CEO compensation, option incentives, and information disclosure

Review of Financial Economics

Volumn 10, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 251-277

  Conyon, Martin J ^a   Sadler, Graham V ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

CEO compensation; Executive options; Information disclosure

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035697568     PISSN: 10583300     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1058-3300(01)00033-7     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. Executive compensation: Six questions that need answering
2. The other side of the trade-off; the impact of risk on executive compensation
3. Long term remuneration for senior executives
4. Share options and profit sharing incentive schemes
5. The pricing of options and corporate liabilities
6. The prince and the pauper? CEO pay in the US and UK
7. Estimating the value of stock option portfolios and their sensitivities to price and volatility
8. Directors' remuneration: Report of a study group chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury
9. The sensitivity of CEO wealth to equity risk: An analysis of the magnitude and determinants
10. Are CEOs really paid like bureaucrats?
11. The economics of executive compensation
12. Committee on corporate governance: Final report
13. CEO incentives: It's not how much you pay, but how
14. Total board remuneration and company performance
15. The theory of rational option pricing
16. Executive compensation
17. A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity
18. Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively?