Aggregation technology of common goods and its strategic consequences: Global warming, biodiversity, and siting conflicts

European Journal of Political Research

Volumn 40, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 117-138

  Holzinger, Katharina ^a,b  

^a Max Planck Proj Grp on Com Goods   (Germany)

^b Max Planck Project Group Common Goods: Law Politics and Economics   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035540841     PISSN: 03044130     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1012933800614     Document Type: Article

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