A theory of ownership arrangements and smooth transition to a free market economy

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 157, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 380-412

  Tian, Guoqiang ^a  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035598965     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1628/0932456013621297     Document Type: Article

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