Delegation and mergers in oligopoly

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 19, Issue 8, 2001, Pages 1263-1279

  Gonzáez Maestre, Miguel ^a   López Cuñat, Javier ^b  

^a UNIVERSITAT AUTÒNOMA DE BARCELONA   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ALICANTE   (Spain)

Author keywords

Delegation; Mergers; Oligopoly

Indexed keywords

FUNCTIONS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS;

COST FUNCTIONS; COURNOT OLIGOPOLY; DELEGATION;

MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS;

EID: 0035607867     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-7187(99)00058-2     Document Type: Article

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