Constraining leviathan: Moral hazard and credible commitment in constitutional design

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 13, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 389-411

  Falaschetti, Dino ^a   Miller, Gary ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE   (United States)

^b WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Collective action; Credibility

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035598007     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951692801013004003     Document Type: Article

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