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Volumn 157, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 413-429

Should the treasury price-discriminate? A procedure for computing hypothetical bid functions

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EID: 0035647217     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1628/0932456013621279     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (5)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.