Transparency international and corruption as an issue of global governance

Global Governance

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 25-49

  Wang, Hongying ^a   Rosenau, James N ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035219671     PISSN: 10752846     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/19426720-00701005     Document Type: Article

References (124)

1. Michael Johnston, "The Search for Definitions: The Vitality of Politics and the Issue of Corruption," International Social Science Journal 149 (September 1996): 321-336. An example of an extensive definitional effort is provided by one observer who sought to design a "culturally neutral" definition: "Corruption is any attempt, whether successful or not, to persuade someone in a position of responsibility to make a decision or recommendation on any grounds other than the intrinsic merits of the case with a view to the advantage or advancement of him-or herself or another person or group to which he or she is linked through personal commitment, obligation, or employment, or individual, professional, or group loyalty." A. W. Cragg, "Business, Globalization, and the Logic and Ethics of Corruption," International Journal 53 (autumn 1998): 651.
2. Michael Johnston, "The Search for Definitions: The Vitality of Politics and the Issue of Corruption," International Social Science Journal 149 (September 1996): 321-336. An example of an extensive definitional effort is provided by one observer who sought to design a "culturally neutral" definition: "Corruption is any attempt, whether successful or not, to persuade someone in a position of responsibility to make a decision or recommendation on any grounds other than the intrinsic merits of the case with a view to the advantage or advancement of him-or herself or another person or group to which he or she is linked through personal commitment, obligation, or employment, or individual, professional, or group loyalty." A. W. Cragg, "Business, Globalization, and the Logic and Ethics of Corruption," International Journal 53 (autumn 1998): 651.
3. Kimberly Ann Elliott, "Corruption as an International Policy Problem: Overview and Recommendations," in Elliott, ed., Corruption and the Global Economy (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997), pp. 178-179.
4. Moisés Naím, "The Corruption Eruption," Brown Journal of World Affairs 2 (summer 1995): 245-261.
5. The New York Times, along with the U.S. president, are considered central to setting the media agenda for national issues in the United States. See John W. Dearing and Everett M. Rogers, Agenda Setting (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1996), p. 25.
6. For comparable data and findings based on the Financial Times and The Economist, see Patrick Glynn, Stephen J. Kobrin, and Moisés Naím, "The Globalization of Corruption," in Elliott, Corruption and the Global Economy, p. 21.
7. Media and public agendas are highly correlated, with the former tending to shape the latter. See Dearing and Rogers, Agenda Setting, chap. 1. The classic study in this area is Maxwell E. McComb and Donald L. Shaw, "The Agenda-Setting Function of the Mass Media," Public Opinion Quarterly 36 (1972): 176-187.
8. Media and public agendas are highly correlated, with the former tending to shape the latter. See Dearing and Rogers, Agenda Setting, chap. 1. The classic study in this area is Maxwell E. McComb and Donald L. Shaw, "The Agenda-Setting Function of the Mass Media," Public Opinion Quarterly 36 (1972): 176-187.
9. Fred Hiatt, "Corruption Is Finally Getting the Attention It Needs," International Herald Tribune, 25 February 1999, p. 9.
10. Volker Rittberger and Henning Boekle, "The International Olympic Committee: A World Government of Sport?" Law and State 56 (Tubingen, Germany: Institute for Scientific Co-operation, 1997): 24-53.
11. See E. J. Dionne Jr., "Score One for the Media Snoops," Washington Post, 26 March 1999, p. A33; and Marie Geoghegan-Quinn, "Discredited Musketeers Were Right to Fall on Their Swords," Irish Times, 20 March 1999, p. 14.
12. See E. J. Dionne Jr., "Score One for the Media Snoops," Washington Post, 26 March 1999, p. A33; and Marie Geoghegan-Quinn, "Discredited Musketeers Were Right to Fall on Their Swords," Irish Times, 20 March 1999, p. 14.
13. Glynn, Kobrin, and Naím, "The Globalization of Corruption," p. 7.
14. "The Lima Declaration," reproduced in Combating Corruption: Are Lasting Solutions Emerging? (Berlin: Transparency International, Annual Report, 1998), pp. 163-168.
15. Reported on Transparency International's official website online at http://www.transparency.de.
16. John Brademas and Fritz Heimann, "Tackling International Corruption: No Longer Taboo," Foreign Affairs 77 (September-October 1998): 20.
17. Ibid. See also Duncan Hughes, "Asian Corruption Going from Bad to Worse," South China Morning Post, 22 September 1998, p. 6.
18. Ibid. See also Duncan Hughes, "Asian Corruption Going from Bad to Worse," South China Morning Post, 22 September 1998, p. 6.
19. However, Wolfensohn was careful to point out that "it would be quite wrong of us to come in like the police." See Trevor Royle, "Corruption Pays Its Way Throughout the World," Scotland on Sunday, 4 May 1997, p. 21.
20. James D. Wolfensohn, "A Proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework (A Discussion Draft)" (photocopy, 21 January 1999), p. 10.
21. Lee Siew Hua, "Who's Who in the Graft League," Straits Times (Singapore), 24 September 1998, p. 12.
22. John Mason and Guy de Jonquières, "Goodbye Mr. 10%," Financial Times, 22 July 1997, p. 15.
23. Some even argue that petty corruption is not corruption at all: such '"payments, which are made to get people to do or speed up what they should be doing anyway,' g et you 'what you're legally entitled to, not subverting the integrity of decision-making at somebody else's expense.' Even the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1997) permits these facilitating payments." The subquote is from Jeremy Pope, in Anita van de Vliet, "Corruption Check," Corporate Location (November-December 1995): 22.
24. Susan Rose-Ackerman, "Democracy and 'Grand' Corruption," International Social Science Journal 48 (September 1996): 365-380. See also Ackerman, "Corruption and Development," paper presented at the annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, D.C., 30 April-1 May 1997, pp. 8-10; George Moody-Stuart, "Grand Corruption in Third World Development," Transparency International Working Paper, 1994; and Marta Steeman, "Close Watch Urged on Corruption Law," The Dominion, 11 March 1999, p. 13.
25. Susan Rose-Ackerman, "Democracy and 'Grand' Corruption," International Social Science Journal 48 (September 1996): 365-380. See also Ackerman, "Corruption and Development," paper presented at the annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, D.C., 30 April-1 May 1997, pp. 8-10; George Moody-Stuart, "Grand Corruption in Third World Development," Transparency International Working Paper, 1994; and Marta Steeman, "Close Watch Urged on Corruption Law," The Dominion, 11 March 1999, p. 13.
26. Susan Rose-Ackerman, "Democracy and 'Grand' Corruption," International Social Science Journal 48 (September 1996): 365-380. See also Ackerman, "Corruption and Development," paper presented at the annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, D.C., 30 April-1 May 1997, pp. 8-10; George Moody-Stuart, "Grand Corruption in Third World Development," Transparency International Working Paper, 1994; and Marta Steeman, "Close Watch Urged on Corruption Law," The Dominion, 11 March 1999, p. 13.
27. Susan Rose-Ackerman, "Democracy and 'Grand' Corruption," International Social Science Journal 48 (September 1996): 365-380. See also Ackerman, "Corruption and Development," paper presented at the annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, D.C., 30 April-1 May 1997, pp. 8-10; George Moody-Stuart, "Grand Corruption in Third World Development," Transparency International Working Paper, 1994; and Marta Steeman, "Close Watch Urged on Corruption Law," The Dominion, 11 March 1999, p. 13.
28. Michelle Celarier, "The Search for the Smoking Gun," Euromoney (September 1996): 50.
29. Frank Vogl, "Laying Corruption to Rest," Economic Reform Today, 18 July 1993.
30. This remark was made by Michael Wiehen of TI and quoted in Mason and de Jonquières, "Goodbye Mr. 10%," p. 15.
31. Van de Vliet, "Corruption Check," p. 22.
32. "Eigen Fights the Corruption Monster," in New Straits Times (Malaysia), 9 September 1997, p. 1.
33. Ben Richardson, "SAR Wanted to Act on Corrupt Behavior of Businessmen Abroad," South China Morning Post, 31 January 1999, p. 1.
34. William McLucas, quoted in Neil Roland, "U.S. Firm May Feel Need to Bribe Overseas," Commission Appeal, 6 March 1997, p. B4.
35. On China, for example, see Julia Kwong, The Political Economy of Corruption in China (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997); Barbara N. Sands, "Decentralizing an Economy: The Role of Bureaucratic Corruption in China's Economic Reforms," Public Choice 65 (April 1990): 85-91; Melanie Manion, "Corruption by Design: Bribery in Chinese Enterprise Licensing," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 12 (April 1996): 167-195; and David S. G. Goodman, "Corruption in the PLA," in Gerald Segal and Richard H. Yang, eds., Chinese Economic Reform: The Impact on Security (London: Routledge, for IISS and the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, 1996), pp. 35-52. On Russia, see Britta Hillstrom, "Effects of Corruption on Democra-cies in Asia, Latin America, and Russia," Woodrow Wilson Center Report 8 (December 1996): 3-40; Federico Varese, "The Transition to the Market and Corruption in Post-Soviet Russia," Political Studies 45, no. 3 (1997): 579-596; and Steven Lee Solnick, Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).
36. On China, for example, see Julia Kwong, The Political Economy of Corruption in China (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997); Barbara N. Sands, "Decentralizing an Economy: The Role of Bureaucratic Corruption in China's Economic Reforms," Public Choice 65 (April 1990): 85-91; Melanie Manion, "Corruption by Design: Bribery in Chinese Enterprise Licensing," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 12 (April 1996): 167-195; and David S. G. Goodman, "Corruption in the PLA," in Gerald Segal and Richard H. Yang, eds., Chinese Economic Reform: The Impact on Security (London: Routledge, for IISS and the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, 1996), pp. 35-52. On Russia, see Britta Hillstrom, "Effects of Corruption on Democra-cies in Asia, Latin America, and Russia," Woodrow Wilson Center Report 8 (December 1996): 3-40; Federico Varese, "The Transition to the Market and Corruption in Post-Soviet Russia," Political Studies 45, no. 3 (1997): 579-596; and Steven Lee Solnick, Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).
37. On China, for example, see Julia Kwong, The Political Economy of Corruption in China (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997); Barbara N. Sands, "Decentralizing an Economy: The Role of Bureaucratic Corruption in China's Economic Reforms," Public Choice 65 (April 1990): 85-91; Melanie Manion, "Corruption by Design: Bribery in Chinese Enterprise Licensing," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 12 (April 1996): 167-195; and David S. G. Goodman, "Corruption in the PLA," in Gerald Segal and Richard H. Yang, eds., Chinese Economic Reform: The Impact on Security (London: Routledge, for IISS and the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, 1996), pp. 35-52. On Russia, see Britta Hillstrom, "Effects of Corruption on Democra-cies in Asia, Latin America, and Russia," Woodrow Wilson Center Report 8 (December 1996): 3-40; Federico Varese, "The Transition to the Market and Corruption in Post-Soviet Russia," Political Studies 45, no. 3 (1997): 579-596; and Steven Lee Solnick, Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).
38. On China, for example, see Julia Kwong, The Political Economy of Corruption in China (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997); Barbara N. Sands, "Decentralizing an Economy: The Role of Bureaucratic Corruption in China's Economic Reforms," Public Choice 65 (April 1990): 85-91; Melanie Manion, "Corruption by Design: Bribery in Chinese Enterprise Licensing," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 12 (April 1996): 167-195; and David S. G. Goodman, "Corruption in the PLA," in Gerald Segal and Richard H. Yang, eds., Chinese Economic Reform: The Impact on Security (London: Routledge, for IISS and the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, 1996), pp. 35-52. On Russia, see Britta Hillstrom, "Effects of Corruption on Democra-cies in Asia, Latin America, and Russia," Woodrow Wilson Center Report 8 (December 1996): 3-40; Federico Varese, "The Transition to the Market and Corruption in Post-Soviet Russia," Political Studies 45, no. 3 (1997): 579-596; and Steven Lee Solnick, Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).
39. On China, for example, see Julia Kwong, The Political Economy of Corruption in China (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997); Barbara N. Sands, "Decentralizing an Economy: The Role of Bureaucratic Corruption in China's Economic Reforms," Public Choice 65 (April 1990): 85-91; Melanie Manion, "Corruption by Design: Bribery in Chinese Enterprise Licensing," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 12 (April 1996): 167-195; and David S. G. Goodman, "Corruption in the PLA," in Gerald Segal and Richard H. Yang, eds., Chinese Economic Reform: The Impact on Security (London: Routledge, for IISS and the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, 1996), pp. 35-52. On Russia, see Britta Hillstrom, "Effects of Corruption on Democra-cies in Asia, Latin America, and Russia," Woodrow Wilson Center Report 8 (December 1996): 3-40; Federico Varese, "The Transition to the Market and Corruption in Post-Soviet Russia," Political Studies 45, no. 3 (1997): 579-596; and Steven Lee Solnick, Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).
40. On China, for example, see Julia Kwong, The Political Economy of Corruption in China (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997); Barbara N. Sands, "Decentralizing an Economy: The Role of Bureaucratic Corruption in China's Economic Reforms," Public Choice 65 (April 1990): 85-91; Melanie Manion, "Corruption by Design: Bribery in Chinese Enterprise Licensing," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 12 (April 1996): 167-195; and David S. G. Goodman, "Corruption in the PLA," in Gerald Segal and Richard H. Yang, eds., Chinese Economic Reform: The Impact on Security (London: Routledge, for IISS and the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, 1996), pp. 35-52. On Russia, see Britta Hillstrom, "Effects of Corruption on Democra-cies in Asia, Latin America, and Russia," Woodrow Wilson Center Report 8 (December 1996): 3-40; Federico Varese, "The Transition to the Market and Corruption in Post-Soviet Russia," Political Studies 45, no. 3 (1997): 579-596; and Steven Lee Solnick, Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).
41. On China, for example, see Julia Kwong, The Political Economy of Corruption in China (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997); Barbara N. Sands, "Decentralizing an Economy: The Role of Bureaucratic Corruption in China's Economic Reforms," Public Choice 65 (April 1990): 85-91; Melanie Manion, "Corruption by Design: Bribery in Chinese Enterprise Licensing," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 12 (April 1996): 167-195; and David S. G. Goodman, "Corruption in the PLA," in Gerald Segal and Richard H. Yang, eds., Chinese Economic Reform: The Impact on Security (London: Routledge, for IISS and the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, 1996), pp. 35-52. On Russia, see Britta Hillstrom, "Effects of Corruption on Democra-cies in Asia, Latin America, and Russia," Woodrow Wilson Center Report 8 (December 1996): 3-40; Federico Varese, "The Transition to the Market and Corruption in Post-Soviet Russia," Political Studies 45, no. 3 (1997): 579-596; and Steven Lee Solnick, Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).
42. The recent economic growth in Malaysia has its flip side. The boom has necessitated an increase in administration, which beefs up the amount of corruption as well as its scale. See Sharon Nelson, "Towards More Open Dealings," New Straits Times (Malaysia), 1 May 1997, p. 9. On Latin America, see Juigi Manzetti and Charles H. Blake, "Market Reforms and Corruption in Latin America: New Means for Old Ways," Review of International Political Economy 3 (winter 1996): 662-697. For a discussion of the relationship between corruption and market-oriented reforms in general, see Steven N. S. Cheung, "A Simplistic General Equilibrium Theory of Corruption," in Contemporary Economic Policy 14 (July 1996): 1-5; and Susanto Basu and David Li, "Corruption and Reform," Department of Economics, University of Michigan, CREST Working Papers No. 94-14 (November 1994).
43. The recent economic growth in Malaysia has its flip side. The boom has necessitated an increase in administration, which beefs up the amount of corruption as well as its scale. See Sharon Nelson, "Towards More Open Dealings," New Straits Times (Malaysia), 1 May 1997, p. 9. On Latin America, see Juigi Manzetti and Charles H. Blake, "Market Reforms and Corruption in Latin America: New Means for Old Ways," Review of International Political Economy 3 (winter 1996): 662-697. For a discussion of the relationship between corruption and market-oriented reforms in general, see Steven N. S. Cheung, "A Simplistic General Equilibrium Theory of Corruption," in Contemporary Economic Policy 14 (July 1996): 1-5; and Susanto Basu and David Li, "Corruption and Reform," Department of Economics, University of Michigan, CREST Working Papers No. 94-14 (November 1994).
44. The recent economic growth in Malaysia has its flip side. The boom has necessitated an increase in administration, which beefs up the amount of corruption as well as its scale. See Sharon Nelson, "Towards More Open Dealings," New Straits Times (Malaysia), 1 May 1997, p. 9. On Latin America, see Juigi Manzetti and Charles H. Blake, "Market Reforms and Corruption in Latin America: New Means for Old Ways," Review of International Political Economy 3 (winter 1996): 662-697. For a discussion of the relationship between corruption and market-oriented reforms in general, see Steven N. S. Cheung, "A Simplistic General Equilibrium Theory of Corruption," in Contemporary Economic Policy 14 (July 1996): 1-5; and Susanto Basu and David Li, "Corruption and Reform," Department of Economics, University of Michigan, CREST Working Papers No. 94-14 (November 1994).
45. The recent economic growth in Malaysia has its flip side. The boom has necessitated an increase in administration, which beefs up the amount of corruption as well as its scale. See Sharon Nelson, "Towards More Open Dealings," New Straits Times (Malaysia), 1 May 1997, p. 9. On Latin America, see Juigi Manzetti and Charles H. Blake, "Market Reforms and Corruption in Latin America: New Means for Old Ways," Review of International Political Economy 3 (winter 1996): 662-697. For a discussion of the relationship between corruption and market-oriented reforms in general, see Steven N. S. Cheung, "A Simplistic General Equilibrium Theory of Corruption," in Contemporary Economic Policy 14 (July 1996): 1-5; and Susanto Basu and David Li, "Corruption and Reform," Department of Economics, University of Michigan, CREST Working Papers No. 94-14 (November 1994).
46. Glynn, Kobrin, and Naím, "The Globalization of Corruption," p. 14.
47. According to one model, industrial policy promotes both corruption and investment. Corruption is higher in countries pursuing active industrial policy. See Alberto Ades and Rafael Di Telia, "National Champions and Corruption: Some Unpleasant Interventionist Arithmetic," Economic Journal 107, no. 443 (July 1997): 1023-1042. Studies show that in Indonesia one-third of the World Bank loans have been siphoned off by bureaucrats. Kastorius Sinaga, "WB Loans Graft Needs to Be Curbed," Jakarta Post, 12 August 1997, p. 4.
48. According to one model, industrial policy promotes both corruption and investment. Corruption is higher in countries pursuing active industrial policy. See Alberto Ades and Rafael Di Telia, "National Champions and Corruption: Some Unpleasant Interventionist Arithmetic," Economic Journal 107, no. 443 (July 1997): 1023-1042. Studies show that in Indonesia one-third of the World Bank loans have been siphoned off by bureaucrats. Kastorius Sinaga, "WB Loans Graft Needs to Be Curbed," Jakarta Post, 12 August 1997, p. 4.
49. The interest in norms is in part attributable to the influence of neo-institutional sociologists who study how normative environments shape the structure and behavior of organizations and individuals. The most important works in this field are those by John Meyer and his associates. See, for example, W. Richard Scott, John W. Meyer, and associates, eds., Institutional Environment and Organizations: Structural Complexity and Individualism (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1994). A major problem with the sociological scholarship on norms is that it has very little to say about the origins and dynamics of norms. See Martha Finnemore, "Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism," International Organization 50 (spring 1996): 325-348. Political scientists are now addressing this inadequacy by exploring the agents and process of norm diffusion. See, for example, Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997); Jacqui True and Michael Mintrom, "Transnational Policy Networks and Policy Diffusion: The Case of Gender Mainstreaming," paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, Atlanta, 1999.
50. The interest in norms is in part attributable to the influence of neo-institutional sociologists who study how normative environments shape the structure and behavior of organizations and individuals. The most important works in this field are those by John Meyer and his associates. See, for example, W. Richard Scott, John W. Meyer, and associates, eds., Institutional Environment and Organizations: Structural Complexity and Individualism (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1994). A major problem with the sociological scholarship on norms is that it has very little to say about the origins and dynamics of norms. See Martha Finnemore, "Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism," International Organization 50 (spring 1996): 325-348. Political scientists are now addressing this inadequacy by exploring the agents and process of norm diffusion. See, for example, Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997); Jacqui True and Michael Mintrom, "Transnational Policy Networks and Policy Diffusion: The Case of Gender Mainstreaming," paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, Atlanta, 1999.
51. The interest in norms is in part attributable to the influence of neo-institutional sociologists who study how normative environments shape the structure and behavior of organizations and individuals. The most important works in this field are those by John Meyer and his associates. See, for example, W. Richard Scott, John W. Meyer, and associates, eds., Institutional Environment and Organizations: Structural Complexity and Individualism (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1994). A major problem with the sociological scholarship on norms is that it has very little to say about the origins and dynamics of norms. See Martha Finnemore, "Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism," International Organization 50 (spring 1996): 325-348. Political scientists are now addressing this inadequacy by exploring the agents and process of norm diffusion. See, for example, Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997); Jacqui True and Michael Mintrom, "Transnational Policy Networks and Policy Diffusion: The Case of Gender Mainstreaming," paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, Atlanta, 1999.
52. The interest in norms is in part attributable to the influence of neo-institutional sociologists who study how normative environments shape the structure and behavior of organizations and individuals. The most important works in this field are those by John Meyer and his associates. See, for example, W. Richard Scott, John W. Meyer, and associates, eds., Institutional Environment and Organizations: Structural Complexity and Individualism (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1994). A major problem with the sociological scholarship on norms is that it has very little to say about the origins and dynamics of norms. See Martha Finnemore, "Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism," International Organization 50 (spring 1996): 325-348. Political scientists are now addressing this inadequacy by exploring the agents and process of norm diffusion. See, for example, Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997); Jacqui True and Michael Mintrom, "Transnational Policy Networks and Policy Diffusion: The Case of Gender Mainstreaming," paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, Atlanta, 1999.
53. The interest in norms is in part attributable to the influence of neo-institutional sociologists who study how normative environments shape the structure and behavior of organizations and individuals. The most important works in this field are those by John Meyer and his associates. See, for example, W. Richard Scott, John W. Meyer, and associates, eds., Institutional Environment and Organizations: Structural Complexity and Individualism (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1994). A major problem with the sociological scholarship on norms is that it has very little to say about the origins and dynamics of norms. See Martha Finnemore, "Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism," International Organization 50 (spring 1996): 325-348. Political scientists are now addressing this inadequacy by exploring the agents and process of norm diffusion. See, for example, Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997); Jacqui True and Michael Mintrom, "Transnational Policy Networks and Policy Diffusion: The Case of Gender Mainstreaming," paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, Atlanta, 1999.
54. "Mission Statement," in Combating Corruption, p. 9.
55. See, for example, Tan Sai Siong, "Corruption Perceptions Index Should Carry Health Warning," Straits Times (Singapore), 8 June 1996.
56. For a discussion of the sources and interpretation of data presented in the CPI, see Transparency International, The Fight Against Corruption, chap. 6.
57. "Need for Greater Transparency," Business Times (Malaysia), 2 April 1998, p. 6.
58. Personal correspondence, 14 April 1999.
59. Peter Eigen, "Sustainable Strategies in Fighting Corruption: An Overview," in Combating Corruption, pp. 12, 15.
60. These figures can be found in Combating Corruption, pp. 118-119.
61. TI home page online at www.transparency.de.
62. Nancy Zucker Boswell, "Building Effective Anticorruption Regimes: A Public-Private Sector Partnership," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of International Law, Washington, D.C., 10 April 1997.
63. R. Michael Gadbaw, "International Anticorruption Initiatives: Today's Fad or Tomorrow's New World?" paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of International Law, Washington, D.C., 10 April 1997.
64. Personal correspondence with TI official, April 1999.
65. For example, during the recent meeting of the National People's Congress, President Jiang Zemin of China warned, "We must recognize the importance and urgency of cracking down on corruption from the point of view of national survival." China News Agency, 5 March 1999.
66. TI 1997 report, pp. 10-11. The often cited article is Shang-jin Wei, "How Taxing Is Corruption on International Investors?" National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. W6030, May 1997. Controlling for other factors, Wei finds that corruption tends to discourage foreign direct investment (FDI), in effect by acting as a tax on foreign business. From Singapore to Mexico, the marginal tax rate on foreign investment is raised by 20 percent. According to Peter Eigen, there is a tendency for countries with rampant corruption to face difficulties in sustaining economic development "because very often the wrong projects are chosen, not the ones which give the best price and best product. Very often funds are not made available to schools, hospitals and other services which are important to create a healthy and prosperous society." Kang Siew Li, "KL's Anti-Graft Laws Lauded," Business Times (Malaysia), 17 September 1998.
67. TI 1997 report, pp. 10-11. The often cited article is Shang-jin Wei, "How Taxing Is Corruption on International Investors?" National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. W6030, May 1997. Controlling for other factors, Wei finds that corruption tends to discourage foreign direct investment (FDI), in effect by acting as a tax on foreign business. From Singapore to Mexico, the marginal tax rate on foreign investment is raised by 20 percent. According to Peter Eigen, there is a tendency for countries with rampant corruption to face difficulties in sustaining economic development "because very often the wrong projects are chosen, not the ones which give the best price and best product. Very often funds are not made available to schools, hospitals and other services which are important to create a healthy and prosperous society." Kang Siew Li, "KL's Anti-Graft Laws Lauded," Business Times (Malaysia), 17 September 1998.
68. TI 1997 report, pp. 10-11. The often cited article is Shang-jin Wei, "How Taxing Is Corruption on International Investors?" National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. W6030, May 1997. Controlling for other factors, Wei finds that corruption tends to discourage foreign direct investment (FDI), in effect by acting as a tax on foreign business. From Singapore to Mexico, the marginal tax rate on foreign investment is raised by 20 percent. According to Peter Eigen, there is a tendency for countries with rampant corruption to face difficulties in sustaining economic development "because very often the wrong projects are chosen, not the ones which give the best price and best product. Very often funds are not made available to schools, hospitals and other services which are important to create a healthy and prosperous society." Kang Siew Li, "KL's Anti-Graft Laws Lauded," Business Times (Malaysia), 17 September 1998.
69. For a review and critique of the functionalist literature on corruption, see Shahid M. Alam, "Anatomy of Corruption: An Approach to the Political Economy of Development," American Journal of Economics and Sociology 48 (October 1989): 441-456.
70. Tyler Cowen, Amihai Glazer, and Henry McMillan, "Rent Seeking Can Promote the Provision of Public Goods," Economics and Politics 6 (July 1994): 131-145.
71. Cheung, "A Simplistic General Equilibrium Theory of Corruption," pp. 1-5. Also see Gordon Tullock, "Corruption Theory and Practice," in Contemporary Economic Policy 14 (July 1996): 6-13.
72. Cheung, "A Simplistic General Equilibrium Theory of Corruption," pp. 1-5. Also see Gordon Tullock, "Corruption Theory and Practice," in Contemporary Economic Policy 14 (July 1996): 6-13.
73. Basu and Li, "Corruption and Reform."
74. Francis T. Liu, "Three Aspects of Corruption," Contemporary Economic Policy 14 (July 1996): 26-29.
75. Trond E. Olsen and Gaute Trosvik, "Collusion and Renegotiation in Hierarchies: A Case of Beneficial Corruption," International Economic Review 39 (May 1998): 413-438.
76. In addition to the study by Shang-jin Wei (note 46), see Oluwole Owoye and Ibrahim Bendardaf, "The Macroeconomic Analysis of the Effects of Corruption on Economic Growth of Developing Economies," Rivista Internazionale de Scienze Economiche e Commerciali 43 (January-March 1996): 191-211; Paolo Mauro, "Corruption and Growth," Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, no. 3 (August 1995): 681-712; and M. Shahid Alam, "Anatomy of Corruption: An Approach to the Political Economy of Underdevelopment," American Journal of Economics and Sociology 48 (October 1989): 441-456.
77. In addition to the study by Shang-jin Wei (note 46), see Oluwole Owoye and Ibrahim Bendardaf, "The Macroeconomic Analysis of the Effects of Corruption on Economic Growth of Developing Economies," Rivista Internazionale de Scienze Economiche e Commerciali 43 (January-March 1996): 191-211; Paolo Mauro, "Corruption and Growth," Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, no. 3 (August 1995): 681-712; and M. Shahid Alam, "Anatomy of Corruption: An Approach to the Political Economy of Underdevelopment," American Journal of Economics and Sociology 48 (October 1989): 441-456.
78. In addition to the study by Shang-jin Wei (note 46), see Oluwole Owoye and Ibrahim Bendardaf, "The Macroeconomic Analysis of the Effects of Corruption on Economic Growth of Developing Economies," Rivista Internazionale de Scienze Economiche e Commerciali 43 (January-March 1996): 191-211; Paolo Mauro, "Corruption and Growth," Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, no. 3 (August 1995): 681-712; and M. Shahid Alam, "Anatomy of Corruption: An Approach to the Political Economy of Underdevelopment," American Journal of Economics and Sociology 48 (October 1989): 441-456.
79. "Corruption in Brazil Raises Costs by Up to 40%," Gazeta Mercantil Online, 18 September 1996.
80. Michael Hamlyn, "Opposition Urges Mandela to Act Against Corruption," New Straits Times (Malaysia), 15 August 1997, p. 12.
81. "Corruption Related to Economic Crisis," Korean Herald, 9 February 1998.
82. "The Cameroon government condemns strongly the arrogance of certain bodies that are in the pay of neo-colonial clusters of people at work to impede the progress of our countries instead of supporting efforts and sacrifices made by our people." Quoted in Barbara Crossette, "Europe Dominates Survey's Top 10 Least-Corrupt-Countries List," New York Times, 4 October 1998, p. 5.
83. "This is a subjective and partial study which is aimed at feeding the political opposition's campaign against the government and renew their attacks on the integrity and credibility of the country." Quoted in Beth Rubenstein, "Corruption Taint Hurts Argentina's Trade Goals," Journal of Commerce, 9 October 1998, p. 4A.
84. For instance, after TI issued the CPI for the first time in 1995, Singapore's prime minister, Goh Chok Tong, noted that "there is no reason why, in terms of the honesty and integrity of our system, Singapore should be second to any other country." See Susan Sim, "Corruption Index Based on 7 Polls of Businessmen, Newsmen," Straits Times (Singapore), 26 August 1995, p. 2. In the aftermath of the issuance of the 1997 CPI, opposition leader Lim Kit Siang told the Malaysian government that by aggressively fighting corruption, Malaysia's ranking in the CPI will improve. See "DAP: Give ACA Chief Back His Old Powers," New Straits Times (Malaysia), 10 April 1997, p. 4.
85. For instance, after TI issued the CPI for the first time in 1995, Singapore's prime minister, Goh Chok Tong, noted that "there is no reason why, in terms of the honesty and integrity of our system, Singapore should be second to any other country." See Susan Sim, "Corruption Index Based on 7 Polls of Businessmen, Newsmen," Straits Times (Singapore), 26 August 1995, p. 2. In the aftermath of the issuance of the 1997 CPI, opposition leader Lim Kit Siang told the Malaysian government that by aggressively fighting corruption, Malaysia's ranking in the CPI will improve. See "DAP: Give ACA Chief Back His Old Powers," New Straits Times (Malaysia), 10 April 1997, p. 4.
86. Quoted in Sharon Nelson, "Towards More Open Dealings," New Straits Times (Malaysia), 1 May 1997, p. 9.
87. Personal correspondence with TI official, April 1999.
88. Quoted in Trevor RoyIe, "Corruption Pays Its Way Throughout the World," Scotland on Sunday (London), 4 May 1997, p. 21.
89. Quoted in Roger Boyes, "Britain Moves Higher in Bribery League," The Times (London), 1 August 1997.
90. Janet Guttsman, "Canada Among the Least Corrupt Countries," Toronto Star, 23 September 1998, p. D7. Indeed, in the fall of 1997, it was reported that TI issued a report stating that Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and South Korea are the most corrupting countries in the world. This is analyzing corruption from the point of view of the corrupting countries offering bribes to countries bidding for contracts. The least corrupting countries are Australia, Malaysia, and Sweden. Gazeta Mercantil Online, 2 September 1997. TI executive director Jeremy Pope cautions that this report was done by a TI researcher and the methodology was inherently flawed. Personal correspondence, April 1999.
91. Janet Guttsman, "Canada Among the Least Corrupt Countries," Toronto Star, 23 September 1998, p. D7. Indeed, in the fall of 1997, it was reported that TI issued a report stating that Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and South Korea are the most corrupting countries in the world. This is analyzing corruption from the point of view of the corrupting countries offering bribes to countries bidding for contracts. The least corrupting countries are Australia, Malaysia, and Sweden. Gazeta Mercantil Online, 2 September 1997. TI executive director Jeremy Pope cautions that this report was done by a TI researcher and the methodology was inherently flawed. Personal correspondence, April 1999.
92. "Eigen Fights the Corruption Monster," New Straits Times (Malaysia), 9 September 1997, p. 1.
93. The level of corruption differs among different economic sectors. George Moody-Stuart, chairman of TI-UK, ranks industries by the extent to which he estimates they are prone to bribery - aircraft and defense, major industrial goods, major civil works, supplies, and consultancy. See Michael Prest, "$40bn Business Beset by Bribes and Kickbacks," The Observer, 22 October 1995, p. 1. Defense sales are ideal for grand corruption because of their size and secrecy. George Moody-Stuart, "Scope for Corruption in Arms Trade," The Times (London), 26 February 1996. In many countries, construction projects tend to be where corruption concentrates. For instance, according to official reports, 63 percent of the more than 100,000 cases of corruption in recent years have taken place in the construction sector (see China News Service, 6 March 1999).
94. The level of corruption differs among different economic sectors. George Moody-Stuart, chairman of TI-UK, ranks industries by the extent to which he estimates they are prone to bribery - aircraft and defense, major industrial goods, major civil works, supplies, and consultancy. See Michael Prest, "$40bn Business Beset by Bribes and Kickbacks," The Observer, 22 October 1995, p. 1. Defense sales are ideal for grand corruption because of their size and secrecy. George Moody-Stuart, "Scope for Corruption in Arms Trade," The Times (London), 26 February 1996. In many countries, construction projects tend to be where corruption concentrates. For instance, according to official reports, 63 percent of the more than 100,000 cases of corruption in recent years have taken place in the construction sector (see China News Service, 6 March 1999).
95. For more details on this model, see Transparency International, The Fight Against Corruption, chap. 4.
96. Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders.
97. Ibid., p. 2.
98. Ibid., p. 8.
99. Ibid., p. 17.
100. Ibid., p. 19.
101. Enrique Laraña, Hank Johnston, and Joseph R. Gusfield, eds., New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994); Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders; Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco, eds., Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997); and David S. Meyer and Signey Tarrow, eds., The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998).
102. Enrique Laraña, Hank Johnston, and Joseph R. Gusfield, eds., New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994); Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders; Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco, eds., Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997); and David S. Meyer and Signey Tarrow, eds., The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998).
103. Enrique Laraña, Hank Johnston, and Joseph R. Gusfield, eds., New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994); Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders; Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco, eds., Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997); and David S. Meyer and Signey Tarrow, eds., The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998).
104. Enrique Laraña, Hank Johnston, and Joseph R. Gusfield, eds., New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994); Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders; Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco, eds., Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997); and David S. Meyer and Signey Tarrow, eds., The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998).
105. Social movements are not the same as transnational activist or advocacy networks. As Tarrow points out, "There is an important substantive difference: activist networks are horizontal elite linkages in transnational space with occasional organizational connections to grassroots social actors, while transnational social movements are built on these social networks themselves." Sidney Tarrow, "Does Internationalization Make Agents Freer - or Weaker?" paper prepared for a workshop on European institutions and transnational contention, Cornell University, 5-6 February 1999, p. 7. Also see Tarrow, "Fishnets, Internets, and Catnets: Globalization and Transnational Collective Action," in M. Hangan, L. Page Moch, and Wayne de Brake, eds., Challenging Authority (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), p. 237. The phrase transnational advocacy network is used in Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders.
106. Social movements are not the same as transnational activist or advocacy networks. As Tarrow points out, "There is an important substantive difference: activist networks are horizontal elite linkages in transnational space with occasional organizational connections to grassroots social actors, while transnational social movements are built on these social networks themselves." Sidney Tarrow, "Does Internationalization Make Agents Freer - or Weaker?" paper prepared for a workshop on European institutions and transnational contention, Cornell University, 5-6 February 1999, p. 7. Also see Tarrow, "Fishnets, Internets, and Catnets: Globalization and Transnational Collective Action," in M. Hangan, L. Page Moch, and Wayne de Brake, eds., Challenging Authority (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), p. 237. The phrase transnational advocacy network is used in Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders.
107. Social movements are not the same as transnational activist or advocacy networks. As Tarrow points out, "There is an important substantive difference: activist networks are horizontal elite linkages in transnational space with occasional organizational connections to grassroots social actors, while transnational social movements are built on these social networks themselves." Sidney Tarrow, "Does Internationalization Make Agents Freer - or Weaker?" paper prepared for a workshop on European institutions and transnational contention, Cornell University, 5-6 February 1999, p. 7. Also see Tarrow, "Fishnets, Internets, and Catnets: Globalization and Transnational Collective Action," in M. Hangan, L. Page Moch, and Wayne de Brake, eds., Challenging Authority (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), p. 237. The phrase transnational advocacy network is used in Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders.
108. Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, pp. 27, 204-205.
109. See Paulo Mauro, "The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and Government Expenditure: A Cross-Country Analysis," in K. A. Elliott (ed.), Corruption and the Global Economy, p. 83.
110. Elliott, "Corruption as an International Policy Problem," p. 190.
111. Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, p. 35.
112. Raymond Bonner, "The World Business of Bribes: Quiet Battle Is Joined," New York Times, 8 July 1996, p. A3.
113. Kerene Witcher, "A Bribe or Tip? A Dilemma," Asian Wall Street Journal, 15 September 1997, p. A1.
114. Shang-Jin Wei, "How Taxing Is Corruption on International Investors?" National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. W6030, May 1997.
115. Stephanie Flanders, "Clear Thinking on Corruption," Financial Times, 23 June 1997, p. 10.
116. Nancy Dunne, "U.S. Presses Drive Against Business Bribery," Financial Times, 24 February 1999, p. 7.
117. Mason and de Jonquières, "Goodbye Mr. 10%," p. 15.
118. A review of TI's financial supporters reveals the importance of corporate donors, especially U.S. multinational corporations. Twenty-nine of the seventy-three corporate donors are U.S. companies. See TI's home page at www.transparency.de. Other sources of funding include multilateral groups, such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Union, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the UN Development Programme; national development agencies such as the U.S. Information Agency, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the French Ministry of Cooperation, and the Swedish International Development Authority; and private foundations such as the Asia Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, the Rowntree Foundation, the Open Society Institute, and the Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung.
119. Russell Mokhiber, editor of Corporate Crime Reporter, letter to the editor of the New York Times, 19 August 1995, section 1, p. 18.
120. Michael Hershman, "A Blow Against Bribery," Financial Times, 23 February 1998, p. 14.
121. Martin Dyckman, "Taking a Reading on Corruption Around the World," St. Petersburg Times, 11 October 1998, p. 3D.
122. Larry Luxner, "Rhetoric Exceeds Reality in Latin America's Anti-Corruption Effort," Journal of Commerce, 4 June 1998, p. 4A.
123. Ben Richardson and David Murphy, "Graft Battle Begins at Home," South China Morning Post, 31 January 1999, p. 3.
124. Quoted in Desmond Ngiam, "Call for Greater Transparency in Financial Sector," New Straits Times (Malaysia), 2 April 1998, p. 19.