Political macroeconomics: A survey of recent developments

Journal of Economic Surveys

Volumn 14, Issue 5, 2000, Pages 527-561

  Gärtner, Manfred ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST GALLEN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Government spending bias; Inflation bias; Inflation target; Performance contract; Political business cycle; Stabilization bias

Indexed keywords

INFLATION; MACROECONOMICS; MONETARY POLICY; POLITICAL ECONOMY;

EID: 0034506797     PISSN: 09500804     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-6419.00124     Document Type: Article

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