On-the-job specific training and efficient screening

Journal of Labor Economics

Volumn 18, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 681-701

  Bac, Mehmet ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034403464     PISSN: 0734306X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/209973     Document Type: Article

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