US foreign policy and enlarging the democratic community

Human Rights Quarterly

Volumn 22, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 988-1010

  Forsythe, David P ^a   Rieffer, Barbara Ann J ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA LINCOLN   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRACY; FOREIGN POLICY; GEOPOLITICS; POLICY MAKING;

UNITED STATES;

EID: 0034545832     PISSN: 02750392     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/hrq.2000.0043     Document Type: Article

References (93)

1. An earlier version of this essay was presented at the 1999 meeting of the Human Rights Research Committee of the International Political Science Association. The authors are grateful for comments especially from Peter Baehr, John Hibbing, Patrice MacMahon, and Andrew Wedeman. A revised draft was also presented at a political science colloquium of the Graduate Institute of International Affairs in Geneva, and we benefited from the comments of that group as well. Anna Khakee was especially helpful.
2. The literature on democracy and democratization is immense. See especially the excellent review of various issues, in DEMOCRACY'S VICTORY AND CRISIS (Axel Hadenius ed., 1997).
3. DAVID P. FORSYTHE, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS (1998), T. Davis & S. Lynn-Jones, "City upon a Hill," 66 FOREIGN POLICY, 2-38 (1987). American exceptionalism is not entirely exceptional. France, the Netherlands, and others also see themselves in a positive light with "lessons" to teach others. But some states, including liberal democracies like Iceland and Portugal, inter alia, are much less confident and internationally assertive about their nationalism - not to mention perhaps special cases like Germany and Japan.
4. DAVID P. FORSYTHE, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS (1998), T. Davis & S. Lynn-Jones, "City upon a Hill," 66 FOREIGN POLICY, 2-38 (1987). American exceptionalism is not entirely exceptional. France, the Netherlands, and others also see themselves in a positive light with "lessons" to teach others. But some states, including liberal democracies like Iceland and Portugal, inter alia, are much less confident and internationally assertive about their nationalism - not to mention perhaps special cases like Germany and Japan.
5. Seymour Martin Lipset, George Washington and the Founding of Democracy, 9 J. DEMOC., 24-38 (1998).
6. TONY SMITH, AMERICA'S MISSION: THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994). JOSHUA MURAVCHIK, EXPORTING DEMOCRACY: FULFILLING AMERICA'S DESTINY (1991). For a critique from the left, see WILLIAM I. ROBINSON, PROMOTING POLYARCHY: GLOBALISATION, US INTERVENTION AND HEGEMONY (1996).
7. TONY SMITH, AMERICA'S MISSION: THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994). JOSHUA MURAVCHIK, EXPORTING DEMOCRACY: FULFILLING AMERICA'S DESTINY (1991). For a critique from the left, see WILLIAM I. ROBINSON, PROMOTING POLYARCHY: GLOBALISATION, US INTERVENTION AND HEGEMONY (1996).
8. TONY SMITH, AMERICA'S MISSION: THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994). JOSHUA MURAVCHIK, EXPORTING DEMOCRACY: FULFILLING AMERICA'S DESTINY (1991). For a critique from the left, see WILLIAM I. ROBINSON, PROMOTING POLYARCHY: GLOBALISATION, US INTERVENTION AND HEGEMONY (1996).
9. For an overview, see Thomas Carothers, Democracy Without Illusions, 76 FOR. AFF., 85-99 (Jan.-Feb. 1997).
10. THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE 331 (1999).
11. For a classic exposition, see ROBERT DAHL, WHO GOVERNS (1961).
12. Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, 76 FOR. AFF. 22-43 (Nov./Dec. 1997).
13. As usual, when one utilizes categories such as authoritarian, illiberal democracy, liberal democracy, and social democracy, questions arise about gray areas and borderline cases. Even given the difficulty of placing countries in categories - e.g., Mexico in the 1970s - the categories remain conceptually useful.
14. See also Jack Donnelly, U.S. Foreign Policy and Democracy: Concepts and Complexities, in THE US AND HUMAN RIGHTS: LOOKING INWARD AND OUTWARD (David P. Forsythe ed., 2000).
15. JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1999).
16. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTINC OFFICE (GAO), PROMOTING DEMOCRACY: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE AGENCIES FUNDS AND ACTIVITIES - 1991 TO 1993 (GAO/NSIAD-94-83, 4 Jan. 1994).
17. SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991).
18. Id. See also GREG SORENSEN, DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION (1993); and Terry Lynn Karl & Philippe C. Schmitter, Democratization around the Globe: Opportunities and Risks, in WORLD SECURITY: CHALLENGES FOR A NEW CENTURY (Michael T. Klare & Daniel C. Thomas eds., 1994).
19. Id. See also GREG SORENSEN, DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION (1993); and Terry Lynn Karl & Philippe C. Schmitter, Democratization around the Globe: Opportunities and Risks, in WORLD SECURITY: CHALLENGES FOR A NEW CENTURY (Michael T. Klare & Daniel C. Thomas eds., 1994).
20. See also Aung San Suu Kyi, Freedom, Development, and Human Worth, 6 J. DEMOC. 11, 17 (1995); Jacques Barzun, Is Democratic Theory for Export?, in ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 57 (Joel Rosenthal ed., 1999).
21. See also Aung San Suu Kyi, Freedom, Development, and Human Worth, 6 J. DEMOC. 11, 17 (1995); Jacques Barzun, Is Democratic Theory for Export?, in ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 57 (Joel Rosenthal ed., 1999).
22. See, e.g., ROBERT PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY (1993); Francis Fukuyama, Social Capital and the Global Economy, 74 FOREIGN AFF. 89-104 (Sept./Oct. 1995); EDGAR OWENS, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS POLITICAL REFORM (1987).
23. See, e.g., ROBERT PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY (1993); Francis Fukuyama, Social Capital and the Global Economy, 74 FOREIGN AFF. 89-104 (Sept./Oct. 1995); EDGAR OWENS, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS POLITICAL REFORM (1987).
24. See, e.g., ROBERT PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY (1993); Francis Fukuyama, Social Capital and the Global Economy, 74 FOREIGN AFF. 89-104 (Sept./Oct. 1995); EDGAR OWENS, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS POLITICAL REFORM (1987).
25. Sylvia Ann Hewlett, Human Rights and Economic Realities: Tradeoffs in Historical Perspective, 94 POL. SCI. Q., 453-73 (1979); MAX SINGER & AARON WILDAVSKY, THE REAL WORLD ORDER: ZONES OF PEACE, ZONES OF TURMOIL (1996, rev. ed.); ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET (1991).
26. Sylvia Ann Hewlett, Human Rights and Economic Realities: Tradeoffs in Historical Perspective, 94 POL. SCI. Q., 453-73 (1979); MAX SINGER & AARON WILDAVSKY, THE REAL WORLD ORDER: ZONES OF PEACE, ZONES OF TURMOIL (1996, rev. ed.); ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET (1991).
27. Sylvia Ann Hewlett, Human Rights and Economic Realities: Tradeoffs in Historical Perspective, 94 POL. SCI. Q., 453-73 (1979); MAX SINGER & AARON WILDAVSKY, THE REAL WORLD ORDER: ZONES OF PEACE, ZONES OF TURMOIL (1996, rev. ed.); ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET (1991).
28. See also Ross E. Burkhart & Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV., 903-10 (Dec. 1994); PAUL R. ABRAMSON & RONALD INGLEHART, VALUE CHANGE IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (1995).
29. See also Ross E. Burkhart & Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV., 903-10 (Dec. 1994); PAUL R. ABRAMSON & RONALD INGLEHART, VALUE CHANGE IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (1995).
30. Carothers, supra note 6.
31. AGE OF EXTREMES: THE SHORT TWENTIETH CENTURY 1914-1991 ch. 4 (1994).
32. Joan Nelson & Stephanie J. Edlinton, The International Donor Community: Conditioned Aid and the Promotion and Defense of Democracy, in BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY: COLLECTIVELY DEFENDING DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAS 169-88 (Tom J. Farer ed., 1996).
33. For the view that scientific knowledge affects policy and power, see especially ERNST A. HAAS, WHEN KNOWLEDGE IS POWER: THREE MODELS OF CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (1990).
34. Joshua Muravchik, Affording Foreign Policy, 75 FOREIGN AFF. 8-13 (Mar./Apr. 1996). For one update, see Thomas L. Friedman, Penny-Pinching as Foreign Policy, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, 21 Oct. 1999, at 8. See also Peter Schraeder, Bruce Taylor & Steven Hook, Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows, 50 WORLD POL., 294-323 (1998). This latter essay argues, inter alia, that most foreign aid is self-interested rather than altruistic, and that US interests were not so easy to define after the cold war - hence the decline in US aid flows.
35. Joshua Muravchik, Affording Foreign Policy, 75 FOREIGN AFF. 8-13 (Mar./Apr. 1996). For one update, see Thomas L. Friedman, Penny-Pinching as Foreign Policy, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, 21 Oct. 1999, at 8. See also Peter Schraeder, Bruce Taylor & Steven Hook, Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows, 50 WORLD POL., 294-323 (1998). This latter essay argues, inter alia, that most foreign aid is self-interested rather than altruistic, and that US interests were not so easy to define after the cold war - hence the decline in US aid flows.
36. Joshua Muravchik, Affording Foreign Policy, 75 FOREIGN AFF. 8-13 (Mar./Apr. 1996). For one update, see Thomas L. Friedman, Penny-Pinching as Foreign Policy, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, 21 Oct. 1999, at 8. See also Peter Schraeder, Bruce Taylor & Steven Hook, Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows, 50 WORLD POL., 294-323 (1998). This latter essay argues, inter alia, that most foreign aid is self-interested rather than altruistic, and that US interests were not so easy to define after the cold war - hence the decline in US aid flows.
37. There is a large literature, which we will not review here, on "political conditionally" in US foreign assistance. Much of the literature argues that manipulation of bilateral foreign assistance on a bilateral basis is of dubious effectiveness, is pursued inconsistently, with more application to African states than to other regions. For one example, see Gordon Crawford, Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality: Issues of Effectiveness and Consistency, 4 DEMOCRATIZATION, 69-108 (1997), placing the United States in comparative perspective.
38. See also Chiyuki Aoi & Yozo Yokota, Japanese Foreign Policy and Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND COMPARATIVE FOREIGN POLICY (David P. Forsythe ed., 2000).
39. Democracy, Rule of Law and Police Training Assistance, Hearing, House Committee on International Relations, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 7 Dec. 1995 [hereinafter Democracy Hearing].
40. When the Guatemalan President sought to abuse his powers, The United States reacted in a strongly negative fashion. Other parties, both domestic and foreign, also reacted in a clearly negative fashion. The result of this transnational pressure was a return to constitutional provisions.
41. The United States and others have applied a variety of sanctions on the military government of Burma (Myanmar) after it refused to accept the outcome of free and fair elections. Yet the junta remains in power in Rangoon, and the leader of the democratic opposition remains under house restrictions.
42. For a USAID general statement, see USAID's Strategies for Sustainable Development: Building Democracy, available on http://www.info.usaid.gov/democracy/strategy.htm. See also CAROTHERS, supra note 7.
43. Democracy Hearing, supra note 27.
44. CAROTHERS, supra note 7.
45. Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies, In Focus: U.S. Democratization Assistance, 4 FOREIGN POL'Y FOCUS (July 1999), available on http://www .foreignpolicy-infocus.
46. See Friedman, supra note 24.
47. Germany has spent hundred of billions of dollars on unification measures after the fall of the Berlin Wall. While much of this amount went for economic measure in the former eastern sector, much also went for political and electoral reform. The precise amount of the latter has never been calculated. See also, Stephen Kinzer, Berlin Gets Bill for Uniting 2 Germanys, New York Times, 31 Mar. 1996; Roger Cohen, "Schroder Lays Fiscal Blame at the Feet of His Foes," New York Times, 17 Sept. 1999, available on www.euroknow.org/dictionary/g.html〉; www.armonkininstitute.org/resourcecenter/gunlicks16.htm〉.
48. Germany has spent hundred of billions of dollars on unification measures after the fall of the Berlin Wall. While much of this amount went for economic measure in the former eastern sector, much also went for political and electoral reform. The precise amount of the latter has never been calculated. See also, Stephen Kinzer, Berlin Gets Bill for Uniting 2 Germanys, New York Times, 31 Mar. 1996; Roger Cohen, "Schroder Lays Fiscal Blame at the Feet of His Foes," New York Times, 17 Sept. 1999, available on www.euroknow.org/dictionary/g.html〉; www.armonkininstitute.org/resourcecenter/gunlicks16.htm〉.
49. . USAID, "Building Democracy and Governance," 1999 Performance Report, available on http://www.usaid.gov/pubs.
50. The Milosevic Regime Versus Serbian Democracy and Balkan Stability, Hearing, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., 10 Dec. 1998, at 41 (1999).
51. USAID, "Building Democracy and Governance," 1996 Performance Report, www.usaid .gov/democracy.
52. "Hapless in Haiti," WASH. POST, 30 Aug. 1999, at A18. See also, Porter Gross, "20,000 Troops Later," WASH. POST, 29 Sep. 1999, at A29.
53. "Hapless in Haiti," WASH. POST, 30 Aug. 1999, at A18. See also, Porter Gross, "20,000 Troops Later," WASH. POST, 29 Sep. 1999, at A29.
54. See USAID, supra note 38.
55. For an overview of spending per annum by the Soros initiatives, see www.soros.org/ intlinit.html〉. For example, Soros was spending over $60 million in Russia alone at the end of the 1990s, whereas USAID spending for democracy was barely twice that for all countries in the world. Soros manifested additional regional funding that targeted the former European communist states, beyond his efforts nation by nation. Special US funding, as in the Freedom Support Initiative, might alter the comparison for a given length of time.
56. THOMAS CAROTHERS, ASSESSING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE: THE CASE Of ROMANIA (1996).
57. See especially Thomas Carothers, Aiding - and Defining - Democracy, 13 WORLD POL'Y J. 97-109 (1996).
58. Douglas Brinkley, Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine, 106 FOREIGN POL'Y 111-27 (1997).
59. Budget of the US Government, Fiscal Year 1999, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., H. Doc 105-177, vol. 1 (1999).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. The Freedom Support initiative was in addition to the Support for Eastern European Democracies initiative. Both elevated economics over democracy in both theory and practice.
63. See also SMITH, supra note 5; ABRAHAM F. LOWENTHAL, EXPORTING DEMOCRACY: THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA (1991).
64. CAROTHERS, supra note 7.
65. See especially Kathryn A. Sikkink, Nongovernmental Organizations, Democracy, and Human Rights in Latin America, in Farer, BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 22, at 150-68.
66. LOWENTHAL, supra note 49.
67. See especially IAN GUEST, BEHIND THE DISAPPEARANCES: ARGENTINA'S DIRTY WAR AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS (1990).
68. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L., 46-91 (1992). But for the argument that there are many sources of governmental legitimacy in fact, and for a review of the obvious fact that the United States has normal relations with numerous authoritarian governments, see DAVID P. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PEACE: INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL DIMENSIONS ch. 3 (1993).
69. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L., 46-91 (1992). But for the argument that there are many sources of governmental legitimacy in fact, and for a review of the obvious fact that the United States has normal relations with numerous authoritarian governments, see DAVID P. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PEACE: INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL DIMENSIONS ch. 3 (1993).
70. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992).
71. See also Richard J. Bloomfield, Making the Western Hemisphere Safe for Democracy? The OAS Defense-of-Democracy Regime, 17 WASH. Q. 157-69 (1994).
72. See also David P. Forsythe, The United Nations, Human Rights, and Development, 19 HUM. RIGHTS Q. 334-49 (1997); David Gillies, Human Rights, Governance, and Democracy: The World Bank's Problem Frontiers, 1 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 3-24 (1993).
73. See also David P. Forsythe, The United Nations, Human Rights, and Development, 19 HUM. RIGHTS Q. 334-49 (1997); David Gillies, Human Rights, Governance, and Democracy: The World Bank's Problem Frontiers, 1 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 3-24 (1993).
74. David P. Forsythe, Human Rights and International Security: United Nations Field Operations Redux, in THE ROLE OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE 21sT CENTURY 251-64 (Monique Castermans-Holleman et al. eds., 1998).
75. Id.
76. See also Edward Luttwak, Where Are the Great Powers?, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 23-29 (July/Aug. 1994), for the argument that the United States and other major states are not willing to incur risks for most foreign policy goals after the cold war. The United States met considerable economic costs for the bombing of Serbia to reverse ethnic cleansing in 1999.
77. See Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate, THE UNITED NATIONS AND CHANGING WORLD POLITICS Part III (3d. 2000).
78. The budget for the US Department of Justice, broken down by division and program, is given on its homepage on the Internet, available on 〈http://www.usdoj.gov.〉
79. Howard J. Wiarda, Cracks in the Consensus: Debating the Democracy Agenda in U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington Papers #172, 1997).
80. CAROTHERS, supra note 7.
81. See Wiarda, supra note 63.
82. WASH. POST, supra note 39, at 8.
83. In general, see also MARK PECENY, DEMOCRACY AT THE POINT OF BAYONETS (1999). He argues that when the international climate allows, the US executive will act to promote liberal democracy, particularly to offset congressional criticism about a realist foreign policy.
84. "Peace Still Precarious in Kosovo," WASH. POST, 9 Dec. 1999, at A2.
85. SMITH, supra note 5.
86. See also HUNTINGTON, supra note 14; Carothers, supra note 6.
87. See also DAVID P. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAI RELATIONS ch. 5 (2000).
88. LARRY DIAMOND, PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE 1990s (Dec. 1995).
89. George Soros, The Capitalist Threat, 279 ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 45-end (Feb. 1997).
90. See also David P. Forsythe, The United Nations, Democracy, and the Americas, in Farer, supra note 22, at 107-31.
91. CAROTHERS, supra note 7.
92. See, e.g., Wiarda, supra note 63. But see the thoughtful analysis by Marina Ottaway, from Political Opening to Democratization?, in DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA: THE HARD ROAD AHEAD (Marina Ottaway ed., 1997). Failed democracy assistance may cause donors to accept authoritarianism as inevitable.
93. But see John-Jean Barya, The New Conditionalities of Aid, 24 IDS BULLETIN, 16-23 (1993).