Israel's Northern Eyes and Shield: The Strategic Value of the Golan Heights Revisited

Journal of Strategic Studies

Volumn 21, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 46-66

  Bar Joseph, Uri ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032256979     PISSN: 01402390     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402399808437726     Document Type: Article

References (44)

1. Asher Arian, Security Threatened: Surveying Israeli Opinion on Peace and War (NY: Cambridge UP 1995) pp.102-3; Israeli Public Opinion on National Security Issues, 1997 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies) (http://www.tau.ac.il:81/jcss/ memo47.html#f5). Recently, however, there are signs for a possible shift in Israeli public opinion on this question. For example, according to a poll conducted in July 1997, 49 per cent supported the returning of the entire Golan Heights to Syria in exchange for 'true peace', appropriate security arrangements and American and other nations' security guaranties, while 48 per cent objected to it (Ma'ariv, 1 Aug. 1997).
2. Asher Arian, Security Threatened: Surveying Israeli Opinion on Peace and War (NY: Cambridge UP 1995) pp.102-3; Israeli Public Opinion on National Security Issues, 1997 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies) (http://www.tau.ac.il:81/jcss/ memo47.html#f5). Recently, however, there are signs for a possible shift in Israeli public opinion on this question. For example, according to a poll conducted in July 1997, 49 per cent supported the returning of the entire Golan Heights to Syria in exchange for 'true peace', appropriate security arrangements and American and other nations' security guaranties, while 48 per cent objected to it (Ma'ariv, 1 Aug. 1997).
3. Asher Arian, Security Threatened: Surveying Israeli Opinion on Peace and War (NY: Cambridge UP 1995) pp.102-3; Israeli Public Opinion on National Security Issues, 1997 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies) (http://www.tau.ac.il:81/jcss/ memo47.html#f5). Recently, however, there are signs for a possible shift in Israeli public opinion on this question. For example, according to a poll conducted in July 1997, 49 per cent supported the returning of the entire Golan Heights to Syria in exchange for 'true peace', appropriate security arrangements and American and other nations' security guaranties, while 48 per cent objected to it (Ma'ariv, 1 Aug. 1997).
4. Ze'ev Schiff, Peace with Security: Israel's Minimal Security Requirements in Negotiations with Syria (Washington DC: Washington Inst. Policy Papers. No.34, 1993) p.47.
5. Syria has other options of attack - primarily by massive use of airpower and ballistic missiles against military and civilian targets within Israel, but the Golan is somewhat irrelevant to this form of warfare.
6. Uri Bar-Joseph, 'The Wealth of Information and the Poverty of Comprehension: Israel's Intelligence Failure of 1973 Revisited', Intelligence and National Security 10/4 (Oct. 1995) p.232 of pp.229-40.
7. For an updated description and analysis of the intelligence information Israel had on the eve of the war and the causes for its intelligence failure see: ibid, and idem, 'Israel's Intelligence Failure of 1973: New Evidence, A New Interpretation, and Theoretical Implications', Security Studies 4/3 (Spring 1995) pp.584-609.
8. For an updated description and analysis of the intelligence information Israel had on the eve of the war and the causes for its intelligence failure see: ibid, and idem, 'Israel's Intelligence Failure of 1973: New Evidence, A New Interpretation, and Theoretical Implications', Security Studies 4/3 (Spring 1995) pp.584-609.
9. 3I Systems: 1993-94 (London: Jane's Info. Group 1993) pp. 199-201.
10. Itamar Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace: Israel & Syria, 1992-1996 (Hebrew, Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth 1998) p.232. Professor Rabinovich was nominated in 1992 by Prime Minister Rabin to head the Israeli delegation for the peace talks with Syria. The stand taken on this issue by Chief of Staff. Amnon Shahak, clearly reflected Rabin's preferred solution to the problem.
11. Some of the important works that reach this conclusion are: Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford UP 1962); Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning (Washington DC: Brookings 1982); and Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1988).
12. Some of the important works that reach this conclusion are: Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford UP 1962); Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning (Washington DC: Brookings 1982); and Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1988).
13. Some of the important works that reach this conclusion are: Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford UP 1962); Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning (Washington DC: Brookings 1982); and Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1988).
14. Anthony H. Cordesman, Perilous Prospects: The Peace Process and the Arab-Israeli Military Balance (Boulder, CO: Westview 1996) p. 163.
15. Yitzhak Hoffi, 'The importance of the Golan Heights and possible security arrangements', Studies in National Security (Hebrew, Tel Aviv: Bar-Ilan University, BESA Center) 8 (April 1995) p. 17.
16. The figures for 1967 are from: Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, The Israeli Army (NY: Harper & Row 1975) p.274, and Trevor N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars 1947-1974 (ibid. 1978) p.337. Present figures are from: Ephraim Kam and Zeev Eytan (eds.) The Middle East Military Balance: 1994-1995 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies 1996) p. 360.
17. The figures for 1967 are from: Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, The Israeli Army (NY: Harper & Row 1975) p.274, and Trevor N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars 1947-1974 (ibid. 1978) p.337. Present figures are from: Ephraim Kam and Zeev Eytan (eds.) The Middle East Military Balance: 1994-1995 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies 1996) p. 360.
18. The figures for 1967 are from: Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, The Israeli Army (NY: Harper & Row 1975) p.274, and Trevor N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars 1947-1974 (ibid. 1978) p.337. Present figures are from: Ephraim Kam and Zeev Eytan (eds.) The Middle East Military Balance: 1994-1995 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies 1996) p. 360.
19. The figures for 1967 and 1973 are from Dupuy (note 11) pp.337, 608; present figures are from: Kam and Eytan (note 11) pp. 250, 359.
20. Aryeh Shalev, Israel and Syria: Peace and Security on the Golan ( Hebrew, Tel Aviv: Papirus 1993) p.151.
21. In 1973 the Jewish population of the Golan was evacuated to Israel's hinterland just before the outbreak of the war and during the first hours of the Syrian attack. Completing this task (rather than focusing on operational aspects of the war) was a main concern of Northern Command during these critical hours.
22. A complete demilitarization of the territory evacuated by Israel was a fundamental principle in the military talks the Rabin government conducted with Syria in 1995. The document which established Israel's basic principals towards the negotiations (known as the 'Shtauber document' on the name of its writer, Brigadier-General Zvika Shtauber of the IDF's Planning Branch GSQ), said: 'Our first principle is, that any territory that will be evacuated by us, will be demilitarized and remain clean of any Syrian military infrastructure and presence.' (Yedioth Ahronoth, 29 June 1995).
23. Shalev (note 13) p.152.
24. Ma'ariv, 12 Dec. 1997.
25. For a comparison of the present Syrian-Israeli airpower balance of ferces, see: Shmuel L. Gordon, 'The Air Balance in the Middle East', in Kam and Eytan (note 11) pp.93-129. For an analysis of main developments in the Syrian Army and the IDF since the Gulf War, see: Amos Gilboa, 'Main Armies of the Middle East', ibid. pp.130-50. For a comprehensive analysis of Arab-Israeli quantitative and qualitative balance of forces in the mid-1990s, see Cordesman (note 9) pp.28-102.
26. For a comparison of the present Syrian-Israeli airpower balance of ferces, see: Shmuel L. Gordon, 'The Air Balance in the Middle East', in Kam and Eytan (note 11) pp.93-129. For an analysis of main developments in the Syrian Army and the IDF since the Gulf War, see: Amos Gilboa, 'Main Armies of the Middle East', ibid. pp.130-50. For a comprehensive analysis of Arab-Israeli quantitative and qualitative balance of forces in the mid-1990s, see Cordesman (note 9) pp.28-102.
27. Barton Gelman, 'Gulf War Workhorses Suffer in Analysis', Los Angeles Times, 10 April 1992. Quoted in George and Meredith Friedman, The Future of War: Power, Technology and American World Dominance in the 21st Century (NY: Crown 1996) p.269.
28. Barton Gelman, 'Gulf War Workhorses Suffer in Analysis', Los Angeles Times, 10 April 1992. Quoted in George and Meredith Friedman, The Future of War: Power, Technology and American World Dominance in the 21st Century (NY: Crown 1996) p.269.
29. Thomas A. Keaney and Elliot A. Cohen, Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian Gulf (Annapolis, MD: Naval Inst. Press 1995) p. 191.
30. David Shukman, Tomorrow's War: The Threat of High-Technology Weapons (NY: Harcourt Brace 1996) p.148.
31. Keaney and Cohen (note 20) pp. 190-1.
32. Ibid. p.95.
33. For a discussion of this dilemma, see: Eliot A. Cohen, Michael J. Eisenstadt and Andrew J. Bacevich, 'Israel's Revolution in Security Affairs', Survival 40/1 (Spring 1998) pp.48-67; Shmuel L. Gordon, The Bow of Paris (Hebrew, Tel Aviv: Syfriat Poalim 1997) pp.206-7.
34. For a discussion of this dilemma, see: Eliot A. Cohen, Michael J. Eisenstadt and Andrew J. Bacevich, 'Israel's Revolution in Security Affairs', Survival 40/1 (Spring 1998) pp.48-67; Shmuel L. Gordon, The Bow of Paris (Hebrew, Tel Aviv: Syfriat Poalim 1997) pp.206-7.
35. Keaney and Cohen (note 20) p.216. Emphasis added.
36. Gilboa (note 18) pp.133-6. Between 1991 and 1997 the Syrian tank arsenal grew from 4,350 to 4,600. At the same time the IDF reduced the number of tanks in its service from 4,488 to 4,300. For details, see: The Military Balance 1991-1992 (London: IISS 1991) pp.109,120; The Military Balance 1997-1998 (ibid. 1997) pp.129, 141.
37. Gilboa (note 18) pp.133-6. Between 1991 and 1997 the Syrian tank arsenal grew from 4,350 to 4,600. At the same time the IDF reduced the number of tanks in its service from 4,488 to 4,300. For details, see: The Military Balance 1991-1992 (London: IISS 1991) pp.109,120; The Military Balance 1997-1998 (ibid. 1997) pp.129, 141.
38. Cordesman (note 9) p. 159.
39. Hirsh Goodman and W. Seth Carus, The Future Battlefield and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 1990) pp.41-2.
40. The IDF's Main Battle Tanks (MBT) were the Israeli-made Merkava and US-made M-60 A1; the Syrians used the same generation Soviet-made T-72. The Israelis used the American-made M-113 armored personal carriers (APC), and the main Syrian APC was the Soviet-made BMP-1.
41. Anthony H. Cordesman, The Arab-Israeli Military Balance and the Art of Operations (Washington D.C.: American UP 1987) pp.86-7.
42. Cohen et al. (note 24) p.62.
43. Gordon (note 24) pp. 190-7.
44. Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma', in Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (eds.) The Use of Force: International Politics and Foreign Policy (Lanham, MD: UP of America 1983) p.61.