Does political reform increase wealth?: Or, why the difference between the Chicago and Virginia schools is really an elasticity question

Public Choice

Volumn 91, Issue 3-4, 1997, Pages 219-227

  Lott Jr , John R ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031482871     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (29)

1. Alchian, A.A. (1950). Uncertainty, evolution, and economic theory. Journal of Political Economy 58 (June): 211-221.
2. Becker, G.S. (1976). Comment on Peltzman. Journal of Law and Economics 19: 245-8.
3. Becker, G.S. (1983). A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (August): 371-399.
4. Becker, G.S. (1985). Public policies, pressure groups, and deadweight costs. Journal of Public Economics 28 (December): 329-347.
5. Brennan, G. and Buchanan, J.M. (1977). Towards a tax constitution for leviathan. Journal of Public Economics 8 (December): 255-274.
6. Brennan, G. and Buchanan, J.M. (1978). Tax instruments as constraints on the disposition of public revenues. Journal of Public Economics 9 (June): 301-318.
7. Brennan, G. and Buchanan, J.M. (1980). The power to tax: analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution. New York: Cambridge University Press.
8. Buchanan, J.M. (1994). Profit maximization as a survival strategy: some normative speculations, paper to be presented at the July 1994 Western Economic Association Meetings in honor of Armen A. Alchian's 80th Birthday.
9. Coate, S. and Stephen M. (1993). On the form of transfers to special interests. University of Pennsylvania Working Paper (November).
10. Coursey, D.L. and Roberts, R.D. (1991). Competition in political and economic markets. Public Choice 70 (April): 83-98.
11. Crew, M.A. and Rowley, C.K. (1988). Toward a public choice theory of monopoly regulation. Public Choice 57 (April): 49-68.
12. Lott, J.R., Jr. (1990a). An explanation for public provision of schooling: the importance of indoctrination. Journal of Law and Economics 33 (April): 199-231.
13. Lott, J.R., Jr. (1990b). Predation by public enterprises. Journal of Public Economics 43 (November): 238-251.
14. McCloskey, D.N. (1992). Writing as a responsiblity of science: a reply to Laband and Taylor. Economic Inquiry 30 (October): 689-695.
15. Niskanen, W.A. (1971). Bureaucracy and representative government. Chicago: Aldine Atherton.
16. Niskanen, W.A. (1975). Bureaucrats and politicians. Journal of Law and Economics 18 (December): 617-643.
17. Peltzman, S. (1976). Towards a more general theory of regulation. Journal of Law and Economics 19: 211-240.
18. Posner, R.A. (1992). The Economic Analysis of Law. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
19. Priest, G. (1977). The common law process and the selection of efficient rules. Journal of Legal Studies 6: 65-79.
20. Roberts, R.D. (1984). A positive model of private charity and public transfer programs. Journal of Political Economy 92 (February): 136-148.
21. Roberts, R.D. (1985). Recipient preferences and the design of government transfer programs. Journal of Law and Economics 28 (April): 27-54.
22. Rowley, C.K. and Vachris, M.A. (1993). Snake oil economics versus public choice. In C.K. Rowley (Ed.), Public Choice Theory, vol. III, 573-584. London: Edmund ElgarPublishing.
23. Rubin, P.H. (1977). Why is the common law efficient. Journal of Legal Studies 6: 51-64.
24. Rubin, P.H. (1982). Common law and statute law. Journal of Legal Studies 11: 205-224.
25. Rubin, P.H. and Bailey, M.J. (1994). A positive theory of legal change. Journal of Legal Studies 13: 324-345.
26. Stigler, G.J. (1971). The theory of economic regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2 (Spring): 3-21.
27. Stigler, G.J. (1982). Economists and public policy. Regulation (May/June): 13-17.
28. Tullock, G. (1983). Economics of income redistribution. Boston: Kluwer Nijhoff Publishing.
29. Wittman, D. (1989). Why democracies produce efficient results. Journal of Political Economy 97 (1989): 1395-1424.