaysheadlines〉.
81. For the European Union, see Crelinsten and Özkut, 'Counter-terrorism Policy in Fortress Europe' (note 5).
82. See David C. Rapoport and Leonard Weinberg (eds.), The Democratic Experience and Political Violence (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass 2001) for an excellent collection of articles and case studies that explore such issues within the context of analyzing the relationship between democracy and political violence.
83. If two models (as in Figure 1) were lined up 'side by side' and viewed end-on, something which is not possible in a two-dimensional diagram unless perspective is used, then all three kinds of interaction can be analysed simultaneously. While beyond the graphic capabilities of this author, such 3D or 4D models are probably possible using existing computer graphics.
84. Case studies that explicitly look at the interaction between terrorism and counter-terrorism are rare. My own study of the October Crisis of 1970 in Canada was the context in which the model presented here was first developed. See 'The Internal Dynamics of the FLQ During the October Crisis of 1970', in David C. Rapoport (ed.), Inside Terrorist Organizations (London: Frank Cass 2001; London: Frank Cass and New York: University of Columbia Press 1988), pp.59-89; 'Power and Meaning: Terrorism as a Struggle over Access to the Communication Structure', in Paul Wilkinson and A. M. Stewart (eds.), Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen Press, 1987), pp.419-50; 'Limits to Criminal Justice in the Control of Insurgent Political Violence: A Case Study of the October Crisis of 1970', unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Montreal, May 1985. There are also edited volumes that focus either on terrorism, per se, or on counter-terrorism, per se, and the case studies therein usually do look at the interaction between terrorists and counter-terrorists. For terrorism, see, for example, Martha Crenshaw (ed.), Terrorism in Context (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania University Press 1995). For counter-terrorism, see, for example, Reinares, European Democracies Against Terrorism (note 5), especially Part I on Governmental Policies; Schmid and Crelinsten, Western Responses to Terrorism (note 6). The Northern Ireland case is one that would lend itself very well to such an analysis, as argued by White, 'Understanding the Motives of Participants' (note 51).
85. Case studies that explicitly look at the interaction between terrorism and counter-terrorism are rare. My own study of the October Crisis of 1970 in Canada was the context in which the model presented here was first developed. See 'The Internal Dynamics of the FLQ During the October Crisis of 1970', in David C. Rapoport (ed.), Inside Terrorist Organizations (London: Frank Cass 2001; London: Frank Cass and New York: University of Columbia Press 1988), pp.59-89; 'Power and Meaning: Terrorism as a Struggle over Access to the Communication Structure', in Paul Wilkinson and A. M. Stewart (eds.), Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen Press, 1987), pp.419-50; 'Limits to Criminal Justice in the Control of Insurgent Political Violence: A Case Study of the October Crisis of 1970', unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Montreal, May 1985. There are also edited volumes that focus either on terrorism, per se, or on counter-terrorism, per se, and the case studies therein usually do look at the interaction between terrorists and counter-terrorists. For terrorism, see, for example, Martha Crenshaw (ed.), Terrorism in Context (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania University Press 1995). For counter-terrorism, see, for example, Reinares, European Democracies Against Terrorism (note 5), especially Part I on Governmental Policies; Schmid and Crelinsten, Western Responses to Terrorism (note 6). The Northern Ireland case is one that would lend itself very well to such an analysis, as argued by White, 'Understanding the Motives of Participants' (note 51).
86. Case studies that explicitly look at the interaction between terrorism and counter-terrorism are rare. My own study of the October Crisis of 1970 in Canada was the context in which the model presented here was first developed. See 'The Internal Dynamics of the FLQ During the October Crisis of 1970', in David C. Rapoport (ed.), Inside Terrorist Organizations (London: Frank Cass 2001; London: Frank Cass and New York: University of Columbia Press 1988), pp.59-89; 'Power and Meaning: Terrorism as a Struggle over Access to the Communication Structure', in Paul Wilkinson and A. M. Stewart (eds.), Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen Press, 1987), pp.419-50; 'Limits to Criminal Justice in the Control of Insurgent Political Violence: A Case Study of the October Crisis of 1970', unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Montreal, May 1985. There are also edited volumes that focus either on terrorism, per se, or on counter-terrorism, per se, and the case studies therein usually do look at the interaction between terrorists and counter-terrorists. For terrorism, see, for example, Martha Crenshaw (ed.), Terrorism in Context (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania University Press 1995). For counter-terrorism, see, for example, Reinares, European Democracies Against Terrorism (note 5), especially Part I on Governmental Policies; Schmid and Crelinsten, Western Responses to Terrorism (note 6). The Northern Ireland case is one that would lend itself very well to such an analysis, as argued by White, 'Understanding the Motives of Participants' (note 51).
87. Case studies that explicitly look at the interaction between terrorism and counter-terrorism are rare. My own study of the October Crisis of 1970 in Canada was the context in which the model presented here was first developed. See 'The Internal Dynamics of the FLQ During the October Crisis of 1970', in David C. Rapoport (ed.), Inside Terrorist Organizations (London: Frank Cass 2001; London: Frank Cass and New York: University of Columbia Press 1988), pp.59-89; 'Power and Meaning: Terrorism as a Struggle over Access to the Communication Structure', in Paul Wilkinson and A. M. Stewart (eds.), Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen Press, 1987), pp.419-50; 'Limits to Criminal Justice in the Control of Insurgent Political Violence: A Case Study of the October Crisis of 1970', unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Montreal, May 1985. There are also edited volumes that focus either on terrorism, per se, or on counter-terrorism, per se, and the case studies therein usually do look at the interaction between terrorists and counter-terrorists. For terrorism, see, for example, Martha Crenshaw (ed.), Terrorism in Context (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania University Press 1995). For counter-terrorism, see, for example, Reinares, European Democracies Against Terrorism (note 5), especially Part I on Governmental Policies; Schmid and Crelinsten, Western Responses to Terrorism (note 6). The Northern Ireland case is one that would lend itself very well to such an analysis, as argued by White, 'Understanding the Motives of Participants' (note 51).
88. Case studies that explicitly look at the interaction between terrorism and counter-terrorism are rare. My own study of the October Crisis of 1970 in Canada was the context in which the model presented here was first developed. See 'The Internal Dynamics of the FLQ During the October Crisis of 1970', in David C. Rapoport (ed.), Inside Terrorist Organizations (London: Frank Cass 2001; London: Frank Cass and New York: University of Columbia Press 1988), pp.59-89; 'Power and Meaning: Terrorism as a Struggle over Access to the Communication Structure', in Paul Wilkinson and A. M. Stewart (eds.), Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen Press, 1987), pp.419-50; 'Limits to Criminal Justice in the Control of Insurgent Political Violence: A Case Study of the October Crisis of 1970', unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Montreal, May 1985. There are also edited volumes that focus either on terrorism, per se, or on counter-terrorism, per se, and the case studies therein usually do look at the interaction between terrorists and counter-terrorists. For terrorism, see, for example, Martha Crenshaw (ed.), Terrorism in Context (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania University Press 1995). For counter-terrorism, see, for example, Reinares, European Democracies Against Terrorism (note 5), especially Part I on Governmental Policies; Schmid and Crelinsten, Western Responses to Terrorism (note 6). The Northern Ireland case is one that would lend itself very well to such an analysis, as argued by White, 'Understanding the Motives of Participants' (note 51).
89. Case studies that explicitly look at the interaction between terrorism and counter-terrorism are rare. My own study of the October Crisis of 1970 in Canada was the context in which the model presented here was first developed. See 'The Internal Dynamics of the FLQ During the October Crisis of 1970', in David C. Rapoport (ed.), Inside Terrorist Organizations (London: Frank Cass 2001; London: Frank Cass and New York: University of Columbia Press 1988), pp.59-89; 'Power and Meaning: Terrorism as a Struggle over Access to the Communication Structure', in Paul Wilkinson and A. M. Stewart (eds.), Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen Press, 1987), pp.419-50; 'Limits to Criminal Justice in the Control of Insurgent Political Violence: A Case Study of the October Crisis of 1970', unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Montreal, May 1985. There are also edited volumes that focus either on terrorism, per se, or on counter-terrorism, per se, and the case studies therein usually do look at the interaction between terrorists and counter-terrorists. For terrorism, see, for example, Martha Crenshaw (ed.), Terrorism in Context (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania University Press 1995). For counter-terrorism, see, for example, Reinares, European Democracies Against Terrorism (note 5), especially Part I on Governmental Policies; Schmid and Crelinsten, Western Responses to Terrorism (note 6). The Northern Ireland case is one that would lend itself very well to such an analysis, as argued by White, 'Understanding the Motives of Participants' (note 51).
90. Case studies that explicitly look at the interaction between terrorism and counter-terrorism are rare. My own study of the October Crisis of 1970 in Canada was the context in which the model presented here was first developed. See 'The Internal Dynamics of the FLQ During the October Crisis of 1970', in David C. Rapoport (ed.), Inside Terrorist Organizations (London: Frank Cass 2001; London: Frank Cass and New York: University of Columbia Press 1988), pp.59-89; 'Power and Meaning: Terrorism as a Struggle over Access to the Communication Structure', in Paul Wilkinson and A. M. Stewart (eds.), Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen Press, 1987), pp.419-50; 'Limits to Criminal Justice in the Control of Insurgent Political Violence: A Case Study of the October Crisis of 1970', unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Montreal, May 1985. There are also edited volumes that focus either on terrorism, per se, or on counter-terrorism, per se, and the case studies therein usually do look at the interaction between terrorists and counter-terrorists. For terrorism, see, for example, Martha Crenshaw (ed.), Terrorism in Context (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania University Press 1995). For counter-terrorism, see, for example, Reinares, European Democracies Against Terrorism (note 5), especially Part I on Governmental Policies; Schmid and Crelinsten, Western Responses to Terrorism (note 6). The Northern Ireland case is one that would lend itself very well to such an analysis, as argued by White, 'Understanding the Motives of Participants' (note 51).
91. Case studies that explicitly look at the interaction between terrorism and counter-terrorism are rare. My own study of the October Crisis of 1970 in Canada was the context in which the model presented here was first developed. See 'The Internal Dynamics of the FLQ During the October Crisis of 1970', in David C. Rapoport (ed.), Inside Terrorist Organizations (London: Frank Cass 2001; London: Frank Cass and New York: University of Columbia Press 1988), pp.59-89; 'Power and Meaning: Terrorism as a Struggle over Access to the Communication Structure', in Paul Wilkinson and A. M. Stewart (eds.), Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen Press, 1987), pp.419-50; 'Limits to Criminal Justice in the Control of Insurgent Political Violence: A Case Study of the October Crisis of 1970', unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Montreal, May 1985. There are also edited volumes that focus either on terrorism, per se, or on counter-terrorism, per se, and the case studies therein usually do look at the interaction between terrorists and counter-terrorists. For terrorism, see, for example, Martha Crenshaw (ed.), Terrorism in Context (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania University Press 1995). For counter-terrorism, see, for example, Reinares, European Democracies Against Terrorism (note 5), especially Part I on Governmental Policies; Schmid and Crelinsten, Western Responses to Terrorism (note 6). The Northern Ireland case is one that would lend itself very well to