Bilateral relationships governed by incomplete contracts

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 153, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 320-333

  Bac, Mehmet ^a  

^a BILKENT UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031477542     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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