Problems of preparedness: U.S. readiness for a domestic terrorist attack

International Security

Volumn 25, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 147-186

  Falkenrath, Richard A ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0035589636     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/01622880151091925     Document Type: Article

References (136)

1. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism: Including Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction/Domestic Preparedness and Critical Infrastructure Protection, May 18, 2000, p. 45. Although there is some disagreement over exactly what constitutes a "weapon of mass destruction," all definitions include nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. For a good technical primer, see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office [GPO], December 1993).
2. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism: Including Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction/Domestic Preparedness and Critical Infrastructure Protection, May 18, 2000, p. 45. Although there is some disagreement over exactly what constitutes a "weapon of mass destruction," all definitions include nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. For a good technical primer, see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office [GPO], December 1993).
3. For a comprehensive survey of federal domestic preparedness programs, see Gregory Koblentz, "Overview of Federal Programs to Enhance State and Local Preparedness for Terrorism with Weapons of Mass Destruction," Discussion Paper (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness [ESDP], forthcoming).
4. See Ariel Merari, "Israel's Preparedness for High-Consequence Terrorism," BCSIA Discussion Paper 2000-30, ESDP Discussion Paper ESDP-2000-02 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, ESDP, October 2000), http://www.esdp.org; and General Accounting Office (GAO), Combating Terrorism: How Five Foreign Countries Are Organized to Combat Terrorism, GAO/NSIAD-00-85, April 2000.
5. See Ariel Merari, "Israel's Preparedness for High-Consequence Terrorism," BCSIA Discussion Paper 2000-30, ESDP Discussion Paper ESDP-2000-02 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, ESDP, October 2000), http://www.esdp.org; and General Accounting Office (GAO), Combating Terrorism: How Five Foreign Countries Are Organized to Combat Terrorism, GAO/NSIAD-00-85, April 2000.
6. GAO, Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and Coordination, NSIAD-98-39, December 1997; GAO, Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency, NSIAD-99-3, November 12, 1998; GAO, Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism Operations, NSIAD-99-135, May 13, 1999; and GAO, Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of Mass Destruction Training, NSIAD-00-64, March 21, 2000.
7. GAO, Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and Coordination, NSIAD-98-39, December 1997; GAO, Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency, NSIAD-99-3, November 12, 1998; GAO, Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism Operations, NSIAD-99-135, May 13, 1999; and GAO, Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of Mass Destruction Training, NSIAD-00-64, March 21, 2000.
8. GAO, Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and Coordination, NSIAD-98-39, December 1997; GAO, Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency, NSIAD-99-3, November 12, 1998; GAO, Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism Operations, NSIAD-99-135, May 13, 1999; and GAO, Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of Mass Destruction Training, NSIAD-00-64, March 21, 2000.
9. GAO, Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and Coordination, NSIAD-98-39, December 1997; GAO, Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency, NSIAD-99-3, November 12, 1998; GAO, Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism Operations, NSIAD-99-135, May 13, 1999; and GAO, Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of Mass Destruction Training, NSIAD-00-64, March 21, 2000.
10. See, for example, United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, New World Coming: American Security in the Twenty-first Century, September 15, 1999; John F. Sopko "The Changing Proliferation Threat," Foreign Policy, No. 105 (Winter 1996-97), pp. 3-20; Jonathan B. Tucker, "Chemical/Biological Terrorism: Coping with a New Threat," Politics and the Life Sciences, Vol. 15, No. 2 (September 1996), pp. 167-183; and National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism, June 7, 2000, pp. 37-44, htrp://w3.access.gpo.gov/nct/index.html.
11. See, for example, United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, New World Coming: American Security in the Twenty-first Century, September 15, 1999; John F. Sopko "The Changing Proliferation Threat," Foreign Policy, No. 105 (Winter 1996-97), pp. 3-20; Jonathan B. Tucker, "Chemical/Biological Terrorism: Coping with a New Threat," Politics and the Life Sciences, Vol. 15, No. 2 (September 1996), pp. 167-183; and National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism, June 7, 2000, pp. 37-44, htrp://w3.access.gpo.gov/nct/index.html.
12. See, for example, United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, New World Coming: American Security in the Twenty-first Century, September 15, 1999; John F. Sopko "The Changing Proliferation Threat," Foreign Policy, No. 105 (Winter 1996-97), pp. 3-20; Jonathan B. Tucker, "Chemical/Biological Terrorism: Coping with a New Threat," Politics and the Life Sciences, Vol. 15, No. 2 (September 1996), pp. 167-183; and National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism, June 7, 2000, pp. 37-44, htrp://w3.access.gpo.gov/nct/index.html.
13. See, for example, United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, New World Coming: American Security in the Twenty-first Century, September 15, 1999; John F. Sopko "The Changing Proliferation Threat," Foreign Policy, No. 105 (Winter 1996-97), pp. 3-20; Jonathan B. Tucker, "Chemical/Biological Terrorism: Coping with a New Threat," Politics and the Life Sciences, Vol. 15, No. 2 (September 1996), pp. 167-183; and National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism, June 7, 2000, pp. 37-44, htrp://w3.access.gpo.gov/nct/index.html.
14. An exception is Arnold Howitt and Gregory Koblentz, "Organizational Capacity and Coordination: Obstacles and Opportunities in Preparing for Domestic Terrorism," Discussion Paper (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, ESDP, forthcoming).
15. See Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 13-44; Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, 2d ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1986), pp. 50-68; and Richard Thackrah, "Terrorism: A Definitional Problem," in Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair M. Stewart, eds., Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen, Scotland: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), pp. 24-41.
16. See Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 13-44; Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, 2d ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1986), pp. 50-68; and Richard Thackrah, "Terrorism: A Definitional Problem," in Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair M. Stewart, eds., Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen, Scotland: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), pp. 24-41.
17. See Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 13-44; Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, 2d ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1986), pp. 50-68; and Richard Thackrah, "Terrorism: A Definitional Problem," in Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair M. Stewart, eds., Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen, Scotland: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), pp. 24-41.
18. The federal government's official statement on the threat of international terrorism is U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/gt_index.html.
19. These databases include the U.S. Department of State; the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv; the RAND Corporation (which became a shared asset of the University of St. Andrews in 1994); Ed Mickolus; and recently the Monterey Institute of International Studies. For an analysis of the biases and limitations of these databases (not including the Monterey Institute), see A.J. Jongman, "Trends in International and Domestic Terrorism in Western Europe, 1968-88," in Alex P. Schmid and Ronald D. Crelinsten, eds., Western Responses to Terrorism (London: Frank Cass, 1993), pp. 26-76. For a discussion of the Monterey database, see Jonathan B. Tucker, "Historical Trends Related to Bioterrorism: An Empirical Analysis," Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 5, No. 4 (July-August 1999), pp. 498-504.
20. These databases include the U.S. Department of State; the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv; the RAND Corporation (which became a shared asset of the University of St. Andrews in 1994); Ed Mickolus; and recently the Monterey Institute of International Studies. For an analysis of the biases and limitations of these databases (not including the Monterey Institute), see A.J. Jongman, "Trends in International and Domestic Terrorism in Western Europe, 1968-88," in Alex P. Schmid and Ronald D. Crelinsten, eds., Western Responses to Terrorism (London: Frank Cass, 1993), pp. 26-76. For a discussion of the Monterey database, see Jonathan B. Tucker, "Historical Trends Related to Bioterrorism: An Empirical Analysis," Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 5, No. 4 (July-August 1999), pp. 498-504.
21. Alfred Nobel patented dynamite (a mixture of nitroglycerin and kieselguhr) in 1867. Terrorists began using small bombs in the 1880s. In 1881 Johann Most, by all accounts a radical socialist, advocated the use of revolutionary chemistry (including dynamite) to "destroy homes, businesses, churches, factories, and the offices of the state." Shortly after that, the Anarchist Congress added its support for violence using new technologies. Throughout Europe, radical cells began employing explosive devices in more deadly, and more visible, attacks. See Martin A. Miller, "The Intellectual Origins of Modern Terrorism in Europe," in Martha Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism in Context (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), pp. 27-63.
22. Peter St. John, Air Piracy, Airport Security, and International Terrorism: Winning the War against Hijackers (New York: Quorum Books, 1991).
23. Walter Laqueur, "Postmodern Terrorism," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 5 (September/October 1996), p. 25.
24. See National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism, pp. 1-6.
25. Examples include Flora Lewis, "The New Anti-Terrorism," New York Review of Books, February 4, 1999, p. 24; Daniel Greenberg, "The Bioterrorism Panic," Washington Post, March 16, 1999, p. A21; and Robert Dreyfuss, "The Phantom Menace," Mother Jones, September-October 2000, pp. 40-46.
26. Examples include Flora Lewis, "The New Anti-Terrorism," New York Review of Books, February 4, 1999, p. 24; Daniel Greenberg, "The Bioterrorism Panic," Washington Post, March 16, 1999, p. A21; and Robert Dreyfuss, "The Phantom Menace," Mother Jones, September-October 2000, pp. 40-46.
27. Examples include Flora Lewis, "The New Anti-Terrorism," New York Review of Books, February 4, 1999, p. 24; Daniel Greenberg, "The Bioterrorism Panic," Washington Post, March 16, 1999, p. A21; and Robert Dreyfuss, "The Phantom Menace," Mother Jones, September-October 2000, pp. 40-46.
28. See David Claridge, "Exploding the Myth of Superterrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Fall 1999), pp. 133-148; Bruce Hoffman, "America and the New Terrorism: An Exchange [The American Perspective]," Survival, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 161-166; Brian Jenkins, "The WMD Terrorist Threat - Is There a Consensus View?" in Brad Roberts, ed., Hype or Reality: New Terrorism and Mass Casualty Attacks (Arlington, Va.: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 2000), pp. 241-253; Ariel Merari, "Terrorism as a Strategy of Struggle: Past and Future," Political Violence and Terrorism, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Fall 1999), pp. 52-65; and Ehud Sprinzak, "The Great Superterrorism Scare," Foreign Policy, No. 112 (Fall 1998), pp. 110-124.
29. See David Claridge, "Exploding the Myth of Superterrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Fall 1999), pp. 133-148; Bruce Hoffman, "America and the New Terrorism: An Exchange [The American Perspective]," Survival, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 161-166; Brian Jenkins, "The WMD Terrorist Threat - Is There a Consensus View?" in Brad Roberts, ed., Hype or Reality: New Terrorism and Mass Casualty Attacks (Arlington, Va.: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 2000), pp. 241-253; Ariel Merari, "Terrorism as a Strategy of Struggle: Past and Future," Political Violence and Terrorism, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Fall 1999), pp. 52-65; and Ehud Sprinzak, "The Great Superterrorism Scare," Foreign Policy, No. 112 (Fall 1998), pp. 110-124.
30. See David Claridge, "Exploding the Myth of Superterrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Fall 1999), pp. 133-148; Bruce Hoffman, "America and the New Terrorism: An Exchange [The American Perspective]," Survival, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 161-166; Brian Jenkins, "The WMD Terrorist Threat - Is There a Consensus View?" in Brad Roberts, ed., Hype or Reality: New Terrorism and Mass Casualty Attacks (Arlington, Va.: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 2000), pp. 241-253; Ariel Merari, "Terrorism as a Strategy of Struggle: Past and Future," Political Violence and Terrorism, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Fall 1999), pp. 52-65; and Ehud Sprinzak, "The Great Superterrorism Scare," Foreign Policy, No. 112 (Fall 1998), pp. 110-124.
31. See David Claridge, "Exploding the Myth of Superterrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Fall 1999), pp. 133-148; Bruce Hoffman, "America and the New Terrorism: An Exchange [The American Perspective]," Survival, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 161-166; Brian Jenkins, "The WMD Terrorist Threat - Is There a Consensus View?" in Brad Roberts, ed., Hype or Reality: New Terrorism and Mass Casualty Attacks (Arlington, Va.: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 2000), pp. 241-253; Ariel Merari, "Terrorism as a Strategy of Struggle: Past and Future," Political Violence and Terrorism, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Fall 1999), pp. 52-65; and Ehud Sprinzak, "The Great Superterrorism Scare," Foreign Policy, No. 112 (Fall 1998), pp. 110-124.
32. See David Claridge, "Exploding the Myth of Superterrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Fall 1999), pp. 133-148; Bruce Hoffman, "America and the New Terrorism: An Exchange [The American Perspective]," Survival, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 161-166; Brian Jenkins, "The WMD Terrorist Threat - Is There a Consensus View?" in Brad Roberts, ed., Hype or Reality: New Terrorism and Mass Casualty Attacks (Arlington, Va.: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 2000), pp. 241-253; Ariel Merari, "Terrorism as a Strategy of Struggle: Past and Future," Political Violence and Terrorism, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Fall 1999), pp. 52-65; and Ehud Sprinzak, "The Great Superterrorism Scare," Foreign Policy, No. 112 (Fall 1998), pp. 110-124.
33. See Amy Smithson, "Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and U.S. Response," Stimson Center Report No. 35, October 2000; Jonathan Tucker, "Chemical and Biological Terrorism: How Real a Threat?" Current History, April 2000, pp. 147-153; Jonathan Tucker and Amy Sands, "An Unlikely Threat," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 55, No. 4 (July-August 1999), pp. 46-52; and Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (The Gilmore Commission), First Annual Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: RAND, December 1999).
34. See Amy Smithson, "Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and U.S. Response," Stimson Center Report No. 35, October 2000; Jonathan Tucker, "Chemical and Biological Terrorism: How Real a Threat?" Current History, April 2000, pp. 147-153; Jonathan Tucker and Amy Sands, "An Unlikely Threat," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 55, No. 4 (July-August 1999), pp. 46-52; and Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (The Gilmore Commission), First Annual Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: RAND, December 1999).
35. See Amy Smithson, "Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and U.S. Response," Stimson Center Report No. 35, October 2000; Jonathan Tucker, "Chemical and Biological Terrorism: How Real a Threat?" Current History, April 2000, pp. 147-153; Jonathan Tucker and Amy Sands, "An Unlikely Threat," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 55, No. 4 (July-August 1999), pp. 46-52; and Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (The Gilmore Commission), First Annual Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: RAND, December 1999).
36. See Amy Smithson, "Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and U.S. Response," Stimson Center Report No. 35, October 2000; Jonathan Tucker, "Chemical and Biological Terrorism: How Real a Threat?" Current History, April 2000, pp. 147-153; Jonathan Tucker and Amy Sands, "An Unlikely Threat," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 55, No. 4 (July-August 1999), pp. 46-52; and Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (The Gilmore Commission), First Annual Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: RAND, December 1999).
37. Graham T. Allison, "Must We Wait for the Nuclear Morning After?" Washington Post, April 30, 1995, p. C7; Richard K. Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January-February 1998), pp. 26-41; Ashton Carter, John Deutch, and Philip Zelikow, "Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 6 (November-December 1998), pp. 80-94; Fred C. Iklé, "The Next Lenin: On the Cusp of Truly Revolutionary Warfare," National Interest, No. 47 (Spring 1997), pp. 9-19; Walter Laqueur, "The New Face of Terror," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 169-178; and Joseph Nye Jr. and R. James Woolsey, "Defend against the Shadow Enemy," Los Angeles Times, June 1, 1997. The present author has also made this argument. Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America's Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 261-336; and Richard A. Falkenrath, "Confronting Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism," Survival, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Autumn 1998), pp. 43-65.
38. Graham T. Allison, "Must We Wait for the Nuclear Morning After?" Washington Post, April 30, 1995, p. C7; Richard K. Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January-February 1998), pp. 26-41; Ashton Carter, John Deutch, and Philip Zelikow, "Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 6 (November-December 1998), pp. 80-94; Fred C. Iklé, "The Next Lenin: On the Cusp of Truly Revolutionary Warfare," National Interest, No. 47 (Spring 1997), pp. 9-19; Walter Laqueur, "The New Face of Terror," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 169-178; and Joseph Nye Jr. and R. James Woolsey, "Defend against the Shadow Enemy," Los Angeles Times, June 1, 1997. The present author has also made this argument. Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America's Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 261-336; and Richard A. Falkenrath, "Confronting Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism," Survival, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Autumn 1998), pp. 43-65.
39. Graham T. Allison, "Must We Wait for the Nuclear Morning After?" Washington Post, April 30, 1995, p. C7; Richard K. Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January-February 1998), pp. 26-41; Ashton Carter, John Deutch, and Philip Zelikow, "Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 6 (November-December 1998), pp. 80-94; Fred C. Iklé, "The Next Lenin: On the Cusp of Truly Revolutionary Warfare," National Interest, No. 47 (Spring 1997), pp. 9-19; Walter Laqueur, "The New Face of Terror," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 169-178; and Joseph Nye Jr. and R. James Woolsey, "Defend against the Shadow Enemy," Los Angeles Times, June 1, 1997. The present author has also made this argument. Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America's Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 261-336; and Richard A. Falkenrath, "Confronting Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism," Survival, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Autumn 1998), pp. 43-65.
40. Graham T. Allison, "Must We Wait for the Nuclear Morning After?" Washington Post, April 30, 1995, p. C7; Richard K. Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January-February 1998), pp. 26-41; Ashton Carter, John Deutch, and Philip Zelikow, "Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 6 (November-December 1998), pp. 80-94; Fred C. Iklé, "The Next Lenin: On the Cusp of Truly Revolutionary Warfare," National Interest, No. 47 (Spring 1997), pp. 9-19; Walter Laqueur, "The New Face of Terror," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 169-178; and Joseph Nye Jr. and R. James Woolsey, "Defend against the Shadow Enemy," Los Angeles Times, June 1, 1997. The present author has also made this argument. Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America's Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 261-336; and Richard A. Falkenrath, "Confronting Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism," Survival, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Autumn 1998), pp. 43-65.
41. Graham T. Allison, "Must We Wait for the Nuclear Morning After?" Washington Post, April 30, 1995, p. C7; Richard K. Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January-February 1998), pp. 26-41; Ashton Carter, John Deutch, and Philip Zelikow, "Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 6 (November-December 1998), pp. 80-94; Fred C. Iklé, "The Next Lenin: On the Cusp of Truly Revolutionary Warfare," National Interest, No. 47 (Spring 1997), pp. 9-19; Walter Laqueur, "The New Face of Terror," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 169-178; and Joseph Nye Jr. and R. James Woolsey, "Defend against the Shadow Enemy," Los Angeles Times, June 1, 1997. The present author has also made this argument. Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America's Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 261-336; and Richard A. Falkenrath, "Confronting Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism," Survival, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Autumn 1998), pp. 43-65.
42. Graham T. Allison, "Must We Wait for the Nuclear Morning After?" Washington Post, April 30, 1995, p. C7; Richard K. Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January-February 1998), pp. 26-41; Ashton Carter, John Deutch, and Philip Zelikow, "Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 6 (November-December 1998), pp. 80-94; Fred C. Iklé, "The Next Lenin: On the Cusp of Truly Revolutionary Warfare," National Interest, No. 47 (Spring 1997), pp. 9-19; Walter Laqueur, "The New Face of Terror," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 169-178; and Joseph Nye Jr. and R. James Woolsey, "Defend against the Shadow Enemy," Los Angeles Times, June 1, 1997. The present author has also made this argument. Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America's Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 261-336; and Richard A. Falkenrath, "Confronting Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism," Survival, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Autumn 1998), pp. 43-65.
43. Graham T. Allison, "Must We Wait for the Nuclear Morning After?" Washington Post, April 30, 1995, p. C7; Richard K. Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January-February 1998), pp. 26-41; Ashton Carter, John Deutch, and Philip Zelikow, "Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 6 (November-December 1998), pp. 80-94; Fred C. Iklé, "The Next Lenin: On the Cusp of Truly Revolutionary Warfare," National Interest, No. 47 (Spring 1997), pp. 9-19; Walter Laqueur, "The New Face of Terror," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 169-178; and Joseph Nye Jr. and R. James Woolsey, "Defend against the Shadow Enemy," Los Angeles Times, June 1, 1997. The present author has also made this argument. Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America's Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 261-336; and Richard A. Falkenrath, "Confronting Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism," Survival, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Autumn 1998), pp. 43-65.
44. Graham T. Allison, "Must We Wait for the Nuclear Morning After?" Washington Post, April 30, 1995, p. C7; Richard K. Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January-February 1998), pp. 26-41; Ashton Carter, John Deutch, and Philip Zelikow, "Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 6 (November-December 1998), pp. 80-94; Fred C. Iklé, "The Next Lenin: On the Cusp of Truly Revolutionary Warfare," National Interest, No. 47 (Spring 1997), pp. 9-19; Walter Laqueur, "The New Face of Terror," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 169-178; and Joseph Nye Jr. and R. James Woolsey, "Defend against the Shadow Enemy," Los Angeles Times, June 1, 1997. The present author has also made this argument. Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America's Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 261-336; and Richard A. Falkenrath, "Confronting Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism," Survival, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Autumn 1998), pp. 43-65.
45. See Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, "The Worldwide Threat in 2000: Global Realities of Our National Security," statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 21, 2000, http://www.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/dci_speech_B2100.html.
46. See Richard A. Falkenrath, "Analytic Models and Policy Prescription," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Spring 2001).
47. For a description of the full range of U.S. programs aimed at countering the threats of WMD and terrorism, see Sidney D. Drell, Abraham D. Sofaer, and George D. Wilson, eds., The New Terror: Facing the Threat of Biological and Chemical Weapons (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1999); and Peter L. Hays, Vincent J. Jodoin, and Alan R. Van Tassel, eds., Countering the Proliferation and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998). For an analysis of the major problems facing these efforts, see Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, "Countering Asymmetric Threats," in Carter and John P. White, eds., Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 119-128.
48. For a description of the full range of U.S. programs aimed at countering the threats of WMD and terrorism, see Sidney D. Drell, Abraham D. Sofaer, and George D. Wilson, eds., The New Terror: Facing the Threat of Biological and Chemical Weapons (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1999); and Peter L. Hays, Vincent J. Jodoin, and Alan R. Van Tassel, eds., Countering the Proliferation and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998). For an analysis of the major problems facing these efforts, see Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, "Countering Asymmetric Threats," in Carter and John P. White, eds., Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 119-128.
49. For a description of the full range of U.S. programs aimed at countering the threats of WMD and terrorism, see Sidney D. Drell, Abraham D. Sofaer, and George D. Wilson, eds., The New Terror: Facing the Threat of Biological and Chemical Weapons (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1999); and Peter L. Hays, Vincent J. Jodoin, and Alan R. Van Tassel, eds., Countering the Proliferation and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998). For an analysis of the major problems facing these efforts, see Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, "Countering Asymmetric Threats," in Carter and John P. White, eds., Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 119-128.
50. Historically, the federal government and U.S. law have sharply distinguished international threats from domestic ones. The federal government assigns responsibility for dealing with a threat to different sets of departments and agencies according to its international or domestic character. The permissible actions of these departments and agencies are controlled by different legal authorities, again according to the international or domestic character of the threat. In the case of terrorism, this international-domestic distinction forms the basis for the designation of a lead federal agency and for the division of specific counterterrorism responsibilities. The State Department is the lead federal agency for dealing with international terrorism. The FBI, which is in the DoJ, is the lead federal agency for dealing with all aspects of domestic terrorism except consequence management, for which FEMA is the lead federal agency. Experts and officials increasingly regard this bureaucratic distinction between international and domestic terrorism as unrealistic and anachronistic. See John Deutch, Arnold Kanter, and Brent Scowcroft, "Strengthening the National Security Interagency Process," in Carter and White, Keeping the Edge, pp. 265-271.
51. Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, February 1986), p. 7.
52. Ibid.
53. Israel and the United Kingdom are the two possible exceptions.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. See, for example, Carter, Deutch, and Zelikow, "Catastrophic Terrorism," p. 82.
58. U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, p. 1. The Department of State's Antiterrorism Training Assistance program offers courses to foreign law enforcement personnel in such areas as airport security, bomb detection, hostage rescue, and crisis management. To date, more than 20,000 representatives from more than one hundred nations have received training. See "Fact Sheet: U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts since the 1998 U.S. Embassy Bombings in Africa," as released by the Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, August 7, 2000.
59. U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, p. 1. The Department of State's Antiterrorism Training Assistance program offers courses to foreign law enforcement personnel in such areas as airport security, bomb detection, hostage rescue, and crisis management. To date, more than 20,000 representatives from more than one hundred nations have received training. See "Fact Sheet: U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts since the 1998 U.S. Embassy Bombings in Africa," as released by the Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, August 7, 2000.
60. Elements of the federal emergency management system date back to the Congressional Act of 1803, which provided assistance to a New Hampshire town following a large fire. For the next 130 years, disaster legislation passed on an ad hoc basis. In the 1930s, a series of new federal statutes gave public agencies the authority to provide disaster assistance. For more information on the history of U.S. disaster management and FEMA, see http://www.fema.gov/about/history.htm.
61. According to the FEMA web site: "The Stafford Act: The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Public Law (P.L.) 93-288, as amended, authorizes the President (FEMA per Executive Order 12673) to provide financial and other forms of assistance to State and local governments, certain private nonprofit organizations and individuals to support response, recovery and mitigation efforts following presidentially declared major disasters and emergencies. The Stafford Act describes generally the declaration process, the types and extent of assistance that may be provided and fundamental eligibility requirements." See http://www.fema.gov/r-n-r/pa/papd/105.htm.
62. FEMA, Federal Response Plan (Washington, D.C.: FEMA, April 1999), p. 15, http://www.fema.gov/r-n-r/frp/.
63. See David R. Franz et al., "Clinical Recognition and Management of Patients Exposed to Biological Warfare Agents," in Joshua Lederberg, ed., Biological Weapons: Limiting the Threat (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999), pp. 37-81; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Biological and Chemical Terrorism: Strategic Plan for Preparedness and Response," Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, April 21, 2000; and Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute and Center for Strategic and International Studies, Contagion and Conflict: Health as a Global Security Challenge (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2000).
64. See David R. Franz et al., "Clinical Recognition and Management of Patients Exposed to Biological Warfare Agents," in Joshua Lederberg, ed., Biological Weapons: Limiting the Threat (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999), pp. 37-81; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Biological and Chemical Terrorism: Strategic Plan for Preparedness and Response," Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, April 21, 2000; and Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute and Center for Strategic and International Studies, Contagion and Conflict: Health as a Global Security Challenge (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2000).
65. See David R. Franz et al., "Clinical Recognition and Management of Patients Exposed to Biological Warfare Agents," in Joshua Lederberg, ed., Biological Weapons: Limiting the Threat (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999), pp. 37-81; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Biological and Chemical Terrorism: Strategic Plan for Preparedness and Response," Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, April 21, 2000; and Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute and Center for Strategic and International Studies, Contagion and Conflict: Health as a Global Security Challenge (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2000).
66. A partial exception to this is the system of radiological emergency response plans that the United States has developed for the regions around its nuclear power plants. See Nuclear Regulatory Commission's web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/AEOD/ER/index.hrml.
67. For a more detailed discussion of the perceptual and conceptual origins of the U.S. domestic preparedness program, see Falkenrath, "Analytic Models and Policy Prescription."
68. For more information on the Tokyo sarin attack, see Ian Reader, Religious Violence in Contemporary Japan: The Case of Aum Shinrikyo, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Monograph Series, No. 82 (London: Curzon, 2000); Robert Jay Lifton, Destroying the World to Save It: Aum Shinrikyo, Apocalyptic Violence, and the New Global Terrorism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1999); David Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World: The Incredible Story of Aum (London: Hutchinson, 1996); and Kyle Olson, "Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat?" Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 5, No. 4 (July/August 1999), http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol5no4/contents.htm.
69. For more information on the Tokyo sarin attack, see Ian Reader, Religious Violence in Contemporary Japan: The Case of Aum Shinrikyo, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Monograph Series, No. 82 (London: Curzon, 2000); Robert Jay Lifton, Destroying the World to Save It: Aum Shinrikyo, Apocalyptic Violence, and the New Global Terrorism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1999); David Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World: The Incredible Story of Aum (London: Hutchinson, 1996); and Kyle Olson, "Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat?" Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 5, No. 4 (July/August 1999), http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol5no4/contents.htm.
70. For more information on the Tokyo sarin attack, see Ian Reader, Religious Violence in Contemporary Japan: The Case of Aum Shinrikyo, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Monograph Series, No. 82 (London: Curzon, 2000); Robert Jay Lifton, Destroying the World to Save It: Aum Shinrikyo, Apocalyptic Violence, and the New Global Terrorism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1999); David Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World: The Incredible Story of Aum (London: Hutchinson, 1996); and Kyle Olson, "Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat?" Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 5, No. 4 (July/August 1999), http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol5no4/contents.htm.
71. For more information on the Tokyo sarin attack, see Ian Reader, Religious Violence in Contemporary Japan: The Case of Aum Shinrikyo, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Monograph Series, No. 82 (London: Curzon, 2000); Robert Jay Lifton, Destroying the World to Save It: Aum Shinrikyo, Apocalyptic Violence, and the New Global Terrorism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1999); David Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World: The Incredible Story of Aum (London: Hutchinson, 1996); and Kyle Olson, "Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat?" Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 5, No. 4 (July/August 1999), http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol5no4/contents.htm.
72. An unclassified summary of PDD-39 is available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm.
73. For more information on CBIRF, see "Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force," http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/CBIRF/cbirf.htm.
74. The first of these domestic response teams was the Metropolitan Medical Strike Team (now part of the Metropolitan Medical Response System) in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, established by the HHS Office of Emergency Preparedness in July 1995. Additional programs were established in Atlanta and seventy other U.S. metropolitan areas. See NDMS/OEP home page at http://ndms.dhhs.gov/.
75. The Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act was part of the FY 1997 defense authorization act signed on September 23, 1996, P.L. 104-201.
76. Senate Committee on Governmental Reform, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996).
77. Approximately half of the money was provided to the Department of Defense ($52 million) to conduct training of state and local first responders, while the remainder of the funding was ear-marked for the Department of Health and Human Services ($6.5 million), the Department of Justice ($17 million), the Federal Emergency Management Agency ($15 million), and the Customs Service ($9 million). See P.L. 104-201, sec. 1412 (A) (1).
78. For the Department of Defense's FY 1997 budget request and the budget enacted by Congress, see http://www.clw.org/milbud.html.
79. The FEMA budget figure is the administration's FY 2000 budget request. See "FEMA Asks Congress for $3.4 Billion 2000 Budget," http://www.fema.gov/nwz99/99020.htm. The DoD figure is the budget enacted by the Congress and signed into law by the president. See Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, http://www.csbaonline.org/3Defense_Budget/Defense_Budget.htm. According to Janice Green of the budget office at FEMA, FEMA's FY 2000 budget was $872,709,000. The FY 2001 budget has not yet been set.
80. The FEMA budget figure is the administration's FY 2000 budget request. See "FEMA Asks Congress for $3.4 Billion 2000 Budget," http://www.fema.gov/nwz99/99020.htm. The DoD figure is the budget enacted by the Congress and signed into law by the president. See Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, http://www.csbaonline.org/3Defense_Budget/Defense_Budget.htm. According to Janice Green of the budget office at FEMA, FEMA's FY 2000 budget was $872,709,000. The FY 2001 budget has not yet been set.
81. Office of the White House Press Secretary, Memorandum on Emergency Response Assistance Program, "Subject: Designation of the Attorney General as the Lead Official for the Emergency Response Assistance Program under Sections 1412 and 1415 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201)," April 6, 2000, http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/ uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/2000/4/7/7.text.2.
82. PDD-39 defined two major phases of an operational response to a terrorist incident: "crisis management" and "consequence management." Crisis management refers to all activities required to eliminate an ongoing terrorist threat, apprehend the perpetrators, and prepare a criminal prosecution. Consequence management refers to disaster response activities such as medical care, HAZMAT cleanup, and personal decontamination.
83. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, April 24, 1996, P.L. 104-132.
84. Department of Justice, OJP Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1997 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1998), p. 19. The BJA program was called the Metropolitan Firefighter and Emergency Services National Training Program for First Responders to Terrorist Incidents. The federal government also provides training for firefighters and emergency managers through the National Fire Academy and the Emergency Management Institute, respectively, but these entities are subordinate to FEMA and thus funded by different authorizing and appropriating subcommittees.
85. The FBI's counterterrorism budget rose from $256 million in 1995 to $581 million in 1998. GAO, Combating Terrorism: FBI's Use of Federal Funds for Counterterrorism-Related Activities (FYs 1995-98), GAO-GGD-99-7, November 1998, p. 2.
86. An exception is the State and Local Bomb Technician Equipment Program at the FBI's Hazardous Devices School at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.
87. The decision to create the NDPO was a response to complaints voiced at an August 1998 meeting of federal, state, and local "stakeholders" in domestic preparedness.
88. The Department of Defense stresses that it will support only domestic WMD response operations, and only when requested to do so by the proper civilian authorities.
89. Defense Science Board, DoD Responses to Transnational Threats (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1997).
90. See National Guard Bureau report to Congress, Enhancing the National Guard's Readiness to Support Emergency Responders in Domestic Chemical and Biological Terrorism Defense, report to Congress, July 20, 1999, http://www.ngb.dtic.mil/wmd/report/; and Science Applications International Corporation, Report to the National Guard Bureau Weapons of Mass Destruction Study, February 9, 1999, http://www.ngb.dtic.rnil/wmd/index/htm.
91. See National Guard Bureau report to Congress, Enhancing the National Guard's Readiness to Support Emergency Responders in Domestic Chemical and Biological Terrorism Defense, report to Congress, July 20, 1999, http://www.ngb.dtic.mil/wmd/report/; and Science Applications International Corporation, Report to the National Guard Bureau Weapons of Mass Destruction Study, February 9, 1999, http://www.ngb.dtic.rnil/wmd/index/htm.
92. The teams were initially called Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection, or RAID, teams. They were subsequently renamed Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams. Each team consists of twenty-two soldiers with special training and equipment. See National Guard Bureau, Enhancing the National Guard's Readiness to Support Emergency Responders in Domestic Chemical and Biological Terrorism Defense; and prepared statement of Charles Cragin, acting assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs, before the House Committee on Government Reform, National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations Subcommittee, hearing on "Combating Terrorism: The National Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) Teams," June 23, 1999.
93. The teams were initially called Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection, or RAID, teams. They were subsequently renamed Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams. Each team consists of twenty-two soldiers with special training and equipment. See National Guard Bureau, Enhancing the National Guard's Readiness to Support Emergency Responders in Domestic Chemical and Biological Terrorism Defense; and prepared statement of Charles Cragin, acting assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs, before the House Committee on Government Reform, National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations Subcommittee, hearing on "Combating Terrorism: The National Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) Teams," June 23, 1999.
94. The Pentagon office is the Consequence Management Program Integration Office, which is subordinate to the director of military support. The new command structure is the Joint Task Force Civilian Support (JTF-CS), which is a subordinate command of Joint Forces Command, based in Norfolk, Virginia. For a more complete review of Defense Department programs in the domestic preparedness area, see Koblentz, "Overview of Federal Programs to Enhance State and Local Preparedness for Terrorism with Weapons of Mass Destruction."
95. This problem was also noted in the 1999 final report of a congressionally chartered commission chaired by former Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch: "Congressional-executive interaction is complicated by the number of congressional committees that now have oversight and budgetary authority over proliferation-related programs. Oversight from at least twenty committees heightens the need for coherent, continuous consultation between the branches." Report of the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, D.C.: GPO, July 1999), p. 7, http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/deutch.
96. An unclassified summary of PDD-62 is available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd-62.htm.
97. Furthermore, as a member of the White House staff, the national coordinator is not accountable to Congress. This has produced some frustration on Capitol Hill, because no one official is unambiguously in charge of the government's domestic preparedness or counterterrorism programs. In the late 1990s, Congress tended to regard the attorney general as the leading official responsible for the federal government's programs in this area. In 1998, for instance, Congress required that the attorney general prepare a Five-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan, which was submitted to Congress in December 1998. The value of this report is not obvious, however, because the Department of Justice does not determine or even influence the budgets of other agencies, and because the attorney general's plan does appear to be the same as the White House's plan. See Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, Counterterrorism and Infrastructure Protection (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1999), pp. 29-31.
98. President Bill Clinton was reportedly motivated, at least in part, by the novel Cobra Event by Richard Preston, which describes a bioterrorism incident in New York City. See Judith Miller and William Broad, "Exercise Finds U.S. Unable to Handle Germ War Threat," New York Times, April 26, 1998, p. A1. This initiative was announced during Clinton's speech at the U.S. Naval Academy commencement on May 22, 1998, http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1998/5/26/18. text.1.
99. President Bill Clinton was reportedly motivated, at least in part, by the novel Cobra Event by Richard Preston, which describes a bioterrorism incident in New York City. See Judith Miller and William Broad, "Exercise Finds U.S. Unable to Handle Germ War Threat," New York Times, April 26, 1998, p. A1. This initiative was announced during Clinton's speech at the U.S. Naval Academy commencement on May 22, 1998, http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1998/5/26/18. text.1.
100. The only modern experience with a large-scale aerosolization of a biological weapon was in 1979, when an accident at a military facility released anthrax over the city of Sverdlovsk, Russia. See Matthew Meselson et al., "The Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak of 1979," in Lederberg, Biological Weapons, pp. 193-209; and Jeanne Guillemin, Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999).
101. The only modern experience with a large-scale aerosolization of a biological weapon was in 1979, when an accident at a military facility released anthrax over the city of Sverdlovsk, Russia. See Matthew Meselson et al., "The Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak of 1979," in Lederberg, Biological Weapons, pp. 193-209; and Jeanne Guillemin, Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999).
102. In December 1998, the CDC established its Biological Preparedness and Readiness Program (BPRP). Before this, the CDC was only tangentially involved in domestic preparedness for biological terrorism, with no dedicated office or budget. For more information on the BPRP, see www.bt.cdc.gov.
103. President Clinton requested a supplemental appropriation to address the threat of bioterrorism in June 1998. Judith Miller, "Clinton Seeks Additional $300 Million to Fight Bioterrorism," New York Times, June 9, 1998, p. A16.
104. GAO, Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and Coordination; GAO, Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency; GAO, Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism Operations; and GAO, Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of Mass Destruction Training, NSIAD-00-64, March 21, 2000.
105. GAO, Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and Coordination; GAO, Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to
106. GAO, Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and Coordination; GAO, Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency; GAO, Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism Operations; and GAO, Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of Mass Destruction Training, NSIAD-00-64, March 21, 2000.
107. GAO, Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and Coordination; GAO, Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency; GAO, Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism Operations; and GAO, Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of Mass Destruction Training, NSIAD-00-64, March 21, 2000.
108. For example, the requirement to train first responders in the nation's 120 largest cities originated not in the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation, but in the now-defunct Senior Interagency Coordination Group (SICG). SICG was established to facilitate coordination among federal agencies involved in providing domestic preparedness support to state and local governments. The figure 120 was based on population and geographic criteria (two smaller cities were added because of their distance from federal response assets). See Department of Defense, Domestic Preparedness Program in the Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction, May 1997, pp. 2, 11-12; and House Committee on National Security, Subcommittee on Military Research and Development, The Federal Response to Domestic Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Status of the Department of Defense Support Program (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1998), pp. 31-32.
109. For example, the requirement to train first responders in the nation's 120 largest cities originated not in the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation, but in the now-defunct Senior Interagency Coordination Group (SICG). SICG was established to facilitate coordination among federal agencies involved in providing domestic preparedness support to state and local governments. The figure 120 was based on population and geographic criteria (two smaller cities were added because of their distance from federal response assets). See Department of Defense, Domestic Preparedness Program in the Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction, May 1997, pp. 2, 11-12; and House Committee on National Security, Subcommittee on Military Research and Development, The Federal Response to Domestic Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Status of the Department of Defense Support Program (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1998), pp. 31-32.
110. If developed, an index of this kind would have to be classified to avoid calling attention to the country's most vulnerable cities.
111. Examples include Environmental Protection Agency assessments of levels of harmful molecules in the air or drinking water, Occupational Safety and Health Administration standards on workplace threats to employee health, and Federal Aviation Administration and National Transportation Safety Board airplane safety regulations.
112. John Buntin, Security Preparations for the 1996 Centennial Olympic Games, Case Study, Part B (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, October 1999), p. 14.
113. As noted earlier, the U.S. government defined two major phases of an operational response to a terrorist incident: crisis management and consequence management. These labels are problematic for several reasons, the most important of which is that there is no clear temporal line between the two phases.
114. See Falkenrath, Newman, and Thayer, America's Achilles' Heel, pp. 261-336.
115. For further discussion, see Howitt and Koblentz, "Organizational Capacity and Coordination."
116. See, for example, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vol. 2, CB Weapons Today (New York: Humanities Press, 1973).
117. See Falkenrath, Newman, and Thayer, America's Achilles' Heel, pp. 277-284.
118. A terrorist attack may also cause unexpected departures from normal activities that could hamper response activities, such as cessation of airline service.
119. For instance, if the authorities cannot define the boundaries of the weapon's effects (usually assumed to be a plume), or do not correctly understand the physical properties of the weapon's agent, then they will not be able to advise the public to stay at home or flee.
120. For more information about the TOPOFF exercise, see Thomas Inglesby, Rita Grossman, and Tara O'Toole, "A Plague on Your City: Observations from TOPOFF," Biodefense Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 2 (September 2000); Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction [The Gilmore Commission], Second Annual Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: RAND, December 2000), appendix L, URL; and www.ojp.usDoJ.gov/ osldps/exer_topoff.htm.
121. For more information about the TOPOFF exercise, see Thomas Inglesby, Rita Grossman, and Tara O'Toole, "A Plague on Your City: Observations from TOPOFF," Biodefense Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 2 (September 2000); Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction [The Gilmore Commission], Second Annual Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: RAND, December 2000), appendix L, URL; and www.ojp.usDoJ.gov/ osldps/exer_topoff.htm.
122. I am indebted to Philip Heymann for this point.
123. Posse Comitatus Act, U.S. Code (U.S.C.) 18, sec. 1385. For more information, see Charles Doyle, The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: The Use of the Military to Execute Civilian Law, Congressional Research Service, September 2, 1995; and Maj. Craig T. Trebilcock, U.S. Army, "The Myth of Posse Comitatus," Journal of Homeland Defense, October 27, 2000, http:// www.homelanddefense.org.
124. Posse Comitatus Act, U.S. Code (U.S.C.) 18, sec. 1385. For more information, see Charles Doyle, The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: The Use of the Military to Execute Civilian Law, Congressional Research Service, September 2, 1995; and Maj. Craig T. Trebilcock, U.S. Army, "The Myth of Posse Comitatus," Journal of Homeland Defense, October 27, 2000, http://www.homelanddefense.org.
125. The status is Emergency Situations Involving Chemical or Biological Weapons of Mass Destruction, U.S.C. 10, sec. 382.
126. See Juliette N. Kayyem, "Preparing for a Biological Terrorism Event: Finding the 'Right' Law," Discussion Paper (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, ESDP, forthcoming).
127. See Laura K. Donohue and Juliette N. Kayyem, "Federalism and the Battle over Counterterrorist Law: State Sovereignty, Criminal Law Enforcement, and National Security," Discussion Paper (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, ESDP, forthcoming).
128. This behavior is rational because (1) state and local governments see the federal government as responsible for national security; and (2) the odds of an attack within the geographic domain of any particular state or locality are a fraction of the odds of an attack within the vast geographic domain of the federal government.
129. For a discussion of this dynamic, see Howitt and Koblentz, "Organizational Capacity and Coordination."
130. The difficulty with this approach is that WMD preparedness is in some ways fundamentally different from the everyday activities it is to be paired with, which presents the possibility that such an attack would not be handled in the emergency manner required. For a more detailed discussion of the possibilities and difficulties with complementarity, see ibid.
131. The United States permitted this to happen because of a complacency after World War II bred from misplaced confidence in the ability of modern medicine to control infectious disease through antimicrobial drugs and proper hygiene. As a result, the American public health system was ill-prepared to cope with the new infectious diseases that emerged in the 1980s, such as HIV or hanta virus, or with the old diseases that had grown resistant to antimicrobials. A second reason appears to have been the gradual weakening of American communities and the concomitant rise in American individualism and antigovernmentalism after World War II. See Laurie Garrett, Betrayal of Trust: The Collapse of Global Public Health (New York: Hyperion, 2000).
132. For a description of the Incident Command System, see Hank Christen and Paul Maniscalco, The EMS Incident Management System (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1998).
133. The lack of interoperable communications systems caused severe difficulties for law enforcement and emergency medical teams responding to the shootings at Columbine High School in April 1999. See Jefferson County Sheriff's Office, Report on the Columbine High School Shootings, April 20, 1999, CD-ROM; and Susan Rosengrant, "The Shootings at Columbine High School: Responding to a New Kind of Terrorism," Case Study (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, forthcoming).
134. The lack of interoperable communications systems caused severe difficulties for law enforcement and emergency medical teams responding to the shootings at Columbine High School in April 1999. See Jefferson County Sheriff's Office, Report on the Columbine High School Shootings, April 20, 1999, CD-ROM; and Susan Rosengrant, "The Shootings at Columbine High School: Responding to a New Kind of Terrorism," Case Study (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, forthcoming).
135. The Department of State is the lead federal agency for responding to terrorist incidents outside of the United States. In the event of such an incident, an interagency foreign emergency support team would be deployed to manage the crisis. An unclassified summary of PDD-39 is available at www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm.
136. On the effects of institutional fragmentation on U.S. defense program implementation, see Ashton B. Carter, "Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future," in Carter and White, Keeping the Edge, pp. 14-19.