Diversification and the Legal Organization of the Firm

Organization Science

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 49-67

  Bethel, Jennifer E ^a   Liebeskind, Julia Porter ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Diversification; Organization Structure; Subsidiary Firms

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032353860     PISSN: 10477039     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/orsc.9.1.49     Document Type: Article

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