Managerial incentives for takeovers

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy

Volumn 5, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 497-514

  Faulí Oller, Ramon ^a   Motta, Massimo ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALICANTE   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030352187     PISSN: 10586407     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00497.x     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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