Dynamic learning in a two-person experimental game

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

Volumn 25, Issue 9, 2001, Pages 1305-1344

  Mason, Charles F ^a   Phillips, Owen R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING   (United States)

Author keywords

C73; C91; D83; Experiments; Kalman filtering; Learning

Indexed keywords

EID: 0011798081     PISSN: 01651889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1889(00)00014-2     Document Type: Article

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