Strategyproof single unit award rules

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 18, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 785-798

  Pápai, Szilvia ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035622963     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550000084     Document Type: Article

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