General John Shalikashvili and the civil-military relations of peacekeeping

Armed Forces and Society

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 387-411

  Goldstein, Lyle J ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034418712     PISSN: 0095327X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X0002600303     Document Type: Article

References (104)

1. Harold Lasswell, cited in Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations (Cambridge: Belknap, 1957), 11.
2. See for example Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control," The National Interest 35 (Spring 1994).
3. Another valid approach would closely examine Shalikashvili's legacy for U.S. peacekeeping doctrine, training, and equipping forces. While I will touch briefly on these issues, they are not the focus of the present effort.
4. Faris R. Kirkland, Ronald R. Halverson, and Paul D. Bliese, "Stress and Psychological Readiness in Post-Cold War Operations," Parameters 26 (Summer 1996): 82. While these opinions surely reflect poor leadership, they also appear to derive from larger aspects of the mission that are endemic to all peacekeeping operations.
5. Ronald R. Halverson and Paul D. Bliese, "Determinants of Soldier Support for Uphold Democracy," Armed Forces & Society 23 (Fall 1996): 84.
6. Col. Mark Walsh (U.S. Army ret.), interview with author, Carlisle, PA, 1 May 1998. While the course remains an elective, there is some peacekeeping material in the core curriculum.
7. Lieutenant Commander Eric Lanman (USN), "Whither the Warrior?" Proceedings (April 1998): 26-29; "Peacekeeping's Toll: High Personnel Tempo Eroding Readiness on Several Fronts," Armed Forces Journal International (March 1998): 18-19.
8. Lieutenant Commander Eric Lanman (USN), "Whither the Warrior?" Proceedings (April 1998): 26-29; "Peacekeeping's Toll: High Personnel Tempo Eroding Readiness on Several Fronts," Armed Forces Journal International (March 1998): 18-19.
9. Laura L. Miller, "Do Soldiers Hate Peacekeeping? The Case of Preventive Diplomacy Operations in Macedonia," Armed Forces & Society 23 (Spring 1997) 424. We might reduce this question to: "the glass is half full or half empty." But the numbers Miller cites as opposed to "Able Sentry" are most certainly higher relative to combat operations, such as the invasion of Panama or the Persian Gulf War.
10. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, quoted in Miller, 419.
11. A. J. Bacevich, "Tradition Abandoned: America's Military in a New Era," The National Interest 48 (Summer 1997): 20.
12. John F. Hillen III, "UN Collective Security: Chapter Six and a Half," Parameters 24 (Spring 1994): 30-31.
13. Douglas Johnson and Steven Metz, "Civil-Military Relations in the United States: The State of the Debate," The Washington Quarterly 18 (Winter 1995): 210.
14. Lanman, "Whither the Warrior," 27.
15. Kirkland, Halverson, and Bliese, "Stress and Psychological Readiness," 90.
16. Mark M. Lowenthal, "PDD-25 in Action" Peacekeeping and US Foreign Policy: Implementing PDD-25 (CRS: Washington D.C.), 7 December 1994.
17. Miller, "Do Soldiers Hate Peacekeeping?" 447.
18. See Stephen Rosen's introduction in Michael Desch and Sharon K. Weiner eds., Colin Powell as JCS Chairman: A Panel Discussion on American Civil-Military Relations (Harvard University John M. Olin Istitute for Strategic Studies: Cambridge, MA, 1995), 2.
19. Quoted in Charles A. Stevenson, "The Evolving Clinton Doctrine on the Use of Force," Armed Forces & Society 22 (Summer 1996): 516.
20. Ibid., 517.
21. Regarding the decision to intervene in Somalia, John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley describe the Pentagon, and in particular the Joint Chiefs, opposing the interventionist State Department and National Security Council until very late in the game. Only in November 1992, did Powell reverse course entirely, proposing that an intervention force of greater size than other U.S. leaders or even Boutros-Boutros Gali had previously considered. John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope (Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1995).
22. Stevenson, "The Evolving Clinton Doctrine," 516.
23. William J. Durch and James A. Schear, "Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia," in UN Peacekeeping, American Policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St. Martin's, 1996), 228.
24. Colin L. Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous," New York Times, 8 October 1992, A35.
25. Stevenson, "The Evolving Clinton Doctrine," 522.
26. Colin Powell in "Department of Defense Appropriations: Fiscal Year 1994," Senate Hearings Before the Committee on Appropriations, 21 April 1993, SuDoc: Y4.AP6/2 S.Hrg. 103-153/Pt. 1, 95-96.
27. Kohn, "Out of Control," 12.
28. Eliot Cohen, "Playing Powell Politics: The General's Zest for Power," Foreign Affairs 74 (November/December 1995): 108.
29. Desch and Weiner, "Colin Powell as UCS Chairman," 8.
30. Edward N. Luttwak, "Why Clinton Called Upon Shalikashvili," Sacremento Bee, 22 August 1993, F1.
31. Cohen, "Playing Powell Politics," 107.
32. Kohn, "Out of Control," 12. Cohen, "Playing Powell Politics," 107.
33. Kohn, "Out of Control," 12. Cohen, "Playing Powell Politics," 107.
34. "An interview with Colin L. Powell: The Chairman as Principal Military Adviser," Joint Forces Quarterly (Autumn 1996): 31.
35. John Lancaster, "Shalikashvili: A Military Man From the Start; Soldiering Runs in Family that Fled Europe," Washington Post, 21 September 1993, A1.
36. Ibid.
37. Luttwak, " Why Clinton Called Upon Shalikashvili," Sacramento Bee, 22 August 1993.
38. Lancaster, "Shalivashvili," Washington Post, 21 September 1993.
39. John Shalikashvili, "The DoD-CARE Humanitarian Connection," remarks before the CARE 50th Anniversary Symposium in Washington D.C., 10 May 1996, Defense Issues 11:4.
40. Quoted in Lancaster, "Shalikashvili," The Washington Post, 21 September 1993.
41. Ibid.
42. William Drozdiak, "NATO Commander Says GI's Feel Strain of Drawdown," Washington Post, 28 March 1993, A24.
43. Steve Vogel, "New NATO Chief Says Balkan Role is Possible," Washington Post, 25 June 1992, A37.
44. Michael Gordon, "NATO Commander is Picked to Lead the Joint Chiefs," New York Times, 11 August 1993, A1.
45. Wolfowitz quoted in Lancaster, "Shalikashvili," Washington Post, 21 September 1993.
46. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, 127.
47. Bradley Graham, "Chairman of Joint Chiefs Bucks Up Troops Being Pulled Out of Somalia," Washington Post, 13 March 1994, A12.
48. John Shalikashvili, quoted in "Defense Department Briefing," Federal News Service, 14 December 1993, 4.
49. Yael S. Aronoff, "An Apology Is Not Enough; What Will Happen in the Next Case of Genocide?" Washington Post, 9 April 1998, A25.
50. "Shameful Dawdling on Rwanda," New York Times, 15 June 1994, A24.
51. R. Jeffrey Smith, "US Mission to Rwanda Criticized; Relief Officials Criticize Gap Between Promise and Performance in Rwanda," Washington Post, 5 September 1994, A1.
52. Bradley Graham, "Pentagon Officials Worry that Aid Missions will Sap Military Strength," Washington Post, 29 July 1994, A29.
53. Rowan Scarborough, "Special Envoy Says Sanctions on Haiti are Doing their Job; Gray Denies Invasion is in Works," The Washington Times, 4 July 1994, A1.
54. John Diamond, "Administration Officials: No Decision Yet on Haiti Invasion," Associated Press, 14 July 1994.
55. Ibid.
56. Ann Devroy, "US Units Ready to Invade but Clinton is Said to be Weeks Away From Decision," Washington Post, 17 July 1994, A21.
57. Elaine Sciolino, "Top US Officials Divided in Debate on Invading Haiti," New York Times, 4 August 1994, A1.
58. Bradley Graham, "New Twist for US Troops: Peace Maneuvers," Washington Post, 15 August 1994, A1.
59. Susanne M. Schafer, "Pentagon Chief Promises Overwhelming Force," Associated Press, 18 September 1994.
60. Ben Barber, "Aristide Backers Fault Restraint by US Soldiers; Credibility Said to Take a Beating," Washington Times, 21 September 1994, A14.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Charles Fenyvesi, "Washington Whispers: Clinton Encouraged on Haiti by Shalikashvili's Can-do Attitude," U.S. News and World Report, 26 September 1994, 40.
64. "Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee: Nomination of General John Shalikashvili to be Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff," Federal News Service, 22 September 1993, 9.
65. Ibid., 12.
66. Bradley Graham, "As Somalia Recedes and Bosnia Looms, a Warning of Casualties," Washington Post, 10 March 1994, A37.
67. Ruth Marcus and Daniel Williams, "US Backs NATO Shift in Bosnia; Clinton Plan Seeks Broader Authority to Conduct Airstrikes," Washington Post, 21 April 1994, A1.
68. Speech by General John Shalikashvili: "Force and Diplomacy in the 21st Century," Federal News Service, 16 November 1994, 4.
69. Durch and Schear, "Fault Lines," 244.
70. "Hearings of the Senate Armed Services Committee: US Involvement in Bosnia," Federal News Service, 7 June 1995, 25-26.
71. John Shalikashvili, "Humanitarian Missions Challenge Military and Media." Remarks before the McCormick Tribune Foundation of George Washington University, 4 May 1995 in Defense Issues 10: 3.
72. John Shalikashvili, "Pivotal Moment: A World in the Grips of Revolutionary Change," remarks to the Town Hall of California in Los Angeles, 11 May 1995 in Defense Issues 10: 3.
73. Joint Pub 3-O7: Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, 16 June 1995, vii-viii. This document is usefully compared to Joint Pub 3-07.3: Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations, 19 April 1994, which was published just after Powell left office. Reflecting Powell's views, this prior document asserts that the most important factor for success in peacekeeping is consent for the operation by all parties. (I-1) Moreover, "political considerations" are buried deep within the document and discuss only legal and chain of command issues. (II-6, II-7)
74. Joint Pub 3-O7: Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, 16 June 1995, vii-viii. This document is usefully compared to Joint Pub 3-07.3: Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations, 19 April 1994, which was published just after Powell left office. Reflecting Powell's views, this prior document asserts that the most important factor for success in peacekeeping is consent for the operation by all parties. (I-1) Moreover, "political considerations" are buried deep within the document and discuss only legal and chain of command issues. (II-6, II-7)
75. Ann Devroy, "US: Unity Must Precede Balkan Action; White House Still Divided, Allies Feuding on 'Safe Areas' Defense," The Washington Post, 18 July 1995, A17.
76. Fred Barbash and Bradley Graham, "Allied Military Chiefs Seek Bosnia Strategy," The Washington Post, 17 July 1995, A15.
77. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House 1998), 81.
78. Eric Schmitt, "Conflict in the Balkans: The Strategist - Bosnia Uncertainty Dims Top US General's Image," The New York Times, 29 July 1995, 1.
79. Anne Hazard, "Shali Hears Republicans' Concerns About Sending US Troops to Enforce Peace in Bosnia," States News Service, 21 September 1995.
80. Dana Priest, "1,400 U.S. Troops Part of Advance Group; NATO Force Will Have Authority to Use Military Response Against Perceived Threat," The Washington Post, 28 November 1995, A9.
81. "Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Peace Process in Bosnia," Federal News Service, 17 October 1995, 6.
82. Holbrooke, "To End a War," 215.
83. Ibid., 118.
84. Ibid., 222. Holbrooke does indicate that in retrospect he regretted accepting Shalikashvili's narrow conception of the mission. The diplomat later described a fascinating meeting of the national security team at the White House on November 22, where the president mildly rebuked Shalikashvili. Clinton supposedly looked directly at Shalikashvili and said, "I know there has been ambivalence among some of your people - not you, Shali, but some of your people - about Bosnia, but that is all in the past. I want everyone here to get behind the agreement." Certainly, in some sense, this episode does suggest that the president wanted Shalikashvili to run a tighter ship. On the other hand, Clinton made a point of saying that Shalikashvili's own behavior was not in question.
85. Ibid., 351-52.
86. John Shalikashvili, "America's Armed Forces: A Perspective." Remarks before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City, 7 November 1996, Defense Issues 11:3.
87. Schmitt, "Conflict in the Balkans," The New York Times, 29 July 1995.
88. See for example "Defense Department Briefing: Bosnia," Federal News Service, 15 November 1996, 7.
89. Ibid.
90. Holbrooke, "To End a War," 219.
91. Colin Powell, "A Word From the Chairman," Joint Forces Quarterly (Autumn 1993): 5.
92. Samuel Huntington, "Exchange on Civil-Military Relations," National Interest 36 (Summer 1994): 27.
93. "Remarks by President Bill Clinton and Secretary of Defense William Cohen at Farewell Ceremony for Outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili," Federal News Service, 30 September 1997, 4.
94. John Shalikashvili, "Maintaining the 'Delta' for Future Military Forces." Remarks before the National Press Club in Washington, 24 September 1997, Defense Issues 12: 5.
95. Lancaster, "Shalikashvili," Washington Post, 21 September 1993.
96. Shalikashvili himself did brush up against the blurry line separating the political and military spheres. For example, I have suggested that his open criticism of American Bosnia policy in the spring of 1993 was probably inappropriate. His vigorous support for Dayton might also have approached this line, in so far as his argument for the American deployment was partly premised on the political damage that NATO would suffer if U.S. forces did not participate.
97. David Wood, "Powerful Washington Trio Ponders; Civil War Lessons 1863 Mirrors Today's Issues," The Times Picayune, 12 March 1995, A14.
98. Richard Cohen, "Chairman Jesse," Washington Post, 22 November 1994, A21.
99. Schmitt, "Conflict in the Balkans," New York Times, 29 July 1995.
100. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 76.
101. Ibid., 76.
102. Steven Lee Meyers and Eric Schmitt, "Crisis in the Balkans: The Leadership," New York Times, 30 May 1999, 1. Among the civil-military mishaps were clearly SACEUR Gen. Wesley Clark's public advocacy of more active consideration of ground force options, and also Army chief of staff Gen. Dennis Reimer's public complaint that he had not been adequately consulted prior to the initiation of hostilities. See Ian Bruce, "The Fight Against an Invasion - Pentagon Battles Against Ground War," The Herald, 28 April 1999, 10; and Robert Burns, "Conflict in the Balkans: General Had Doubts on Air-only Strategy," Atlanta Constitution, 26 May 1999, A12.
103. Steven Lee Meyers and Eric Schmitt, "Crisis in the Balkans: The Leadership," New York Times, 30 May 1999, 1. Among the civil-military mishaps were clearly SACEUR Gen. Wesley Clark's public advocacy of more active consideration of ground force options, and also Army chief of staff Gen. Dennis Reimer's public complaint that he had not been adequately consulted prior to the initiation of hostilities. See Ian Bruce, "The Fight Against an Invasion - Pentagon Battles Against Ground War," The Herald, 28 April 1999, 10; and Robert Burns, "Conflict in the Balkans: General Had Doubts on Air-only Strategy," Atlanta Constitution, 26 May 1999, A12.
104. Steven Lee Meyers and Eric Schmitt, "Crisis in the Balkans: The Leadership," New York Times, 30 May 1999, 1. Among the civil-military mishaps were clearly SACEUR Gen. Wesley Clark's public advocacy of more active consideration of ground force options, and also Army chief of staff Gen. Dennis Reimer's public complaint that he had not been adequately consulted prior to the initiation of hostilities. See Ian Bruce, "The Fight Against an Invasion - Pentagon Battles Against Ground War," The Herald, 28 April 1999, 10; and Robert Burns, "Conflict in the Balkans: General Had Doubts on Air-only Strategy," Atlanta Constitution, 26 May 1999, A12.