Bayesian inferences: A theoretical revision;Inferencias bayesianas: Una revisión teórica

Anuario de Psicologia

Volumn 33, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 25-47

  Alonso, Diego ^a   Tabua, Elisabet ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALMERÍA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Base rates; Bayes's theorem; Bayesian reasoning; Frequentism; Heuristics and biases; Mental models; Probabilistic reasoning

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; BAYES THEOREM; HUMAN; INTUITION; MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS; PROBABILITY; THEORY;

EID: 0036282887     PISSN: 00665126     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (45)

1. Intuitive theories of events and the effects of base-rate information on predictions
2. Disociación en aprendizaje de probabilidades en un problema contraintuitivo
3. The base-rate fallacy in probability judgments
4. Some teasers concerning conditional probabilities
5. When do base rates affect predictions?
6. The base-rate fallacy in attribution and prediction
7. Interpretation by phisicians of clinical laboratory results
8. Biases in probabilistic reasoning may be produced by associative learning mechanisms
9. Are humans good intuitive statisticians after all? Rethinking some conclusions from the literature on judgment under uncertainty
10. Conservatism in human information processing
11. Frequency versus probability formats in statistical word problems
12. A closer look at the probabilities of the notorious three prisoners
13. How to make cognitive illusions disappear: Beyond «heuristics and biases»
14. Why the distinction between single-event probabilities and frequencies is important for psychology (and vice versa)
15. On narrow norms and vague heuristics: A reply to Kahneman and Tversky (1996)
16. Presentation and content: The use of base rates as a continuous variable
17. How to improve bayesian reasoning without instruction: Frequency formats
18. Solving probabilistic and statistical problems: A matter of information structure and question form
19. Content presentation in reasoning about base rates
20. A new version of the Monty Hall Dilemma with unequal probabilities
21. The Monty Hall Dilemma
22. Further exploration of two stage decision making in the Monty Hall Dilemma
23. Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning
24. Subjective probability: A judgement of representativeness
25. On the psychology of prediction
26. The base rate fallacy reconsidered: Descriptive, normative, and methodological challenges
27. Conversational conventions, order of information acquisition, and the effect of base rates and individuating information on social judgments
28. Conservatism in a simple probability model inference task
29. Études de décisions expérimentales et calcul de probabilités
30. Base rates, representativeness, and the logic of conversation: The contextual relevance of «irrelevant» information
31. Cognitive heuristics and biases in behavioral auditing: Review, comments and observations
32. Intuitive reasoning about probability: Theoretical and experimental analyses of the «problem of three prisoners»
33. Modelos mentales en un problema contraintuitivo: Experiencias que posibilitan cambiarlos
34. Causal schemas in judgments under uncertainty
35. Judgments of and by representativeness
36. The theoretical status of judgmental heuristics