Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 37, Issue 1, 1988, Pages 29-53

  Harrington, Winston ^a  

^a RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002187015     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(88)90003-5     Document Type: Article

References (26)

1. Air quality regulation and management in the four corners states
2. Crime and punishment An economic analysis
3. The limits of economism in controlling harmful corporate conduct
4. The verification problem in arms control: A theoretical analysis
5. Enforcing pollution control laws in the United States
6. The economics of enforcing air pollution controls
7. Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach
8. Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable standards and taxes
9. Enforcement of continuous compliance with air quality regulations
10. Incentive generating state dependent penalty system
11. Enforcement costs and regulatory reform: The agency and firm response
12. The criminal waste discharger
13. Optimal standards with incomplete enforcement
14. Rule enforcement by the Los Angeles air pollution control district