Technology's knowledge burden, the RMA and the IDF: Organizing the hypertext organization for future 'wars of disruption'?

Journal of Strategic Studies

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 82-146

  Demchak, Chris C ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0035616132     PISSN: 01402390     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402390108437836     Document Type: Article

References (272)

1. See Neil Fleming, 'Coping with a Revolution: Will the Internet Change Learning?', Canterbury, New Zealand: Lincoln University (http://www 1990s) http://www.lincoln. az.nz/educ/learning, downloaded 10 Feb. 2000.
2. Shimon Naveh, head of Israel's National Defense College, March 1998 quoted in Arieh O'Sullivan, 'Facing Reality: The IDF Embarks on a Restructuring Program', Armed Forces Journal International (April 1999) pp. 17-18.
3. Some prominent scholars have gone so far as to use the term 'technology', to mean all the technical equipment and applications combined with the organization as a whole. For a seminal work on this theme, see Todd R. LaPorte (ed.) Organized Social Complexity (Princeton UP 1975).
4. See JV2010, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, United States Government, Joint Vision 2010 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office 1996).
5. This overarching goal is also called 'full spectrum dominance', and considered 'the key characteristic we seek for our Armed Forces'. See CFJO, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, United States Government, Concept for Future Joint Operations (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office 1997) p.2.
6. This is the 'fog of war', discussed by Clausewitz and made famous in the Western militaries when his works were finally translated after World War II. For a good translation, see Michael Howard and Peter Paret (eds. and translators) Carl von Clausewitz (Princeton UP 1976).
7. See James Adams, The Next World War: Computers are the Weapons and the Front Line is Everywhere (NY: Simon & Schuster 1998).
8. Innocence in war is very tough to define but an emerging disinclination for arbitrary death among westernized nations is defining innocence as the nonparticipant in a military force or military action, increasingly including the enemy's civilian populations. This has profound effects on military doctrine. Here the televised media's pictures of victims on both sides encourages the distaste for any kind of killing. These make anything other than extremely accurate killing - i.e., only the 'guilty', - increasingly unacceptable in western societies. Unless it can be 'sanitary', with few deaths, war as a legitimate institution is itself undermined.The RMA with its emphasis on IW offers such sanitization, at least in principle. See Robert L. O'Connell, Ride of the Second Horseman: Birth and Death of War (NY: Oxford UP 1995); Adams (note 7); and Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos and Mark R. Shulman (eds.) The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1994).
9. Innocence in war is very tough to define but an emerging disinclination for arbitrary death among westernized nations is defining innocence as the nonparticipant in a military force or military action, increasingly including the enemy's civilian populations. This has profound effects on military doctrine. Here the televised media's pictures of victims on both sides encourages the distaste for any kind of killing. These make anything other than extremely accurate killing - i.e., only the 'guilty', - increasingly unacceptable in western societies. Unless it can be 'sanitary', with few deaths, war as a legitimate institution is itself undermined.The RMA with its emphasis on IW offers such sanitization, at least in principle. See Robert L. O'Connell, Ride of the Second Horseman: Birth and Death of War (NY: Oxford UP 1995); Adams (note 7); and Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos and Mark R. Shulman (eds.) The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1994).
10. For relatively in-depth discussions of these points, see Eliot A. Cohen, Michael J. Eisenstadt, and Andrew J. Bacevich, Knives, Tanks and Missiles: Israel's Security Revolution (Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1998); Hirsh Goodman and W. Seth Carus The Future Battlefield and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New Brunswick, NJ: CT Transaction 1990); Chris C. Demchak, 'Numbers or networks: Organizational and modernization dilemmas in the Israeli Defense Forces', Armed Forces and Society 23/2 (Winter 1996a) pp.179-208; and the volume by Shai Feldman (ed.) Technology and Strategy: Future Trends (conference summary, Tel Aviv University 1987) (Tel Aviv Jaffee Institute for Strategic Studies 1989).
11. For relatively in-depth discussions of these points, see Eliot A. Cohen, Michael J. Eisenstadt, and Andrew J. Bacevich, Knives, Tanks and Missiles: Israel's Security Revolution (Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1998); Hirsh Goodman and W. Seth Carus The Future Battlefield and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New Brunswick, NJ: CT Transaction 1990); Chris C. Demchak, 'Numbers or networks: Organizational and modernization dilemmas in the Israeli Defense Forces', Armed Forces and Society 23/2 (Winter 1996a) pp.179-208; and the volume by Shai Feldman (ed.) Technology and Strategy: Future Trends (conference summary, Tel Aviv University 1987) (Tel Aviv Jaffee Institute for Strategic Studies 1989).
12. For relatively in-depth discussions of these points, see Eliot A. Cohen, Michael J. Eisenstadt, and Andrew J. Bacevich, Knives, Tanks and Missiles: Israel's Security Revolution (Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1998); Hirsh Goodman and W. Seth Carus The Future Battlefield and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New Brunswick, NJ: CT Transaction 1990); Chris C. Demchak, 'Numbers or networks: Organizational and modernization dilemmas in the Israeli Defense Forces', Armed Forces and Society 23/2 (Winter 1996a) pp.179-208; and the volume by Shai Feldman (ed.) Technology and Strategy: Future Trends (conference summary, Tel Aviv University 1987) (Tel Aviv Jaffee Institute for Strategic Studies 1989).
13. For relatively in-depth discussions of these points, see Eliot A. Cohen, Michael J. Eisenstadt, and Andrew J. Bacevich, Knives, Tanks and Missiles: Israel's Security Revolution (Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1998); Hirsh Goodman and W. Seth Carus The Future Battlefield and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New Brunswick, NJ: CT Transaction 1990); Chris C. Demchak, 'Numbers or networks: Organizational and modernization dilemmas in the Israeli Defense Forces', Armed Forces and Society 23/2 (Winter 1996a) pp.179-208; and the volume by Shai Feldman (ed.) Technology and Strategy: Future Trends (conference summary, Tel Aviv University 1987) (Tel Aviv Jaffee Institute for Strategic Studies 1989).
14. Israel's military successes are often due to extraordinary sacrifice on the part of tactical commanders. It is a history of tactical innovation and personal sacrifice but not one of exceptionally efficient cross-leveling use of organizational resources. In particular, the IDF's ability to perform combined arms operations has never been great, especially in wartime. For both the military and political problems of the Israeli wars, see Trevor N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974 (NY: Harper & Row 1978); and Samuel Sager, The Parliamentary System of Israel (Syracuse UP 1985). See also Richard A. Gabriel, Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon (NY: Hill and Wang 1984); and Yoram Peri, Between Battles and Ballots: Israeli Military in Politics (Cambridge, UK: CUP 1983).
15. Israel's military successes are often due to extraordinary sacrifice on the part of tactical commanders. It is a history of tactical innovation and personal sacrifice but not one of exceptionally efficient cross-leveling use of organizational resources. In particular, the IDF's ability to perform combined arms operations has never been great, especially in wartime. For both the military and political problems of the Israeli wars, see Trevor N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974 (NY: Harper & Row 1978); and Samuel Sager, The Parliamentary System of Israel (Syracuse UP 1985). See also Richard A. Gabriel, Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon (NY: Hill and Wang 1984); and Yoram Peri, Between Battles and Ballots: Israeli Military in Politics (Cambridge, UK: CUP 1983).
16. Israel's military successes are often due to extraordinary sacrifice on the part of tactical commanders. It is a history of tactical innovation and personal sacrifice but not one of exceptionally efficient cross-leveling use of organizational resources. In particular, the IDF's ability to perform combined arms operations has never been great, especially in wartime. For both the military and political problems of the Israeli wars, see Trevor N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974 (NY: Harper & Row 1978); and Samuel Sager, The Parliamentary System of Israel (Syracuse UP 1985). See also Richard A. Gabriel, Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon (NY: Hill and Wang 1984); and Yoram Peri, Between Battles and Ballots: Israeli Military in Politics (Cambridge, UK: CUP 1983).
17. Israel's military successes are often due to extraordinary sacrifice on the part of tactical commanders. It is a history of tactical innovation and personal sacrifice but not one of exceptionally efficient cross-leveling use of organizational resources. In particular, the IDF's ability to perform combined arms operations has never been great, especially in wartime. For both the military and political problems of the Israeli wars, see Trevor N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974 (NY: Harper & Row 1978); and Samuel Sager, The Parliamentary System of Israel (Syracuse UP 1985). See also Richard A. Gabriel, Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon (NY: Hill and Wang 1984); and Yoram Peri, Between Battles and Ballots: Israeli Military in Politics (Cambridge, UK: CUP 1983).
18. This vision of the 1991 Gulf War has been repeatedly undermined in analytical publications but the imagery produced by television is much stronger than the reality. For one such early critique, see Gene I. Rochlin and Chris C. Demchak, The Gulf War: Technological and Organizational Implications', Survival 33 (March 1991) pp.260-73. For a later analysis, see George Friedman and Meredith Friedman, The Future of War: Power, Technology and American World Dominance in the Twenty-First Century (NY: St Martin's Griffin Press 1996).
19. This vision of the 1991 Gulf War has been repeatedly undermined in analytical publications but the imagery produced by television is much stronger than the reality. For one such early critique, see Gene I. Rochlin and Chris C. Demchak, The Gulf War: Technological and Organizational Implications', Survival 33 (March 1991) pp.260-73. For a later analysis, see George Friedman and Meredith Friedman, The Future of War: Power, Technology and American World Dominance in the Twenty-First Century (NY: St Martin's Griffin Press 1996).
20. See Gene I. Rochlin, 'Broken Plowshare: System Failure and the Nuclear Power Industry', in Jane Summerton (ed.) Changing Large Technical Systems (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1994) pp.231-61.
21. Faced with mind-boggling complexity across millions of lines of code and the addition of the deviant human into the process, the computer industry began sending its not-quitefinished programs out for volunteers to play with to see what went wrong. This was called the 'beta test', after the initial functioning or 'alpha', test occurred inside the firm.The highly integrated RMA military's system of systems shares many of the characteristics of these early programs, including the difficulty of testing in advance of completing the program. There are real limitations to organizational simulations and, as of now, the actual use of a highly integrated organization cannot reliably be simulated in advance. Not only scale matters but humans are remarkably deviant in their activities, posing exceptional difficulties for the simulation community in struggling to model organizational behavior. See Richard W. Pew and Anne S. Mavor (eds.) Modeling Human and Organizational Behavior: Application to Military Simulations (Washington DC National Research Council: National Academy Press 1998). All RMA-associated future paths are, at this point, completely opaque because no nation has yet performed this 'beta test', for anyone else's benefit. Hence, any nation implementing a highly integrated RMA military will be, in effect, performing an Organizational beta test', (OBT), facing the surprises and knowledge burden across all the elements of the socio-technical system on its own.
22. See Efraim Turban, Ephraim McLean, and James Wetherbe, Information Technology for Management: Making Strategic Connections for Strategic Advantage, 2nd ed. (NY: John Wiley 1999). See also Thomas J. Buckholtz, Information Proficiency (NY: Van Nostrand Reinhold 1995).
23. See Efraim Turban, Ephraim McLean, and James Wetherbe, Information Technology for Management: Making Strategic Connections for Strategic Advantage, 2nd ed. (NY: John Wiley 1999). See also Thomas J. Buckholtz, Information Proficiency (NY: Van Nostrand Reinhold 1995).
24. This kind of integration in one major business firm cost $200 million and involved thousands of consultants to install the system and keep it operating effectively. This firm purchased the most successful of these huge integration applications, the one by SAP of Germany. The firm employs 10,000 maintenance consultants who oversea the installation and maintenance of the 70 odd module program. The selection of these programs is usually the outcome of 'enterprise resources planning', (ERP) by a firm, a process that is a highly rationalized, comprehensive effort to get every single process in the organization operating in perfect synchronization with every business goal and opportunity. For a discussion of this case and of the managerial challenges of what are called enterprise-wide applications, see Turban et al. (note 14) Chs.7-9.
25. The business press does not use this language but the stories of failure clearly indicate the knowledge burden to be a shortcoming. See Joseph L. Badaracco, The Knowledge Link: How Firms Compete Through Strategic Alliances (Boston: Harvard Business School Press 1991). See also Turban et al. (note 14) for illustrative cases throughout the text.
26. In 1996 I published a piece on the modernization of the ground forces of the IDF and will draw upon that work in some parts of this discussion, especially the historical material. See Demchak (note 9) pp. 179-89.
27. See Cohen et al. (note 9) p. 104.
28. See Ikujiro Nonaka and Hirotaka Takeuchi, 'A New Organizational Structure', HyperText Organization, in Laurence Prusak (ed.) Knowledge in Organizations (Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann 1997) pp.99-133.
29. There is a continuing debate on whether this is or is not a 'revolution'. See Earl H. Tilford, 'The Revolution in Military Affairs: Prospects and Cautions', US Army War College Published Papers (Carlisle, PA: May 1995) p.1; Andrew R. Krepinevich, 'Cavalry to computer: The pattern of military revolutions', The National Interest 37 (Fall 1994) pp.30-42 and the edited volume, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr and Richard H. Shultz Jr (eds.) war in the Information Age: New Challenges for US Security Policy (Washington DC: Brassey's 1997). Others argue this is merely the next step in incremental technological changes. See Stephen Biddle, 'Assessing Theories of Future War', paper presented at American Political Science Association annual conference (Washington DC, Sept. 1997).The debate is not relevant to this discussion.
30. There is a continuing debate on whether this is or is not a 'revolution'. See Earl H. Tilford, 'The Revolution in Military Affairs: Prospects and Cautions', US Army War College Published Papers (Carlisle, PA: May 1995) p.1; Andrew R. Krepinevich, 'Cavalry to computer: The pattern of military revolutions', The National Interest 37 (Fall 1994) pp.30-42 and the edited volume, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr and Richard H. Shultz Jr (eds.) war in the Information Age: New Challenges for US Security Policy (Washington DC: Brassey's 1997). Others argue this is merely the next step in incremental technological changes. See Stephen Biddle, 'Assessing Theories of Future War', paper presented at American Political Science Association annual conference (Washington DC, Sept. 1997).The debate is not relevant to this discussion.
31. There is a continuing debate on whether this is or is not a 'revolution'. See Earl H. Tilford, 'The Revolution in Military Affairs: Prospects and Cautions', US Army War College Published Papers (Carlisle, PA: May 1995) p.1; Andrew R. Krepinevich, 'Cavalry to computer: The pattern of military revolutions', The National Interest 37 (Fall 1994) pp.30-42 and the edited volume, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr and Richard H. Shultz Jr (eds.) war in the Information Age: New Challenges for US Security Policy (Washington DC: Brassey's 1997). Others argue this is merely the next step in incremental technological changes. See Stephen Biddle, 'Assessing Theories of Future War', paper presented at American Political Science Association annual conference (Washington DC, Sept. 1997).The debate is not relevant to this discussion.
32. There is a continuing debate on whether this is or is not a 'revolution'. See Earl H. Tilford, 'The Revolution in Military Affairs: Prospects and Cautions', US Army War College Published Papers (Carlisle, PA: May 1995) p.1; Andrew R. Krepinevich, 'Cavalry to computer: The pattern of military revolutions', The National Interest 37 (Fall 1994) pp.30-42 and the edited volume, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr and Richard H. Shultz Jr (eds.) war in the Information Age: New Challenges for US Security Policy (Washington DC: Brassey's 1997). Others argue this is merely the next step in incremental technological changes. See Stephen Biddle, 'Assessing Theories of Future War', paper presented at American Political Science Association annual conference (Washington DC, Sept. 1997).The debate is not relevant to this discussion.
33. See Tilford (note 20) p.1; and Krepinevich (note 20) pp.30-42.
34. See JV2010 (note 4).
35. See CFJO (note 5) p.2.
36. For the use of another frequently-used term - the 'Military Technology Revolution', see James R. Fitzsimonds and Jan M. van Toi, 'Revolutions in Military Affairs', Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 1994) pp.24-31; Dan Goure, 'Is There a Military Technical Revolution in America's Future?', The Washington Quarterly 16/4 (1993) pp.175-92; and Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr, 'Beyond Luddites and magicians: Examining the MTR', Parameters (Summer 1995) pp.15-21. The label 'RMA', however, has come to encompass a military that successfully employs networked computerized innovations in military technologies and operations, and so will be solely used here. Other terms such as the 'Revolution in Security Affairs', (RSA) are too specialized for a general publication but are hereby noted. See Cohen et al. (note 9). Information warfare (IW) is widely used, although at this time there is no real consensus on what exactly is involved other than offensive-defensive use of computer networks by someone. For an introduction to IW, see JDW, 'Jane's Special Report - Information Warfare 1997', Janes Defense Weekly online (Oct. 1996) downloaded 14 July 1999. See also John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (eds.) In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1996); and Chris C. Demchak, 'High reliability Organizational Dilemmas in the Information Age', Journal of Contingency and Crisis Management 42 (June 1996b) pp.93-103. For a broad view, see as well Martin C Libicki, Defending Cyberspace and Other Metaphors (Washington DC: National Defense University Press 1995a); and idem, What is Information Warfare? (Washington DC: National Defense University Press 1995b). Another term gaining in usage among military analysts is 'Network Centric Warfare', but this has yet to be widely employed for IW. See David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein, 'Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority', Department of Defense C4ISR Cooperative Research Program (Washington DC: DoDCCRP Publications 1999). Finally, information operations is increasingly used as a generic term for all activities using the information associated with computerization, whether or not these operations are ever directly employed in battle.This term is so easily integrated into the common military lexicon that I could find no seminal article defining the term, while there are many using the term without any definition. For an excellent critique of this linguistic morass, see James F. Dunnigan, Digital Soldiers (NY: St Martin's Press 1996).
37. For the use of another frequently-used term - the 'Military Technology Revolution', see James R. Fitzsimonds and Jan M. van Toi, 'Revolutions in Military Affairs', Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 1994) pp.24-31; Dan Goure, 'Is There a Military Technical Revolution in America's Future?', The Washington Quarterly 16/4 (1993) pp.175-92; and Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr, 'Beyond Luddites and magicians: Examining the MTR', Parameters (Summer 1995) pp.15-21. The label 'RMA', however, has come to encompass a military that successfully employs networked computerized innovations in military technologies and operations, and so will be solely used here. Other terms such as the 'Revolution in Security Affairs', (RSA) are too specialized for a general publication but are hereby noted. See Cohen et al. (note 9). Information warfare (IW) is widely used, although at this time there is no real consensus on what exactly is involved other than offensive-defensive use of computer networks by someone. For an introduction to IW, see JDW, 'Jane's Special Report - Information Warfare 1997', Janes Defense Weekly online (Oct. 1996) downloaded 14 July 1999. See also John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (eds.) In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1996); and Chris C. Demchak, 'High reliability Organizational Dilemmas in the Information Age', Journal of Contingency and Crisis Management 42 (June 1996b) pp.93-103. For a broad view, see as well Martin C Libicki, Defending Cyberspace and Other Metaphors (Washington DC: National Defense University Press 1995a); and idem, What is Information Warfare? (Washington DC: National Defense University Press 1995b). Another term gaining in usage among military analysts is 'Network Centric Warfare', but this has yet to be widely employed for IW. See David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein, 'Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority', Department of Defense C4ISR Cooperative Research Program (Washington DC: DoDCCRP Publications 1999). Finally, information operations is increasingly used as a generic term for all activities using the information associated with computerization, whether or not these operations are ever directly employed in battle.This term is so easily integrated into the common military lexicon that I could find no seminal article defining the term, while there are many using the term without any definition. For an excellent critique of this linguistic morass, see James F. Dunnigan, Digital Soldiers (NY: St Martin's Press 1996).
38. For the use of another frequently-used term - the 'Military Technology Revolution', see James R. Fitzsimonds and Jan M. van Toi, 'Revolutions in Military Affairs', Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 1994) pp.24-31; Dan Goure, 'Is There a Military Technical Revolution in America's Future?', The Washington Quarterly 16/4 (1993) pp.175-92; and Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr, 'Beyond Luddites and magicians: Examining the MTR', Parameters (Summer 1995) pp.15-21. The label 'RMA', however, has come to encompass a military that successfully employs networked computerized innovations in military technologies and operations, and so will be solely used here. Other terms such as the 'Revolution in Security Affairs', (RSA) are too specialized for a general publication but are hereby noted. See Cohen et al. (note 9). Information warfare (IW) is widely used, although at this time there is no real consensus on what exactly is involved other than offensive-defensive use of computer networks by someone. For an introduction to IW, see JDW, 'Jane's Special Report - Information Warfare 1997', Janes Defense Weekly online (Oct. 1996) downloaded 14 July 1999. See also John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (eds.) In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1996); and Chris C. Demchak, 'High reliability Organizational Dilemmas in the Information Age', Journal of Contingency and Crisis Management 42 (June 1996b) pp.93-103. For a broad view, see as well Martin C Libicki, Defending Cyberspace and Other Metaphors (Washington DC: National Defense University Press 1995a); and idem, What is Information Warfare? (Washington DC: National Defense University Press 1995b). Another term gaining in usage among military analysts is 'Network Centric Warfare', but this has yet to be widely employed for IW. See David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein, 'Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority', Department of Defense C4ISR Cooperative Research Program (Washington DC: DoDCCRP Publications 1999). Finally, information operations is increasingly used as a generic term for all activities using the information associated with computerization, whether or not these operations are ever directly employed in battle.This term is so easily integrated into the common military lexicon that I could find no seminal article defining the term, while there are many using the term without any definition. For an excellent critique of this linguistic morass, see James F. Dunnigan, Digital Soldiers (NY: St Martin's Press 1996).
39. For the use of another frequently-used term - the 'Military Technology Revolution', see James R. Fitzsimonds and Jan M. van Toi, 'Revolutions in Military Affairs', Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 1994) pp.24-31; Dan Goure, 'Is There a Military Technical Revolution in America's Future?', The Washington Quarterly 16/4 (1993) pp.175-92; and Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr, 'Beyond Luddites and magicians: Examining the MTR', Parameters (Summer 1995) pp.15-21. The label 'RMA', however, has come to encompass a military that successfully employs networked computerized innovations in military technologies and operations, and so will be solely used here. Other terms such as the 'Revolution in Security Affairs', (RSA) are too specialized for a general publication but are hereby noted. See Cohen et al. (note 9). Information warfare (IW) is widely used, although at this time there is no real consensus on what exactly is involved other than offensive-defensive use of computer networks by someone. For an introduction to IW, see JDW, 'Jane's Special Report - Information Warfare 1997', Janes Defense Weekly online (Oct. 1996) downloaded 14 July 1999. See also John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (eds.) In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1996); and Chris C. Demchak, 'High reliability Organizational Dilemmas in the Information Age', Journal of Contingency and Crisis Management 42 (June 1996b) pp.93-103. For a broad view, see as well Martin C Libicki, Defending Cyberspace and Other Metaphors (Washington DC: National Defense University Press 1995a); and idem, What is Information Warfare? (Washington DC: National Defense University Press 1995b). Another term gaining in usage among military analysts is 'Network Centric Warfare', but this has yet to be widely employed for IW. See David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein, 'Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority', Department of Defense C4ISR Cooperative Research Program (Washington DC: DoDCCRP Publications 1999). Finally, information operations is increasingly used as a generic term for all activities using the information associated with computerization, whether or not these operations are ever directly employed in battle.This term is so easily integrated into the common military lexicon that I could find no seminal article defining the term, while there are many using the term without any definition. For an excellent critique of this linguistic morass, see James F. Dunnigan, Digital Soldiers (NY: St Martin's Press 1996).
40. For the use of another frequently-used term - the 'Military Technology Revolution', see James R. Fitzsimonds and Jan M. van Toi, 'Revolutions in Military Affairs', Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 1994) pp.24-31; Dan Goure, 'Is There a Military Technical Revolution in America's Future?', The Washington Quarterly 16/4 (1993) pp.175-92; and Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr, 'Beyond Luddites and magicians: Examining the MTR', Parameters (Summer 1995) pp.15-21. The label 'RMA', however, has come to encompass a military that successfully employs networked computerized innovations in military technologies and operations, and so will be solely used here. Other terms such as the 'Revolution in Security Affairs', (RSA) are too specialized for a general publication but are hereby noted. See Cohen et al. (note 9). Information warfare (IW) is widely used, although at this time there is no real consensus on what exactly is involved other than offensive-defensive use of computer networks by someone. For an introduction to IW, see JDW, 'Jane's Special Report - Information Warfare 1997', Janes Defense Weekly online (Oct. 1996) downloaded 14 July 1999. See also John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (eds.) In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1996); and Chris C. Demchak, 'High reliability Organizational Dilemmas in the Information Age', Journal of Contingency and Crisis Management 42 (June 1996b) pp.93-103. For a broad view, see as well Martin C Libicki, Defending Cyberspace and Other Metaphors (Washington DC: National Defense University Press 1995a); and idem, What is Information Warfare? (Washington DC: National Defense University Press 1995b). Another term gaining in usage among military analysts is 'Network Centric Warfare', but this has yet to be widely employed for IW. See David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein, 'Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority', Department of Defense C4ISR Cooperative Research Program (Washington DC: DoDCCRP Publications 1999). Finally, information operations is increasingly used as a generic term for all activities using the information associated with computerization, whether or not these operations are ever directly employed in battle.This term is so easily integrated into the common military lexicon that I could find no seminal article defining the term, while there are many using the term without any definition. For an excellent critique of this linguistic morass, see James F. Dunnigan, Digital Soldiers (NY: St Martin's Press 1996).
41. For the use of another frequently-used term - the 'Military Technology Revolution', see James R. Fitzsimonds and Jan M. van Toi, 'Revolutions in Military Affairs', Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 1994) pp.24-31; Dan Goure, 'Is There a Military Technical Revolution in America's Future?', The Washington Quarterly 16/4 (1993) pp.175-92; and Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr, 'Beyond Luddites and magicians: Examining the MTR', Parameters (Summer 1995) pp.15-21. The label 'RMA', however, has come to encompass a military that successfully employs networked computerized innovations in military technologies and operations, and so will be solely used here. Other terms such as the 'Revolution in Security Affairs', (RSA) are too specialized for a general publication but are hereby noted. See Cohen et al. (note 9). Information warfare (IW) is widely used, although at this time there is no real consensus on what exactly is involved other than offensive-defensive use of computer networks by someone. For an introduction to IW, see JDW, 'Jane's Special Report - Information Warfare 1997', Janes Defense Weekly online (Oct. 1996) downloaded 14 July 1999. See also John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (eds.) In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1996); and Chris C. Demchak, 'High reliability Organizational Dilemmas in the Information Age', Journal of Contingency and Crisis Management 42 (June 1996b) pp.93-103. For a broad view, see as well Martin C Libicki, Defending Cyberspace and Other Metaphors (Washington DC: National Defense University Press 1995a); and idem, What is Information Warfare? (Washington DC: National Defense University Press 1995b). Another term gaining in usage among military analysts is 'Network Centric Warfare', but this has yet to be widely employed for IW. See David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein, 'Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority', Department of Defense C4ISR Cooperative Research Program (Washington DC: DoDCCRP Publications 1999). Finally, information operations is increasingly used as a generic term for all activities using the information associated with computerization, whether or not these operations are ever directly employed in battle.This term is so easily integrated into the common military lexicon that I could find no seminal article defining the term, while there are many using the term without any definition. For an excellent critique of this linguistic morass, see James F. Dunnigan, Digital Soldiers (NY: St Martin's Press 1996).
42. For the use of another frequently-used term - the 'Military Technology Revolution', see James R. Fitzsimonds and Jan M. van Toi, 'Revolutions in Military Affairs', Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 1994) pp.24-31; Dan Goure, 'Is There a Military Technical Revolution in America's Future?', The Washington Quarterly 16/4 (1993) pp.175-92; and Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr, 'Beyond Luddites and magicians: Examining the MTR', Parameters (Summer 1995) pp.15-21. The label 'RMA', however, has come to encompass a military that successfully employs networked computerized innovations in military technologies and operations, and so will be solely used here. Other terms such as the 'Revolution in Security Affairs', (RSA) are too specialized for a general publication but are hereby noted. See Cohen et al. (note 9). Information warfare (IW) is widely used, although at this time there is no real consensus on what exactly is involved other than offensive-defensive use of computer networks by someone. For an introduction to IW, see JDW, 'Jane's Special Report - Information Warfare 1997', Janes Defense Weekly online (Oct. 1996) downloaded 14 July 1999. See also John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (eds.) In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1996); and Chris C. Demchak, 'High reliability Organizational Dilemmas in the Information Age', Journal of Contingency and Crisis Management 42 (June 1996b) pp.93-103. For a broad view, see as well Martin C Libicki, Defending Cyberspace and Other Metaphors (Washington DC: National Defense University Press 1995a); and idem, What is Information Warfare? (Washington DC: National Defense University Press 1995b). Another term gaining in usage among military analysts is 'Network Centric Warfare', but this has yet to be widely employed for IW. See David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein, 'Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority', Department of Defense C4ISR Cooperative Research Program (Washington DC: DoDCCRP Publications 1999). Finally, information operations is increasingly used as a generic term for all activities using the information associated with computerization, whether or not these operations are ever directly employed in battle.This term is so easily integrated into the common military lexicon that I could find no seminal article defining the term, while there are many using the term without any definition. For an excellent critique of this linguistic morass, see James F. Dunnigan, Digital Soldiers (NY: St Martin's Press 1996).
43. For the use of another frequently-used term - the 'Military Technology Revolution', see James R. Fitzsimonds and Jan M. van Toi, 'Revolutions in Military Affairs', Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 1994) pp.24-31; Dan Goure, 'Is There a Military Technical Revolution in America's Future?', The Washington Quarterly 16/4 (1993) pp.175-92; and Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr, 'Beyond Luddites and magicians: Examining the MTR', Parameters (Summer 1995) pp.15-21. The label 'RMA', however, has come to encompass a military that successfully employs networked computerized innovations in military technologies and operations, and so will be solely used here. Other terms such as the 'Revolution in Security Affairs', (RSA) are too specialized for a general publication but are hereby noted. See Cohen et al. (note 9). Information warfare (IW) is widely used, although at this time there is no real consensus on what exactly is involved other than offensive-defensive use of computer networks by someone. For an introduction to IW, see JDW, 'Jane's Special Report - Information Warfare 1997', Janes Defense Weekly online (Oct. 1996) downloaded 14 July 1999. See also John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (eds.) In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1996); and Chris C. Demchak, 'High reliability Organizational Dilemmas in the Information Age', Journal of Contingency and Crisis Management 42 (June 1996b) pp.93-103. For a broad view, see as well Martin C Libicki, Defending Cyberspace and Other Metaphors (Washington DC: National Defense University Press 1995a); and idem, What is Information Warfare? (Washington DC: National Defense University Press 1995b). Another term gaining in usage among military analysts is 'Network Centric Warfare', but this has yet to be widely employed for IW. See David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein, 'Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority', Department of Defense C4ISR Cooperative Research Program (Washington DC: DoDCCRP Publications 1999). Finally, information operations is increasingly used as a generic term for all activities using the information associated with computerization, whether or not these operations are ever directly employed in battle.This term is so easily integrated into the common military lexicon that I could find no seminal article defining the term, while there are many using the term without any definition. For an excellent critique of this linguistic morass, see James F. Dunnigan, Digital Soldiers (NY: St Martin's Press 1996).
44. For the use of another frequently-used term - the 'Military Technology Revolution', see James R. Fitzsimonds and Jan M. van Toi, 'Revolutions in Military Affairs', Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 1994) pp.24-31; Dan Goure, 'Is There a Military Technical Revolution in America's Future?', The Washington Quarterly 16/4 (1993) pp.175-92; and Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr, 'Beyond Luddites and magicians: Examining the MTR', Parameters (Summer 1995) pp.15-21. The label 'RMA', however, has come to encompass a military that successfully employs networked computerized innovations in military technologies and operations, and so will be solely used here. Other terms such as the 'Revolution in Security Affairs', (RSA) are too specialized for a general publication but are hereby noted. See Cohen et al. (note 9). Information warfare (IW) is widely used, although at this time there is no real consensus on what exactly is involved other than offensive-defensive use of computer networks by someone. For an introduction to IW, see JDW, 'Jane's Special Report - Information Warfare 1997', Janes Defense Weekly online (Oct. 1996) downloaded 14 July 1999. See also John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (eds.) In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1996); and Chris C. Demchak, 'High reliability Organizational Dilemmas in the Information Age', Journal of Contingency and Crisis Management 42 (June 1996b) pp.93-103. For a broad view, see as well Martin C Libicki, Defending Cyberspace and Other Metaphors (Washington DC: National Defense University Press 1995a); and idem, What is Information Warfare? (Washington DC: National Defense University Press 1995b). Another term gaining in usage among military analysts is 'Network Centric Warfare', but this has yet to be widely employed for IW. See David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein, 'Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority', Department of Defense C4ISR Cooperative Research Program (Washington DC: DoDCCRP Publications 1999). Finally, information operations is increasingly used as a generic term for all activities using the information associated with computerization, whether or not these operations are ever directly employed in battle.This term is so easily integrated into the common military lexicon that I could find no seminal article defining the term, while there are many using the term without any definition. For an excellent critique of this linguistic morass, see James F. Dunnigan, Digital Soldiers (NY: St Martin's Press 1996).
45. For the use of another frequently-used term - the 'Military Technology Revolution', see James R. Fitzsimonds and Jan M. van Toi, 'Revolutions in Military Affairs', Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 1994) pp.24-31; Dan Goure, 'Is There a Military Technical Revolution in America's Future?', The Washington Quarterly 16/4 (1993) pp.175-92; and Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr, 'Beyond Luddites and magicians: Examining the MTR', Parameters (Summer 1995) pp.15-21. The label 'RMA', however, has come to encompass a military that successfully employs networked computerized innovations in military technologies and operations, and so will be solely used here. Other terms such as the 'Revolution in Security Affairs', (RSA) are too specialized for a general publication but are hereby noted. See Cohen et al. (note 9). Information warfare (IW) is widely used, although at this time there is no real consensus on what exactly is involved other than offensive-defensive use of computer networks by someone. For an introduction to IW, see JDW, 'Jane's Special Report - Information Warfare 1997', Janes Defense Weekly online (Oct. 1996) downloaded 14 July 1999. See also John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (eds.) In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1996); and Chris C. Demchak, 'High reliability Organizational Dilemmas in the Information Age', Journal of Contingency and Crisis Management 42 (June 1996b) pp.93-103. For a broad view, see as well Martin C Libicki, Defending Cyberspace and Other Metaphors (Washington DC: National Defense University Press 1995a); and idem, What is Information Warfare? (Washington DC: National Defense University Press 1995b). Another term gaining in usage among military analysts is 'Network Centric Warfare', but this has yet to be widely employed for IW. See David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein, 'Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority', Department of Defense C4ISR Cooperative Research Program (Washington DC: DoDCCRP Publications 1999). Finally, information operations is increasingly used as a generic term for all activities using the information associated with computerization, whether or not these operations are ever directly employed in battle.This term is so easily integrated into the common military lexicon that I could find no seminal article defining the term, while there are many using the term without any definition. For an excellent critique of this linguistic morass, see James F. Dunnigan, Digital Soldiers (NY: St Martin's Press 1996).
46. The central coordinating statement of these visions is the Joint Chiefs' of Staff 1996 statement, 'Vision 2010', and their May 1997 follow-on elaboration, 'Concept for Future Joint Operations (CFJO)'. I also draw upon the equivalent vision statements of the subordinate services.These documents express how these senior leaders expect implementation of the advanced information technologies will change their future military activities, costs, and successes in both the actual execution of an operation and in power projection en route.
47. See JV2010 (note 4).
48. It is important to note that 'information war', can be attempted by any organization. It is more properly the full range of applications of information across all spectra of operations. The RMA organization differs in that it is in principle optimized to use information operations most effectively. See Defense Science Board (DSB), Department of Defense, US Government, Report of Defense Science Board Task Force on Information Warfare - Defense (IW-D) (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office Nov. 1996) URL: http://cryptomeorg/iwdmain.
49. See David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugler and Martin C. Libicki, Mind the Gap: Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs (Washington DC: National Defense UP 1999) pp.33-4.
50. See JV2010 (note 4).
51. See ibid. p. 17.
52. See Gen. Gordon Sullivan, US Army Chief of Staff, 'America's Army - Focusing on the Future', in Association of the United States Army (AUSA), Army Greenbook (Washington DC: AUSA Press 1994) pp. 19-29 (20). The doctrine of the US Army is largely driving the organizational notions of the RMA.Early in the 1990s, the US Army had begun to specify the outcomes the RMA would achieve once implemented. For example, the Army's doctrine developers in TRADOC had defined the so-called Force XXI by five characteristics: 'doctrinal flexibility, strategic mobility, tailorability and modularity, joint and multinational connectivity, and the versatility to function in War and OOTW (Operations Other Than War)', [emphasis mine]. See US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Department of the Army, Dimensional Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early Twenty-First Century, Pam 525-5 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office 1994) p.3-1 and US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Department of the Army, The Airland Battle and Corps: Operational Concepts series (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office 1995). These attributes are themselves developing with the organizational changes emergent in the process of translating the information warfare (IW) visions of senior US defense leaders into military organizational structures. See National Research Council (NRC), National Academy of Science, Star 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century (Washington DC: National Academic Press 1992). Later joint documents demonstrate the influence of these early expressions of what future militaries will contain by the use of language such as connectivity, modularity, real-time and synchronized operations. For examples of this commonality, see JV2010 (note 4) and the subordinate service documents.
53. See Gen. Gordon Sullivan, US Army Chief of Staff, 'America's Army - Focusing on the Future', in Association of the United States Army (AUSA), Army Greenbook (Washington DC: AUSA Press 1994) pp. 19-29 (20). The doctrine of the US Army is largely driving the organizational notions of the RMA.Early in the 1990s, the US Army had begun to specify the outcomes the RMA would achieve once implemented. For example, the Army's doctrine developers in TRADOC had defined the so-called Force XXI by five characteristics: 'doctrinal flexibility, strategic mobility, tailorability and modularity, joint and multinational connectivity, and the versatility to function in War and OOTW (Operations Other Than War)', [emphasis mine]. See US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Department of the Army, Dimensional Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early Twenty-First Century, Pam 525-5 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office 1994) p.3-1 and US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Department of the Army, The Airland Battle and Corps: Operational Concepts series (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office 1995). These attributes are themselves developing with the organizational changes emergent in the process of translating the information warfare (IW) visions of senior US defense leaders into military organizational structures. See National Research Council (NRC), National Academy of Science, Star 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century (Washington DC: National Academic Press 1992). Later joint documents demonstrate the influence of these early expressions of what future militaries will contain by the use of language such as connectivity, modularity, real-time and synchronized operations. For examples of this commonality, see JV2010 (note 4) and the subordinate service documents.
54. See Gen. Gordon Sullivan, US Army Chief of Staff, 'America's Army - Focusing on the Future', in Association of the United States Army (AUSA), Army Greenbook (Washington DC: AUSA Press 1994) pp. 19-29 (20). The doctrine of the US Army is largely driving the organizational notions of the RMA.Early in the 1990s, the US Army had begun to specify the outcomes the RMA would achieve once implemented. For example, the Army's doctrine developers in TRADOC had defined the so-called Force XXI by five characteristics: 'doctrinal flexibility, strategic mobility, tailorability and modularity, joint and multinational connectivity, and the versatility to function in War and OOTW (Operations Other Than War)', [emphasis mine]. See US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Department of the Army, Dimensional Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early Twenty-First Century, Pam 525-5 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office 1994) p.3-1 and US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Department of the Army, The Airland Battle and Corps: Operational Concepts series (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office 1995). These attributes are themselves developing with the organizational changes emergent in the process of translating the information warfare (IW) visions of senior US defense leaders into military organizational structures. See National Research Council (NRC), National Academy of Science, Star 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century (Washington DC: National Academic Press 1992). Later joint documents demonstrate the influence of these early expressions of what future militaries will contain by the use of language such as connectivity, modularity, real-time and synchronized operations. For examples of this commonality, see JV2010 (note 4) and the subordinate service documents.
55. See Gen. Gordon Sullivan, US Army Chief of Staff, 'America's Army - Focusing on the Future', in Association of the United States Army (AUSA), Army Greenbook (Washington DC: AUSA Press 1994) pp. 19-29 (20). The doctrine of the US Army is largely driving the organizational notions of the RMA.Early in the 1990s, the US Army had begun to specify the outcomes the RMA would achieve once implemented. For example, the Army's doctrine developers in TRADOC had defined the so-called Force XXI by five characteristics: 'doctrinal flexibility, strategic mobility, tailorability and modularity, joint and multinational connectivity, and the versatility to function in War and OOTW (Operations Other Than War)', [emphasis mine]. See US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Department of the Army, Dimensional Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early Twenty-First Century, Pam 525-5 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office 1994) p.3-1 and US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Department of the Army, The Airland Battle and Corps: Operational Concepts series (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office 1995). These attributes are themselves developing with the organizational changes emergent in the process of translating the information warfare (IW) visions of senior US defense leaders into military organizational structures. See National Research Council (NRC), National Academy of Science, Star 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century (Washington DC: National Academic Press 1992). Later joint documents demonstrate the influence of these early expressions of what future militaries will contain by the use of language such as connectivity, modularity, real-time and synchronized operations. For examples of this commonality, see JV2010 (note 4) and the subordinate service documents.
56. See JV2010 (note 4)p. 17.
57. See TRADOC 1994 (note 31).
58. See Winn Schwartau, 'An Introduction to Information Warfare', in Pfaltzgraff and Shultz (note 19) pp.47-60.
59. See Manuel De Landa, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines (NY: Zone Books 1991).
60. See Leon E. Salomon, 'At AMC, the Future Begins Today', in Association of the United States Army (AUSA), Army Greenbook (Washington DC: AUSA Press 1994) pp.69-76 (70).
61. See Rochlin and Demchak (note 11); Williamson Murray, Air War in the Persian Gulf (Baltimore, MD: Nautical and Aviation 1995); and Bruce W. Watson and Peter G. Tsouras (eds.) Military Lessons of the Gulf War (Novato, CA: Presidio Press 1993).
62. See Rochlin and Demchak (note 11); Williamson Murray, Air War in the Persian Gulf (Baltimore, MD: Nautical and Aviation 1995); and Bruce W. Watson and Peter G. Tsouras (eds.) Military Lessons of the Gulf War (Novato, CA: Presidio Press 1993).
63. See Alvin Toeffler and Heidi Toeffler, War and Anti-War (Boston, MA: Little, Brown 1993).
64. See Schwartau (note 34) as well as Winn Schwartau, Information Warfare (NY: Thunder's Mouth Press 1994).
65. See Schwartau (note 34) p.49.
66. See Franklin C. Spinney, Defense Facts of Life: The Plans/Reality Mismatch (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1985); and Ian McDonald, 'Exploiting Battlespace Transparency: Operating Inside an Opponent's Decision Cycle', in Pfaltzgraff and Shultz (note 19) pp. 143-68.
67. See Franklin C. Spinney, Defense Facts of Life: The Plans/Reality Mismatch (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1985); and Ian McDonald, 'Exploiting Battlespace Transparency: Operating Inside an Opponent's Decision Cycle', in Pfaltzgraff and Shultz (note 19) pp. 143-68.
68. See James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (NY: Basic Books 1989) and Peter F. Drucker, Technology Management and Society (San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row 1959).
69. See James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (NY: Basic Books 1989) and Peter F. Drucker, Technology Management and Society (San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row 1959).
70. These concepts are dutifully, if not exactly, echoed in the vision statements of the subordinate services and, in future work, I will explore the implications of the inexactitude in these subordinate service echoes.
71. See TRADOC 1994 (note 31) p.3-1.
72. See Rick Maze, 'The War That will Never be Won', Army Times (5 Aug. 1996) p.26.
73. See Chris C. Demchak, 'Creating the Enemy: Worldwide Diffusion of an Electronic Military', in Emily Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason (eds.) The Diffusion of Military Knowledge from the Napoleonic Era to the Information Age (Edited volume under review by university publisher, forthcoming).
74. See Robert L. O'Connell, Of Anns and Men: A History of War, Weapons and Aggression (NY: OUP 1989); and Martin van Creveld, Technology in War (NY: Free Press 1989).
75. See Robert L. O'Connell, Of Anns and Men: A History of War, Weapons and Aggression (NY: OUP 1989); and Martin van Creveld, Technology in War (NY: Free Press 1989).
76. This model is spreading in the absence of any local or, often, strategic need. By some accounts, peace appears to be breaking out all over in the arenas of military competition between states. See John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: the Obsolescence of Major War (NY: Basic Books 1989); and John Lewis Gaddis, 'International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War', International Security 17/3 (Winter 1992) pp.5-58. For a longer range historical view, see also Lynn White Jr, Medieval Technology and Social Change (Oxford: OUP 1978). As the international system regroups following the demise of the Cold War, potential enemies have become less well defined and declared wars are becoming fewer and more deadly. Even while military budgets around the world are being reduced in response to an apparent relative reduction in imminent threats, military leaders around the globe are declaring their intention to modernize their organizations using information technologies (IT) and precision weapons in smaller, more professional force structures. It is possible that nations simply no longer declare their hostilities as war and, hence, while large wars are infrequent, lethal conflicts are more likely. Nonetheless, this explanation for diffusion does not adequately explain the geographic spread of modernization.
77. This model is spreading in the absence of any local or, often, strategic need. By some accounts, peace appears to be breaking out all over in the arenas of military competition between states. See John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: the Obsolescence of Major War (NY: Basic Books 1989); and John Lewis Gaddis, 'International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War', International Security 17/3 (Winter 1992) pp.5-58. For a longer range historical view, see also Lynn White Jr, Medieval Technology and Social Change (Oxford: OUP 1978). As the international system regroups following the demise of the Cold War,
78. This model is spreading in the absence of any local or, often, strategic need. By some accounts, peace appears to be breaking out all over in the arenas of military competition between states. See John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: the Obsolescence of Major War (NY: Basic Books 1989); and John Lewis Gaddis, 'International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War', International Security 17/3 (Winter 1992) pp.5-58. For a longer range historical view, see also Lynn White Jr, Medieval Technology and Social Change (Oxford: OUP 1978). As the international system regroups following the demise of the Cold War, potential enemies have become less well defined and declared wars are becoming fewer and more deadly. Even while military budgets around the world are being reduced in response to an apparent relative reduction in imminent threats, military leaders around the globe are declaring their intention to modernize their organizations using information technologies (IT) and precision weapons in smaller, more professional force structures. It is possible that nations simply no longer declare their hostilities as war and, hence, while large wars are infrequent, lethal conflicts are more likely. Nonetheless, this explanation for diffusion does not adequately explain the geographic spread of modernization.
79. The taken-for-granted aspect of this structuration is best captured by the following statement by the Chief of the People's Army of Vietnam. Despite halving a 1.2 million strong armed forces since 1988, by 1993 Vietnam was planning on having 'regular and modern armed forces by the end of the century'. See Robert Karniol, 'PAVN strives to modernize in a climate of austerity', Jane's Defence Weekly 3 (3 April 1993) p. 18. Alongtime intelligence analyst specializing in East Asia dismissed regional competition as a factor in the modernization programs of East Asian countries, characterizing the process as 'keeping up with the neighbors', with no perception of hostile intent by neighboring countries. See JDW Interview, 'Hugh White, Deputy Secretary, Strategy and Intelligence, Australian DoD', Jane's Defence Weekly (24 July 1996) p.32. Finally, a curious case is Botswana, whose modernization tendency is clearly an anomaly for Sub-Saharan Africa. Its geographic location suggests no opponent aside from South Africa which could pose a sophisticated threat, and that one potential foe has recently experienced a peaceful transition to democracy. See Demchak forthcoming.
80. The taken-for-granted aspect of this structuration is best captured by the following statement by the Chief of the People's Army of Vietnam. Despite halving a 1.2 million strong armed forces since 1988, by 1993 Vietnam was planning on having 'regular and modern armed forces by the end of the century'. See Robert Karniol, 'PAVN strives to modernize in a climate of austerity', Jane's Defence Weekly 3 (3 April 1993) p. 18. Alongtime intelligence analyst specializing in East Asia dismissed regional competition as a factor in the modernization programs of East Asian countries, characterizing the process as 'keeping up with the neighbors', with no perception of hostile intent by neighboring countries. See JDW Interview, 'Hugh White, Deputy Secretary, Strategy and Intelligence, Australian DoD', Jane's Defence Weekly (24 July 1996) p.32. Finally, a curious case is Botswana, whose modernization tendency is clearly an anomaly for Sub-Saharan Africa. Its geographic location suggests no opponent aside from South Africa which could pose a sophisticated threat, and that one potential foe has recently experienced a peaceful transition to democracy. See Demchak forthcoming.
81. See David Strang and John W. Meyer, 'Institutional Conditions for Diffusion', Theory and Society 22 (1993) pp.487-511.
82. For a better rendition of this argument that the patterns of world wide military modernization are difficult to explain using traditional realist explanations, see Chris C. Demchak, 'Watersheds in Perception and Knowledge', Contemporary Security Policy 20/3 (Dec. 1999).
83. See Adams (note 7) as well as Friedman and Friedman (note 11).
84. See JV2010 (note 4).
85. More precisely, this system of systems links four large networks for complete battlefield overview by the commander. The first is a sensor grid providing long range (up 300 km) real-time and detailed information streams. The second is an engagement grid with graphical real-time depiction of all elements of the battle (and refined trend analyses on the spot presumably. The third is an enormous database grid providing query, drill down, summary, and push information in all directions of the command structure. The fourth is an offensive information operations network that enables the overt or covert destruction, disruption, diversion, intrusion, insertion, and inspection of the targeted organization's use of information technologies. For elaboration of these concepts, see JV2010 (note 4); Gompert et al. (note 28) p.34; and Allen and Demchak forthcoming 2000.
86. See Frances Cairncross, The Death of Distance: How the Communications Revolution Will Change Our Lives (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press 1996).
87. See Adams (note 7).
88. Likely effectiveness (F) of an organization is defined as the level of 'systems fit', between the precision requirements built into the system and the surprise potential inherent in the level of unknowable or knowable unknowns extant coordination of activities through knowledge exchange and the validity of the information exchanged for the situation at hand. For a discussion of 'systems fit', and effectiveness, see Michael Harrison, Diagnosing Organizations: Methods, Models and Processes (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications 1987). For a discussion by a panel of organization scholars which placed effectiveness as one of the key components of productivity, see Douglas H. Harris (ed.) Organizational Linkages: Understanding the Productivity Paradox (Washington DC: National Academy Press 1994) p.8. The definition of effectiveness is always under debate among both practitioners and scholars, especially in security studies and defense policy debates due to the material and human costs of mistakes.
89. Likely effectiveness (F) of an organization is defined as the level of 'systems fit', between the precision requirements built into the system and the surprise potential inherent in the level of unknowable or knowable unknowns extant coordination of activities through knowledge exchange and the validity of the information exchanged for the situation at hand. For a discussion of 'systems fit', and effectiveness, see Michael Harrison, Diagnosing Organizations: Methods, Models and Processes (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications 1987). For a discussion by a panel of organization scholars which placed effectiveness as one of the key components of productivity, see Douglas H. Harris (ed.) Organizational Linkages: Understanding the Productivity Paradox (Washington DC: National Academy Press 1994) p.8. The definition of effectiveness is always under debate among both practitioners and scholars, especially in security studies and defense policy debates due to the material and human costs of mistakes.
90. See Wilson (note 42); Drucker (note 42); and Renate Mayntz and Thomas P. Hughes (eds.) The Development of Large Technical Systems (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1988).
91. See Carl Mitcham, Thinking Through Technology: The Path Between Engineering and Philosophy (U. of Chicago Press 1994); and White (note 48).
92. See Nitin Nohria, 'Is a Network Perspective a Useful Way of Studying Organizations?', in idem and Robert G. Eccles (eds.) Networks and Organizations: Structure, Form and Action (Boston: Harvard Business School Press 1992) pp.1-22 (4).
93. See Gerald R. Salancik, 'Wanted: A Good Network Theory of Organization', Administrative Science Quarterly 40/2 (June 1995) pp.345-54.
94. As a side note for further research, it is possible that the basic form of an organization is neither a market nor hierarchy as suggested by Williamson nor any other bifurcated typology. See Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies (NY: Free Press 1975). Rather, Priore argues that markets may be at one end of a continuum with hierarchies at the other and the continuum may be composed of various kinds of networks. See Michael J. Priore, 'Fragments of a Cognitive Theory of Technological Change and Organizational Structure', in Nohria and Eccles, Networks and Organizations (note 60) pp.430-44.
95. As a side note for further research, it is possible that the basic form of an organization is neither a market nor hierarchy as suggested by Williamson nor any other bifurcated typology. See Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies (NY: Free Press 1975). Rather, Priore argues that markets may be at one end of a continuum with hierarchies at the other and the continuum may be composed of various kinds of networks. See Michael J. Priore, 'Fragments of a Cognitive Theory of Technological Change and Organizational Structure', in Nohria and Eccles, Networks and Organizations (note 60) pp.430-44.
96. See Theodore Caplow, Principles of Organization (NY: Harcourt, Brace 1964).
97. For an introduction to the field and to further references see Sheila Jasanoff, Gerald E. Markle, James C. Peterson, and Trevor Pinch, Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications 1995); Mitcham and Jane Summerton (ed.) Changing Large Technical Systems (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1994). For discussions of technology in organizations across varying circumstances, see Urs Gattiker, Technology Management in Organizations (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications 1990); Luis R. Gomez-Mejia and Michael W. Lawless (eds.) Organizational Issues in High Technology Management Monographs in Organizational Behavior and Industrial Relations, Vol.11 (London: JAI Press 1990); and Jon Clark, Ian McLoughlin, Howard Rose, and Robert King, The Process of Technological Change: New Technology and Social Choice in the Workplace (Cambridge, UK: CUP 1990).
98. For an introduction to the field and to further references see Sheila Jasanoff, Gerald E. Markle, James C. Peterson, and Trevor Pinch, Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications 1995); Mitcham and Jane Summerton (ed.) Changing Large Technical Systems (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1994). For discussions of technology in organizations across varying circumstances, see Urs Gattiker, Technology Management in Organizations (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications 1990); Luis R. Gomez-Mejia and Michael W. Lawless (eds.) Organizational Issues in High Technology Management Monographs in Organizational Behavior and Industrial Relations, Vol.11 (London: JAI Press 1990); and Jon Clark, Ian McLoughlin, Howard Rose, and Robert King, The Process of Technological Change: New Technology and Social Choice in the Workplace (Cambridge, UK: CUP 1990).
99. For an introduction to the field and to further references see Sheila Jasanoff, Gerald E. Markle, James C. Peterson, and Trevor Pinch, Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications 1995); Mitcham and Jane Summerton (ed.) Changing Large Technical Systems (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1994). For discussions of technology in organizations across varying circumstances, see Urs Gattiker, Technology Management in Organizations (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications 1990); Luis R. Gomez-Mejia and Michael W. Lawless (eds.) Organizational Issues in High Technology Management Monographs in Organizational Behavior and Industrial Relations, Vol.11 (London: JAI Press 1990); and Jon Clark, Ian McLoughlin, Howard Rose, and Robert King, The Process of Technological Change: New Technology and Social Choice in the Workplace (Cambridge, UK: CUP 1990).
100. For an introduction to the field and to further references see Sheila Jasanoff, Gerald E. Markle, James C. Peterson, and Trevor Pinch, Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications 1995); Mitcham and Jane Summerton (ed.) Changing Large Technical Systems (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1994). For discussions of technology in organizations across varying circumstances, see Urs Gattiker, Technology Management in Organizations (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications 1990); Luis R. Gomez-Mejia and Michael W. Lawless (eds.) Organizational Issues in High Technology Management Monographs in Organizational Behavior and Industrial Relations, Vol.11 (London: JAI Press 1990); and Jon Clark, Ian McLoughlin, Howard Rose, and Robert King, The Process of Technological Change: New Technology and Social Choice in the Workplace (Cambridge, UK: CUP 1990).
101. For an introduction to the field and to further references see Sheila Jasanoff, Gerald E. Markle, James C. Peterson, and Trevor Pinch, Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications 1995); Mitcham and Jane Summerton (ed.) Changing Large Technical Systems (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1994). For discussions of technology in organizations across varying circumstances, see Urs Gattiker, Technology Management in Organizations (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications 1990); Luis R. Gomez-Mejia and Michael W. Lawless (eds.) Organizational Issues in High Technology Management Monographs in Organizational Behavior and Industrial Relations, Vol.11 (London: JAI Press 1990); and Jon Clark, Ian McLoughlin, Howard Rose, and Robert King, The Process of Technological Change: New Technology and Social Choice in the Workplace (Cambridge, UK: CUP 1990).
102. See Stephen R. Barley, 'The alignment of technology and structure through roles and networks', Administrative Science Quarterly 35/1 (Spring 1990) pp.61-103; and Marlene E. Burkhardt and Daniel J. Brass, 'Changing patterns or patterns of change: The effects of a change in technology on social network structure and power', Administrative Science Quarterly 35/1 (1990) pp.104-27.
103. See Stephen R. Barley, 'The alignment of technology and structure through roles and networks', Administrative Science Quarterly 35/1 (Spring 1990) pp.61-103; and Marlene E. Burkhardt and Daniel J. Brass, 'Changing patterns or patterns of change: The effects of a change in technology on social network structure and power', Administrative Science Quarterly 35/1 (1990) pp.104-27.
104. See Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grassroots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organizations (Berkeley, CA: U. of California Press 1949); and Johannes M. Pennings and Peter Buitendam (eds.) New Technology as Organizational Innovation: The Development and Diffusion of Microelectronics (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger 1987).
105. See Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grassroots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organizations (Berkeley, CA: U. of California Press 1949); and Johannes M. Pennings and Peter Buitendam (eds.) New Technology as Organizational Innovation: The Development and Diffusion of Microelectronics (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger 1987).
106. See Shoshana Zuboff, In the Age of the Smart Machine (NY: Basic Books 1984).
107. See Rochlin (note 12) for a discussion of this kind of outcome in the nuclear power industries of Europe.
108. See Summerton (note 64) as well as Mayntz and Hughes (note 58).
109. This use of the term knowledge is unusual. If one perceives organizations as 'knowledge-producing', entities or as information processing systems, then knowledge is the lifeblood of operations. See Martin Landau and Russell Stout Jr, "'To Manage Is Not to Control: The Folly of Type II Errors'", Public Administration Review 39 (March-April 1979) pp. 148-56. In my work, knowledge comes in any form that is critical to completing the mission at hand. Hence, the right spare part, manual or technical education in the repairer's head can all contain the same essential knowledge. In principle, they may be considered interchangeable if the knowledge is exactly replicated. In practice, all three are needed because each has unique types of knowledge. The part contains the ability to operate, the manual the information about how to connect and disconnect, and the repairer the knowledge to remember patterns in diagnosis and to pick up, select and turn things. In the abstract, however, any of the three can be perceived as bringing essential knowledge to the situation. It is a much broader notion of knowledge than is normally used. It has a great deal in common with the recently emerging economic notions of Romer who has revolutionized economic thinking by adding 'K', for knowledge to the established Capital-Labor equation. See Chris C. Demchak, Military Organizations, Complex Machines: Modernization in the U.S. Armed Services (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1991); Chris C. Demchak, 'Coping, Copying, and Concentrating: Organizational Learning and Modernization in Militaries (Case Studies of Israel, Germany and Britain)', Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 5/3 (July 1995) pp.345-76; and Paul M. Romer, 'Beyond the Knowledge Worker', World Link Davos '95 (Jan./Feb. 1995). Correspondingly, the conception of slack is based on the notion that accurate knowledge at the time and place of deleterious surprises is the fundamental component of slack.
110. This use of the term knowledge is unusual. If one perceives organizations as 'knowledge-producing', entities or as information processing systems, then knowledge is the lifeblood of operations. See Martin Landau and Russell Stout Jr, "'To Manage Is Not to Control: The Folly of Type II Errors'", Public Administration Review 39 (March-April 1979) pp. 148-56. In my work, knowledge comes in any form that is critical to completing the mission at hand. Hence, the right spare part, manual or technical education in the repairer's head can all contain the same essential knowledge. In principle, they may be considered interchangeable if the knowledge is exactly replicated. In practice, all three are needed because each has unique types of knowledge. The part contains the ability to operate, the manual the information about how to connect and disconnect, and the repairer the knowledge to remember patterns in diagnosis and to pick up, select and turn things. In the abstract, however, any of the three can be perceived as bringing essential knowledge to the situation. It is a much broader notion of knowledge than is normally used. It has a great deal in common with the recently emerging economic notions of Romer who has revolutionized economic thinking by adding 'K', for knowledge to the established Capital-Labor equation. See Chris C. Demchak, Military Organizations, Complex Machines: Modernization in the U.S. Armed Services (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1991); Chris C. Demchak, 'Coping, Copying, and Concentrating: Organizational Learning and Modernization in Militaries (Case Studies of Israel, Germany and Britain)', Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 5/3 (July 1995) pp.345-76; and Paul M. Romer, 'Beyond the Knowledge Worker', World Link Davos '95 (Jan./Feb. 1995). Correspondingly, the conception of slack is based on the notion that accurate knowledge at the time and place of deleterious surprises is the fundamental component of slack.
111. This use of the term knowledge is unusual. If one perceives organizations as 'knowledge-producing', entities or as information processing systems, then knowledge is the lifeblood of operations. See Martin Landau and Russell Stout Jr, "'To Manage Is Not to Control: The Folly of Type II Errors'", Public Administration Review 39 (March-April 1979) pp. 148-56. In my work, knowledge comes in any form that is critical to completing the mission at hand. Hence, the right spare part, manual or technical education in the repairer's head can all contain the same essential knowledge. In principle, they may be considered interchangeable if the knowledge is exactly replicated. In practice, all three are needed because each has unique types of knowledge. The part contains the ability to operate, the manual the information about how to connect and disconnect, and the repairer the knowledge to remember patterns in diagnosis and to pick up, select and turn things. In the abstract, however, any of the three can be perceived as bringing essential knowledge to the situation. It is a much broader notion of knowledge than is normally used. It has a great deal in common with the recently emerging economic notions of Romer who has revolutionized economic thinking by adding 'K', for knowledge to the established Capital-Labor equation. See Chris C. Demchak, Military Organizations, Complex Machines: Modernization in the U.S. Armed Services (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1991); Chris C. Demchak, 'Coping, Copying, and Concentrating: Organizational Learning and Modernization in Militaries (Case Studies of Israel, Germany and Britain)', Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 5/3 (July 1995) pp.345-76; and Paul M. Romer, 'Beyond the Knowledge Worker', World Link Davos '95 (Jan./Feb. 1995). Correspondingly, the conception of slack is based on the notion that accurate knowledge at the time and place of deleterious surprises is the fundamental component of slack.
112. This use of the term knowledge is unusual. If one perceives organizations as 'knowledge-producing', entities or as information processing systems, then knowledge is the lifeblood of operations. See Martin Landau and Russell Stout Jr, "'To Manage Is Not to Control: The Folly of Type II Errors'", Public Administration Review 39 (March-April 1979) pp. 148-56. In my work, knowledge comes in any form that is critical to completing the mission at hand. Hence, the right spare part, manual or technical education in the repairer's head can all contain the same essential knowledge. In principle, they may be considered interchangeable if the knowledge is exactly replicated. In practice, all three are needed because each has unique types of knowledge. The part contains the ability to operate, the manual the information about how to connect and disconnect, and the repairer the knowledge to remember patterns in diagnosis and to pick up, select and turn things. In the abstract, however, any of the three can be perceived as bringing essential knowledge to the situation. It is a much broader notion of knowledge than is normally used. It has a great deal in common with the recently emerging economic notions of Romer who has revolutionized economic thinking by adding 'K', for knowledge to the established Capital-Labor equation. See Chris C. Demchak, Military Organizations, Complex Machines: Modernization in the U.S. Armed Services (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1991); Chris C. Demchak, 'Coping, Copying, and Concentrating: Organizational Learning and Modernization in Militaries (Case Studies of Israel, Germany and Britain)', Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 5/3 (July 1995) pp.345-76; and Paul M. Romer, 'Beyond the Knowledge Worker', World Link Davos '95 (Jan./Feb. 1995). Correspondingly, the conception of slack is based on the notion that accurate knowledge at the time and place of deleterious surprises is the fundamental component of slack.
113. See Jay R. Galbraith, Organizational Design (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 1976). See also LaPorte (note 3) and Demchak (note 70).
114. The literature on complexity is incomplete; the work so far has focused on some aspects of complexity and neglected the power of the phenomenon as a whole. Examples of conceptual difficulties with complexity and surprise in their various guises exist even in some of the better works. One well-known author observes that size and wealth decrease internal and external uncertainty (for militaries) without much explanation as to how this intuitively problematical outcome can be true. See Barry R. Posen, 'Nationalism, the Mass Army and Military Power', International Security 18/2 (Fall 1993) pp.80-124 (49). A second author suggests that a war without chaos can exist if it is solely between machines - no surprises or uncertainty. See Zvi Lanir, Baruch Fischoff, and Stephen Johnson, 'Military Risk-taking: C31 and the Cognitive Functions of Boldness in War', Journal of Strategic Studies 11/1 (March 1988) pp.96-114 (100). Even Perrow, in an otherwise excellent book, seems to muddle the concept of complexity by linking it to loose coupling and, indirectly, to both greater and lesser redundancy. See Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies (NY: Basic Books 1984) p.280. The operational difficulties are obvious. Complex systems produce the unexpected with annoying regularity but the fragmented set of approaches has often produced inconclusive research and little broadly applicable guidance. For example, redundancy is either a cure for, or a cause of, complexity, depending on the author chosen. See Martin Landau, 'Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap', Public Administration Review (July-Aug. 1969) pp.346-58. The situation is exacerbated by the tendency of complexity to vary in its significance across systems. For recent works specifically on the development of a science of complexity, see M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos (NY: Simon and Schuster 1992); and John Casti, Complexiflcation: Explaining A Paradoxical World through the Science of Surprise (NY: HarperCollins 1994).
115. The literature on complexity is incomplete; the work so far has focused on some aspects of complexity and neglected the power of the phenomenon as a whole. Examples of conceptual difficulties with complexity and surprise in their various guises exist even in some of the better works. One well-known author observes that size and wealth decrease internal and external uncertainty (for militaries) without much explanation as to how this intuitively problematical outcome can be true. See Barry R. Posen, 'Nationalism, the Mass Army and Military Power', International Security 18/2 (Fall 1993) pp.80-124 (49). A second author suggests that a war without chaos can exist if it is solely between machines - no surprises or uncertainty. See Zvi Lanir, Baruch Fischoff, and Stephen Johnson, 'Military Risk-taking: C31 and the Cognitive Functions of Boldness in War', Journal of Strategic Studies 11/1 (March 1988) pp.96-114 (100). Even Perrow, in an otherwise excellent book, seems to muddle the concept of complexity by linking it to loose coupling and, indirectly, to both greater and lesser redundancy. See Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies (NY: Basic Books 1984) p.280. The operational difficulties are obvious. Complex systems produce the unexpected with annoying regularity but the fragmented set of approaches has often produced inconclusive research and little broadly applicable guidance. For example, redundancy is either a cure for, or a cause of, complexity, depending on the author chosen. See Martin Landau, 'Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap', Public Administration Review (July-Aug. 1969) pp.346-58. The situation is exacerbated by the tendency of complexity to vary in its significance across systems. For recent works specifically on the development of a science of complexity, see M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos (NY: Simon and Schuster 1992); and John Casti, Complexiflcation: Explaining A Paradoxical World through the Science of Surprise (NY: HarperCollins 1994).
116. The literature on complexity is incomplete; the work so far has focused on some aspects of complexity and neglected the power of the phenomenon as a whole. Examples of conceptual difficulties with complexity and surprise in their various guises exist even in some of the better works. One well-known author observes that size and wealth decrease internal and external uncertainty (for militaries) without much explanation as to how this intuitively problematical outcome can be true. See Barry R. Posen, 'Nationalism, the Mass Army and Military Power', International Security 18/2 (Fall 1993) pp.80-124 (49). A second author suggests that a war without chaos can exist if it is solely between machines - no surprises or uncertainty. See Zvi Lanir, Baruch Fischoff, and Stephen Johnson, 'Military Risk-taking: C31 and the Cognitive Functions of Boldness in War', Journal of Strategic Studies 11/1 (March 1988) pp.96-114 (100). Even Perrow, in an otherwise excellent book, seems to muddle the concept of complexity by linking it to loose coupling and, indirectly, to both greater and lesser redundancy. See Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies (NY: Basic Books 1984) p.280. The operational difficulties are obvious. Complex systems produce the unexpected with annoying regularity but the fragmented set of approaches has often produced inconclusive research and little broadly applicable guidance. For example, redundancy is either a cure for, or a cause of, complexity, depending on the author chosen. See Martin Landau, 'Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap', Public Administration Review (July-Aug. 1969) pp.346-58. The situation is exacerbated by the tendency of complexity to vary in its significance across systems. For recent works specifically on the development of a science of complexity, see M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos (NY: Simon and Schuster 1992); and John Casti, Complexiflcation: Explaining A Paradoxical World through the Science of Surprise (NY: HarperCollins 1994).
117. The literature on complexity is incomplete; the work so far has focused on some aspects of complexity and neglected the power of the phenomenon as a whole. Examples of conceptual difficulties with complexity and surprise in their various guises exist even in some of the better works. One well-known author observes that size and wealth decrease internal and external uncertainty (for militaries) without much explanation as to how this intuitively problematical outcome can be true. See Barry R. Posen, 'Nationalism, the Mass Army and Military Power', International Security 18/2 (Fall 1993) pp.80-124 (49). A second author suggests that a war without chaos can exist if it is solely between machines - no surprises or uncertainty. See Zvi Lanir, Baruch Fischoff, and Stephen Johnson, 'Military Risk-taking: C31 and the Cognitive Functions of Boldness in War', Journal of Strategic Studies 11/1 (March 1988) pp.96-114 (100). Even Perrow, in an otherwise excellent book, seems to muddle the concept of complexity by linking it to loose coupling and, indirectly, to both greater and lesser redundancy. See Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies (NY: Basic Books 1984) p.280. The operational difficulties are obvious. Complex systems produce the unexpected with annoying regularity but the fragmented set of approaches has often produced inconclusive research and little broadly applicable guidance. For example, redundancy is either a cure for, or a cause of, complexity, depending on the author chosen. See Martin Landau, 'Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap', Public Administration Review (July-Aug. 1969) pp.346-58. The situation is exacerbated by the tendency of complexity to vary in its significance across systems. For recent works specifically on the development of a science of complexity, see M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos (NY: Simon and Schuster 1992); and John Casti, Complexiflcation: Explaining A Paradoxical World through the Science of Surprise (NY: HarperCollins 1994).
118. The literature on complexity is incomplete; the work so far has focused on some aspects of complexity and neglected the power of the phenomenon as a whole. Examples of conceptual difficulties with complexity and surprise in their various guises exist even in some of the better works. One well-known author observes that size and wealth decrease internal and external uncertainty (for militaries) without much explanation as to how this intuitively problematical outcome can be true. See Barry R. Posen, 'Nationalism, the Mass Army and Military Power', International Security 18/2 (Fall 1993) pp.80-124 (49). A second author suggests that a war without chaos can exist if it is solely between machines - no surprises or uncertainty. See Zvi Lanir, Baruch Fischoff, and Stephen Johnson, 'Military Risk-taking: C31 and the Cognitive Functions of Boldness in War', Journal of Strategic Studies 11/1 (March 1988) pp.96-114 (100). Even Perrow, in an otherwise excellent book, seems to muddle the concept of complexity by linking it to loose coupling and, indirectly, to both greater and lesser redundancy. See Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies (NY: Basic Books 1984) p.280. The operational difficulties are obvious. Complex systems produce the unexpected with annoying regularity but the fragmented set of approaches has often produced inconclusive research and little broadly applicable guidance. For example, redundancy is either a cure for, or a cause of, complexity, depending on the author chosen. See Martin Landau, 'Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap', Public Administration Review (July-Aug. 1969) pp.346-58. The situation is exacerbated by the tendency of complexity to vary in its significance across systems. For recent works specifically on the development of a science of complexity, see M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos (NY: Simon and Schuster 1992); and John Casti, Complexiflcation: Explaining A Paradoxical World through the Science of Surprise (NY: HarperCollins 1994).
119. The literature on complexity is incomplete; the work so far has focused on some aspects of complexity and neglected the power of the phenomenon as a whole. Examples of conceptual difficulties with complexity and surprise in their various guises exist even in some of the better works. One well-known author observes that size and wealth decrease internal and external uncertainty (for militaries) without much explanation as to how this intuitively problematical outcome can be true. See Barry R. Posen, 'Nationalism, the Mass Army and Military Power', International Security 18/2 (Fall 1993) pp.80-124 (49). A second author suggests that a war without chaos can exist if it is solely between machines - no surprises or uncertainty. See Zvi Lanir, Baruch Fischoff, and Stephen Johnson, 'Military Risk-taking: C31 and the Cognitive Functions of Boldness in War', Journal of Strategic Studies 11/1 (March 1988) pp.96-114 (100). Even Perrow, in an otherwise excellent book, seems to muddle the concept of complexity by linking it to loose coupling and, indirectly, to both greater and lesser redundancy. See Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies (NY: Basic Books 1984) p.280. The operational difficulties are obvious. Complex systems produce the unexpected with annoying regularity but the fragmented set of approaches has often produced inconclusive research and little broadly applicable guidance. For example, redundancy is either a cure for, or a cause of, complexity, depending on the author chosen. See Martin Landau, 'Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap', Public Administration Review (July-Aug. 1969) pp.346-58. The situation is exacerbated by the tendency of complexity to vary in its significance across systems. For recent works specifically on the development of a science of complexity, see M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos (NY: Simon and Schuster 1992); and John Casti, Complexiflcation: Explaining A Paradoxical World through the Science of Surprise (NY: HarperCollins 1994).
120. There is considerable disagreement about how one measures complexity. In my original work I drew upon LaPorte (note 3) in measuring it parametrically by the number of components (N), the differentiation among them (D) and their interdependence (I). In brief, increases in one attribute not accommodated by decreases in another constitute an increase in complexity. Space constraints forbid reproducing the necessarily lengthy defense of this measure but it has proven consistent with similar measures in both engineering and psychology. See Demchak (note 70) for an application of the measure. For other variations, see Casti (note 72) as well as Waldrop (note 72).
121. The actual origin of the term 'tightly coupled', is unclear but it appears Karl Weick first used the term to mean strong interdependence between elements whose operations are critical to the organization. It is a term with a good deal of evocative power, expressing the consequences of high levels of interdependence. See Karl E. Weick, The Social Psychology of Organizing, 2nd ed. (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 1979 <1969>).
122. See Lee Sproul and Sara Kiesler, Connections: News Ways of Working in the Networked Organization (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1991), and Casti (note 72).
123. See Weick (note 74) as well as Perrow (note 72) for this use of the term 'coupled'.
124. See Waldrop (note 72). Four newer literatures with rising conceptual power are directly relevant to understanding the rising complexification of modern military structures, environments and missions. The first is complexity theory led by the Santa Fe Institute scholars. See Waldrop (note 72); Horgan; and Ralph Gomory, 'The Known, the Unknown and the Unknowable', Scientific American 272/6 (June 1995) pp.120+. This approach is also distributed across disciplines as other scholars individually seek a way to handle largescale, dynamic, integrated systems. For various complementary approaches, see Demchak (note 70); C.F. Larry Heiman, 'Understanding the Challenger Disaster: Organizational Structure and the Design of Reliable Systems', American Political Science Review 87/2 (June 1993) pp.421-35; and Emery Roe, Taking Complexity Seriously: Policy Analysis, Triangulation and Sustainable Development (Boston: Kluwer Academic 1998). Increasingly, variations of this work are called 'surprise theory'. See the volume by Casti (note 72). This literature focuses on how qualitative rules operating through a complexifying system can produce unpredictable and path-dependent outcomes which can differ each time the system operates. The goal is to seek the minimal set of underlying rules that govern the surprising outcomes in complex systems and to be able to identify the broad outlines of likely outcomes - the 'trends', - in advance. The second is the chaos theory or nonlinear dynamics literature. For basic introductions to these concepts, see James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (NY: Viking 1987); L. Douglas Kiel, Managing Chaos and Complexity in Government: A New Paradigm for Managing Change, Innovation, and Organizational Renewal (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass 1994); and Margaret J. Wheatley, Leadership and the New Science (San Francisco, CA: Boerrett-Kochler 1992). The third is the network literature which studies groups of elements which have formed into structures whose relations show important characteristics. See Priore (note 62); Nohria (note 60); and Salancik (note 61). Finally the fourth is the literature on largescale technical systems (LTS) which focuses on identifying the constellations of socio-technical circumstances most likely to incur costly and/or catastrophic surprises for whole communities. See again Mayntz and Hughes (note 58); and Summerton (note 64).
125. See Waldrop (note 72). Four newer literatures with rising conceptual power are directly relevant to understanding the rising complexification of modern military structures, environments and missions. The first is complexity theory led by the Santa Fe Institute scholars. See Waldrop (note 72); Horgan; and Ralph Gomory, 'The Known, the Unknown and the Unknowable', Scientific American 272/6 (June 1995) pp.120+. This approach is also distributed across disciplines as other scholars individually seek a way to handle largescale, dynamic, integrated systems. For various complementary approaches, see Demchak (note 70); C.F. Larry Heiman, 'Understanding the Challenger Disaster: Organizational Structure and the Design of Reliable Systems', American Political Science Review 87/2 (June 1993) pp.421-35; and Emery Roe, Taking Complexity Seriously: Policy Analysis, Triangulation and Sustainable Development (Boston: Kluwer Academic 1998). Increasingly, variations of this work are called 'surprise theory'. See the volume by Casti (note 72). This literature focuses on how qualitative rules operating through a complexifying system can produce unpredictable and path-dependent outcomes which can differ each time the system operates. The goal is to seek the minimal set of underlying rules that govern the surprising outcomes in complex systems and to be able to identify the broad outlines of likely outcomes - the 'trends', - in advance. The second is the chaos theory or nonlinear dynamics literature. For basic introductions to these concepts, see James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (NY: Viking 1987); L. Douglas Kiel, Managing Chaos and Complexity in Government: A New Paradigm for Managing Change, Innovation, and Organizational Renewal (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass 1994); and Margaret J. Wheatley, Leadership and the New Science (San Francisco, CA: Boerrett-Kochler 1992). The third is the network literature which studies groups of elements which have formed into structures whose relations show important characteristics. See Priore (note 62); Nohria (note 60); and Salancik (note 61). Finally the fourth is the literature on largescale technical systems (LTS) which focuses on identifying the constellations of socio-technical circumstances most likely to incur costly and/or catastrophic surprises for whole communities. See again Mayntz and Hughes (note 58); and Summerton (note 64).
126. See Waldrop (note 72). Four newer literatures with rising conceptual power are directly relevant to understanding the rising complexification of modern military structures, environments and missions. The first is complexity theory led by the Santa Fe Institute scholars. See Waldrop (note 72); Horgan; and Ralph Gomory, 'The Known, the Unknown and the Unknowable', Scientific American 272/6 (June 1995) pp.120+. This approach is also distributed across disciplines as other scholars individually seek a way to handle largescale, dynamic, integrated systems. For various complementary approaches, see Demchak (note 70); C.F. Larry Heiman, 'Understanding the Challenger Disaster: Organizational Structure and the Design of Reliable Systems', American Political Science Review 87/2 (June 1993) pp.421-35; and Emery Roe, Taking Complexity Seriously: Policy Analysis, Triangulation and Sustainable Development (Boston: Kluwer Academic 1998). Increasingly, variations of this work are called 'surprise theory'. See the volume by Casti (note 72). This literature focuses on how qualitative rules operating through a complexifying system can produce unpredictable and path-dependent outcomes which can differ each time the system operates. The goal is to seek the minimal set of underlying rules that govern the surprising outcomes in complex systems and to be able to identify the broad outlines of likely outcomes - the 'trends', - in advance. The second is the chaos theory or nonlinear dynamics literature. For basic introductions to these concepts, see James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (NY: Viking 1987); L. Douglas Kiel, Managing Chaos and Complexity in Government: A New Paradigm for Managing Change, Innovation, and Organizational Renewal (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass 1994); and Margaret J. Wheatley, Leadership and the New Science (San Francisco, CA: Boerrett-Kochler 1992). The third is the network literature which studies groups of elements which have formed into structures whose relations show important characteristics. See Priore (note 62); Nohria (note 60); and Salancik (note 61). Finally the fourth is the literature on largescale technical systems (LTS) which focuses on identifying the constellations of socio-technical circumstances most likely to incur costly and/or catastrophic surprises for whole communities. See again Mayntz and Hughes (note 58); and Summerton (note 64).
127. See Waldrop (note 72). Four newer literatures with rising conceptual power are directly relevant to understanding the rising complexification of modern military structures, environments and missions. The first is complexity theory led by the Santa Fe Institute scholars. See Waldrop (note 72); Horgan; and Ralph Gomory, 'The Known, the Unknown and the Unknowable', Scientific American 272/6 (June 1995) pp.120+. This approach is also distributed across disciplines as other scholars individually seek a way to handle largescale, dynamic, integrated systems. For various complementary approaches, see Demchak (note 70); C.F. Larry Heiman, 'Understanding the Challenger Disaster: Organizational Structure and the Design of Reliable Systems', American Political Science Review 87/2 (June 1993) pp.421-35; and Emery Roe, Taking Complexity Seriously: Policy Analysis, Triangulation and Sustainable Development (Boston: Kluwer Academic 1998). Increasingly, variations of this work are called 'surprise theory'. See the volume by Casti (note 72). This literature focuses on how qualitative rules operating through a complexifying system can produce unpredictable and path-dependent outcomes which can differ each time the system operates. The goal is to seek the minimal set of underlying rules that govern the surprising outcomes in complex systems and to be able to identify the broad outlines of likely outcomes - the 'trends', - in advance. The second is the chaos theory or nonlinear dynamics literature. For basic introductions to these concepts, see James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (NY: Viking 1987); L. Douglas Kiel, Managing Chaos and Complexity in Government: A New Paradigm for Managing Change, Innovation, and Organizational Renewal (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass 1994); and Margaret J. Wheatley, Leadership and the New Science (San Francisco, CA: Boerrett-Kochler 1992). The third is the network literature which studies groups of elements which have formed into structures whose relations show important characteristics. See Priore (note 62); Nohria (note 60); and Salancik (note 61). Finally the fourth is the literature on largescale technical systems (LTS) which focuses on identifying the constellations of socio-technical circumstances most likely to incur costly and/or catastrophic surprises for whole communities. See again Mayntz and Hughes (note 58); and Summerton (note 64).
128. See Waldrop (note 72). Four newer literatures with rising conceptual power are directly relevant to understanding the rising complexification of modern military structures, environments and missions. The first is complexity theory led by the Santa Fe Institute scholars. See Waldrop (note 72); Horgan; and Ralph Gomory, 'The Known, the Unknown and the Unknowable', Scientific American 272/6 (June 1995) pp.120+. This approach is also distributed across disciplines as other scholars individually seek a way to handle largescale, dynamic, integrated systems. For various complementary approaches, see Demchak (note 70); C.F. Larry Heiman, 'Understanding the Challenger Disaster: Organizational Structure and the Design of Reliable Systems', American Political Science Review 87/2 (June 1993) pp.421-35; and Emery Roe, Taking Complexity Seriously: Policy Analysis, Triangulation and Sustainable Development (Boston: Kluwer Academic 1998). Increasingly, variations of this work are called 'surprise theory'. See the volume by Casti (note 72). This literature focuses on how qualitative rules operating through a complexifying system can produce unpredictable and path-dependent outcomes which can differ each time the system operates. The goal is to seek the minimal set of underlying rules that govern the surprising outcomes in complex systems and to be able to identify the broad outlines of likely outcomes - the 'trends', - in advance. The second is the chaos theory or nonlinear dynamics literature. For basic introductions to these concepts, see James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (NY: Viking 1987); L. Douglas Kiel, Managing Chaos and Complexity in Government: A New Paradigm for Managing Change, Innovation, and Organizational Renewal (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass 1994); and Margaret J. Wheatley, Leadership and the New Science (San Francisco, CA: Boerrett-Kochler 1992). The third is the network literature which studies groups of elements which have formed into structures whose relations show important characteristics. See Priore (note 62); Nohria (note 60); and Salancik (note 61). Finally the fourth is the literature on largescale technical systems (LTS) which focuses on identifying the constellations of socio-technical circumstances most likely to incur costly and/or catastrophic surprises for whole communities. See again Mayntz and Hughes (note 58); and Summerton (note 64).
129. See Waldrop (note 72). Four newer literatures with rising conceptual power are directly relevant to understanding the rising complexification of modern military structures, environments and missions. The first is complexity theory led by the Santa Fe Institute scholars. See Waldrop (note 72); Horgan; and Ralph Gomory, 'The Known, the Unknown and the Unknowable', Scientific American 272/6 (June 1995) pp.120+. This approach is also distributed across disciplines as other scholars individually seek a way to handle largescale, dynamic, integrated systems. For various complementary approaches, see Demchak (note 70); C.F. Larry Heiman, 'Understanding the Challenger Disaster: Organizational Structure and the Design of Reliable Systems', American Political Science Review 87/2 (June 1993) pp.421-35; and Emery Roe, Taking Complexity Seriously: Policy Analysis, Triangulation and Sustainable Development (Boston: Kluwer Academic 1998). Increasingly, variations of this work are called 'surprise theory'. See the volume by Casti (note 72). This literature focuses on how qualitative rules operating through a complexifying system can produce unpredictable and path-dependent outcomes which can differ each time the system operates. The goal is to seek the minimal set of underlying rules that govern the surprising outcomes in complex systems and to be able to identify the broad outlines of likely outcomes - the 'trends', - in advance. The second is the chaos theory or nonlinear dynamics literature. For basic introductions to these concepts, see James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (NY: Viking 1987); L. Douglas Kiel, Managing Chaos and Complexity in Government: A New Paradigm for Managing Change, Innovation, and Organizational Renewal (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass 1994); and Margaret J. Wheatley, Leadership and the New Science (San Francisco, CA: Boerrett-Kochler 1992). The third is the network literature which studies groups of elements which have formed into structures whose relations show important characteristics. See Priore (note 62); Nohria (note 60); and Salancik (note 61). Finally the fourth is the literature on largescale technical systems (LTS) which focuses on identifying the constellations of socio-technical circumstances most likely to incur costly and/or catastrophic surprises for whole communities. See again Mayntz and Hughes (note 58); and Summerton (note 64).
130. See Casti (note 72) in particular.
131. See Demchak (note 70).
132. While fully aware of the oversimplification of the measure and that a healthy statistical literature on sensitivity analysis exists, I have nonetheless proposed a simple measure of possible changes in robustness as the multiplication of redundancy by slack. Intuitively appealing, the term rises or falls as the combination of redundancy and slack rises and falls. See Demchak (note 70). If system A has high slack and low redundancy and system B has low slack and high redundancy, then it is intuitively clear that both could have the same level of robustness. The processes resulting in robustness vary considerably, and more needs to be known about both systems and the slack or redundancy at their critical nodes. This measure is extremely rough but heuristically useful for focusing on the relationships between complexity and robustness via redundancy and slack.
133. See Demchak (note 70).
134. Chaos theorists start with an equation and watch the outcomes to discern the rule changes over time. Complexity theorists set up the rules for change and then watch the outcomes to see if any general unifying relation or equation is at work. See Gleick as well as Gomory.
135. See Gleick (note 77); Gomoryn (note 77); and John Horgan, 'From Complexity to Perplexity', Scientific American 272/6 (June 1995) pp. 104-9.
136. See Roe (note 77) for a discussion of how taking complexity seriously has profound implications for social interactions.
137. See Turban et al. (note 14) p.530.
138. See again Casti (note 72); Waldrop (note 72); and Demchak (note 70).
139. For organizations using networked computers, effectiveness (F) can also be defined in web-related organizational terms as the least constrained systems fit between the coordination of activities through knowledge exchange and the validity of the information exchange. See Chris C. Demchak, Christian Friis and Todd M. La Porte, 'Webbing Governance: National Differences in Constructing the Public Face', in G. David Garson, Handbook of Public Information Systems (NY: Marcel Dekker 2000). For more discussion of applying this approach see also the CyPRG web site (www.cyprg.arizona.edu).
140. Published statements of expected outcomes by senior leaders, given sufficient emphasis through a large organization, are powerful influences on the social constructions of reality emerging in the rest of the organization. For a useful introduction to this social construction approach, see Anne L. Schneider and Helen Ingram, 'How the Social Construction of Target Populations Contributes to Problems in Policy Design', Policy Currents 3/1 (Feb. 1993) pp.1+. For the emergent model, I draw primarily upon the expected characteristics of the new information technology military as stated by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and by the subordinate services.
141. For complementary discussions of this problem, see Weick (note 74); Demchak (note 70); and Galbraith (note 10).
142. See CFJO (note 5) pp.31-3.
143. Among the vulnerabilities are: 'may outpace our allies and coalition partners' ability to integrate[,]... data overload[,]... [competition with commercial uses,] assured military access to all required frequencies can not be taken for granted[,]... strategic and operational commanders [tempted] to take control of tactical actions[,]... [o]ver reliance on, or unrealistic expectations from, information systems could inhibit or lengthen decisions. ...Sophisticated information systems can fail... [need to ]develop a new skill set of knowing how to correctly evaluate digitized information ... success results from technological advances and innovative ways of considering and combining them for warfighting ...'. See CFJO (note 5) pp.31-3.
144. See ibid, pp.67-71.
145. 'The JFC uses knowledge about the adversary and the battlespace to determine enemy centers of gravity - which may be forces or functions -and to identify vulnerabilities which render these centers of gravity susceptible to attack and destruction. Information superiority ways and means, particularly information manipulation, computer viruses, and other information intrusions, will increase the JFC's capability to asymmetrically attack a variety of enemy targets'. See CFJO (note 5) pp.67-71.
146. 'Information superiority will help the JFC determine when termination is appropriate or imminent and will help the joint force monitor termination actions. The JFC will rely on capabilities of the four new concepts to keep an adversary in check during this unstable period and to enforce termination conditions'. See CFJO (note 5) pp.67-71.
147. See ibid, pp.67.
148. For this insight about complexity, I thank Lt. Col. Dennis Lowrey (ret.) who worked for years to combine simulations and real forces in useful learning exercises.
149. '...data include both open sources and traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems and architectures. Collected data becomes information when processed into usableforms such as reports or images. This information is transformed into intelligence by purposeful analysis, interpretation, and collation with related information and background to meet the specific needs of the user.' See CFJO (note 5) pp.46.
150. Much of this discussion was previously published in Chris C. Demchak, 'Information Warfare, Organizations, and the Power of Disruption', L'Enjeu Atlantiques (June 1996).
151. This is currently an extremely divisive political debate but credible analysts and scholars are declaring support for ceding the Golan in view of the new IO capabilities. See Uri Bar-Joseph, 'Israel's Northern Eyes and Shield: The Strategic Value of the Golan Heights Revisited', Journal of Strategic Studies 21/3 (Sept. 1998) pp.46-66. See also Cohen et al. (note 9).
152. See Reuven Pedatzur, Obstacles Towards a Regional Control Mechanism: Israel's View of Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Peace Era', Contemporary
153. See B. O'Shea, 'Israel's Vietnam?', Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 21/3 (Sept. 1998) p.307.
154. See Stuart A. Cohen, 'Small States and Their Armies: Restructuring the Militia Framework of the Israel Defense Force', Journal of Strategic Studies 18/4 (Dec. 1995a) pp.78-93 (81).
155. See Gabriel (note 10); O'Shea as well as Scott Peterson, '"Grapes of Wrath" Blitz Still Bites Back at Israel', Christian Science Monitor International Online (15 Oct. 1997) http://www.csmonitor.eom/durable/1997/10/15/intl/intl.l.html, downloaded 22 Oct. 1999.
156. See Cohen (note 102) p.89.
157. See Bar-Joseph (note 99).
158. See Arieh O'Sullivan, 'IDF targets 21 days the millennium bug could strike', Jerusalem Post (online) (17 Jan. 1999b) www.jpost.co.il, downloaded 21 Oct. 1999.
159. This material was obtained during interviews with senior IDF officers, active and retired, in 1990-93 and referred forthwith as 'interviews 1990-93'.
160. See Stuart Cohen, The Israeli Defense Forces from a "People's Army" to a "Professional military" - Causes and Implications', Armed Forces and Society 21/2 (Winter 1995b) pp.237-54 (241-3).
161. See O'Sullivan (note 106) pp.17-18.
162. See Stuart A. Cohen, 'From Integration to Segregation: the Role of Religion in the IDF', Armed Forces and Society 25/3 (Spring 1999) pp.387-406. The current uprising has changed Reservist service time right now but is not clear the new service lengths are permanent.
163. See Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes and Trevor J. Pinch (eds.) The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1987) p.240.
164. See O'Sullivan (note 106).
165. This intention has been gaining momentum for some time, beginning in full force with the tenure of former Chief of General Staff Ehud Barak (1991-94) who strongly promoted the professionalization of the force and reduction in dependence on the reserves. See Cohen (notes 102 and 108) for a particularly informed discussion of these changes.
166. See Jonathan Marcus, 'Israel's Defense Policy at a Strategic Crossroads', The Washington Quarterly 22/1 (Winter 1998) pp.33-48.
167. See Cohen (note 102).
168. '24/7', as a short name for continuous operations has emerged with the rising popularity of ecommerce where website stores are Open', all the time. For a basic discussion of this widening phenomenon, see Turban et al. (note 14) p.236.
169. See Pat Allen and Chris C. Demchak, 'An Information Operations (IO) Conceptual Model and Application Framework', paper presented and accepted for proceedings of Military Operations Research Society (MORS) Symposium, 20-22 June 2000, US Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, CO.
170. A 'normal error', is simply the inherent surprise encased in large complex systems with limited sensor sets. All complex systems have this error in some fashion. See Perrow (note 72) for a full explanation of this term and concept.
171. These essential elements and their interrelation are discussed in greater detail in Pat Allen and Chris C. Demchak, 'The Need for, and Design of, an IO-ISR Federation of Models'. Paper presented to Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization's (SISO) conference, 26-31 March 2000, Orlando, Florida.
172. See La Porte (note 3); Demchak (note 70); Roe (note 77); and Sproul and Kiesler (note 75).
173. For comparison, Turkey with a population of 65 million bought just 300,000 in the same year. See Nisso Cohen, 'The Israel High-Tech Industry - Fifty Years of Excellence', Ministry of Foreign Affairs website (Government of Israel 1999) URL:www.israelmfa.gov.il/mfa/goasp?MFAH01vu0, downloaded 17 Oct. 1999.
174. See iGuide, 'Israeli Internet Guide: Growth Data', NetVision Corporation (2000) www.iguide.co.il/stats, downloaded 20 Jan. 2000.
175. See NUA, 'Internet Users in the Middle East (estimated)', NUA (1999) www.nua.ie/ surveys/how_many_online/m_east, downloaded 15 Jan. 2000.
176. See ibid.
177. See ibid.
178. See IIS, 'Science and Technology in Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs Online', Israel Information Service (1999) gopher://israel-info gov.il/00/facts/science/, downloaded 17 Oct. 1999.
179. See Israeli Central Bureau of Stalistics (ICBS), Statistical Abstract of Israel (Tel Aviv: Government of Israel Press 1999) http://www.cbs.gov.il/, downloaded 15 Jan. 2000.
180. See Cohen (note 108).
181. See Barbara Tuck, 'Israel: A Remarkable Hotbed for Hi-Tech', Electronic Systems Technology & Design: Computer Design 36/7 (July 1996) pp. 16-23. See also Barbara Kollmeyer, 'Israeli hightechs talk e-commerce', CBS NewsWatch online (27 Oct. 1999) www.cbs.marketwatch.com/archive/19991027/news/current/israel.htx, downloaded 27 Oct. 1999.
182. See Barbara Tuck, 'Israel: A Remarkable Hotbed for Hi-Tech', Electronic Systems Technology & Design: Computer Design 36/7 (July 1996) pp. 16-23. See also Barbara Kollmeyer, 'Israeli hightechs talk e-commerce', CBS NewsWatch online (27 Oct. 1999) www.cbs.marketwatch.com/archive/19991027/news/current/israel.htx, downloaded 27 Oct. 1999.
183. See Israel Line, 'Economic Briefs: Israeli company Go SMS has developed a technology enabling cellular handset owners to retrieve information from Internet sites', Israel Line (NY: Israeli Consulate Online, 6 Feb. 2000).
184. See Reuven Gal, A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier (NY: Greenwood Press 1986).
185. This is not something Israelis like to talk about but most of them see as necessary for their survival - that potential enemies know as little as possible about the Israeli national defense structure. This has led, for example, to the closure of an IDF English language publication by then Chief of Staff Ehud Barak who is supposed to have said that it only educated Israel's enemies. See interviews 1990-93.
186. Material obtained during interviews with senior webmasters across major government agencies in Israel as a part of National Science Foundation (NSF SDEST) grant no. 9602007 Hotlinked Governance (grant period 1996-1999).
187. The focus on science and technology is reinforced in the wider society. In the early 1950s, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, considered the founder of modern Israel, called for government policies to form a society based on advanced skills in science and technology. He argued this focus was needed because agriculture would not ultimately sustain a modernized Israel and the country had few other resources but their education and wits. Hence, the military drive for advanced technologies also had a strong economic basis. This scientification of Israel to replace agriculture as its main comparative advantage would directly help the defense industries who were until recently all owned by the government. See Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion (NY: Adama Books 1978); Ze'ev Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army (NY: Macmillan 1985, orig. 1974); and, in particular, Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel, Vol.11 (NY: OUP 1987) p.218.
188. The focus on science and technology is reinforced in the wider society. In the early 1950s, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, considered the founder of modern Israel, called for government policies to form a society based on advanced skills in science and technology. He argued this focus was needed because agriculture would not ultimately sustain a modernized Israel and the country had few other resources but their education and wits. Hence, the military drive for advanced technologies also had a strong economic basis. This scientification of Israel to replace agriculture as its main comparative advantage would directly help the defense industries who were until recently all owned by the government. See Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion (NY: Adama Books 1978); Ze'ev Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army (NY: Macmillan 1985, orig. 1974); and, in particular, Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel, Vol.11 (NY: OUP 1987) p.218.
189. The focus on science and technology is reinforced in the wider society. In the early 1950s, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, considered the founder of modern Israel, called for government policies to form a society based on advanced skills in science and technology. He argued this focus was needed because agriculture would not ultimately sustain a modernized Israel and the country had few other resources but their education and wits. Hence, the military drive for advanced technologies also had a strong economic basis. This scientification of Israel to replace agriculture as its main comparative advantage would directly help the defense industries who were until recently all owned by the government. See Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion (NY: Adama Books 1978); Ze'ev Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army (NY: Macmillan 1985, orig. 1974); and, in particular, Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel, Vol.11 (NY: OUP 1987) p.218.
190. See Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Anatomy of the Israeli Army (London: Batsford 1979) pp.99-100.
191. See Shimon Engel, 'The Long Road from Molotov Cocktails to Missiles, Tanks and Lasers: A Technological History of the IDF', IDF Journal III (Summer 1988) pp.22-31; Gerald Steinberg, 'Recycled weapons', Technology Review 58 (April 1985) pp.28-38; and Benny Michelson, 'Bom in battle: A history of the IDF through four decades', IDF Journal 15 (Summer 1988) pp.8-21.
192. See Shimon Engel, 'The Long Road from Molotov Cocktails to Missiles, Tanks and Lasers: A Technological History of the IDF', IDF Journal III (Summer 1988) pp.22-31; Gerald Steinberg, 'Recycled weapons', Technology Review 58 (April 1985) pp.28-38; and Benny Michelson, 'Bom in battle: A history of the IDF through four decades', IDF Journal 15 (Summer 1988) pp.8-21.
193. See Shimon Engel, 'The Long Road from Molotov Cocktails to Missiles, Tanks and Lasers: A Technological History of the IDF', IDF Journal III (Summer 1988) pp.22-31; Gerald Steinberg, 'Recycled weapons', Technology Review 58 (April 1985) pp.28-38; and Benny Michelson, 'Bom in battle: A history of the IDF through four decades', IDF Journal 15 (Summer 1988) pp.8-21.
194. See ibid. p.11.
195. It is interesting to note that these innovations were a work-around to an overall equipment shortage. See Engel (note 136). According to senior officers interviewed in a series of visits 1990-93, if the early acquisitions could have been entire systems of the first quality, the innovative piecemeal upgrading would not have been valued over acquiring intact new systems. The Israelis always would have preferred new equipment even if it posed severe maintenance challenges and were not interchangeable in any way with existing equipment. See also Stewart Reiser, The Israeli Anns Industry (NY: Holmes & Meier 1989).
196. See Aaron D. Rosenbaum, 'How Israeli Engineers Improve US Weaponry', IEEE Spectrum 25 (Nov. 1988) pp.38-9.
197. See Richard M. Hodgetts and Fred Luthans, International Management: Culture, Strategy and Behavior (NY: McGraw-Hill 2000) pp.118-23.
198. The small community of scholars of Israeli administration who publish in English demonstrate a common assessment of Israeli administration as highly personalistic. It sets unrealistic but politically charged goals and implements them poorly, and is widely intermingled in all aspects of the society in this former socialist state. Rosenbloom argues that divergent operating norms, values, and operating styles are typical for public administration in Israel and that a weak or missing ethic of public service is linked to a high degree of personalization and a low degree of formalization of roles and obligations. See David H. Rosenbloom, 'Israel's Administrative Culture, Israeli Arabs, and Arab Subjects', Syracuse Journal of International Law & Commerce 13 (Spring 1987) pp.435-73. This situation is historically long-lived according to Caiden who characterized Israel's administrative culture as Opportunistic dogmatism'. See Gerald E. Caiden, Israel's Administrative Culture (Berkeley: U. of California Institute of Governmental Studies monograph 1970) p.28.
199. The small community of scholars of Israeli administration who publish in English demonstrate a common assessment of Israeli administration as highly personalistic. It sets unrealistic but politically charged goals and implements them poorly, and is widely intermingled in all aspects of the society in this former socialist state. Rosenbloom argues that divergent operating norms, values, and operating styles are typical for public administration in Israel and that a weak or missing ethic of public service is linked to a high degree of personalization and a low degree of formalization of roles and obligations. See David H. Rosenbloom, 'Israel's Administrative Culture, Israeli Arabs, and Arab Subjects', Syracuse Journal of International Law & Commerce 13 (Spring 1987) pp.435-73. This situation is historically long-lived according to Caiden who characterized Israel's administrative culture as Opportunistic dogmatism'. See Gerald E. Caiden, Israel's Administrative Culture (Berkeley: U. of California Institute of Governmental Studies monograph 1970) p.28.
200. See interviews 1990-93.
201. See Tuck (note 129).
202. In interviews, current and former officers noted the casual, unplanned nature of operations in peacetime, whether in acquisition, training, maintenance or command and control, which turned in war or crisis into frenzied self-sacrifice and intense, sometimes contradictory ad hoc efforts to find expedient solutions to organizational shortcomings ignored or endured in peace. During the 1982 Lebanon War the constant switching of commanders and commands in order to improvise a task organization around a situation is said to have 'created confusion and negated the much valued cohesion'. See Gabriel (note 10) p.185. In interviews, senior retired officers have argued that, since Israel's wars have been successes for the most part, there has been little incentive for the IDF organization to alter the widespread presumption that improvised operations will ultimately suffice. See interviews 1990-93.
203. See Demehak (note 9).
204. See Rosenbloom (note 141) pp.435-73.
205. See Caiden (note 141) p.28.
206. See Ira Sharkansky, What Makes Israel Tick: How Domestic Policy-Makers Cope with Constraints (Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall 1985).
207. See Ira Sharkansky and Margaret Wrightson, 'The Overloaded State: Response to Ira Sharkansky', Public Administration Review 49 (March/April 1989) pp.201-5.
208. See interviews 1990-93.
209. See Israel Line, 'Assailants Fire on Israeli Bus Near Hebron', Israel Line (NY: Israeli Consulate Online, 3 Nov. 1999).
210. See Clifford Stoll, The Cuckoo's Egg: Tracking a Spy Through the Maze of Computer Espionage (NY: Doubleday 1989).
211. There is a vast literature on computer security today and the marketing of most of it promises 24/7 automatic protection. Nonetheless most of them required a skilled operator to keep ahead of the equally determined and skilled attacker. For a good basic primer on the issues, see William R. Cheswick and Steven M. Bellovin, Firewalls and Internet Security (NY: Addison-Wesley 1994).
212. See Perrow (note 72).
213. See Chris Nuttall, 'Chernobyl Virus Causes Asian Meltdown', BBC Online News (27 April 27 1999) URL:http://news2.thls.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_329000/329688, downloaded 10 May 1999.
214. See O'Sullivan (note 106).
215. In particular, the 1995 assassination of Prime Minister Rabin by a devout Yeminite Jew was extremely disturbing to the Israeli Jewish population because of their long held belief that 'Jews don't kill Jews', an extremely strong clan tenet. For a discussion of how the current divisions among Jews in Israel are affecting the IDF, see Cohen (note 110) pp.387-406.
216. See Gal (note 131).
217. There is a large literature acknowledging this change in Israel, much of it by Israelis themselves. For a brief introduction to these changes, see Jonathan Marcus, 'Israel Sharpens its Military Strategy', BBC Online Special Report (April 29 1998) http://news 2.thls.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/events/israel_at_50/israel_today/newsid_79000/79617, downloaded 17 Oct. 1999. For more depth, see works by Cohen (notes 102 and 108) and Efraim Inbar, 'Israeli National Security, 1973-1996', Security and Policy Studies 38 (Bar-Ilan University, Israel: BESA Center for Strategic Studies Publications Feb. 1998) p.76.
218. There is a large literature acknowledging this change in Israel, much of it by Israelis themselves. For a brief introduction to these changes, see Jonathan Marcus, 'Israel Sharpens its Military Strategy', BBC Online Special Report (April 29 1998) http://news 2.thls.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/events/israel_at_50/israel_today/newsid_79000/79617, downloaded 17 Oct. 1999. For more depth, see works by Cohen (notes 102 and 108) and Efraim Inbar, 'Israeli National Security, 1973-1996', Security and Policy Studies 38 (Bar-Ilan University, Israel: BESA Center for Strategic Studies Publications Feb. 1998) p.76.
219. See Tuck (note 129).
220. See Israel Line, 3 Nov. 1999.
221. See Jacques S. Gansler, Defense Conversion (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1995) and Lauren Holland, Weapons Under Fire (London: Garland 1996).
222. See Jacques S. Gansler, Defense Conversion (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1995) and Lauren Holland, Weapons Under Fire (London: Garland 1996).
223. See Rosenbaum (note 141) pp.38-9.
224. In the more technically advanced industries, it is increasingly assumed that a product on the market will be copied relatively rapidly. Hence, rather than trying to hoard technical secrets as the Apple Corporation did and ultimately losing them anyway, the current wisdom is that it is better to make something exceptionally complex (hard to reverse engineer) or exceptionally linked to derivative products that are too rapidly produced for a competitor to copy effectively. See Turban et al. (note 14) Ch.6.
225. See Tuck (note 129).
226. Cohen (notes 102 and 108) has noted that the IDF is iterating towards a de facto selective service by making it easy for the less competent conscripts to avoid military service. Unfortunately, the wider society's current support for conscription, based on a widespread belief that everyone serves, will be undermined over time if the IDF tries to only take the already computer literate middle and upper class conscripts.
227. See Turban et al. (note 14).
228. Doctrine is used here to mean the way in which operations are supposed to be conducted as accepted by the leaders of the organization. It is the 'way', not the purpose, of warfare. This definition differs from the former Soviet notion of doctrine adopted by much of the Third World. The latter includes the political purposes of conflict in the decisions concerning military strategy. The Israelis, like the British, have been reluctant to commit a standardized statement of 'doctrine', as defined here to paper. In general, aside from generally accepted tenets such as the necessity to be ready to improvise and subordinate autonomy, doctrine is defined locally in the training camps of the various corps such as Armor, Artillery, etc. In this situation, key generals define doctrine in their decisions and, until the next general with differing ideas comes along or all the implementing officers retire, this version prevails. It is for this reason that the memoirs of generals, routinely marginalized in countries like the US which publish doctrine, take on a greater importance in countries where only the retired will speak freely of the changes that occurred during their tenure. See Avraham Adan, On the Banks of the Suez (Novato, CA: Presidio Press 1980) and Shabtai Teveth, The Tanks of Tammuz (NY: Viking Press 1969) for examples of these post hoc revelations. One cautionary note: in such a small personalized society, it is not unusual to find that intra-organizational political battles continue in these memoirs.
229. Doctrine is used here to mean the way in which operations are supposed to be conducted as accepted by the leaders of the organization. It is the 'way', not the purpose, of warfare. This definition differs from the former Soviet notion of doctrine adopted by much of the Third World. The latter includes the political purposes of conflict in the decisions concerning military strategy. The Israelis, like the British, have been reluctant to commit a standardized statement of 'doctrine', as defined here to paper. In general, aside from generally accepted tenets such as the necessity to be ready to improvise and subordinate autonomy, doctrine is defined locally in the training camps of the various corps such as Armor, Artillery, etc. In this situation, key generals define doctrine in their decisions and, until the next general with differing ideas comes along or all the implementing officers retire, this version prevails. It is for this reason that the memoirs of generals, routinely marginalized in countries like the US which publish doctrine, take on a greater importance in countries where only the retired will speak freely of the changes that occurred during their tenure. See Avraham Adan, On the Banks of the Suez (Novato, CA: Presidio Press 1980) and Shabtai Teveth, The Tanks of Tammuz (NY: Viking Press 1969) for examples of these post hoc revelations. One cautionary note: in such a small personalized society, it is not unusual to find that intra-organizational political battles continue in these memoirs.
230. See interviews 1990-93.
231. See Gal (note 131).
232. See Todd R. La Porte and Paula Consolini, 'Working in Practice but Not in Theory: Theoretical Challenges of "High Reliability", Organizations', Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 1 (Jan. 1991) pp.19-48.
233. Gurian has noted that inhibitions and a wait-and-see attitudes decline dramatically as a young male's hormone levels are elevated. Late adolescent males have about 20 times the amount of aggression-fostering testoterone hormones as females who, conversely, have much higher levels of serotonin - the calming hormone. Males are better soldiers when the battle is overt, the tactical goals near term and clear, and the response largely physical. But females are more likely to perform better when the battle takes time or is covert, the tactical goals are longer term and require constant attention for subtle adjustments during implementation, and the response largely at a distance and psychological. Hence, the IDF's plan to grow smaller and reduce the employment of females is at variance with the kind of average skills associated with each gender group at this age. In a 1986, 60 minutes interview, the chief of the California Conservation Corps, a Vietnam vet, stated that he would prefer to have more females to send out to clear out forests. His experience is that the young males hurt themselves too often by impulsively trying to do something they could not physically do alone while the females always teamed up before attempting large jobs. For more information of the effects of these testoterone levels on impulsivity, see Jan Norman, 'The Evolutionary Theory of Sexual Attraction', Web of Human Sexuality Site (University of Missouri-Kansas City 1998) URL: http://www.umkc.edu/sites/hsw/other/ evolution.html, downloaded 8 Jan. 2000. See also Michael Gurian, The Good Son (NY: Putnam 1999).
234. Gurian has noted that inhibitions and a wait-and-see attitudes decline dramatically as a young male's hormone levels are elevated. Late adolescent males have about 20 times the amount of aggression-fostering testoterone hormones as females who, conversely, have much higher levels of serotonin - the calming hormone. Males are better soldiers when the battle is overt, the tactical goals near term and clear, and the response largely physical. But females are more likely to perform better when the battle takes time or is covert, the tactical goals are longer term and require constant attention for subtle adjustments during implementation, and the response largely at a distance and psychological. Hence, the IDF's plan to grow smaller and reduce the employment of females is at variance with the kind of average skills associated with each gender group at this age. In a 1986, 60 minutes interview, the chief of the California Conservation Corps, a Vietnam vet, stated that he would prefer to have more females to send out to clear out forests. His experience is that the young males hurt themselves too often by impulsively trying to do something they could not physically do alone while the females always teamed up before attempting large jobs. For more information of the effects of these testoterone levels on impulsivity, see Jan Norman, 'The Evolutionary Theory of Sexual Attraction', Web of Human Sexuality Site (University of Missouri-Kansas City 1998) URL: http://www.umkc.edu/sites/hsw/other/ evolution.html, downloaded 8 Jan. 2000. See also Michael Gurian, The Good Son (NY: Putnam 1999).
235. See Gal (note 131) p.34.
236. See interviews 1990-93.
237. If the age and gender cannot fully explain this phenomena, it is often telling that game software - long the strongest province of young males in the US - tends to be the most inefficient in terms of memory use, the least helpful in troubleshooting options, and the most nonrobust on computers with multiple applications open. For a discussion of the security consequences of loopholes left in sloppy programs, see John Vacca, Internet Security Secrets (Foster City, CA: IDG 1996).
238. This process has also resulted in an interesting public relations phenomenon in which the number of beta testers is highlighted in promotional literature announcing the imminent arrival of the new program in the stores. This kind of test involves more than computer program bugs; it also engages the interactive effects of computerization on knowledge bases, anticipatory behaviors and other organizational incentives which are often forgotten by the programmers. Many systems fail to meet the promises of their promoters because the humans in the system were presumed to be relatively inert components of the new computerized organization.This 'buggy' phenomenon has become so common that, for a while in the early years of massive applications, the number of beta testers was used by Microsoft in its advance advertising for the new Windows 95. Interesting enough, nothing was ever said about what these over 400 beta testers reported or what was done in response. Today, application bugs are assumed to exist and customers' complaints back to the firm are used in lieu of this small army of formal testers. Applications are no longer held up to such scrutiny before being issued. Instead, consultants and firm technical support, for which the client pays additionally, are rapidly becoming the alternative to beta tests by volunteers.
239. See Zuboff (note 67) as well as Perrow (note 72).
240. The page limits of this piece preclude a full discussion of where and how to insert this slack. See Demchak (note 72) for more details.
241. See Turban et al. (note 14); and Nonaka and Tageuchi (note 19) pp.99-133.
242. See Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana UP 1984).
243. See Marcus (note 159) pp.33-48.
244. See Bar-Joseph (note 99).
245. See Rochlin and Demchak (note 11); and William G. Pagonis, Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press 1992).
246. See Gaddis (note 48) pp.21-2.
247. See Toeffler(s) (note 38) p.139.
248. See as noted by Cohen et al. (note 9).
249. An important side note: the US RMA also embodies less and less use of reservists but the political realities of the costs of a large expeditionary force as of now do not allow this part of the model to be pursued. As IW becomes dominant, however, I fully expect this portion of the RMA model to be more implemented in the US.
250. See Cohen et al. (note 9) p. 104.
251. See Martin Landau, On the Concept of a Self-Correcting Organization', Public Administration Review (Nov.-Dec. 1973) pp.533-42.
252. See Nonaka and Takeuchi (note 19) pp.99-133.
253. 'The goal is an organizational structure that views bureaucracy and the task force as complementary rather than mutually exclusive... Like an actual hypertext document, hypertext organization is made up of interconnected layers or contexts... Nonaka and Tageuchi (note 19) pp. 106-7.
254. See ibid. pp.99-133.
255. In a manuscript under construction now 'The Atrium - Refining the HyperText Organizational Form', I more fully explain the mechanisms of integrating an Atrium into an organization.
256. See Margaret J. Wheatley, Leadership and the New Science (San Francisco: Boerrett-Koehler 1992) as well as Gleick (note 77) for a more modern use of this term.
257. The evolution of the Internet or the World Wide Web is in essence a social history of information sharing among individuals embedded in organizations. There are several versions of the history of the Internet. See Michael Benedikt (ed.) Cyberspace: First Steps (Boston: MIT Press 1991) for one discussion. See also the Internet Society website.
258. In organizational terms, especially for public organization, a webbed approach to information directly challenges the long-established notions of the fundamentals of bureaucratic power. Weber's sociological argument about such power, translated in the 1940s, was further symbolically captured by the 1970s concept of an 'iron triangle', in which public agencies. Congressional committees and interested corporate entities controlled outcomes nearly absolutely by controlling the information anyone outside the organization could acquire. See H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (NY: Oxford 1947); and E. Sam Overman and Don F. Simanton, 'Iron Triangles and Issue Networks of Information Policy', Public Administration Review (special issue on public management information issues 1986) pp.584-9.
259. In organizational terms, especially for public organization, a webbed approach to information directly challenges the long-established notions of the fundamentals of bureaucratic power. Weber's sociological argument about such power, translated in the 1940s, was further symbolically captured by the 1970s concept of an 'iron triangle', in which public agencies. Congressional committees and interested corporate entities controlled outcomes nearly absolutely by controlling the information anyone outside the organization could acquire. See H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (NY: Oxford 1947); and E. Sam Overman and Don F. Simanton, 'Iron Triangles and Issue Networks of Information Policy', Public Administration Review (special issue on public management information issues 1986) pp.584-9.
260. See Thomas H. Davenport, Information Ecology (NY: OUP 1997); and Charles Savage, The 5th Generation Management (London: Butterworth-Heinemann 1996) for interesting variations on these notions of integrating the web into the organization's and society's critical operational information flows.
261. See Thomas H. Davenport, Information Ecology (NY: OUP 1997); and Charles Savage, The 5th Generation Management (London: Butterworth-Heinemann 1996) for interesting variations on these notions of integrating the web into the organization's and society's critical operational information flows.
262. See Cohen et al. (note 9).
263. I would argue the global community is currently bifurcated into regions where this city-like competition among more westernized nations dominates (e.g., the western hemisphere, western Europe) and regions marked by the lingering violence-prone less stable societies more typical of the realist perception of state relations (e.g., the broken states of Africa, the FSU states. The interesting distinction is that both regions are acquiring the network capabilities to touch each other in ways unprecedented historically. This interaction is the basis for is the oft too casually used term 'asymmetric warfare'. The term is conceptually handy for what it sums up but analytically vague. All warfare is, at the end of the day, asymmetric. See also Arquilla and Ronfeldt (note 24).
264. See O'Connell (note 47).
265. See Inbar (note 159).
266. Gabriel notes that, although mobilization was limited in the Lebanon War, the bulk of the very few medals the IDF awarded were given to Reservists. See Gabriel (note 10) p.11.
267. See David Eshel, 'Night Fighters: Israeli Military Maintains Wide Array of Highly Trained Special Forces Units', Armed Forces Journal International (April 1998) p.50.
268. The Israelis call terrorists and other threats below the state level by the euphemism 'current security'. See Cohen et al. (note 9).
269. See Stuart A. Cohen, 'Mista'arvim - IDF Masqueraders: the Military Unit and the Public Debate', Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 2/2 (Autumn 1993).
270. See Cohen et al. (note 9).
271. It is expected these forces will be matrix organizations in their deliberative or problem solving functions, not hierarchically linked military units, but they could evolve into nested hierarchies of both such as those seen in the high reliability research conducted in the US during the 1980s. See LaPorte and Consolini (note 171) pp.19-48.
272. See Cohen et al. (note 9).