Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 88, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 261-293

  Martimort, David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE PAU ET DES PAYS DE L'ADOUR   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0006118759     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2556     Document Type: Article

References (36)

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