Rogue rage: Can we prevent mass destruction?

Journal of Strategic Studies

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 188-212

  Herring, Eric ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0034386684     PISSN: 01402390     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402390008437783     Document Type: Article

References (101)

1. Nevertheless, that would be a worthwhile research objective. If one developed a more complex picture based on cross-pressured, ambivalent preferences, one might grasp how coalitions of preferences could play an important role in influencing how perspectives on rogue states shape world politics. For the application of this kind of approach to the politics of nuclear weapons policy, see James DeNardo, The Amateur Strategist. Intuitive Deterrence Theories and the Politics of the Nuclear Anns Race (Cambridge: CUP 1995).
2. See John Mueller and Karl Mueller, 'The Methodology of Mass Destruction: Assessing Threats in the New World Order', this volume. See also Geoff Simons' polemic The Scourging of Iraq. Sanctions, Law and Natural Justice 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1998).
3. See John Mueller and Karl Mueller, 'The Methodology of Mass Destruction: Assessing Threats in the New World Order', this volume. See also Geoff Simons' polemic The Scourging of Iraq. Sanctions, Law and Natural Justice 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1998).
4. Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap. Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington DC: United States Inst. of Peace Press 1993). Michael Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws. America's Search for a New Foreign Policy (NY: Hill & Wang 1995). Raymond Tanter, Rogue Regimes. Terrorism and Proliferation (NY: St Martin's Press 1998). For left-wing critiques, see Stephen Zunes, 'The Function of Rogue States in US Middle East Policy'. 〈http://www.mepc.org/zunes56.htm〉 and John Pilger, '"Humanitarian Intervention" is the Latest Brand Name for Imperialism as it Begins a Return to Respectability', The New Statesman, 28 June 1999.
5. Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap. Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington DC: United States Inst. of Peace Press 1993). Michael Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws. America's Search for a New Foreign Policy (NY: Hill & Wang 1995). Raymond Tanter, Rogue Regimes. Terrorism and Proliferation (NY: St Martin's Press 1998). For left-wing critiques, see Stephen Zunes, 'The Function of Rogue States in US Middle East Policy'. 〈http://www.mepc.org/zunes56.htm〉 and John Pilger, '"Humanitarian Intervention" is the Latest Brand Name for Imperialism as it Begins a Return to Respectability', The New Statesman, 28 June 1999.
6. Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap. Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington DC: United States Inst. of Peace Press 1993). Michael Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws. America's Search for a New Foreign Policy (NY: Hill & Wang 1995). Raymond Tanter, Rogue Regimes. Terrorism and Proliferation (NY: St Martin's Press 1998). For left-wing critiques, see Stephen Zunes, 'The Function of Rogue States in US Middle East Policy'. 〈http://www.mepc.org/zunes56.htm〉 and John Pilger, '"Humanitarian Intervention" is the Latest Brand Name for Imperialism as it Begins a Return to Respectability', The New Statesman, 28 June 1999.
7. Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap. Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington DC: United States Inst. of Peace Press 1993). Michael Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws. America's Search for a New Foreign Policy (NY: Hill & Wang 1995). Raymond Tanter, Rogue Regimes. Terrorism and Proliferation (NY: St Martin's Press 1998). For left-wing critiques, see Stephen Zunes, 'The Function of Rogue States in US Middle East Policy'. 〈http://www.mepc.org/zunes56.htm〉 and John Pilger, '"Humanitarian Intervention" is the Latest Brand Name for Imperialism as it Begins a Return to Respectability', The New Statesman, 28 June 1999.
8. Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap. Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington DC: United States Inst. of Peace Press 1993). Michael Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws. America's Search for a New Foreign Policy (NY: Hill & Wang 1995). Raymond Tanter, Rogue Regimes. Terrorism and Proliferation (NY: St Martin's Press 1998). For left-wing critiques, see Stephen Zunes, 'The Function of Rogue States in US Middle East Policy'. 〈http://www.mepc.org/zunes56.htm〉 and John Pilger, '"Humanitarian Intervention" is the Latest Brand Name for Imperialism as it Begins a Return to Respectability', The New Statesman, 28 June 1999.
9. Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1984).
10. Noam Chomsky, Deterring Democracy (London: Vintage 1992) pp.27-45.
11. Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era 2nd ed. (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf 1991) pp.297-311; Stephen Chan and Andrew J. Williams (eds.) Renegade States. The Evolution of Revolutionary Foreign Policy (Manchester UP 1994); Eric Herring, Danger and Opportunity: Explaining International Crisis Outcomes (ibid. 1995) pp.47-9; Randall L. Schweller, 'Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In', International Security 19/1 (Summer 1994) pp.72-107; and Charles L. Glaser, 'Political Consequences of Military Strategy. Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models', World Politics 44/4 (1992) pp.497-538.
12. Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era 2nd ed. (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf 1991) pp.297-311; Stephen Chan and Andrew J. Williams (eds.) Renegade States. The Evolution of Revolutionary Foreign Policy (Manchester UP 1994); Eric Herring, Danger and Opportunity: Explaining International Crisis Outcomes (ibid. 1995) pp.47-9; Randall L. Schweller, 'Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In', International Security 19/1 (Summer 1994) pp.72-107; and Charles L. Glaser, 'Political Consequences of Military Strategy. Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models', World Politics 44/4 (1992) pp.497-538.
13. Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era 2nd ed. (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf 1991) pp.297-311; Stephen Chan and Andrew J. Williams (eds.) Renegade States. The Evolution of Revolutionary Foreign Policy (Manchester UP 1994); Eric Herring, Danger and Opportunity: Explaining International Crisis Outcomes (ibid. 1995) pp.47-9; Randall L. Schweller, 'Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In', International Security 19/1 (Summer 1994) pp.72-107; and Charles L. Glaser, 'Political Consequences of Military Strategy. Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models', World Politics 44/4 (1992) pp.497-538.
14. Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era 2nd ed. (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf 1991) pp.297-311; Stephen Chan and Andrew J. Williams (eds.) Renegade States. The Evolution of Revolutionary Foreign Policy (Manchester UP 1994); Eric Herring, Danger and Opportunity: Explaining International Crisis Outcomes (ibid. 1995) pp.47-9; Randall L. Schweller, 'Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In', International Security 19/1 (Summer 1994) pp.72-107; and Charles L. Glaser, 'Political Consequences of Military Strategy. Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models', World Politics 44/4 (1992) pp.497-538.
15. Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era 2nd ed. (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf 1991) pp.297-311; Stephen Chan and Andrew J. Williams (eds.) Renegade States. The Evolution of Revolutionary Foreign Policy (Manchester UP 1994); Eric Herring, Danger and Opportunity: Explaining International Crisis Outcomes (ibid. 1995) pp.47-9; Randall L. Schweller, 'Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In', International Security 19/1 (Summer 1994) pp.72-107; and Charles L. Glaser, 'Political Consequences of Military Strategy. Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models', World Politics 44/4 (1992) pp.497-538.
16. Richard K. Betts, 'Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs and Nonproliferation', Foreign Policy 26 (1977) pp.157-83. Robert Harkavy, 'Pariah States and Nuclear Proliferation', International Organization 35 (1981) pp. 135-63.
17. Richard K. Betts, 'Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs and Nonproliferation', Foreign Policy 26 (1977) pp.157-83. Robert Harkavy, 'Pariah States and Nuclear Proliferation', International Organization 35 (1981) pp. 135-63.
18. Gordon H. Chang, 'JFK, China and the Bomb', Jnl of American History 74 (1988) pp. 1287-310. The Soviet Union and United States also shared concerns over the possibility of a revanchist Germany or Japan with nuclear weapons, and of the potential for nuclear use by Britain and France.
19. Klare, Rogue States (note 3) pp.16, 19-20, 24, 133.
20. Debra von Opstal and Andrew C. Goldberg, Meeting the Mavericks: Regional Challengers for the Next President (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Int. Studies 1988); Anthony Lake, 'Confronting Backlash States', Foreign Affairs 73/2 (March-April 1994) pp.45-55; and Klare, Rogue States (note 3) p.24.
21. Debra von Opstal and Andrew C. Goldberg, Meeting the Mavericks: Regional Challengers for the Next President (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Int. Studies 1988); Anthony Lake, 'Confronting Backlash States', Foreign Affairs 73/2 (March-April 1994) pp.45-55; and Klare, Rogue States (note 3) p.24.
22. Debra von Opstal and Andrew C. Goldberg, Meeting the Mavericks: Regional Challengers for the Next President (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Int. Studies 1988); Anthony Lake, 'Confronting Backlash States', Foreign Affairs 73/2 (March-April 1994) pp.45-55; and Klare, Rogue States (note 3) p.24.
23. Ibid, pp.28-37.
24. There is much less awareness of the fact that Iran used chemical weapons against Iraq. See Carolyn C. James, 'Iran and Iraq as Rational Crisis Actors: Dangers and Dynamics of Survivable Nuclear War', this volume.
25. John Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War (U. of Chicago Press 1994) pp.20, 23, 39-12, 118, 142.
26. Klare, Rogue States (note 3) pp.41-2, 62-85, 104.
27. Toby I. Gati, Assessing Current and Projected Threats to U.S. National Security, Statement by Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC, 5 Feb. 1997. 〈http://www.state.gov/www/global/ terrorism/970205.html〉. See also Lake 'Confronting Backlash States'(note 10). Lake's list of backlash (i.e. rogue) states is Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya and Cuba.
28. Toby I. Gati, Assessing Current and Projected Threats to U.S. National Security, Statement by Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC, 5 Feb. 1997. 〈http://www.state.gov/www/global/ terrorism/970205.html〉. See also Lake 'Confronting Backlash States'(note 10). Lake's list of backlash (i.e. rogue) states is Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya and Cuba.
29. Klare, Rogue States (note 3) pp.97-116.
30. See James Wirtz, 'Counterproliferation, Conventional Counterforce and Nuclear War', this volume.
31. Klare, Rogue States (note 3) pp.119-25; Martin Kettle, 'US Strategy on Nuclear War', The Guardian, 9 Dec. 1997.
32. Klare, Rogue States (note 3) pp.119-25; Martin Kettle, 'US Strategy on Nuclear War', The Guardian, 9 Dec. 1997.
33. Ed Vulliamy, 'US Building Up New Nuclear Arsenal', The Guardian, 19 Aug. 1997.
34. Kettle, 'US Strategy on Nuclear War' (note 18).
35. Ian Black and Richard Norton-Taylor, 'Trident Warheads to be Cut By Half, The Guardian, 18 June 1998.
36. David Fairhall, 'Nuclear Deterrent Aimed at Third World Dictators', The Guardian, 9 Jan. 1996.
37. Richard Halloran, '… But Carry A Big Stick', Far Eastern Economic Review 161/49 (3 Dec. 1998) pp.26-27, and John Gittings, 'US Threat to Invade North Korea', The Guardian, 26 Nov. 1998. This has strong and not very reassuring echoes of the US invasion of North Korea in 1950. The fact that starvation and malnutrition is rife in North Korea makes conservatives worry that it will attack South Korea conventionally or develop nuclear weapons and create a nuclear crisis. In contrast, liberals and the left argue that the dire situation in North Korea makes such a war or crisis less likely. They also argue that the hardliners in North Korea and the United States are in a symbiotic relationship (officially they may exist to eliminate each other, but the existence of the other is vital to their identity, mission and status). See John Gittings, 'An Enemy Already Defeated', The Guardian, 26 Nov. 1998.
38. Richard Halloran, '… But Carry A Big Stick', Far Eastern Economic Review 161/49 (3 Dec. 1998) pp.26-27, and John Gittings, 'US Threat to Invade North Korea', The Guardian, 26 Nov. 1998. This has strong and not very reassuring echoes of the US invasion of North Korea in 1950. The fact that starvation and malnutrition is rife in North Korea makes conservatives worry that it will attack South Korea conventionally or develop nuclear weapons and create a nuclear crisis. In contrast, liberals and the left argue that the dire situation in North Korea makes such a war or crisis less likely. They also argue that the hardliners in North Korea and the United States are in a symbiotic relationship (officially they may exist to eliminate each other, but the existence of the other is vital to their identity, mission and status). See John Gittings, 'An Enemy Already Defeated', The Guardian, 26 Nov. 1998.
39. Richard Halloran, '… But Carry A Big Stick', Far Eastern Economic Review 161/49 (3 Dec. 1998) pp.26-27, and John Gittings, 'US Threat to Invade North Korea', The Guardian, 26 Nov. 1998. This has strong and not very reassuring echoes of the US invasion of North Korea in 1950. The fact that starvation and malnutrition is rife in North Korea makes conservatives worry that it will attack South Korea conventionally or develop nuclear weapons and create a nuclear crisis. In contrast, liberals and the left argue that the dire situation in North Korea makes such a war or crisis less likely. They also argue that the hardliners in North Korea and the United States are in a symbiotic relationship (officially they may exist to eliminate each other, but the existence of the other is vital to their identity, mission and status). See John Gittings, 'An Enemy Already Defeated', The Guardian, 26 Nov. 1998.
40. Tanter, Rogue Regimes (note 3) pp.ix, xi, 40. Unacceptable to whom, one might ask.
41. Tanter's list of rogue states is Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya and Syria (with Sudan as its surrogate). Unusually among conservatives, Tanter does not see Cuba as a rogue state because he sees it as no longer exporting terrorism or revolution and no longer seeking WMD. Ibid. Ch.6.
42. See James, 'Iran and Iraq', this volume, and Mueller and Mueller, 'Methodology of Mass Destruction', this volume.
43. See James, 'Iran and Iraq', this volume, and Mueller and Mueller, 'Methodology of Mass Destruction', this volume.
44. Klare, Rogue States (note 3) p.161.
45. Ibid. p.3.
46. Ibid, p.206.
47. Ibid, pp.85-96, 116-19.
48. Ibid, p.22.
49. Ralph K. White, 'American Acts of Force: Results and Misperceptions', Peace and Conflict: Jnl of Peace Psychology 4/2 (1998) p. 114. For more on the psychological bias of portraying oneself as reactive, defensive, benign, and directed towards no-one in particular, and the opponent as pro-active, offensive, malign and directed against you, see Wirtz, 'Counterproliferation', this volume, and Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton UP 1976) Chs.8-10.
50. Ralph K. White, 'American Acts of Force: Results and Misperceptions', Peace and Conflict: Jnl of Peace Psychology 4/2 (1998) p. 114. For more on the psychological bias of portraying oneself as reactive, defensive, benign, and directed towards no-one in particular, and the opponent as pro-active, offensive, malign and directed against you, see Wirtz, 'Counterproliferation', this volume, and Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton UP 1976) Chs.8-10.
51. Ralph K. White, 'American Acts of Force: Results and Misperceptions', Peace and Conflict: Jnl of Peace Psychology 4/2 (1998) p. 114. For more on the psychological bias of portraying oneself as reactive, defensive, benign, and directed towards no-one in particular, and the opponent as pro-active, offensive, malign and directed against you, see Wirtz, 'Counterproliferation', this volume, and Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton UP 1976) Chs.8-10.
52. Pilger, '"Humanitarian Intervention"' (note 3). Brief discussions by Chomsky of the issue of 'rogues' can be found in World Orders. Old and New (London: Pluto Press 1994) pp.72-3, and 'The Current Bombings: Behind the Rhetoric' May 1999 〈http://www.zmag.org/ chomsky/index.cfm〉. See also Phyllis Bennis, Calling the Shots. How Washington Dominates Today's UN (Brooklyn, NY: Olive Branch Press) pp.159-73.
53. Pilger, '"Humanitarian Intervention"' (note 3). Brief discussions by Chomsky of the issue of 'rogues' can be found in World Orders. Old and New (London: Pluto Press 1994) pp.72-3, and 'The Current Bombings: Behind the Rhetoric' May 1999 〈http://www.zmag.org/ chomsky/index.cfm〉. See also Phyllis Bennis, Calling the Shots. How Washington Dominates Today's UN (Brooklyn, NY: Olive Branch Press) pp.159-73.
54. Pilger, '"Humanitarian Intervention"' (note 3). Brief discussions by Chomsky of the issue of 'rogues' can be found in World Orders. Old and New (London: Pluto Press 1994) pp.72-3, and 'The Current Bombings: Behind the Rhetoric' May 1999 〈http://www.zmag.org/ chomsky/index.cfm〉. See also Phyllis Bennis, Calling the Shots. How Washington Dominates Today's UN (Brooklyn, NY: Olive Branch Press) pp.159-73.
55. For many claims from the left of examples, see Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights (Boston, MA: South End Press 1979) 2 volumes; Noam Chomsky, Pirates and Emperors: International Terrorism in the Real World (NY: Claremont 1986); Noam Chomsky, The Culture of Terrorism (London: Pluto Press 1989); Alexander George (ed.) Western State Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity Press 1991); and Zunes, 'Function of Rogue States' (note 3).
56. For many claims from the left of examples, see Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights (Boston, MA: South End Press 1979) 2 volumes; Noam Chomsky, Pirates and Emperors: International Terrorism in the Real World (NY: Claremont 1986); Noam Chomsky, The Culture of Terrorism (London: Pluto Press 1989); Alexander George (ed.) Western State Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity Press 1991); and Zunes, 'Function of Rogue States' (note 3).
57. For many claims from the left of examples, see Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights (Boston, MA: South End Press 1979) 2 volumes; Noam Chomsky, Pirates and Emperors: International Terrorism in the Real World (NY: Claremont 1986); Noam Chomsky, The Culture of Terrorism (London: Pluto Press 1989); Alexander George (ed.) Western State Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity Press 1991); and Zunes, 'Function of Rogue States' (note 3).
58. For many claims from the left of examples, see Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights (Boston, MA: South End Press 1979) 2 volumes; Noam Chomsky, Pirates and Emperors: International Terrorism in the Real World (NY: Claremont 1986); Noam Chomsky, The Culture of Terrorism (London: Pluto Press 1989); Alexander George (ed.) Western State Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity Press 1991); and Zunes, 'Function of Rogue States' (note 3).
59. For many claims from the left of examples, see Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights (Boston, MA: South End Press 1979) 2 volumes; Noam Chomsky, Pirates and Emperors: International Terrorism in the Real World (NY: Claremont 1986); Noam Chomsky, The Culture of Terrorism (London: Pluto Press 1989); Alexander George (ed.) Western State Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity Press 1991); and Zunes, 'Function of Rogue States' (note 3).
60. See Jack Nelson-Pallmeyer, School of Assassins (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books 1997) and the SOA Watch website http://www.soaw.org/. For a response by the SOA, see its website http://www.benning.army.mil/usarsa/main.htm.
61. Zunes, 'Function of Rogue Stales' (note 3). In April 1999, Libya did hand over the two suspects to face trial in The Netherlands unders Scottish Law.
62. For additional examples, see Geoff Simons, Vietnam Syndrome. Impact on US Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1998) and Scourging of Iraq (note 2).
63. For additional examples, see Geoff Simons, Vietnam Syndrome. Impact on US Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1998) and Scourging of Iraq (note 2).
64. Chomsky, Deterring Democracy (note 5) p.315 and, on Libya, Zunes, 'Function of Rogue States' (note 3).
65. Chomsky, Deterring Democracy (note 5) p.315 and, on Libya, Zunes, 'Function of Rogue States' (note 3).
66. Victoria Brittain, 'Children Die in Agony as US Trade Ban Stifles Cuba', The Guardian, 7 March 1997 and Stephen Bates and Martin Kettle, 'US Under Fire for Cuba Ban', The Guardian, 28 April 1998.
67. Victoria Brittain, 'Children Die in Agony as US Trade Ban Stifles Cuba', The Guardian, 7 March 1997 and Stephen Bates and Martin Kettle, 'US Under Fire for Cuba Ban', The Guardian, 28 April 1998.
68. New York Times, 'UN Call To End Block on Cuba', The Guardian, 16 Oct. 1998
69. New York Times, 'UN Call To End Block on Cuba', The Guardian, 16 Oct. 1998
70. UNICEF Situation Analysis summarised by the Iraqi Action Coalition (IAC) 〈http://leb.net/IAC/main.html〉. See also CASI [Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq] Starving Iraq: One Humanitarian Disaster We Can Stop (Cambridge: Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq, Feb. 1999) 〈http://linux.clare.cam.ac.uk/casi〉.
71. UNICEF Situation Analysis summarised by the Iraqi Action Coalition (IAC) 〈http://leb.net/IAC/main.html〉. See also CASI [Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq] Starving Iraq: One Humanitarian Disaster We Can Stop (Cambridge: Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq, Feb. 1999) 〈http://linux.clare.cam.ac.uk/casi〉.
72. Simons, Scourging of Iraq (note 2).
73. Ed Vulliamy, 'US Law Blocks Weapons Inspectors', The Guardian, 12 Feb. 1998.
74. Zunes, 'Function of Rogue States' (note 3).
75. Julian Borger and Martin Kettle, 'Israel Goes Underwater to Counter Arab Bomb', The Guardian, 2 July 1998. Note the topsy-turvy perspective of The Guardian: German assistance for the Israeli nuclear weapon programme is presented as countering an Arab bomb, even though there is at present no Arab bomb to counter, and serious dispute over whether Iran is actually seeking nuclear weapons.
76. Tanter, Rogue Regimes (note 3) forthcoming rev. ed., Ch.7.
77. Samuel Huntington made a similar move. He wrote that 'While the United States regularly demonises various countries as "rogue states", in the eyes of many countries it is becoming the rogue superpower.' However, the rogue behaviour he has in mind is anodyne stuff - merely leaning a bit too hard on allied governments. The much more robust rogue accusations made by the left are omitted from his discussion. See Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Lonely Superpower', Foreign Affairs 78/2 (March/April 1999) p.42. In the same issue Gary Wills presents a slightly tougher version of the same line as that of Huntington. See Gary Wills, 'Bully of the Free World', Foreign Affairs 78/2 (March/April 1999) pp.50-9.
78. Samuel Huntington made a similar move. He wrote that 'While the United States regularly demonises various countries as "rogue states", in the eyes of many countries it is becoming the rogue superpower.' However, the rogue behaviour he has in mind is anodyne stuff - merely leaning a bit too hard on allied governments. The much more robust rogue accusations made by the left are omitted from his discussion. See Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Lonely Superpower', Foreign Affairs 78/2 (March/April 1999) p.42. In the same issue Gary Wills presents a slightly tougher version of the same line as that of Huntington. See Gary Wills, 'Bully of the Free World', Foreign Affairs 78/2 (March/April 1999) pp.50-9.
79. The same sort of ideas tends to be labelled post-structuralism, post-positivism or post-modernism. Of course, this is just a broad cluster of ideas, and there are deep disputes among those who might be categorised with these labels. Tanter also does not engage with the interpretive perspective on rogue states outlined in my Vienna paper.
80. David Campbell, Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester UP 1998) rev. ed., and National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia (Minneapolis: U. of Minnesota 1998).
81. David Campbell, Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester UP 1998) rev. ed., and National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia (Minneapolis: U. of Minnesota 1998).
82. Richard Devetak, 'The Project of Modernity and International Relations Theory', Millennium: Jnl of International Studies 24/1 (1995) pp.27-51.
83. On biopolitics see, for example, Paul Rabinow (ed.) The Foucault Header (London: Penguin 1994).
84. Mueller and Mueller, 'Methodology of Mass Destruction', this volume.
85. Trish Saywell, 'Death Sentence', Far Eastern Economic Review 161/50 (10 Dec. 1998), pp.54-6 and Sarah Bosely, 'Tobacco Will Kill 1 in 3 Chinese Men', The Guardian, 20 Nov. 1998. Although the US tobacco industry agreed to hand over S120 billion to various US authorities to compensate for the mass destruction they cause, with US government help they are using international trade regulations to gain access to people in less industrialised countries to replace this lost profit.
86. Trish Saywell, 'Death Sentence', Far Eastern Economic Review 161/50 (10 Dec. 1998), pp.54-6 and Sarah Bosely, 'Tobacco Will Kill 1 in 3 Chinese Men', The Guardian, 20 Nov. 1998. Although the US tobacco industry agreed to hand over S120 billion to various US authorities to compensate for the mass destruction they cause, with US government help they are using international trade regulations to gain access to people in less industrialised countries to replace this lost profit.
87. Chomsky, Deterring Democracy (note 5) pp.123-7.
88. For a fascinating application of this kind of thinking to a debate over whether or not US behaviour contradicts its professed principles, see Toby Robertson, Stephen Reicher, 'An Analysis of the Construction and Contestation of Contradictions in a Debate Between Noam Chomsky and Lord Jenkins on the Gulf War', British Journal of Social Psychology 37 (1998) pp.287-302.
89. For example, Chomsky argues that 'Typically, the thugs and gangsters whom the US backs reach a point in their careers when they become too independent and grasping, outliving their usefulness.' At this point, he claims, they become demonised by the United States and treated as foes to be crushed. Deterring Democracy (note 5) pp.161, 201-02.
90. For diverse contributions, see Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1996); Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World Politics (NY: Columbia UP 1996); Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.) Critical Security Studies. Concepts and Cases (London: UCL Press 1997); Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security. A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1998); and Campbell, National Deconstruction (note 49).
91. For diverse contributions, see Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1996); Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World Politics (NY: Columbia UP 1996); Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.) Critical Security Studies. Concepts and Cases (London: UCL Press 1997); Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security. A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1998); and Campbell, National Deconstruction (note 49).
92. For diverse contributions, see Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1996); Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World Politics (NY: Columbia UP 1996); Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.) Critical Security Studies. Concepts and Cases (London: UCL Press 1997); Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security. A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1998); and Campbell, National Deconstruction (note 49).
93. For diverse contributions, see Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1996); Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World Politics (NY: Columbia UP 1996); Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.) Critical Security Studies. Concepts and Cases (London: UCL Press 1997); Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security. A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1998); and Campbell, National Deconstruction (note 49).
94. For diverse contributions, see Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1996); Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World Politics (NY: Columbia UP 1996); Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.) Critical Security Studies. Concepts and Cases (London: UCL Press 1997); Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security. A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1998); and Campbell, National Deconstruction (note 49).
95. Pilger, '"Humanitarian Intervention"' (note 3), Chomsky, 'Current Bombings'(note 33).
96. Pilger, '"Humanitarian Intervention"' (note 3), Chomsky, 'Current Bombings'(note 33).
97. Michael Sheehan also uses the phrase 'radical security studies'. The extent to which he and I mean the same thing by it remains to be seen.
98. For a statement of the common ground between social science and interpretivism, see Georg Sørensen, 'IR Theory After the Cold War', Review of International Studies 24/3 (1998) pp.83-100. One of the many virtues of Campbell's interpretivist work is its detailed engagement with empirical material. However, Campbell is intent mainly but not exclusively upon emphasising what divides him from those working from a social science perspective: see Barry Buzan and Eric Herring, The Arms Dynamic in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1998) pp.193-8. Chomsky's position is that social science already fully accepts that interpretation is unavoidable, that there can be no such thing as an unintepreted fact, and that, in this sense, a social science-interpretivism dichotomy is false. I agree that social science generally accepts this in principle: what I have in mind is are spectra in which interpretivists tend to be more or differently preoccupied with the difficulties and pitfalls of choosing one interpretation over another.
99. For a statement of the common ground between social science and interpretivism, see Georg Sørensen, 'IR Theory After the Cold War', Review of International Studies 24/3 (1998) pp.83-100. One of the many virtues of Campbell's interpretivist work is its detailed engagement with empirical material. However, Campbell is intent mainly but not exclusively upon emphasising what divides him from those working from a social science perspective: see Barry Buzan and Eric Herring, The Arms Dynamic in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1998) pp.193-8. Chomsky's position is that social science already fully accepts that interpretation is unavoidable, that there can be no such thing as an unintepreted fact, and that, in this sense, a social science-interpretivism dichotomy is false. I agree that social science generally accepts this in principle: what I have in mind is are spectra in which interpretivists tend to be more or differently preoccupied with the difficulties and pitfalls of choosing one interpretation over another.
100. On the processes by which national interests get constructed while appearing to be natural (and hence non-constructed), see Jutta Weldes, 'Constructing National Interests', European Journal of International Relations 2/3 (1996) pp.275-318, and idem and Diana Saco, 'Making State Action Possible: The United States and the Discursive Construction of "The Cuban problem", 1960-1994', Millennium 25/2 (1996) pp.361-95.
101. On the processes by which national interests get constructed while appearing to be natural (and hence non-constructed), see Jutta Weldes, 'Constructing National Interests', European Journal of International Relations 2/3 (1996) pp.275-318, and idem and Diana Saco, 'Making State Action Possible: The United States and the Discursive Construction of "The Cuban problem", 1960-1994', Millennium 25/2 (1996) pp.361-95.