How strong is the case for a populist central banker? A note

European Economic Review

Volumn 46, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 623-632

  Jerger, Jürgen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FREIBURG   (Germany)

Author keywords

Central bank; Inflation; Unemployment; Wage setting

Indexed keywords

CENTRAL BANK;

EID: 0036192307     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00096-9     Document Type: Article

References (11)

1. Central bank independence and macroeconomic performance: Some comparative evidence
2. Disinflation and the NAIRU
3. A positive theory of monetary policy in a natural rate model
4. Central bank independence, centralization of wage bargaining, inflation and unemployment: Theory and some evidence
5. The case for a poulist central banker
6. The interaction of monetary policy and wages
7. Rules rather than discretion: The inconsistency of optimal plans
8. The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target
9. Performance contracts for central bankers