The parade of sovereignties: Testing theories of secession in the Soviet setting

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 31-56

  Hale, Henry E ^a  

^a EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY AT ST PETERSBURG   (Russian Federation)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034404025     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123400000028     Document Type: Article

References (80)

1. Specifically, I am interested in the propensity of an ethnic region to secede, not whether it actually succeeds.
2. David D. Laitin, 'The National Uprisings in the Soviet Union', World Politics, 44 (1991), 139-77.
3. Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); 'The Dynamics of Secession', Acta Sociologica, 35 (1992), 267-83, p. 275.
4. Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); 'The Dynamics of Secession', Acta Sociologica, 35 (1992), 267-83, p. 275.
5. Henry E. Hale, 'Statehood at Stake: Democratization, Secession and the Collapse of the USSR' (doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1998); Robert H. Bates, 'Ethnic Competition and Modernization in Contemporary Africa', Comparative Political Studies, 6 (1974), 457-84; Bates, 'Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa', in Donald Rothchild and Victor A. Olorunsola, eds, State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1983), pp. 152-71.
6. Henry E. Hale, 'Statehood at Stake: Democratization, Secession and the Collapse of the USSR' (doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1998); Robert H. Bates, 'Ethnic Competition and Modernization in Contemporary Africa', Comparative Political Studies, 6 (1974), 457-84; Bates, 'Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa', in Donald Rothchild and Victor A. Olorunsola, eds, State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1983), pp. 152-71.
7. Henry E. Hale, 'Statehood at Stake: Democratization, Secession and the Collapse of the USSR' (doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1998); Robert H. Bates, 'Ethnic Competition and Modernization in Contemporary Africa', Comparative Political Studies, 6 (1974), 457-84; Bates, 'Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa', in Donald Rothchild and Victor A. Olorunsola, eds, State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1983), pp. 152-71.
8. Other than these works, the 'rich seceders' hypothesis has not been well developed theoretically, although several scholars have noted that rich regions or ethnic groups seem to be the most secessionist. Immanual Wallerstein makes a passing assertion that this is true in his Africa: The Politics of Independence: An Interpretation of Modern African History (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), p. 88.
9. Timothy M. Frye finds support for Wallerstein's claims in his focused comparison of ethnic groups in Spain, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, although he does not develop Wallerstein's argument (which itself was not elaborated theoretically). Frye's study also does not use quantitative methods to analyse the cases he considers (see his 'Ethnicity, Sovereignty and Transitions from Non-Democratic Rule', Journal of International Affairs, 45 (1992), 599-623).
10. Milica Zarkovic Bookman notes that rich regions often are, in fact, separatist but does not go so far as to claim that relative wealth is more associated with separatism than relative poverty (see Bookman, The Political Economy of Discontinuous Development: Regional Disparities and Inter-regional Conflict (New York: Praeger, 1991).
11. David Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, ed. Peiro Sraffa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953 [1817]); Ernst Haas, 'Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe', in Stephan R. Groubard, ed., A New Europe? (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), pp. 66-88;
12. David Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, ed. Peiro Sraffa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953 [1817]); Ernst Haas, 'Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe', in Stephan R. Groubard, ed., A New Europe? (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), pp. 66-88;
13. Haas, 'Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration', International Organization, 30 (1976), 173-212;
14. and Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957 (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958).
15. Hechter, Internal Colonialism, p. 276; Paul R. Brass, 'Language and National Identity in the Soviet Union and India', in Alexander J. Motyl, ed., Thinking Theoretically About Soviet Nationalities: History and Comparison in the Study of the USSR (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), pp. 99-128.
16. Hechter, Internal Colonialism, p. 276; Paul R. Brass, 'Language and National Identity in the Soviet Union and India', in Alexander J. Motyl, ed., Thinking Theoretically About Soviet Nationalities: History and Comparison in the Study of the USSR (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), pp. 99-128.
17. Daniel S. Treisman, 'Russia's 'Ethnic Revival': The Separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in a Postcommunist Order', World Politics, 41 (1997), 212-49.
18. Dmitry Gorenburg, 'Nationalism for the Masses: Minority Ethnic Mobilization in the Russian Federation' (doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, expected 1999).
19. Hudson Meadwell, 'Breaking the Mould? Quebec Independence and Secession in the Developed West', in Sukumar Periwal, ed., Notions of Nationalism (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995), pp. 129-61; Meadwell, 'Nationalism in Quebec', World Politics, 45 (1993), 203-41; Meadwell and Pierre Martin, 'Economic Integration and the Politics of Independence', Nations and Nationalism, 2 (1996), 1-21; Ralph Premdas, 'Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective', in Ralph R. Premdas, S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe and Alan B. Anderson, eds, Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), pp. 12-29; Anthony Smith, 'Ethnic Identity and Territorial Nationalism in Comparative Perspective', in Motyl, ed., Thinking Theoretically About Soviet Nationalities, pp. 45-65; and Anthony Smith, ed., Nationalist Movements (London: Macmillan, 1976).
20. Hudson Meadwell, 'Breaking the Mould? Quebec Independence and Secession in the Developed West', in Sukumar Periwal, ed., Notions of Nationalism (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995), pp. 129-61; Meadwell, 'Nationalism in Quebec', World Politics, 45 (1993), 203-41; Meadwell and Pierre Martin, 'Economic Integration and the Politics of Independence', Nations and Nationalism, 2 (1996), 1-21; Ralph Premdas, 'Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective', in Ralph R. Premdas, S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe and Alan B. Anderson, eds, Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), pp. 12-29; Anthony Smith, 'Ethnic Identity and Territorial Nationalism in Comparative Perspective', in Motyl, ed., Thinking Theoretically About Soviet Nationalities, pp. 45-65; and Anthony Smith, ed., Nationalist Movements (London: Macmillan, 1976).
21. Hudson Meadwell, 'Breaking the Mould? Quebec Independence and Secession in the Developed West', in Sukumar Periwal, ed., Notions of Nationalism (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995), pp. 129-61; Meadwell, 'Nationalism in Quebec', World Politics, 45 (1993), 203-41; Meadwell and Pierre Martin, 'Economic Integration and the Politics of Independence', Nations and Nationalism, 2 (1996), 1-21; Ralph Premdas, 'Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective', in Ralph R. Premdas, S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe and Alan B. Anderson, eds, Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), pp. 12-29; Anthony Smith, 'Ethnic Identity and Territorial Nationalism in Comparative Perspective', in Motyl, ed., Thinking Theoretically About Soviet Nationalities, pp. 45-65; and Anthony Smith, ed., Nationalist Movements (London: Macmillan, 1976).
22. Hudson Meadwell, 'Breaking the Mould? Quebec Independence and Secession in the Developed West', in Sukumar Periwal, ed., Notions of Nationalism (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995), pp. 129-61; Meadwell, 'Nationalism in Quebec', World Politics, 45 (1993), 203-41; Meadwell and Pierre Martin, 'Economic Integration and the Politics of Independence', Nations and Nationalism, 2 (1996), 1-21; Ralph Premdas, 'Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective', in Ralph R. Premdas, S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe and Alan B. Anderson, eds, Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), pp. 12-29; Anthony Smith, 'Ethnic Identity and Territorial Nationalism in Comparative Perspective', in Motyl, ed., Thinking Theoretically About Soviet Nationalities, pp. 45-65; and Anthony Smith, ed., Nationalist Movements (London: Macmillan, 1976).
23. Hudson Meadwell, 'Breaking the Mould? Quebec Independence and Secession in the Developed West', in Sukumar Periwal, ed., Notions of Nationalism (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995), pp. 129-61; Meadwell, 'Nationalism in Quebec', World Politics, 45 (1993), 203-41; Meadwell and Pierre Martin, 'Economic Integration and the Politics of Independence', Nations and Nationalism, 2 (1996), 1-21; Ralph Premdas, 'Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective', in Ralph R. Premdas, S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe and Alan B. Anderson, eds, Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), pp. 12-29; Anthony Smith, 'Ethnic Identity and Territorial Nationalism in Comparative Perspective', in Motyl, ed., Thinking Theoretically About Soviet Nationalities, pp. 45-65; and Anthony Smith, ed., Nationalist Movements (London: Macmillan, 1976).
24. Hudson Meadwell, 'Breaking the Mould? Quebec Independence and Secession in the Developed West', in Sukumar Periwal, ed., Notions of Nationalism (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995), pp. 129-61; Meadwell, 'Nationalism in Quebec', World Politics, 45 (1993), 203-41; Meadwell and Pierre Martin, 'Economic Integration and the Politics of Independence', Nations and Nationalism, 2 (1996), 1-21; Ralph Premdas, 'Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective', in Ralph R. Premdas, S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe and Alan B. Anderson, eds, Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), pp. 12-29; Anthony Smith, 'Ethnic Identity and Territorial Nationalism in Comparative Perspective', in Motyl, ed., Thinking Theoretically About Soviet Nationalities, pp. 45-65; and Anthony Smith, ed., Nationalist Movements (London: Macmillan, 1976).
25. Treisman, 'Russia's "Ethnic Revival" ', p. 243.
26. The terms 'advanced' and 'backward' groups are from Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, and are used here only to represent his theory clearly. No normative connotations are intended.
27. Donald Horowitz, 'Patterns of Ethnic Separatism', Comparative Studies in Society and History, 23 (1981), 165-95; Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 229-88; Horowitz, 'How to Begin Thinking Comparatively About Soviet Ethnic Problems', in Motyl, ed., Thinking Theoretically About Soviet Nationalities; Subrata K. Mitra, 'The Rational Politics of Cultural Nationalism: Subnational Movements of South Asia in Comparative Perspective', British Journal of Political Science, 25 (1995), 57-78.
28. Donald Horowitz, 'Patterns of Ethnic Separatism', Comparative Studies in Society and History, 23 (1981), 165-95; Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 229-88; Horowitz, 'How to Begin Thinking Comparatively About Soviet Ethnic Problems', in Motyl, ed., Thinking Theoretically About Soviet Nationalities; Subrata K. Mitra, 'The Rational Politics of Cultural Nationalism: Subnational Movements of South Asia in Comparative Perspective', British Journal of Political Science, 25 (1995), 57-78.
29. Donald Horowitz, 'Patterns of Ethnic Separatism', Comparative Studies in Society and History, 23 (1981), 165-95; Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 229-88; Horowitz, 'How to Begin Thinking Comparatively About Soviet Ethnic Problems', in Motyl, ed., Thinking Theoretically About Soviet Nationalities; Subrata K. Mitra, 'The Rational Politics of Cultural Nationalism: Subnational Movements of South Asia in Comparative Perspective', British Journal of Political Science, 25 (1995), 57-78.
30. Donald Horowitz, 'Patterns of Ethnic Separatism', Comparative Studies in Society and History, 23 (1981), 165-95; Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 229-88; Horowitz, 'How to Begin Thinking Comparatively About Soviet Ethnic Problems', in Motyl, ed., Thinking Theoretically About Soviet Nationalities; Subrata K. Mitra, 'The Rational Politics of Cultural Nationalism: Subnational Movements of South Asia in Comparative Perspective', British Journal of Political Science, 25 (1995), 57-78.
31. Ronald Rogowski, 'Causes and Varieties of Nationalism: A Rationalist Account', in Edward Tiryakian and Ronald Rogowski, eds, New Nationalisms of the Developed West: Toward Explanation (Boston, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 1985), pp. 87-108.
32. Mitra, 'The Rational Politics of Cultural Nationalism'; Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict; Rogowski, 'Causes and Varieties of Nationalism'; and Premdas, 'Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective'.
33. Mitra, 'The Rational Politics of Cultural Nationalism'; Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict; Rogowski, 'Causes and Varieties of Nationalism'; and Premdas, 'Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective'.
34. Mitra, 'The Rational Politics of Cultural Nationalism'; Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict; Rogowski, 'Causes and Varieties of Nationalism'; and Premdas, 'Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective'.
35. Mitra, 'The Rational Politics of Cultural Nationalism'; Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict; Rogowski, 'Causes and Varieties of Nationalism'; and Premdas, 'Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective'.
36. Laitin, 'The National Uprisings in the Soviet Union', p. 157.
37. Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993).
38. Gurr, Minorities at Risk.
39. Hale, 'Statehood at Stake'; Horowitz, 'How to Begin Thinking Comparatively About Ethnic Problems'; Laitin, 'The National Uprisings in the Soviet Union'; Brass, 'Language and National Identity in the Soviet Union and India'; and Treisman, 'Russia's "Ethnic Revival"'.
40. Hale, 'Statehood at Stake'; Horowitz, 'How to Begin Thinking Comparatively About Ethnic Problems'; Laitin, 'The National Uprisings in the Soviet Union'; Brass, 'Language and National Identity in the Soviet Union and India'; and Treisman, 'Russia's "Ethnic Revival"'.
41. Hale, 'Statehood at Stake'; Horowitz, 'How to Begin Thinking Comparatively About Ethnic Problems'; Laitin, 'The National Uprisings in the Soviet Union'; Brass, 'Language and National Identity in the Soviet Union and India'; and Treisman, 'Russia's "Ethnic Revival"'.
42. Hale, 'Statehood at Stake'; Horowitz, 'How to Begin Thinking Comparatively About Ethnic Problems'; Laitin, 'The National Uprisings in the Soviet Union'; Brass, 'Language and National Identity in the Soviet Union and India'; and Treisman, 'Russia's "Ethnic Revival"'.
43. Hale, 'Statehood at Stake'; Horowitz, 'How to Begin Thinking Comparatively About Ethnic Problems'; Laitin, 'The National Uprisings in the Soviet Union'; Brass, 'Language and National Identity in the Soviet Union and India'; and Treisman, 'Russia's "Ethnic Revival"'.
44. Gurr, Minorities at Risk.
45. Assuming they are not systematically correlated with both the independent and dependent variables; otherwise bias would result.
46. At first glance, Chechnya appears to be an exception, but this mainly points up the fact that this study does not consider changes in republic policy. Indeed, during the period in which we are interested, Chechnya did in fact pursue a relatively unionist course under Doku Zavgaev. In the wake of the failed Soviet coup of August 1991, clearly a pivotal event in Soviet history, Soviet General Djokhar Dudaev seized power in Chechnya and rapidly mobilized popular support for a radically separatist policy, aided by a number of peculiar circumstances. In any case, even if one argues that the timing of the declaration of sovereignty seriously mismeasures the Chechen case, this does not significantly alter the conclusions of the study. When I recode Chechnya as being equivalent in separatism to Lithuania (the most separatist region next to Estonia), the statistical results do not change significantly.
47. The coding of these cases does matter for our results, however. If I count 'status upgrades' as declarations of sovereignty, in these four cases, our confidence that wealth and separatism are correlated drops to the 93 per cent level, slightly below the 95 per cent level usually taken to be the threshold of 'statistical significance'. The assimilation variable similarly drops to the 91 per cent significance level. The four cases involved are the Ust-Ordinsky Buryat Autonomous District, the Jewish Autonomous Region, Khakassia and Mordvinia.
48. I do, however, also run a regression including the Estonian case which takes the 19th Party Conference in the summer of 1988 as the starting point of serious Soviet liberalization, counting the number of weeks after this event before a given republic declares sovereignty as my dependent variable. There is no major change in results.
49. These are the Ust-Ordinsky Buryat Autonomous District, the Jewish Autonomous Region, Khakassia, Mordvinia, Evenkia and Khanty-Mansiisk.
50. That is, these values are treated as censored.
51. Donna Bahry, 'The Union Republics and Contradictions in Gorbachev's Economic Reform', Soviet Economy, 1 (1991), 215-55.
52. Gary King, 'Statistical Models for Political Science Event Counts: Bias in Conventional Procedures and Evidence for the Exponential Poisson Regression Model', American Journal of Political Science, 32 (1988), 838-63, p. 851; Gary King, James E. Alt, Nancy Elizabeth Burns and Michael Laver, 'A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 846-71, pp. 845-6.
53. Gary King, 'Statistical Models for Political Science Event Counts: Bias in Conventional Procedures and Evidence for the Exponential Poisson Regression Model', American Journal of Political Science, 32 (1988), 838-63, p. 851; Gary King, James E. Alt, Nancy Elizabeth Burns and Michael Laver, 'A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 846-71, pp. 845-6.
54. King, 'Statistical Models for Political Science Event Counts', p. 846.
55. Emizet and Hesli, 'The Disposition to Secede'.
56. One of the most recent and methodologically rigorous studies is D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam III, 'The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816-1985', American Political Science Review, 90 (1996), 239-57. Other political science applications include Joel S. Heliman, 'Competitive Advantage: Political Competition and Economic Reform in Postcommunist Transitions' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 1996), and several studies of how long leaders or governments remain in power: King et al., 'A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies'; Henry Bienen and Nicholas van de Walle, 'A Proportional Hazard Model of Leadership Duration', Journal of Politics, 54 (1992), 685-717;
57. One of the most recent and methodologically rigorous studies is D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam III, 'The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816-1985', American Political Science Review, 90 (1996), 239-57. Other political science applications include Joel S. Heliman, 'Competitive Advantage: Political Competition and Economic Reform in Postcommunist Transitions' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 1996), and several studies of how long leaders or governments remain in power: King et al., 'A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies'; Henry Bienen and Nicholas van de Walle, 'A Proportional Hazard Model of Leadership Duration', Journal of Politics, 54 (1992), 685-717;
58. One of the most recent and methodologically rigorous studies is D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam III, 'The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816-1985', American Political Science Review, 90 (1996), 239-57. Other political science applications include Joel S. Heliman, 'Competitive Advantage: Political Competition and Economic Reform in Postcommunist Transitions' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 1996), and several studies of how long leaders or governments remain in power: King et al., 'A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies'; Henry Bienen and Nicholas van de Walle, 'A Proportional Hazard Model of Leadership Duration', Journal of Politics, 54 (1992), 685-717;
59. One of the most recent and methodologically rigorous studies is D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam III, 'The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816-1985', American Political Science Review, 90 (1996), 239-57. Other political science applications include Joel S. Heliman, 'Competitive Advantage: Political Competition and Economic Reform in Postcommunist Transitions' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 1996), and several studies of how long leaders or governments remain in power: King et al., 'A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies'; Henry Bienen and Nicholas van de Walle, 'A Proportional Hazard Model of Leadership Duration', Journal of Politics, 54 (1992), 685-717;
60. and Paul Warwick, 'Economic Trends and Governmental Survival in West European Parliamentary Democracies', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 875-87.
61. For a discussion of duration models, see articles in the previous footnote as well as Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier and Bradford S. Jones, 'Time Is of the Essence: Event History Models in Political Science', American Journal of Political Science, 41 (1997), 1414-61; J. D. Kalbfleisch and R. L. Prentice, The Statistical Analysis of Failure Time Data (New York: Wiley, 1980), pp. 23-4, 30-2, 54-5; and William H. Greene, Econometric Analysis, 2nd edn (New York: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 717-18, 721-2.
62. For a discussion of duration models, see articles in the previous footnote as well as Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier and Bradford S. Jones, 'Time Is of the Essence: Event History Models in Political Science', American Journal of Political Science, 41 (1997), 1414-61; J. D. Kalbfleisch and R. L. Prentice, The Statistical Analysis of Failure Time Data (New York: Wiley, 1980), pp. 23-4, 30-2, 54-5; and William H. Greene, Econometric Analysis, 2nd edn (New York: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 717-18, 721-2.
63. For a discussion of duration models, see articles in the previous footnote as well as Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier and Bradford S. Jones, 'Time Is of the Essence: Event History Models in Political Science', American Journal of Political Science, 41 (1997), 1414-61; J. D. Kalbfleisch and R. L. Prentice, The Statistical Analysis of Failure Time Data (New York: Wiley, 1980), pp. 23-4, 30-2, 54-5; and William H. Greene, Econometric Analysis, 2nd edn (New York: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 717-18, 721-2.
64. The dataset used in this article contains a 'duration' reading for each of the forty-five ethnic regions studied, denominated in weeks. Independent variables are measured for 1988, when the measured durations all begin, or for the closest possible year to this point. With one exception described below, I do not incorporate any changes in the values of the independent variables that may have taken place during the 'durations' studied; such changes were generally insignificant or non-existent.
65. This paragraph draws primarily on Kalbfleisch and Prentice, The Statistical Analysis of Failure Time Data, pp. 23-4, 30-2, 54-5); Greene, Econometric Analysis, pp. 717-18, 721-2; and Bennett and Stam, 'The Duration of Interstate Wars', pp. 244-5.
66. This paragraph draws primarily on Kalbfleisch and Prentice, The Statistical Analysis of Failure Time Data, pp. 23-4, 30-2, 54-5); Greene, Econometric Analysis, pp. 717-18, 721-2; and Bennett and Stam, 'The Duration of Interstate Wars', pp. 244-5.
67. This paragraph draws primarily on Kalbfleisch and Prentice, The Statistical Analysis of Failure Time Data, pp. 23-4, 30-2, 54-5); Greene, Econometric Analysis, pp. 717-18, 721-2; and Bennett and Stam, 'The Duration of Interstate Wars', pp. 244-5.
68. Greene, Econometric Analysis; Kalbfleisch and Prentice, The Statistical Analysis of Failure Time Data.
69. Greene, Econometric Analysis; Kalbfleisch and Prentice, The Statistical Analysis of Failure Time Data.
70. I do not adopt Emizet and Hesli's ('The Disposition to Secede') measures for independent variables for several reasons. Most importantly, many of their measures are available only for the fifteen union republics, not the other thirty cases in which I am interested. Secondly, the logic behind their categorizations and their choice of indices is unclear and not as directly linked to the theories I am interested in testing. Thirdly, they do not make a very sharp distinction between 'nationality group' and 'republic' in their study. For instance, their measure of social development, which they take as a measure of whether a group is 'advanced' or 'backward', refers to the share of the whole republic population (not just the titular group) that lives in urban areas. Finally, they sometimes mix variables and rates of change in these variables together in the same indices; these may well not vary together, however, and may reflect different things. I also choose to avoid indices in general, of which they use many, since they greatly complicate interpretation. I do use many of the same measures as Treisman ('Russia's "Ethnic Revival"'), although some of his measures are not available for some of the Soviet regions for the time period in which I am interested.
71. Oksana Genrikhovna Dmitrieva, Regional'naya Ekonomicheskaya Diagnostika (Saint Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta Ekonomiki i Finansov, 1992), pp. 130-2.
72. She also identifies the number of doctors and hospital beds per capita to be reasonable indicators of social development (which she equates with standards of living), although argues these are not very sensitive indicators. The other indicators that she writes best correlate with other indicators of development and are justified theoretically (like infant mortality rates) were not available for this study. See Dmitrieva, Regional'naya Ekonomicheskaya Diagnostika, pp. 116-17.
73. This provides solid statistical evidence for Treisman's ('Russia's "Ethnic Revival"') suspicion that this relationship is important, even though his own statistical study did not include enough cases to generate statistically significant results. Treisman interprets the correlation between wealth and regions' 'separatist activism' to reflect the fact that rich regions have better prospects as direct participants in the world market and hence can make more credible threats to secede so as to bargain for more resources from the centre.
74. See Treisman's 'Russia's "Ethnic Revival"' for a good discussion of the Tuvan case.
75. This category includes the Baltic states, Kalmykia, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Chechnya, Armenia, Moldova, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Buryatia, Yakutia, Evenkia, Khanty-Mansiisk and Chukotka. Victimization data are from Aleksandr Nekrich, The Punished Peoples (New York: Norton, 1978), and Gerhard Simon, Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union: From Totalitarian Dictatorship to Post-Stalinist Society (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), in particular p. 101.
76. This category includes the Baltic states, Kalmykia, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Chechnya, Armenia, Moldova, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Buryatia, Yakutia, Evenkia, Khanty-Mansiisk and Chukotka. Victimization data are from Aleksandr Nekrich, The Punished Peoples (New York: Norton, 1978), and Gerhard Simon, Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union: From Totalitarian Dictatorship to Post-Stalinist Society (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), in particular p. 101.
77. The argument that Russia's declaration had a huge impact has been made by Gail W. Lapidus ('From Democratization to Disintegration: The Impact of Perestroika on the National Question', in Lapidus and Victor Zaslavsky, with Philip Goldman, eds, From Union to Commonwealth: Nationalism and Separatism in the Soviet Republics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 45-70, at p. 59); and also by Gwendolyn Stewart, who has illustrated this well in an unpublished graphic provided to the author.
78. A dataset in which independent variables vary over time is a TVC (time-varying covariates) dataset. See Bennett and Stam, 'The Duration of Interstate Wars', for an example of the use of TVC in a Weibull regression.
79. This form of 'contagion', however, does not appear to affect significantly the confidence with which we can determine whether our variables have effects, since the variables passing a 5 per cent significance test passed it in both the TVC (including the Russian precedent variable) and the non-TVC (not including it) sets of regressions. Adding the Russian precedent variable does have a significant impact on the size of the coefficients estimated for the independent variables, however, actually increasing their magnitudes in most cases. Those from the TVC regression nearly double in magnitude as we move from the non-TVC to the TVC datasets. Importantly, this suggests that any similar contagion effects, for which this model does not control, are not likely to distort our ability to detect statistically significant relationships between the variables in which we are interested, since the effect of Russia's declaration is generally believed to have far outweighed the impact of any other single republic. In any case, significant results were found, and they are all the more remarkable the more 'noise' that should obscure them. The presence of such non-Russian contagion might, however, hinder our efforts to get an idea of the true size of the coefficients involved. Since the p parameter is much smaller in the TVC model, and since the accumulation of republic precedents occurs over time, results also suggest that the time-dependence parameter is capturing much of this contagion.
80. As explained in the next paragraph, the inclusion of the Russian precedent variable cuts the size of the time dependence parameter by about one half, indicating that Russia was indeed producing a large share of the demonstration effects detected in this study.