Median voter preferences, central bank independence and conservatism

Public Choice

Volumn 105, Issue 3-4, 2000, Pages 323-338

  Lippi, Francesco ^a  

^a BANK OF ITALY   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034367160     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1005140329575     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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