Regulatory enforcement with discretionary fining and litigation

Bulletin of Economic Research

Volumn 54, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 105-118

  Rodriguez Ibeas, Roberto ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LA RIOJA   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC INSTRUMENT; INDUSTRIAL REGULATION; MODELING;

EID: 0036205201     PISSN: 03073378     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-8586.00142     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. Crime and punishment: An economic approach
2. Regulatory errors, optimal fines and the level of compliance
3. Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted
4. Environmental enforcement when 'inspectability' is endogenous: A model with overshooting properties
5. Regulatory dealing - Revisiting the Harrington paradox
6. Regulatory enforcement in the presence of a court system
7. Monitoring, appeal and investigation: The enforcement and legal process
8. Regulatory standards, non compliance and enforcement
9. The optimal probability and the magnitude of fines for acts that are definitively undesirable
10. Avoidance, screening and optimum enforcement
11. Challenging the enforcement of environmental regulation
12. Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted: A reconsideration under asymmetric information
13. On economic incentives for reducing hazardous waste generation