In defense of defect

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 39, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 309-321

  Volij, Oscar ^a,b  

^a IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

Automata; Complexity; Prisoner's dilemma

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036255607     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.2001.0893     Document Type: Article

References (16)

1. "The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata"
2. "The Evolution of Exchange"
3. "Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations"
4. "Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games Played by Finite Automata"
5. "Supergames Played by Finite Automata with Finite Costs of Complexity in an Evolutionary Setting"
6. "Supergames Played by Finite Automata with Finite Costs of Complexity in an Evolutionary Setting"
7. "Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics"
8. "Explaining Cooperation and Commitment in Repeated Games"
9. "Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games"
10. "Learning, Mutations and Long Run Equilibria in Games"
11. "The Logic of Animal Conflict"
12. Markov Decision Processes
13. "Finite Automata Play the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma"
14. "The Evolution of Walrasian Behaviour"
15. "The Evolution of Conventions"
16. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining"