Supergames played by finite automata with finite costs of complexity in an evolutionary setting

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 68, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 266-275

  Cooper, David J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0029688425     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.0015     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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4. 4. K. BINMORE AND L. SAMUELSON, Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata, J. Econ. Theory 57 (1992), 278-305.
5. 5. E. KALAI AND W. STANFORD, Finite rationality and interpersonal complexity in repeated games, Econometrica 56 (1988), 397-410.
6. 6. J. MAYNARD SMITH, The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts, J. Theor. Biol. 47 (1974), 209-221.
7. 7. J. MAYNARD SMITH, "Evolution and the Theory of Games," The Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, UK, 1982.
8. 8. A. RUBINSTEIN, Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma, J. Econ. Theory 39 (1986), 83-96.