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Volumn 29, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 365-374

Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains

Author keywords

Domain restriction; Efficiency; Strategy proofness

Indexed keywords


EID: 0034346937     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820000046     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (19)

References (17)
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  • 6
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    • Holmström, B.1
  • 8
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    • On strategy-proofness and single peakedness
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    • Moulin, H.1
  • 10
    • 0033479811 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with an indivisible good
    • Ohseto S (1999) Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with an indivisible good. Social Choice and Welfare 16:121-136
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    • Ohseto, S.1
  • 11
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  • 14
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    • Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
    • Schummer J (2000) Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation. Games and Economic Behavior 30:293-318
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    • Large indivisibles: An analysis with respect to price equilibrium and fairness
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    • Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
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    • Zhou, L.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.