US hegemony and the perpetuation of NATO

Journal of Strategic Studies

Volumn 23, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 59-91

  Layne, Christopher ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0034365750     PISSN: 01402390     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402390008437800     Document Type: Article

References (190)

1. John Mearsheimer, 'The Future of America's Continental Commitment', in Geir Lundestad (ed.) No End to Alliance - The United States and Western Europe: Past, Present and Future (NY: St Martin's 1998) pp.221-44.
2. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 1979) pp.126, 209. As Waltz puts it (p.209), 'Alliances are made by states that have some but not all of their interests in common. The common interest is ordinarily a negative one: fear of other states.'
3. Christopher Layne, 'Superpower Disengagement', Foreign Policy, No.77 (Winter 1989-1990) pp-17-10; C. Layne, 'Atlanticism Without NATO', ibid. No.67 (Summer 1987) pp.22-15; C. Layne, Toward German Reunification?' Journal of Contemporary Studies 7/4 (Fall 1984) pp.7-37; C. Layne, 'Ending the Alliance', ibid. 6/3 (Summer 1983) pp.5-31; John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War', International Security 15/1 (Summer 1990) pp.5-56; Mearsheimer (note 1); Stephen Walt, 'The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart', National Interest, No.54 (Winter 1998-99) pp.3-11; and Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', International Security 18/2 (Fall 1993) pp.44-79.
4. Christopher Layne, 'Superpower Disengagement', Foreign Policy, No.77 (Winter 1989-1990) pp-17-10; C. Layne, 'Atlanticism Without NATO', ibid. No.67 (Summer 1987) pp.22-15; C. Layne, Toward German Reunification?' Journal of Contemporary Studies 7/4 (Fall 1984) pp.7-37; C. Layne, 'Ending the Alliance', ibid. 6/3 (Summer 1983) pp.5-31; John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War', International Security 15/1 (Summer 1990) pp.5-56; Mearsheimer (note 1); Stephen Walt, 'The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart', National Interest, No.54 (Winter 1998-99) pp.3-11; and Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', International Security 18/2 (Fall 1993) pp.44-79.
5. Christopher Layne, 'Superpower Disengagement', Foreign Policy, No.77 (Winter 1989-1990) pp-17-10; C. Layne, 'Atlanticism Without NATO', ibid. No.67 (Summer 1987) pp.22-15; C. Layne, Toward German Reunification?' Journal of Contemporary Studies 7/4 (Fall 1984) pp.7-37; C. Layne, 'Ending the Alliance', ibid. 6/3 (Summer 1983) pp.5-31; John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War', International Security 15/1 (Summer 1990) pp.5-56; Mearsheimer (note 1); Stephen Walt, 'The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart', National Interest, No.54 (Winter 1998-99) pp.3-11; and Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', International Security 18/2 (Fall 1993) pp.44-79.
6. Christopher Layne, 'Superpower Disengagement', Foreign Policy, No.77 (Winter 1989-1990) pp-17-10; C. Layne, 'Atlanticism Without NATO', ibid. No.67 (Summer 1987) pp.22-15; C. Layne, Toward German Reunification?' Journal of Contemporary Studies 7/4 (Fall 1984) pp.7-37; C. Layne, 'Ending the Alliance', ibid. 6/3 (Summer 1983) pp.5-31; John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War', International Security 15/1 (Summer 1990) pp.5-56; Mearsheimer (note 1); Stephen Walt, 'The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart', National Interest, No.54 (Winter 1998-99) pp.3-11; and Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', International Security 18/2 (Fall 1993) pp.44-79.
7. Christopher Layne, 'Superpower Disengagement', Foreign Policy, No.77 (Winter 1989-1990) pp-17-10; C. Layne, 'Atlanticism Without NATO', ibid. No.67 (Summer 1987) pp.22-15; C. Layne, Toward German Reunification?' Journal of Contemporary Studies 7/4 (Fall 1984) pp.7-37; C. Layne, 'Ending the Alliance', ibid. 6/3 (Summer 1983) pp.5-31; John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War', International Security 15/1 (Summer 1990) pp.5-56; Mearsheimer (note 1); Stephen Walt, 'The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart', National Interest, No.54 (Winter 1998-99) pp.3-11; and Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', International Security 18/2 (Fall 1993) pp.44-79.
8. Christopher Layne, 'Superpower Disengagement', Foreign Policy, No.77 (Winter 1989-1990) pp-17-10; C. Layne, 'Atlanticism Without NATO', ibid. No.67 (Summer 1987) pp.22-15; C. Layne, Toward German Reunification?' Journal of Contemporary Studies 7/4 (Fall 1984) pp.7-37; C. Layne, 'Ending the Alliance', ibid. 6/3 (Summer 1983) pp.5-31; John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War', International Security 15/1 (Summer 1990) pp.5-56; Mearsheimer (note 1); Stephen Walt, 'The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart', National Interest, No.54 (Winter 1998-99) pp.3-11; and Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', International Security 18/2 (Fall 1993) pp.44-79.
9. Christopher Layne, 'Superpower Disengagement', Foreign Policy, No.77 (Winter 1989-1990) pp-17-10; C. Layne, 'Atlanticism Without NATO', ibid. No.67 (Summer 1987) pp.22-15; C. Layne, Toward German Reunification?' Journal of Contemporary Studies 7/4 (Fall 1984) pp.7-37; C. Layne, 'Ending the Alliance', ibid. 6/3 (Summer 1983) pp.5-31; John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War', International Security 15/1 (Summer 1990) pp.5-56; Mearsheimer (note 1); Stephen Walt, 'The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart', National Interest, No.54 (Winter 1998-99) pp.3-11; and Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', International Security 18/2 (Fall 1993) pp.44-79.
10. Jeffrey Herf, War by Any Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of the Euromissiles (NY: Free Press 1991).
11. This argument was developed in Layne, 'Toward German Reunification?' (note 3).
12. On the interplay between NATO nuclear strategy and West Germany's diplomacy vis-à-vis Washington and Moscow in the 1980s, see Jeffery Boutwell, The German Nuclear Dilemma (London: Brassey's 1990). The chasm between America's and West Germany's respective strategic interests that was revealed by the Euro-missile debate is illustrated by Egon Bahr, 'Peace: A State of Emergency', in Rudolf Steinke and Michel Vale (eds.) Germany Debates Defense: The NATO Alliance at the Crossroads (Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe 1983) pp.141-54; McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, and Gerard Smith, 'Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance', Foreign Affairs 60/4 (Spring 1982) pp.753-68; Karl Kaiser, Georg Leber, Alois Mertes, and Franz-Joseph Schulze, 'Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace: A German Response to No First Use', Foreign Affairs 60/5 (Summer 1982) pp.1157-70; and Ekkehart Krippendorff and Michael Lucas, "'One Day We Americans Will Have to Consider the Destruction of Europe'", in Germany Debates Defense, supra, pp.33-43.
13. On the interplay between NATO nuclear strategy and West Germany's diplomacy vis-à-vis Washington and Moscow in the 1980s, see Jeffery Boutwell, The German Nuclear Dilemma (London: Brassey's 1990). The chasm between America's and West Germany's respective strategic interests that was revealed by the Euro-missile debate is illustrated by Egon Bahr, 'Peace: A State of Emergency', in Rudolf Steinke and Michel Vale (eds.) Germany Debates Defense: The NATO Alliance at the Crossroads (Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe 1983) pp.141-54; McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, and Gerard Smith, 'Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance', Foreign Affairs 60/4 (Spring 1982) pp.753-68; Karl Kaiser, Georg Leber, Alois Mertes, and Franz-Joseph Schulze, 'Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace: A German Response to No First Use', Foreign Affairs 60/5 (Summer 1982) pp.1157-70; and Ekkehart Krippendorff and Michael Lucas, "'One Day We Americans Will Have to Consider the Destruction of Europe'", in Germany Debates Defense, supra, pp.33-43.
14. On the interplay between NATO nuclear strategy and West Germany's diplomacy vis-à-vis Washington and Moscow in the 1980s, see Jeffery Boutwell, The German Nuclear Dilemma (London: Brassey's 1990). The chasm between America's and West Germany's respective strategic interests that was revealed by the Euro-missile debate is illustrated by Egon Bahr, 'Peace: A State of Emergency', in Rudolf Steinke and Michel Vale (eds.) Germany Debates Defense: The NATO Alliance at the Crossroads (Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe 1983) pp.141-54; McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, and Gerard Smith, 'Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance', Foreign Affairs 60/4 (Spring 1982) pp.753-68; Karl Kaiser, Georg Leber, Alois Mertes, and Franz-Joseph Schulze, 'Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace: A German Response to No First Use', Foreign Affairs 60/5 (Summer 1982) pp.1157-70; and Ekkehart Krippendorff and Michael Lucas, "'One Day We Americans Will Have to Consider the Destruction of Europe'", in Germany Debates Defense, supra, pp.33-43.
15. On the interplay between NATO nuclear strategy and West Germany's diplomacy vis-à-vis Washington and Moscow in the 1980s, see Jeffery Boutwell, The German Nuclear Dilemma (London: Brassey's 1990). The chasm between America's and West Germany's respective strategic interests that was revealed by the Euro-missile debate is illustrated by Egon Bahr, 'Peace: A State of Emergency', in Rudolf Steinke and Michel Vale (eds.) Germany Debates Defense: The NATO Alliance at the Crossroads (Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe 1983) pp.141-54; McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, and Gerard Smith, 'Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance', Foreign Affairs 60/4 (Spring 1982) pp.753-68; Karl Kaiser, Georg Leber, Alois Mertes, and Franz-Joseph Schulze, 'Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace: A German Response to No First Use', Foreign Affairs 60/5 (Summer 1982) pp.1157-70; and Ekkehart Krippendorff and Michael Lucas, "'One Day We Americans Will Have to Consider the Destruction of Europe'", in Germany Debates Defense, supra, pp.33-43.
16. On the interplay between NATO nuclear strategy and West Germany's diplomacy vis-à-vis Washington and Moscow in the 1980s, see Jeffery Boutwell, The German Nuclear Dilemma (London: Brassey's 1990). The chasm between America's and West Germany's respective strategic interests that was revealed by the Euro-missile debate is illustrated by Egon Bahr, 'Peace: A State of Emergency', in Rudolf Steinke and Michel Vale (eds.) Germany Debates Defense: The NATO Alliance at the Crossroads (Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe 1983) pp.141-54; McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, and Gerard Smith, 'Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance', Foreign Affairs 60/4 (Spring 1982) pp.753-68; Karl Kaiser, Georg Leber, Alois Mertes, and Franz-Joseph Schulze, 'Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace: A German Response to No First Use', Foreign Affairs 60/5 (Summer 1982) pp.1157-70; and Ekkehart Krippendorff and Michael Lucas, "'One Day We Americans Will Have to Consider the Destruction of Europe'", in Germany Debates Defense, supra, pp.33-43.
17. See Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (NY: Harper & Row 1987) pp. 135-60, 190-209.
18. For the view that Gorbachev was 'for real' see Jerry Hough, Russia and the West: Gorbachev and the Politics of Reform (NY: Simon & Schuster 1988); and Jerry F. Hough, 'Gorbachev's Politics', Foreign Affairs 68/5 (Winter 1989-90) pp.26-41. For somewhat more cautious expressions of this view, see the chapters by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., William G. Hyland, and Seweryn Bialer in Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum (eds.) Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1988). Typical of the view that Gorbachev's new thinking was simply a tactical ploy designed to buy time for the Soviet Union to rebuild its strength for renewed competition with the West is Robert C. MacFarlane, 'Effective Strategic Policy', Foreign Affairs 67/1 (Fall 1988) pp.33-48.
19. For the view that Gorbachev was 'for real' see Jerry Hough, Russia and the West: Gorbachev and the Politics of Reform (NY: Simon & Schuster 1988); and Jerry F. Hough, 'Gorbachev's Politics', Foreign Affairs 68/5 (Winter 1989-90) pp.26-41. For somewhat more cautious expressions of this view, see the chapters by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., William G. Hyland, and Seweryn Bialer in Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum (eds.) Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1988). Typical of the view that Gorbachev's new thinking was simply a tactical ploy designed to buy time for the Soviet Union to rebuild its strength for renewed competition with the West is Robert C. MacFarlane, 'Effective Strategic Policy', Foreign Affairs 67/1 (Fall 1988) pp.33-48.
20. For the view that Gorbachev was 'for real' see Jerry Hough, Russia and the West: Gorbachev and the Politics of Reform (NY: Simon & Schuster 1988); and Jerry F. Hough, 'Gorbachev's Politics', Foreign Affairs 68/5 (Winter 1989-90) pp.26-41. For somewhat more cautious expressions of this view, see the chapters by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., William G. Hyland, and Seweryn Bialer in Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum (eds.) Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1988). Typical of the view that Gorbachev's new thinking was simply a tactical ploy designed to buy time for the Soviet Union to rebuild its strength for renewed competition with the West is Robert C. MacFarlane, 'Effective Strategic Policy', Foreign Affairs 67/1 (Fall 1988) pp.33-48.
21. For the view that Gorbachev was 'for real' see Jerry Hough, Russia and the West: Gorbachev and the Politics of Reform (NY: Simon & Schuster 1988); and Jerry F. Hough, 'Gorbachev's Politics', Foreign Affairs 68/5 (Winter 1989-90) pp.26-41. For somewhat more cautious expressions of this view, see the chapters by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., William G. Hyland, and Seweryn Bialer in Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum (eds.) Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1988). Typical of the view that Gorbachev's new thinking was simply a tactical ploy designed to buy time for the Soviet Union to rebuild its strength for renewed competition with the West is Robert C. MacFarlane, 'Effective Strategic Policy', Foreign Affairs 67/1 (Fall 1988) pp.33-48.
22. In his own words, Bush was 'probably less suspicious of Gorbachev than were others in my incoming team', especially his National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, who believed 'that Gorbachev's goal was to restore dynamism to a socialist political and economic system and revitalize the Soviet Union domestically and internationally to compete with the West'. George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed: The Collapse of The Soviet Empire, The Unification of Germany, Tiananmen Square, The Gulf War (NY: Knopf 1998) pp.9, 13.
23. Hans Dietrich Genscher, 'Taking Gorbachev at His Word', German Information Center, New York, 6 Feb. 1987.
24. Bush and Snowcroft (note 9) pp.9-10.
25. Ibid, pp.37-56. Representative of the foreign policy community's intellectually sterile response to Gorbachev's initiatives is Graham T. Allison, 'Testing Gorbachev', Foreign Affairs 67/1 (Fall 1988) pp.18-32.
26. Bush and Scowcroft (note 9) p.43. The administration was deeply concerned that Gorbachev's policies of perestroika, and 'new thinking' would chip away at NATO's cohesion: 'The danger was growing that NATO would fragment in the face of Gorbachev's charm offensive and a diminishing Soviet military threat.' James A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War & Peace, 1989-1992 (NY: Putnam's 1995) pp.43-4, 92.
27. Layne, 'Superpower Disengagement' (note 3); Christopher Layne, 'Continental Divide - Time to Disengage in Europe', National Interest, No. 13 (Fall 1988) pp. 13-27; and Ronald Steel, 'NATO's Last Mission', Foreign Policy, No.76 (Fall 1989) pp.83-97. Although these proposals were criticized in some quarters as 'isolationist', in the Bush administration's early months in office, Brent Scowcroft toyed with mutual disengagement as a policy response to Gorbachev. As he recounts, the mutual withdrawal of US and Soviet forces from Central Europe 'made military sense because NATO minus most of its US troops would was better off than the Warsaw Pact without Soviet troops. But primarily, such a move would reduce the smothering presence of Soviet forces in Central Europe - one of our goals.' Bush and Scowcroft, p.43. See also Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1995) p.27. Scowroft's proposal was opposed by the administration's leading Europeanist, Robert Blackwill of the NSC staff, and Assistant Secretary of State Rozanne Ridgway. Ibid.
28. Layne, 'Superpower Disengagement' (note 3); Christopher Layne, 'Continental Divide - Time to Disengage in Europe', National Interest, No. 13 (Fall 1988) pp. 13-27; and Ronald Steel, 'NATO's Last Mission', Foreign Policy, No.76 (Fall 1989) pp.83-97. Although these proposals were criticized in some quarters as 'isolationist', in the Bush administration's early months in office, Brent Scowcroft toyed with mutual disengagement as a policy response to Gorbachev. As he recounts, the mutual withdrawal of US and Soviet forces from Central Europe 'made military sense because NATO minus most of its US troops would was better off than the Warsaw Pact without Soviet troops. But primarily, such a move would reduce the smothering presence of Soviet forces in Central Europe - one of our goals.' Bush and Scowcroft, p.43. See also Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1995) p.27. Scowroft's proposal was opposed by the administration's leading Europeanist, Robert Blackwill of the NSC staff, and Assistant Secretary of State Rozanne Ridgway. Ibid.
29. Layne, 'Superpower Disengagement' (note 3); Christopher Layne, 'Continental Divide - Time to Disengage in Europe', National Interest, No. 13 (Fall 1988) pp. 13-27; and Ronald Steel, 'NATO's Last Mission', Foreign Policy, No.76 (Fall 1989) pp.83-97. Although these proposals were criticized in some quarters as 'isolationist', in the Bush administration's early months in office, Brent Scowcroft toyed with mutual disengagement as a policy response to Gorbachev. As he recounts, the mutual withdrawal of US and Soviet forces from Central Europe 'made military sense because NATO minus most of its US troops would was better off than the Warsaw Pact without Soviet troops. But primarily, such a move would reduce the smothering presence of Soviet forces in Central Europe - one of our goals.' Bush and Scowcroft, p.43. See also Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1995) p.27. Scowroft's proposal was opposed by the administration's leading Europeanist, Robert Blackwill of the NSC staff, and Assistant Secretary of State Rozanne Ridgway. Ibid.
30. Layne, 'Superpower Disengagement' (note 3); Christopher Layne, 'Continental Divide - Time to Disengage in Europe', National Interest, No. 13 (Fall 1988) pp. 13-27; and Ronald Steel, 'NATO's Last Mission', Foreign Policy, No.76 (Fall 1989) pp.83-97. Although these proposals were criticized in some quarters as 'isolationist', in the Bush administration's early months in office, Brent Scowcroft toyed with mutual disengagement as a policy response to Gorbachev. As he recounts, the mutual withdrawal of US and Soviet forces from Central Europe 'made military sense because NATO minus most of its US troops would was better off than the Warsaw Pact without Soviet troops. But primarily, such a move would reduce the smothering presence of Soviet forces in Central Europe - one of our goals.' Bush and Scowcroft, p.43. See also Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1995) p.27. Scowroft's proposal was opposed by the administration's leading Europeanist, Robert Blackwill of the NSC staff, and Assistant Secretary of State Rozanne Ridgway. Ibid.
31. Layne, 'Superpower Disengagement' (note 3); Christopher Layne, 'Continental Divide - Time to Disengage in Europe', National Interest, No. 13 (Fall 1988) pp. 13-27; and Ronald Steel, 'NATO's Last Mission', Foreign Policy, No.76 (Fall 1989) pp.83-97. Although these proposals were criticized in some quarters as 'isolationist', in the Bush administration's early months in office, Brent Scowcroft toyed with mutual disengagement as a policy response to Gorbachev. As he recounts, the mutual withdrawal of US and Soviet forces from Central Europe 'made military sense because NATO minus most of its US troops would was better off than the Warsaw Pact without Soviet troops. But primarily, such a move would reduce the smothering presence of Soviet forces in Central Europe - one of our goals.' Bush and Scowcroft, p.43. See also Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1995) p.27. Scowroft's proposal was opposed by the administration's leading Europeanist, Robert Blackwill of the NSC staff, and Assistant Secretary of State Rozanne Ridgway. Ibid.
32. Allison (note 12) pp.21-2.
33. Two key members of the Bush administration's foreign policy team state that by 1988 the US government defined the end of the Cold War in terms of attainment of three main objectives: '(1) Stabilize and reduce any danger from US-Soviet rivalry in the development and deployment of nuclear forces. (2) Defuse and ameliorate any major areas of tension in the US-Soviet competition for influence or advantage in the Third World. (3) Persuade Moscow to move toward respect for the fundamental human rights of its citizens as a basis for full Soviet participation in the international community.' Zelikow and Rice (note 14), pp.18-19.
34. As applied to Europe, Gorbachev's 'new thinking' appears to have unfolded on an ad hoc basis. Gorbachev seems not to have had a step-by-step strategy either with respect to European security affairs or to the German Question. Although a few officials in Moscow seem to have appreciated the opportunities that the German reunification gambit held for Moscow, Gorbachev himself apparently did not realize the potentialities inherent in the playing the 'German card'. See Hannes Adomeit, Imperial Overstretch: Germany in Soviet Policy From Stalin to Gorbachev (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos 1998) pp.191-381; William C. Wohlforth, 'Realism and the End of the Cold War', in Michael E. Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (eds.) The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1995) pp.27-30.
35. As applied to Europe, Gorbachev's 'new thinking' appears to have unfolded on an ad hoc basis. Gorbachev seems not to have had a step-by-step strategy either with respect to European security affairs or to the German Question. Although a few officials in Moscow seem to have appreciated the opportunities that the German reunification gambit held for Moscow, Gorbachev himself apparently did not realize the potentialities inherent in the playing the 'German card'. See Hannes Adomeit, Imperial Overstretch: Germany in Soviet Policy From Stalin to Gorbachev (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos 1998) pp.191-381; William C. Wohlforth, 'Realism and the End of the Cold War', in Michael E. Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (eds.) The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1995) pp.27-30.
36. See David P. Calleo, The Bankrupting of America: How the Federal Budget is Impoverishing the Nation (NY: Morrow 1992); and Calleo, The Imperious Economy (Cambridge, MA: and Harvard UP 1982).
37. See David P. Calleo, The Bankrupting of America: How the Federal Budget is Impoverishing the Nation (NY: Morrow 1992); and Calleo, The Imperious Economy (Cambridge, MA: and Harvard UP 1982).
38. Most of those who argued America's economic leadership was in jeopardy believed that Japan was emerging as the main challenger to US preeminence. For example, see Ronald Morse, 'Japan's Drive for Preeminence', Foreign Policy, No.69 (Winter 1987-88) pp.3-21. Samuel Huntington, however, viewed Western Europe as a superpower-inembryo that could, if it fulfilled its political and economic potential, become 'the preeminent power of the 21st century'. Samuel P. Huntington, 'The U.S. - Decline or Renewal?' Foreign Affairs 67/1 (Winter 1988-89) pp.93.
39. Most of those who argued America's economic leadership was in jeopardy believed that Japan was emerging as the main challenger to US preeminence. For example, see Ronald Morse, 'Japan's Drive for Preeminence', Foreign Policy, No.69 (Winter 1987-88) pp.3-21. Samuel Huntington, however, viewed Western Europe as a superpower-inembryo that could, if it fulfilled its political and economic potential, become 'the preeminent power of the 21st century'. Samuel P. Huntington, 'The U.S. - Decline or Renewal?' Foreign Affairs 67/1 (Winter 1988-89) pp.93.
40. See Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State (NY: Basic Books 1986).
41. Report of the Defense Burdensharing Panel, Armed Services Committee, US House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office 1988).
42. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000 (NY: Random House 1987). Kennedy's thesis provoked a sharp debate between those who found his thesis compelling, and the self-styled 'anti-declinists' who took issue with him. Anti-declinists argued that the picture of an America in relative decline was substantially overdrawn. It was true, they admitted, that America's relative power position indeed had eroded from its artificial post World War II apogee. Nevertheless, this slippage notwithstanding, the United States had merely reverted to its 'normal' level of relative power, and was still preeminent economically and militarily. Moreover, they argued, the intense focus on on the relative decline of America's 'hard power' overlooked its formidable 'soft power'. See Henry Nau, The Myth of America's Decline: Leading the World Economy into the 1990s (NY: OUP 1990); and Joseph S. Nye Jr, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (NY: Basic Books 1990).
43. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000 (NY: Random House 1987). Kennedy's thesis provoked a sharp debate between those who found his thesis compelling, and the self-styled 'anti-declinists' who took issue with him. Anti-declinists argued that the picture of an America in relative decline was substantially overdrawn. It was true, they admitted, that America's relative power position indeed had eroded from its artificial post World War II apogee. Nevertheless, this slippage notwithstanding, the United States had merely reverted to its 'normal' level of relative power, and was still preeminent economically and militarily. Moreover, they argued, the intense focus on on the relative decline of America's 'hard power' overlooked its formidable 'soft power'. See Henry Nau, The Myth of America's Decline: Leading the World Economy into the 1990s (NY: OUP 1990); and Joseph S. Nye Jr, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (NY: Basic Books 1990).
44. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000 (NY: Random House 1987). Kennedy's thesis provoked a sharp debate between those who found his thesis compelling, and the self-styled 'anti-declinists' who took issue with him. Anti-declinists argued that the picture of an America in relative decline was substantially overdrawn. It was true, they admitted, that America's relative power position indeed had eroded from its artificial post World War II apogee. Nevertheless, this slippage notwithstanding, the United States had merely reverted to its 'normal' level of relative power, and was still preeminent economically and militarily. Moreover, they argued, the intense focus on on the relative decline of America's 'hard power' overlooked its formidable 'soft power'. See Henry Nau, The Myth of America's Decline: Leading the World Economy into the 1990s (NY: OUP 1990); and Joseph S. Nye Jr, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (NY: Basic Books 1990).
45. Kennedy's thesis was anticipated by Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: CUP 1981).
46. Representative of those who saw the United States engaged in an increasingly fierce economic competition with its West European and Japanese allies is Lester Thurow, Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe, and America (NY: Morrow 1992).
47. Walter Lippmann had defined the objective of national strategy as the 'bringing into balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the nation's commitments and the nation's resources'. Walter Lippmann, US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston: Little, Brown 1944) p.9.
48. See James Chace, Solvency: The Price of Survival (NY: Random House 1981); David P. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance (NY: Basic Books 1987); James Chace, 'A New Grand Strategy', Foreign Policy, No.70 (Spring 1998) pp.3-23; and William G. Hyland, 'Setting Global Priorities', Foreign Policy, No.73 (Winter 1988-89) pp.22-40. For arguments that the United States should terminate its security commitments in Western Europe and East Asia, see Melvyn P. Krauss, How NATO Weakens the West (NY: Simon & Schuster 1986); and Earl C. Ravenal, NATO: The Tides of Discontent (Berkeley, CA: Inst. of Int. Studies 1987).
49. See James Chace, Solvency: The Price of Survival (NY: Random House 1981); David P. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance (NY: Basic Books 1987); James Chace, 'A New Grand Strategy', Foreign Policy, No.70 (Spring 1998) pp.3-23; and William G. Hyland, 'Setting Global Priorities', Foreign Policy, No.73 (Winter 1988-89) pp.22-40. For arguments that the United States should terminate its security commitments in Western Europe and East Asia, see Melvyn P. Krauss, How NATO Weakens the West (NY: Simon & Schuster 1986); and Earl C. Ravenal, NATO: The Tides of Discontent (Berkeley, CA: Inst. of Int. Studies 1987).
50. See James Chace, Solvency: The Price of Survival (NY: Random House 1981); David P. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance (NY: Basic Books 1987); James Chace, 'A New Grand Strategy', Foreign Policy, No.70 (Spring 1998) pp.3-23; and William G. Hyland, 'Setting Global Priorities', Foreign Policy, No.73 (Winter 1988-89) pp.22-40. For arguments that the United States should terminate its security commitments in Western Europe and East Asia, see Melvyn P. Krauss, How NATO Weakens the West (NY: Simon & Schuster 1986); and Earl C. Ravenal, NATO: The Tides of Discontent (Berkeley, CA: Inst. of Int. Studies 1987).
51. See James Chace, Solvency: The Price of Survival (NY: Random House 1981); David P. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance (NY: Basic Books 1987); James Chace, 'A New Grand Strategy', Foreign Policy, No.70 (Spring 1998) pp.3-23; and William G. Hyland, 'Setting Global Priorities', Foreign Policy, No.73 (Winter 1988-89) pp.22-40. For arguments that the United States should terminate its security commitments in Western Europe and East Asia, see Melvyn P. Krauss, How NATO Weakens the West (NY: Simon & Schuster 1986); and Earl C. Ravenal, NATO: The Tides of Discontent (Berkeley, CA: Inst. of Int. Studies 1987).
52. See James Chace, Solvency: The Price of Survival (NY: Random House 1981); David P. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance (NY: Basic Books 1987); James Chace, 'A New Grand Strategy', Foreign Policy, No.70 (Spring 1998) pp.3-23; and William G. Hyland, 'Setting Global Priorities', Foreign Policy, No.73 (Winter 1988-89) pp.22-40. For arguments that the United States should terminate its security commitments in Western Europe and East Asia, see Melvyn P. Krauss, How NATO Weakens the West (NY: Simon & Schuster 1986); and Earl C. Ravenal, NATO: The Tides of Discontent (Berkeley, CA: Inst. of Int. Studies 1987).
53. See James Chace, Solvency: The Price of Survival (NY: Random House 1981); David P. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance (NY: Basic Books 1987); James Chace, 'A New Grand Strategy', Foreign Policy, No.70 (Spring 1998) pp.3-23; and William G. Hyland, 'Setting Global Priorities', Foreign Policy, No.73 (Winter 1988-89) pp.22-40. For arguments that the United States should terminate its security commitments in Western Europe and East Asia, see Melvyn P. Krauss, How NATO Weakens the West (NY: Simon & Schuster 1986); and Earl C. Ravenal, NATO: The Tides of Discontent (Berkeley, CA: Inst. of Int. Studies 1987).
54. Representative of this sense of post-Cold War grand strategic possibilities are Robert E. Hunter, 'Starting at Zero: US Foreign Policy for the 1990s', Washington Quarterly 15/1 (Winter 1992) pp.27-42; William G. Hyland, 'The Case for Pragmatism', Foreign Affairs: America and the World 1991-1992 71/2 (1991-92) pp.38-52; Michael Mandelbaum, 'The Bush Foreign Policy', Foreign Affairs 'America and the World 1990-1991' 70/1 (1990-91) pp.4-22; Charles William Maynes, 'America Without the Cold War', Foreign Policy, No.78 (Spring 1990) pp.3-25; and James Schlesinger, The Quest for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy', Foreign Affairs 'America and the World 1992-1993' 72/1 (1992-93) pp.17-28.
55. Representative of this sense of post-Cold War grand strategic possibilities are Robert E. Hunter, 'Starting at Zero: US Foreign Policy for the 1990s', Washington Quarterly 15/1 (Winter 1992) pp.27-42; William G. Hyland, 'The Case for Pragmatism', Foreign Affairs: America and the World 1991-1992 71/2 (1991-92) pp.38-52; Michael Mandelbaum, 'The Bush Foreign Policy', Foreign Affairs 'America and the World 1990-1991' 70/1 (1990-91) pp.4-22; Charles William Maynes, 'America Without the Cold War', Foreign Policy, No.78 (Spring 1990) pp.3-25; and James Schlesinger, The Quest for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy', Foreign Affairs 'America and the World 1992-1993' 72/1 (1992-93) pp.17-28.
56. Representative of this sense of post-Cold War grand strategic possibilities are Robert E. Hunter, 'Starting at Zero: US Foreign Policy for the 1990s', Washington Quarterly 15/1 (Winter 1992) pp.27-42; William G. Hyland, 'The Case for Pragmatism', Foreign Affairs: America and the World 1991-1992 71/2 (1991-92) pp.38-52; Michael Mandelbaum, 'The Bush Foreign Policy', Foreign Affairs 'America and the World 1990-1991' 70/1 (1990-91) pp.4-22; Charles William Maynes, 'America Without the Cold War', Foreign Policy, No.78 (Spring 1990) pp.3-25; and James Schlesinger, The Quest for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy', Foreign Affairs 'America and the World 1992-1993' 72/1 (1992-93) pp.17-28.
57. Representative of this sense of post-Cold War grand strategic possibilities are Robert E. Hunter, 'Starting at Zero: US Foreign Policy for the 1990s', Washington Quarterly 15/1 (Winter 1992) pp.27-42; William G. Hyland, 'The Case for Pragmatism', Foreign Affairs: America and the World 1991-1992 71/2 (1991-92) pp.38-52; Michael Mandelbaum, 'The Bush Foreign Policy', Foreign Affairs 'America and the World 1990-1991' 70/1 (1990-91) pp.4-22; Charles William Maynes, 'America Without the Cold War', Foreign Policy, No.78 (Spring 1990) pp.3-25; and James Schlesinger, The Quest for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy', Foreign Affairs 'America and the World 1992-1993' 72/1 (1992-93) pp.17-28.
58. Representative of this sense of post-Cold War grand strategic possibilities are Robert E. Hunter, 'Starting at Zero: US Foreign Policy for the 1990s', Washington Quarterly 15/1 (Winter 1992) pp.27-42; William G. Hyland, 'The Case for Pragmatism', Foreign Affairs: America and the World 1991-1992 71/2 (1991-92) pp.38-52; Michael Mandelbaum, 'The Bush Foreign Policy', Foreign Affairs 'America and the World 1990-1991' 70/1 (1990-91) pp.4-22; Charles William Maynes, 'America Without the Cold War', Foreign Policy, No.78 (Spring 1990) pp.3-25; and James Schlesinger, The Quest for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy', Foreign Affairs 'America and the World 1992-1993' 72/1 (1992-93) pp.17-28.
59. For example, see James Chace, The Consequences of the Peace: The New Internationalism and American Foreign Policy (NY: OUP 1992); David Abshire, 'Strategic Challenges: Contingencies, Force Structures, Deterrence', Washington Quarterly 15/2 (Spring 1992) pp.33-5; John Lewis Gaddis, 'Toward the Post-Cold War World', Foreign Affairs 70/2 (Spring 1991) pp.102-22;' Mandelbaum, 'The Bush Foreign Policy' (note 27) pp.12-13; Joseph S. Nye Jr, 'What New World Order?' Foreign Affairs 71/2 (Spring 1992) p.95; Elizabeth Pond, 'Germany in the New Europe', Foreign Affairs 71/2 (Spring 1992) pp.114-30; and Gregory F. Treverton, The New Europe', Foreign Affairs 'America and the World 1991-1992' 71/2 (1991-92) pp.94-112.
60. For example, see James Chace, The Consequences of the Peace: The New Internationalism and American Foreign Policy (NY: OUP 1992); David Abshire, 'Strategic Challenges: Contingencies, Force Structures, Deterrence', Washington Quarterly 15/2 (Spring 1992) pp.33-5; John Lewis Gaddis, 'Toward the Post-Cold War World', Foreign Affairs 70/2 (Spring 1991) pp.102-22;' Mandelbaum, 'The Bush Foreign Policy' (note 27) pp.12-13; Joseph S. Nye Jr, 'What New World Order?' Foreign Affairs 71/2 (Spring 1992) p.95; Elizabeth Pond, 'Germany in the New Europe', Foreign Affairs 71/2 (Spring 1992) pp.114-30; and Gregory F. Treverton, The New Europe', Foreign Affairs 'America and the World 1991-1992' 71/2 (1991-92) pp.94-112.
61. For example, see James Chace, The Consequences of the Peace: The New Internationalism and American Foreign Policy (NY: OUP 1992); David Abshire, 'Strategic Challenges: Contingencies, Force Structures, Deterrence', Washington Quarterly 15/2 (Spring 1992) pp.33-5; John Lewis Gaddis, 'Toward the Post-Cold War World', Foreign Affairs 70/2 (Spring 1991) pp.102-22;' Mandelbaum, 'The Bush Foreign Policy' (note 27) pp.12-13; Joseph S. Nye Jr, 'What New World Order?' Foreign Affairs 71/2 (Spring 1992) p.95; Elizabeth Pond, 'Germany in the New Europe', Foreign Affairs 71/2 (Spring 1992) pp.114-30; and Gregory F. Treverton, The New Europe', Foreign Affairs 'America and the World 1991-1992' 71/2 (1991-92) pp.94-112.
62. For example, see James Chace, The Consequences of the Peace: The New Internationalism and American Foreign Policy (NY: OUP 1992); David Abshire, 'Strategic Challenges: Contingencies, Force Structures, Deterrence', Washington Quarterly 15/2 (Spring 1992) pp.33-5; John Lewis Gaddis, 'Toward the Post-Cold War World', Foreign Affairs 70/2 (Spring 1991) pp.102-22;' Mandelbaum, 'The Bush Foreign Policy' (note 27) pp.12-13; Joseph S. Nye Jr, 'What New World Order?' Foreign Affairs 71/2 (Spring 1992) p.95; Elizabeth Pond, 'Germany in the New Europe', Foreign Affairs 71/2 (Spring 1992) pp.114-30; and Gregory F. Treverton, The New Europe', Foreign Affairs 'America and the World 1991-1992' 71/2 (1991-92) pp.94-112.
63. For example, see James Chace, The Consequences of the Peace: The New Internationalism and American Foreign Policy (NY: OUP 1992); David Abshire, 'Strategic Challenges: Contingencies, Force Structures, Deterrence', Washington Quarterly 15/2 (Spring 1992) pp.33-5; John Lewis Gaddis, 'Toward the Post-Cold War World', Foreign Affairs 70/2 (Spring 1991) pp.102-22;' Mandelbaum, 'The Bush Foreign Policy' (note 27) pp.12-13; Joseph S. Nye Jr, 'What New World Order?' Foreign Affairs 71/2 (Spring 1992) p.95; Elizabeth Pond, 'Germany in the New Europe', Foreign Affairs 71/2 (Spring 1992) pp.114-30; and Gregory F. Treverton, The New Europe', Foreign Affairs 'America and the World 1991-1992' 71/2 (1991-92) pp.94-112.
64. For example, see James Chace, The Consequences of the Peace: The New Internationalism and American Foreign Policy (NY: OUP 1992); David Abshire, 'Strategic Challenges: Contingencies, Force Structures, Deterrence', Washington Quarterly 15/2 (Spring 1992) pp.33-5; John Lewis Gaddis, 'Toward the Post-Cold War World', Foreign Affairs 70/2 (Spring 1991) pp.102-22;' Mandelbaum, 'The Bush Foreign Policy' (note 27) pp.12-13; Joseph S. Nye Jr, 'What New World Order?' Foreign Affairs 71/2 (Spring 1992) p.95; Elizabeth Pond, 'Germany in the New Europe', Foreign Affairs 71/2 (Spring 1992) pp.114-30; and Gregory F. Treverton, The New Europe', Foreign Affairs 'America and the World 1991-1992' 71/2 (1991-92) pp.94-112.
65. For example, see James Chace, The Consequences of the Peace: The New Internationalism and American Foreign Policy (NY: OUP 1992); David Abshire, 'Strategic Challenges: Contingencies, Force Structures, Deterrence', Washington Quarterly 15/2 (Spring 1992) pp.33-5; John Lewis Gaddis, 'Toward the Post-Cold War World', Foreign Affairs 70/2 (Spring 1991) pp.102-22;' Mandelbaum, 'The Bush Foreign Policy' (note 27) pp.12-13; Joseph S. Nye Jr, 'What New World Order?' Foreign Affairs 71/2 (Spring 1992) p.95; Elizabeth Pond, 'Germany in the New Europe', Foreign Affairs 71/2 (Spring 1992) pp.114-30; and Gregory F. Treverton, The New Europe', Foreign Affairs 'America and the World 1991-1992' 71/2 (1991-92) pp.94-112.
66. As Fareed Zakaria puts it: 'The strong are all the same… Over the course of history, states that have experienced significant growth in their material resources have relatively soon redefined and expanded their political interests abroad, measured by their increases in military spending, initiation of wars, acquisition of territory, posting of soldiers and diplomats, and participation in great power decision-making.' Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton UP 1998) p.3.
67. Ibid. pp. 18-20. An earlier statement of the link between capabilities and intentions is Robert Gilpin's observation that, 'As the power of a state increases, it seeks to extend its territorial control, its political influence, and/or its domination of the international economy'. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (note 23) p.106. A.F.K. Organski also suggested that it is rising great powers that seek to expand their influence in, and control over, the international system. A.F.K. Organski, World Politics (NY: Knopf 1968) p.97.
68. Ibid. pp. 18-20. An earlier statement of the link between capabilities and intentions is Robert Gilpin's observation that, 'As the power of a state increases, it seeks to extend its territorial control, its political influence, and/or its domination of the international economy'. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (note 23) p.106. A.F.K. Organski also suggested that it is rising great powers that seek to expand their influence in, and control over, the international system. A.F.K. Organski, World Politics (NY: Knopf 1968) p.97.
69. Ibid. pp. 18-20. An earlier statement of the link between capabilities and intentions is Robert Gilpin's observation that, 'As the power of a state increases, it seeks to extend its territorial control, its political influence, and/or its domination of the international economy'. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (note 23) p.106. A.F.K. Organski also suggested that it is rising great powers that seek to expand their influence in, and control over, the international system. A.F.K. Organski, World Politics (NY: Knopf 1968) p.97.
70. Ibid. pp.5, 184-5. As Zakaria says (note 29; pp. 184-5), a state's 'definition of security, of the interests that require protection, usually expands in tandem with a nation's material resources'.
71. Eric J. Labs, Offensive Realism and Why States Expand Their Security Aims', Security Studies 6/4 (Summer 1997) p.15. Zakaria offers a slightly different formulation, contending that instead of attempting to maximize their relative power, states act to maximize their influence over the international system (Zakaria, note 29, p.19). The utility of this distinction is problematic, because whether one views a state as seeking to maximize its 'relative power' or its 'influence', the state's goal in either case is the same: an attempt to enhance its range of grand strategic options, to increase its control over the external security environment, and thereby to bolster its security. A similarly problematic semantic distinction is that between offensive realists and defensive realists over whether states maximize their relative power, or maximize their security. In fact, the distinction between 'power' and 'security' that is drawn by defensive realists is an illusory one. In an anarchic, self-help realm like international politics, a state's power is the very foundation of its security, a point nicely captured in John Herz's description of the 'security and power dilemma' at the heart of international politics. John Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism (U. of Chicago Press 1951) p.24.
72. Eric J. Labs, Offensive Realism and Why States Expand Their Security Aims', Security Studies 6/4 (Summer 1997) p.15. Zakaria offers a slightly different formulation, contending that instead of attempting to maximize their relative power, states act to maximize their influence over the international system (Zakaria, note 29, p.19). The utility of this distinction is problematic, because whether one views a state as seeking to maximize its 'relative power' or its 'influence', the state's goal in either case is the same: an attempt to enhance its range of grand strategic options, to increase its control over the external security environment, and thereby to bolster its security. A similarly problematic semantic distinction is that between offensive realists and defensive realists over whether states maximize their relative power, or maximize their security. In fact, the distinction between 'power' and 'security' that is drawn by defensive realists is an illusory one. In an anarchic, self-help realm like international politics, a state's power is the very foundation of its security, a point nicely captured in John Herz's description of the 'security and power dilemma' at the heart of international politics. John Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism (U. of Chicago Press 1951) p.24.
73. Zakaria (note 29) p.20. There is a conflict that runs throughout Zakaria's analysis of expansion because he makes two contradictory claims. On the one hand, after acknowledging that great powers have the luxury of defining their interests in ways that go beyond the mere attainment of minimal security (p. 182), he argues that expansion occurs in response to the opportunities for successful expansion that are presented as the state's relative power increases. The implication of Zakaria's argument is that a state's decision to expand is volitional. However, later Zakaria also argues (pp.29-30) that states expand for security reasons because the international system's constraints compel them to do so. According to this explanation, a state's decision to expand is reflexive.
74. John J. Mearsheimer, Great Power Politics (NY: Norton, forthcoming) Ch.2. I am grateful to John Mearsheimer for allowing me to read, and cite from, his manuscript.
75. Ashley J. Tellis, 'The Drive to Domination' (Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Political Science, U.of Chicago 1994) p.11. Tellis's subcategorization of hegemonic grand strategies is a potentially useful framework. Unfortunately, he neither elaborates on the differences between these subcategories nor does he define them. For my purposes, I would define these categories as follows. Elimination is self-explanatory. An example would be Rome's extinguishing of Carthage at the end of the Third Punic War. Elimination of rivals would seem to be a relatively rare path to hegemony. Subjugation encompasses a state's use of its military and economic capabilities to establish a relationship of dominance over its rivals. Often, but not always, subjugation is accomplished by defeating one's rivals in war. By establishing a clear power advantage over its rival(s), a hegemon is able to circumscribe the rival's autonomy, and reduce its material capabilities, thereby decreasing the likelihood that a defeated rival will resurface as a future threat. Subordination is the most interesting path to hegemony. Subordination is a subtle strategy that combines elements of both hard and soft power. The hegemon uses its hard power to define the power relationship between itself and others. The hegemon's hard power serves to circumscribe others' freedom of action and to dissuade, or prevent, them from developing their power capabilities to a point that would enable them to challenge the hegemon's preeminence. The hegemon uses its soft power to coopt others and to legitimize its dominance over them.
76. This is because: multipolar systems have more 'conflict dyads', which means that there are more chances for wars to erupt and spread; deterrence is difficult because power imbalances frequently occur in multipolar systems and, when they do, wars often occur because the powerful are tempted to aggress; and 'collective action' problems impede timely and successful balancing against aggressors, and encourage states to engage in buck-passing and 'free-riding' behavior. The most succinct critique of multipolarity, upon which this discussion is based, is Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future' (note 30) pp.13-19. Also, see Waltz (note 2) pp. 164-5. As Waltz points out, another reason balancing sometimes fails to occur effectively in multipolar systems is that it is not always clear (or it often is unclear) who threatens whom. On collective action problems generally, see Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (NY: Schocken Books 1968). On free riding, see Richard Zeckhauser and Mancur Olson, 'An Economic Theory of Alliances', The Review of Economics and Statistics 48/3 (Aug. 1966) pp.266-79. On buck passing, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, 'Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity', International Organization 44/1 (Spring 1990) pp. 137-68.
77. This is because: multipolar systems have more 'conflict dyads', which means that there are more chances for wars to erupt and spread; deterrence is difficult because power imbalances frequently occur in multipolar systems and, when they do, wars often occur because the powerful are tempted to aggress; and 'collective action' problems impede timely and successful balancing against aggressors, and encourage states to engage in buck-passing and 'free-riding' behavior. The most succinct critique of multipolarity, upon which this discussion is based, is Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future' (note 30) pp.13-19. Also, see Waltz (note 2) pp. 164-5. As Waltz points out, another reason balancing sometimes fails to occur effectively in multipolar systems is that it is not always clear (or it often is unclear) who threatens whom. On collective action problems generally, see Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (NY: Schocken Books 1968). On free riding, see Richard Zeckhauser and Mancur Olson, 'An Economic Theory of Alliances', The Review of Economics and Statistics 48/3 (Aug. 1966) pp.266-79. On buck passing, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, 'Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity', International Organization 44/1 (Spring 1990) pp. 137-68.
78. This is because: multipolar systems have more 'conflict dyads', which means that there are more chances for wars to erupt and spread; deterrence is difficult because power imbalances frequently occur in multipolar systems and, when they do, wars often occur because the powerful are tempted to aggress; and 'collective action' problems impede timely and successful balancing against aggressors, and encourage states to engage in buck-passing and 'free-riding' behavior. The most succinct critique of multipolarity, upon which this discussion is based, is Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future' (note 30) pp.13-19. Also, see Waltz (note 2) pp. 164-5. As Waltz points out, another reason balancing sometimes fails to occur effectively in multipolar systems is that it is not always clear (or it often is unclear) who threatens whom. On collective action problems generally, see Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (NY: Schocken Books 1968). On free riding, see Richard Zeckhauser and Mancur Olson, 'An Economic Theory of Alliances', The Review of Economics and Statistics 48/3 (Aug. 1966) pp.266-79. On buck passing, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, 'Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity', International Organization 44/1 (Spring 1990) pp. 137-68.
79. This is because: multipolar systems have more 'conflict dyads', which means that there are more chances for wars to erupt and spread; deterrence is difficult because power imbalances frequently occur in multipolar systems and, when they do, wars often occur because the powerful are tempted to aggress; and 'collective action' problems impede timely and successful balancing against aggressors, and encourage states to engage in buck-passing and 'free-riding' behavior. The most succinct critique of multipolarity, upon which this discussion is based, is Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future' (note 30) pp.13-19. Also, see Waltz (note 2) pp. 164-5. As Waltz points out, another reason balancing sometimes fails to occur effectively in multipolar systems is that it is not always clear (or it often is unclear) who threatens whom. On collective action problems generally, see Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (NY: Schocken Books 1968). On free riding, see Richard Zeckhauser and Mancur Olson, 'An Economic Theory of Alliances', The Review of Economics and Statistics 48/3 (Aug. 1966) pp.266-79. On buck passing, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, 'Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity', International Organization 44/1 (Spring 1990) pp. 137-68.
80. Mearsheimer, Great Power Politics (note 34) Ch.2, p.9.
81. As Hans Morgenthau puts it: 'Since no nation can be sure that its calculation of the distribution of power at any particular moment is correct, it must at least make sure that its errors, whatever they may be, will not put the nation at a disadvantage in the contest for power. In other words, the nation must try to have at least a margin of safety that will allow it to make erroneous calculations and still maintain the balance of power. To that effect, all nations actively engaged in the struggle for power must actually aim not at a balance - that is, equality - of power, but at superiority of power in their own behalf'. Hans J. Morgenthau, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th ed. (NY: Knopf 1986) pp.227-8.
82. Ibid. p.377. The classic expositions of how differential economic growth rates affect the distribution of relative power in the international system are Gilpin (note 23) and Kennedy (note 22).
83. Morgenthrau (note 38) p.378.
84. Quoted in Robert B. Strassler (ed.) The Landmark Thucydides (NY: Free Press 1996) p.372.
85. See Walter F. Hahn, 'West Germany's Ostpolitik: The Grand Design of Egon Bahr', Orbis, 16/4 (Winter 1973) pp.859-80; and Karsten Voigt, 'The Function of Defence Alliances in the Future', address to the conference on 'NATO at 40', Cato Institute, Washington DC, 4 April 1989.
86. See Walter F. Hahn, 'West Germany's Ostpolitik: The Grand Design of Egon Bahr', Orbis, 16/4 (Winter 1973) pp.859-80; and Karsten Voigt, 'The Function of Defence Alliances in the Future', address to the conference on 'NATO at 40', Cato Institute, Washington DC, 4 April 1989.
87. In American foreign policy circles, George F. Kennan was the leading advocate of this view. In 1948, while serving as director of the State Department's policy planning staff, Kennan had urged mutual superpower disengagement from Central Europe, coupled with German unification as an alternative to the creation of NATO, which he feared would solidify Europe's bipolar division for decades to come. See PPS 43, 'Considerations Affecting the Conclusion of a North Atlantic Security Pact', 23 Nov. 1948, in Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis (eds.) Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950 (NY: Columbia UP 1978) p.157. Out of office, Kennan revived this idea in 1958. George F. Kennan, 'A Chance to Withdraw Our Troops in Europe', Harper's 216/1293 (Feb. 1958) pp.34-41.
88. In American foreign policy circles, George F. Kennan was the leading advocate of this view. In 1948, while serving as director of the State
89. As Defense Secretary Richard Cheney said, 'America should continue to anchor its strategy to the still-valid doctrines of deterrence, flexible response, forward defense, [and] security alliances… Even the extraordinary events of 1989 do not mean that America should abandon this strategic foundation.' 'Statement of Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney', Senate Budget Committee 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 5 Feb. 1990, p.3. If the events of 1989 did not indicate that a review of US grand strategy was needed, it is difficult to imagine what would trigger the need for such a reassessment.
90. The American foreign policy community came to believe that US interests in Europe were best furthered by the 'Yalta' system of a divided Continent and a divided Germany. The flip side of this viewpoint was the belief that any change in the post-1945 European status quo would be inimical to the United States. The classic statement of this dominant American outlook is A. W. De Porte, Europe Between the Superpowers: The Enduring Balance (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1979).
91. News Conference in Brussels, Belgium, 4 Dec. 1989, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 11 Dec. 1989 (25, No.49).
92. Zelikow and Rice (note 14) pp.169-70 (emphasis added).
93. Bush and Scowcroft (note 9) pp.230-31 (emphasis added).
94. For example, in early 1990, when Britain and France suggested that CSCE play a more important role in post-Cold War Europe's security architecture, the Bush administration believed that this could lead to NATO's being supplanted. As Scowcroft said, that was an 'unacceptable notion' because of 'the centrality of NATO to US strategy'. Ibid, p.249.
95. Ibid. p.188. President Bush himself, who, prior to Nov. 1989, seemed more willing than his senior advisors to entertain the possibility of German reunification, has nevertheless made clear that his support for that outcome was rather tepid. He recalls that he 'did not feel that strongly' about whether Washington should push German reunification, and that if 'the NSC or the State Department had avowed it was a bad idea, I certainly would have been receptive'. Ibid. pp. 187-8.
96. As two mid-level Bush administration officials who were involved intimately in the German reunification process put it, the Bush administration was resolved that NATO's essential functions - especially the containment of German power - would remain unchanged even if the Cold War ended: 'Germany would continue to rely on NATO for protection… The Germans would thus forego pursuit of a purely national defense, including the development of their own nuclear weapons'. Zelikow and Rice (note 14) pp.169-70.
97. American concerns that Bonn would trade NATO membership in exchange for Moscow's consent to reunification were fanned both by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's Dec. 1989 'Ten Point' plan for reunification, and by Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher's policy statements, notably his Jan. 1990 speech at Tautzig on 'German Unity in a European Framework'. As Scowcroft says, Washington was worried about Kohl's speech because the German Chancellor was silent about the security implications of German reunification, and Germany's future relationship to NATO: 'It was important that Germany remain firmly within the alliance, not just because it was important to anchor that nation to the West and to assuage the fears of its neighbors, but also because it was crucial to NATO…A Germany outside NATO would "gut" the Alliance.' Bush and Scowcroft (note 9) pp.196-97. In his Tautzig speech Genscher acknowledged that a unified Germany would remain in NATO, but he also called for a special arrangement to govern the relationship between the alliance and the territory of the former GDR. This worried US policymakers, as did intelligence reports suggesting that Genscher wanted to create a new pan-European security framework that would quickly supersede NATO. Zelikow and Rice (note 14) pp.174-5. In Dec. 1989, Washington had determined that Germany's full membership in NATO was the sine qua non of reunification. Ibid. pp.113, 133, 147. When Kohl and Bush met at Camp David in late Feb. 1990, it was made clear to the Germans that the US support for reunification was predicated on Bonn's commitment that a reunified Germany would remain a full NATO member. Ibid. pp. 172-3, 211. With respect to the role of the Two Plus Four talks in ensuring US interests, Baker observes that: 'Without such a process, the odds of the Germans and the Soviets going it alone and cutting a private deal disadvantageous to Western interests (as they had with the agreements of Brest-Litovsk in 1918, Rapallo in 1922, and the Molotov-Ribbentrop accord in 1939) would increase. I felt it important to have the major players at one table, where we could all see the cards that each of us was playing.' Baker (note 13) pp. 198-9.
98. As Baker told Gorbachev in May 1990, 'unless we find a way to truly anchor Germany in European institutions we will sow the seeds for history to repeat itself. If Germany was not anchored to the existing security institution [NATO], then we would have a powerful new entity in Europe concerned about developing its [own] security measures.' Baker (note 13) p.273.
99. Bush and Scowcroft (note 9) p.205; and Zelikow and Rice (note 14) p.197. Gorbachev certainly came to understand that Washington was seeking to fashion a post-Cold War European settlement that would give the United States the upper hand. As he told Baker when they met in Moscow in May 1990, 'Sometimes I have the sense that you want an edge, you may seek an advantage [on Germany and NATO]… that's going to mean a very serious development in the strategic balance; it's going to mean a serious shift in the balance.' Baker (note 13) pp.248-9.
100. This became a point of friction between Washington and Genscher, who was prepared to be more accommodating to Moscow because he worried that US policy would undermine Gorbachev. However, 'Genscher may not have understood that the Americans had decided that the US objectives for Germany were more important than protecting Gorbachev.' Zelikow and Rice (note 14) p.252.
101. Ibid. p. 197.
102. As Baker says, the Bush administration recognized the need to give Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze political 'cover' in the form of arguments they could make domestically to justify accepting Washington's terms. And, he says, 'That meant we had to work with our European partners to adapt NATO and CSCE to make them appear less threatening to the Soviet people.' Baker (note 13) pp.231-2 (emphasis added).
103. Bush and Scowcroft (note 9) pp.239, 273; and Zelikow and Rice (note 14) pp.18-182. No doubt, those arguments were self-serving. At the same time, however, it is also true that, for its own part, the United States did worry about the geopolitical implications of a reunified Germany, which posed a latent threat to US interests.
104. Gorbachev found it inconsistent for the United States to argue, on the one hand, that a democratic, unified Germany could be trusted to behave responsibly, but to maintain, on the other hand, that a reunified Germany could be a trouble-maker unless embedded in NATO. Bush and Scowcroft (note 9) pp.257, 272. Gorbachev also insisted that the American insistence on maintaining NATO was in conflict with the goal of ending the Cold War. Ibid, p.272.
105. Bush and Scowcroft (note 9) p.253. Also see Zelikow and Rice (note 14) p.215.
106. This is what Baker told Gorbachev when the two met in Moscow in May 1990. Bush and Scowcroft (note 9) p.273.
107. Zelikow and Rice (note 14) p.274. See text and references at note 55.
108. Baker (note 13) p.257.
109. In early 1990, when the diplomatic process leading to German reunification was just beginning to gather momentum, Genscher assured Moscow that reunification would not mean NATO's eastward extension. As Genscher said, 'To think that the borders of NATO could be moved 300 kilometers eastward, via German unification, would be an illusion. No reasonable person could expect the Soviet Union to accept such an outcome.' Quoted in Zelikow and Rice (note 14) p.175. In Feb. 1990, Baker told Shevardnadze that if a reunified Germany remained in NATO, Moscow would receive firm guarantees 'that NATO's jurisdiction or forces would not move eastward'. Ibid. p. 180; Bush and Scowcroft (note 9) p.239.
110. As President Clinton said: 'I know that some in Russia still look at NATO through a Cold War prism and, therefore, look at our proposals to expand it in a negative light. But I ask them to look again. We are building a new NATO, just as we support the Russian people in building a new Russia. By reducing rivalry and fear, by strengthening peace and cooperation, NATO will promote greater stability in Europe and Russia will be among the beneficiaries. Indeed, Russia has the best chance in history to help build that peaceful and undivided Europe, and to be an equal and respected and successful partner in that sort of future. The great opportunity the Russian people have is to define themselves in terms of the future, not the past; to forge a new relationship with NATO as enlargement moves forward.' President Bill Clinton, 'Remarks to the People of Detroit', 22 Oct. 1996, White House Press Office transcript, http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma. eop.gov.us/1996/10/22/4.text.1 Arguing that NATO enlargement was not drawing new lines of division in Europe, a senior Pentagon official said: 'NATO is a defensive alliance created to ensure more security and stability for Europe as a whole, Russia included, whatever its formal or informal relations with the alliance. NATO is not an alliance against Russia. NATO's basic principles -collective defense, democracy, consensus and cooperative security - are no threat to the Russia of today or, we trust and hope, of the Russia of tomorrow. 'Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Walter Slocombe, 'Partnership for Peace and NATO-Russian Relations', Speech to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC), Defense Issues 10/28 (online), 2 March 1995. Also see Strobe Talbott, 'Why NATO Should Grow', New York Review of Books 42/13 (10 Aug. 1995) pp.27-30.
111. As President Clinton said: 'I know that some in Russia still look at NATO through a Cold War prism and, therefore, look at our proposals to expand it in a negative light. But I ask them to look again. We are building a new NATO, just as we support the Russian people in building a new Russia. By reducing rivalry and fear, by strengthening peace and cooperation, NATO will promote greater stability in Europe and Russia will be among the beneficiaries. Indeed, Russia has the best chance in history to help build that peaceful and undivided Europe, and to be an equal and respected and successful partner in that sort of future. The great opportunity the Russian people have is to define themselves in terms of the future, not the past; to forge a new relationship with NATO as enlargement moves forward.' President Bill Clinton, 'Remarks to the People of Detroit', 22 Oct. 1996, White House Press Office transcript, http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma. eop.gov.us/1996/10/22/4.text.1 Arguing that NATO enlargement was not drawing new lines of division in Europe, a senior Pentagon official said: 'NATO is a defensive alliance created to ensure more security and stability for Europe as a whole, Russia included, whatever its formal or informal relations with the alliance. NATO is not an alliance against Russia. NATO's basic principles -collective defense, democracy, consensus and cooperative security - are no threat to the Russia of today or, we trust and hope, of the Russia of tomorrow. 'Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Walter Slocombe, 'Partnership for Peace and NATO-Russian Relations', Speech to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC), Defense Issues 10/28 (online), 2 March 1995. Also see Strobe Talbott, 'Why NATO Should Grow', New York Review of Books 42/13 (10 Aug. 1995) pp.27-30.
112. As President Clinton said: 'I know that some in Russia still look at NATO through a Cold War prism and, therefore, look at our proposals to expand it in a negative light. But I ask them to look again. We are building a new NATO, just as we support the Russian people in building a new Russia. By reducing rivalry and fear, by strengthening peace and cooperation, NATO will promote greater stability in Europe and Russia will be among the beneficiaries. Indeed, Russia has the best chance in history to help build that peaceful and undivided Europe, and to be an equal and respected and successful partner in that sort of future. The great opportunity the Russian people have is to define themselves in terms of the future, not the past; to forge a new relationship with NATO as enlargement moves forward.' President Bill Clinton, 'Remarks to the People of Detroit', 22 Oct. 1996, White House Press Office transcript, http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma. eop.gov.us/1996/10/22/4.text.1 Arguing that NATO enlargement was not drawing new lines of division in Europe, a senior Pentagon official said: 'NATO is a defensive alliance created to ensure more security and stability for Europe as a whole, Russia included, whatever its formal or informal relations with the alliance. NATO is not an alliance against Russia. NATO's basic principles -collective defense, democracy, consensus and cooperative security - are no threat to the Russia of today or, we trust and hope, of the Russia of tomorrow. 'Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Walter Slocombe, 'Partnership for Peace and NATO-Russian Relations', Speech to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC), Defense Issues 10/28 (online), 2 March 1995. Also see Strobe Talbott, 'Why NATO Should Grow', New York Review of Books 42/13 (10 Aug. 1995) pp.27-30.
113. The most detailed account of Russia's reaction to NATO expansion is J.L. Black, Russia Faces NATO Expansion: Bearing Gifts or Bearing Arms (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2000). See also Susan Eisenhower, 'The Perils of Victory', in Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry (eds.) NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality (Washington DC: Cato Institute 1998) pp.103-19.
114. The most detailed account of Russia's reaction to NATO expansion is J.L. Black, Russia Faces NATO Expansion: Bearing Gifts or Bearing Arms (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2000). See also Susan Eisenhower, 'The Perils of Victory', in Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry (eds.) NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality (Washington DC: Cato Institute 1998) pp.103-19.
115. Ronald D. Asmus, 'Double Enlargement: Redefining the Atlantic Partnership After the Cold War', in David C. Gompert and F. Stephen Larrabee (eds.) America and Europe: A Partnership for a New Era (Cambridge: CUP 1997) pp.19-50.
116. For example, a senior Pentagon official made the case that post-Cold War NATO would need to focus on Out of area threats', stating that 'real, immediate challenges to NATO allies have been mounting to the south. Flash points have emerged in the Mediterranean, in Southwest Asia, in the Balkans and in North Africa. The potential spread of instability across the Mediterranean would not only threaten friendly regimes of North Africa and the prospects for peace in the Middle East, it would also threaten Europe with new social and security problems.' Slocombe (note 65). The most robust vision of how NATO should serve to defend a geographically expansive notion of US strategic interests is Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives (NY: Basic Books 1997). Brzezinski calls for ultimately transforming NATO into a Trans-Eurasian Security System (TESS), that would encompass all of Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus, and East Asia.
117. As Secretary of State Albright put it, 'instability that is dangerous and contagious is best stopped before it reaches NATO's borders'. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, 'Press Conference at NATO Headquarters', Washington DC: US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, 8 Dec. 1998.
118. President Bill Clinton, 'Remarks on Foreign Policy', San Francisco, 26 Feb. 1999, White House Press Office transcript, http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi:// oma.eop.gov.us/1999/3/1/3.text.1.
119. Melvyn P. Leffler, 'National Security', in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (eds.) Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations (Cambridge: CUP 1991) p.204.
120. President Clinton, 'Remarks on Foreign Policy' (note 70).
121. Slocombe, 'Partnership for Peace and NATO-Russian Relations' (note 65).
122. President Bill Clinton, 'Remarks to the American Society of Newspaper Editors', Annapolis, MD, 1 April 1993, White House Press Office transcript, http://www.pub.white house.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1993/4/1/10.text.1.
123. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, 'Robert C. Frasure Memorial Lecture', Tallinn, Estonia, 24 Jan. 2000, State Dept. Website, http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/ 2000/000124_talbott_Tallinn.html.
124. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, 'Remarks at a Conference on the Future of NATO', The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 7 Oct. 1999, http://www. state.gov/www.policy_remarks/1999/991007_talbott_London.html.
125. Ibid. Also see John Lancaster, 'Albright Signals Strong Backing for Milosevic Foes', Washington Post, 4 Nov. 1999, p.A27.
126. Ibid. Also see John Lancaster, 'Albright Signals Strong Backing for Milosevic Foes', Washington Post, 4 Nov. 1999, p.A27.
127. Marc Lacy, 'US Will Reconsider Ties if Haider Joins Coalition', New York Times, 2 Feb. 2000.
128. President Bill Clinton, 'Remarks to the People of Detroit' (note 65).
129. An early expression of US fears of 'renationalization' was the Pentagon's 1991 Summer Study, which argued that the main threat to America's post-Cold War preponderance was of 'Germany and/or Japan disconnecting from multilateral security and economic arrangements and pursuing an independent course'. Undersecretary of Defense (Policy), 1991 Summer Study, Organized by the Director, Net Assessment, held at Newport, RI, 5-13 Aug. 1991, p.17.
130. For the argument that the American commitment to NATO is vital to preventing Europe from relapsing into security competitions, see Robert J. Art, 'Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO', Political Science Quarterly 111/1 (Spring 1996) pp. 1-39. Also see Stephen Van Evera, 'Why Europe Matters, Why The Third World Doesn't', Journal of Strategic Studies 13/2 (June 1990) pp.1-51. Simply put, US policymakers believe that a unipolar world in which America is hegemonic is more peaceful than a multipolar system. The case against multipolarity is set forth in the Regional Defense Strategy, prepared by the Pentagon during the Bush administration: 'It is not in our interest….to return to earlier periods in which multiple military powers balanced one against another in what passed for security structures, while regional, or even global peace hung in the balance'. Dept. of Defense, Regional Defense Strategy, 1992, p.12.
131. For the argument that the American commitment to NATO is vital to preventing Europe from relapsing into security competitions, see Robert J. Art, 'Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO', Political Science Quarterly 111/1 (Spring 1996) pp. 1-39. Also see Stephen Van Evera, 'Why Europe Matters, Why The Third World Doesn't', Journal of Strategic Studies 13/2 (June 1990) pp.1-51. Simply put, US policymakers believe that a unipolar world in which America is hegemonic is more peaceful than a multipolar system. The case against multipolarity is set forth in the Regional Defense Strategy, prepared by the Pentagon during the Bush administration: 'It is not in our interest….to return to earlier periods in which multiple military powers balanced one against another in what passed for security structures, while regional, or even global peace hung in the balance'. Dept. of Defense, Regional Defense Strategy, 1992, p.12.
132. For the argument that the American commitment to NATO is vital to preventing Europe from relapsing into security competitions, see Robert J. Art, 'Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO', Political Science Quarterly 111/1 (Spring 1996) pp. 1-39. Also see Stephen Van Evera, 'Why Europe Matters, Why The Third World Doesn't', Journal of Strategic Studies 13/2 (June 1990) pp.1-51. Simply put, US policymakers believe that a unipolar world in which America is hegemonic is more peaceful than a multipolar system. The case against multipolarity is set forth in the Regional Defense Strategy, prepared by the Pentagon during the Bush administration: 'It is not in our interest….to return to earlier periods in which multiple military powers balanced one against another in what passed for security structures, while regional, or even global peace hung in the balance'. Dept. of Defense, Regional Defense Strategy, 1992, p.12.
133. If this 'reassurance' provided by the United States ever was doubted by America's allies, the entire fabric of European security would unravel. As a recent Pentagon strategy document puts it, a loss of confidence in US reassurance 'could cause allies and friends to adopt more divergent defense policies and postures, thereby weakening the web of alliances and coalitions on which we rely to protect our interests abroad'. Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (May 1997) p.12. As a consequence, Europe 'could unravel into unrestrained military competition, conflict, and aggression'. Regional Defense Strategy (note 81) p.12. The 'virtuous circle' theory of US strategy has been outlined by Secretary of Defense Cohen. He argues that, 'Peace and stability are the very cornerstones of prosperity. When our diplomats and military forces combine to help create stability and security in a nation or region, that same stability and security attracts investment. Investment generates prosperity. And prosperity strengthens democracy, which creates more stability and more security.' Cohen went on to emphasize the connection between peace and stability, and the US military presence in Europe (and in East Asia): Our wisest and most-cost effective actions are those that encourage peace and discourage violence and instability - instability which destroys lives and markets. That means being forward deployed in Asia and Europe…and addressing instability before it turns into war.' Secretary of Defense William Cohen, 'Remarks at Microsoft Corporation', Redmond, WA, 18 Feb. 1999, DoD website, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1999/s19990218-secdef.html.
134. If this 'reassurance' provided by the United States ever was doubted by America's allies, the entire fabric of European security would unravel. As a recent Pentagon strategy document puts it, a loss of confidence in US reassurance 'could cause allies and friends to adopt more divergent defense policies and postures, thereby weakening the web of alliances and coalitions on which we rely to protect our interests abroad'. Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (May 1997) p.12. As a consequence, Europe 'could unravel into unrestrained military competition, conflict, and aggression'. Regional Defense Strategy (note 81) p.12. The 'virtuous circle' theory of US strategy has been outlined by Secretary of Defense Cohen. He argues that, 'Peace and stability are the very cornerstones of prosperity. When our diplomats and military forces combine to help create stability and security in a nation or region, that same stability and security attracts investment. Investment generates prosperity. And prosperity strengthens democracy, which creates more stability and more security.' Cohen went on to emphasize the connection between peace and stability, and the US military presence in Europe (and in East Asia): Our wisest and most-cost effective actions are those that encourage peace and discourage violence and instability - instability which destroys lives and markets. That means being forward deployed in Asia and Europe…and addressing instability before it turns into war.' Secretary of Defense William Cohen, 'Remarks at Microsoft Corporation', Redmond, WA, 18 Feb. 1999, DoD website, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1999/s19990218-secdef.html.
135. If this 'reassurance' provided by the United States ever was doubted by America's allies, the entire fabric of European security would unravel. As a recent Pentagon strategy document puts it, a loss of confidence in US reassurance 'could cause allies and friends to adopt more divergent defense policies and postures, thereby weakening the web of alliances and coalitions on which we rely to protect our interests abroad'. Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (May 1997) p.12. As a consequence, Europe 'could unravel into unrestrained military competition, conflict, and aggression'. Regional Defense Strategy (note 81) p.12. The 'virtuous circle' theory of US strategy has been outlined by Secretary of Defense Cohen. He argues that, 'Peace and stability are the very cornerstones of prosperity. When our diplomats and military forces combine to help create stability and security in a nation or region, that same stability and security attracts investment. Investment generates prosperity. And prosperity strengthens democracy, which creates more stability and more security.' Cohen went on to emphasize the connection between peace and stability, and the US military presence in Europe (and in East Asia): Our wisest and most-cost effective actions are those that encourage peace and discourage violence and instability - instability which destroys lives and markets. That means being forward deployed in Asia and Europe…and addressing instability before it turns into war.' Secretary of Defense William Cohen, 'Remarks at Microsoft Corporation', Redmond, WA, 18 Feb. 1999, DoD website, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1999/s19990218-secdef.html.
136. Since the Cold War's end, US grand strategy has aimed at perpetuating America's role as the only great power in a unipolar world. The most forthright statement of this grand strategic objective was the Bush administration's Draft Defense Planning Guidance for FY 1994-99, which stated, 'We must account sufficiently for the interests of the large industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political or economic order', and that 'we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role'. 'Excerpts from Pentagon's Plan: "Prevent the Emergence of a New Rival"', New York Times, 8 March 1992, p. 14. The Bush administration disavowed that document when such leaks triggered a public relations backlash (especially with US allies in Europe and East Asia). However, the substance of the strategy has been reaffirmed in innumerable policy statements and documents during both the Bush and Clinton administrations.
137. For elaboration, see Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz, 'American Hegemony - Without An Enemy', Foreign Policy, No.92 (Fall 1993) pp.5-23. Also see Benjamin Schwarz, '"Cold War" Continuities: US Economic and Security Strategy Towards Europe', Journal of Strategic Studies 17/4 (Dec. 1994) pp.82-104.
138. For elaboration, see Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz, 'American Hegemony - Without An Enemy', Foreign Policy, No.92 (Fall 1993) pp.5-23. Also see Benjamin Schwarz, '"Cold War" Continuities: US Economic and Security Strategy Towards Europe', Journal of Strategic Studies 17/4 (Dec. 1994) pp.82-104.
139. The term 'double containment' is from Wolfram F. Hanreider, Germany, Europe, and America (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1989). Also see, idem, 'The German-American Alliance at Forty', Aussenpolitik (II/89) 40/2, 2nd Quarter 1989, pp.148-59.
140. The term 'double containment' is from Wolfram F. Hanreider, Germany, Europe, and America (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1989). Also see, idem, 'The German-American Alliance at Forty', Aussenpolitik (II/89) 40/2, 2nd Quarter 1989, pp.148-59.
141. See Joseph Joffe, 'Europe's American Pacifier', Foreign Policy, No.54 (Spring 1984) pp.64-82.
142. The link between America's security, its preponderance, and an American-led world order was articulated in NSC-68, which stated: (1) the purpose of American power was 'to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish' and (2) the strategy of preponderance was 'a policy which [the United States] would probably pursue even if there were no Soviet Union'. Text of NSC-68 in Thomas Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis (eds.) Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950 (NY: Columbia UP 1978) p.401.
143. As diplomatic historian John Lewis Gaddis states: 'Few historians would deny, today, that the United States did expect to dominate the international scene after World War.II, and that it did so well before the Soviet Union emerged as a clear and present antagonist.' John Lewis Gaddis, 'The Tragedy of Cold War History', Diplomatic History 17/1 (Winter 1993) pp.3-4.
144. Quoted in Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford UP 1994) p.19.
145. See Russell D. Buhite and Wm. Christopher Hamel, 'War for Peace: The Question of American Preventive War against the Soviet Union, 1945-1955', Diplomatic History 14/3 (Summer 1990) pp.367-85.
146. Leffler (note 89) p.17.
147. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics (note 2) pp. 126-7. As Hans Morgenthau observes, 'A nation that throws into the scale of international politics the maximum of material power it is capable of mustering will find itself confronted with the maximum effort of all its competitors to equal or surpass its power. It will find that it has no friends, but only vassals and enemies.' Morgenthau (note 38) p. 183. It should be noted that offensive realists, as well as defensive realists, acknowledge that a would-be hegemon must surmount formidable barriers to attain its objective. Even Mearsheimer, the leading proponent of offensive realism, says: 'Hegemony is rarely achieved, however, because power tends to be somewhat evenly distributed among states, because threatened states have strong incentives to join together to thwart an aspiring hegemon, and because the costs of expansion usually outrun the benefits before domination is achieved, causing extension to become overextension.' John Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future', International Security 15/1 (Summer 1990) p.13, n.15.
148. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics (note 2) pp. 126-7. As Hans Morgenthau observes, 'A nation that throws into the scale of international politics the maximum of material power it is capable of mustering will find itself confronted with the maximum effort of all its competitors to equal or surpass its power. It will find that it has no friends, but only vassals and enemies.' Morgenthau (note 38) p. 183. It should be noted that offensive realists, as well as defensive realists, acknowledge that a would-be hegemon must surmount formidable barriers to attain its objective. Even Mearsheimer, the leading proponent of offensive realism, says: 'Hegemony is rarely achieved, however, because power tends to be somewhat evenly distributed among states, because threatened states have strong incentives to join together to thwart an aspiring hegemon, and because the costs of expansion usually outrun the benefits before domination is achieved, causing extension to become overextension.' John Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future', International Security 15/1 (Summer 1990) p.13, n.15.
149. For elaboration of this argument, see Christopher Layne, 'The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise', International Security 17/4 (Spring 1993) pp.5-55.
150. William C. Wohlforth, 'The Stability of a Unipolar World', International Security 24/1 (Summer 1999) pp.5-41.
151. For example, see Michael Mastanduno, 'Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy', International Security 21/4 (Spring 1997) pp.49-88. On balance-of-threat theory, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell UP 1987).
152. For example, see Michael Mastanduno, 'Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy', International Security 21/4 (Spring 1997) pp.49-88. On balance-of-threat theory, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell UP 1987).
153. On the role of soft power in US grand strategy, see Nye, Bound to Lead (note 22). In an important speech in the autumn of 1999, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger invoked the ideas of 'soft power' and 'balance of threat' theory to refute European claims that the United States was an overbearing hegemon. Berger acknowledged that the United States is seen in Europe, Russia and China as 'a hectoring hegemon' and a country that is 'unilateralist and too powerful'. Berger did not deny that the United States indeed is hegemonic, nor did he suggest that Washington is going to renounce its geopolitical preponderance. What he tried to do, however, was to allay others' fears of American power by arguing that the United States is a benign hegemon: 'We are accused of dominating others, of seeing the world in zero sum terms in which any other country's gain must be our loss. But that is an utterly mistaken view. It's not just because we are the first global power in history that is not an imperial power. It's because for 50 years, we have consciously tried to define and pursue our interests in a way that is consistent with the common good - rising prosperity, expanding freedom, collective security.' Samuel R. Berger, 'American Power: Hegemony, Isolationism or Engagement', speech at the Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, 21 Oct. 1999, on the White House website at http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/speeches/1999I021.html.
154. On the role of soft power in US grand strategy, see Nye, Bound to Lead (note 22). In an important speech in the autumn of 1999, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger invoked the ideas of 'soft power' and 'balance of threat' theory to refute European claims that the United States was an overbearing hegemon. Berger acknowledged that the United States is seen in Europe, Russia and China as 'a hectoring hegemon' and a country that is 'unilateralist and too powerful'. Berger did not deny that the United States indeed is hegemonic, nor did he suggest that Washington is going to renounce its geopolitical preponderance. What he tried to do, however, was to allay others' fears of American power by arguing that the United States is a benign hegemon: 'We are accused of dominating others, of seeing the world in zero sum terms in which any other country's gain must be our loss. But that is an utterly mistaken view. It's not just because we are the first global power in history that is not an imperial power. It's because for 50 years, we have consciously tried to define and pursue our interests in a way that is consistent with the common good - rising prosperity, expanding freedom, collective security.' Samuel R. Berger, 'American Power: Hegemony, Isolationism or Engagement', speech at the Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, 21 Oct. 1999, on the White House website at http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/speeches/1999I021.html.
155. For example, see Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton UP 1968); Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy (ibid. 1995); Mary N. Hampton, 'NATO at the Creation: US Foreign Policy, West Germany and the Wilsonian Impulse', Security Studies 4/3 (Spring 1995) p.653; and Robert G. Kaufman, 'A Two-Level Interaction: Structure, Stable Liberal Democracy, and US Grand Strategy', Security Studies 3/4 (Summer 1994) pp.681-5.
156. For example, see Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton UP 1968); Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy (ibid. 1995); Mary N. Hampton, 'NATO at the Creation: US Foreign Policy, West Germany and the Wilsonian Impulse', Security Studies 4/3 (Spring 1995) p.653; and Robert G. Kaufman, 'A Two-Level Interaction: Structure, Stable Liberal Democracy, and US Grand Strategy', Security Studies 3/4 (Summer 1994) pp.681-5.
157. For example, see Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton UP 1968); Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy (ibid. 1995); Mary N. Hampton, 'NATO at the Creation: US Foreign Policy, West Germany and the Wilsonian Impulse', Security Studies 4/3 (Spring 1995) p.653; and Robert G. Kaufman, 'A Two-Level Interaction: Structure, Stable Liberal Democracy, and US Grand Strategy', Security Studies 3/4 (Summer 1994) pp.681-5.
158. For example, see Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton UP 1968); Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy (ibid. 1995); Mary N. Hampton, 'NATO at the Creation: US Foreign Policy, West Germany and the Wilsonian Impulse', Security Studies 4/3 (Spring 1995) p.653; and Robert G. Kaufman, 'A Two-Level Interaction: Structure, Stable Liberal Democracy, and US Grand Strategy', Security Studies 3/4 (Summer 1994) pp.681-5.
159. Geir Lundestad, The American 'Empire' and Other Studies of US Foreign Policy in a Comparative Perspective (NY: OUP 1990).
160. See for example D.C. Watt, 'Perceptions of the United States in Europe, 1945-1983', in Lawrence Freedman (ed.) The Troubled Alliance: Atlantic Relations in the 1980s (NY: St Martin's 1983) pp.28-43. As Watt notes, the West Europeans have perceived the United States both as a friend and as an adversary.
161. Quoted in Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (Cambridge: CUP 1987) p.113.
162. As Edward Kolodziej observes, 'In the closing years of Gaullist rule, the possible development of a unipolar system became one of the major concerns of the French government.' Edward A. Kolodziej, French International Policy Under De Gaulle and Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1974) p.91.
163. On US distrust of the motives underlying Bonn's Ostpolitik, see Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown 1979) pp.408-10.
164. As University of Munich political scientist Ulrich Beck put it, 'Kosovo could be our military euro, creating a political and defense identity for the European Union in the same way as the euro is the expression of economic and financial integration.' Quoted in Roger Cohen, 'In Uniting Over Kosovo, A New Sense of Identity', New York Times, 28 April 1999, p.A11.
165. Quoted in Craig R. Whitney, 'France Presses For a Power Independent of the US', New York Times, 7 Nov. 1999, p.A5.
166. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer hinted that Germany would respond to US NBMD deployment by developing its own nuclear forces. See William Drozdiak, 'Possible US Missile Shield Alarms Europe', Washington Post, 6 Nov. 1999, p.A1. Arguing that NBMD deployment would render Europe more vulnerable than the United States to nuclear attack and disrupt the strategic coupling of Europe and America, Fischer observed that Germany's commitment to forego nuclear weapons 'was always based on our trust that the United States would protect our interests, that the United States, as the leading nuclear wer, would guarantee some sort of order'. Fischer said NBMD deployment would undercut Germany's trust in the efficacy of American security guarantees.
167. See Craig R. Whitney, 'Hey, Allies, Follow Me. I've Got All the New Toys', New York Times, 30 May 1999 (online ed.); Roger Cohen, 'Dependent on US Now, Europe Vows Defense Push', New York Times, 12 May 1999 (online ed.); John-Thor Dahlburg, 'Battle for Kosovo Shows Europe Still Needs US', Los Angeles Times, 20 April 1999 (online ed.).
168. See Craig R. Whitney, 'Hey, Allies, Follow Me. I've Got All the New Toys', New York Times, 30 May 1999 (online ed.); Roger Cohen, 'Dependent on US Now, Europe Vows Defense Push', New York Times, 12 May 1999 (online ed.); John-Thor Dahlburg, 'Battle for Kosovo Shows Europe Still Needs US', Los Angeles Times, 20 April 1999 (online ed.).
169. See Craig R. Whitney, 'Hey, Allies, Follow Me. I've Got All the New Toys', New York Times, 30 May 1999 (online ed.); Roger Cohen, 'Dependent on US Now, Europe Vows Defense Push', New York Times, 12 May 1999 (online ed.); John-Thor Dahlburg, 'Battle for Kosovo Shows Europe Still Needs US', Los Angeles Times, 20 April 1999 (online ed.).
170. This ambivalence is deeply rooted. Henry Kissinger warned that while it might prove to be a price worth paying, the United States indeed would pay a price if Europe achieved political and economic unification. A unified Europe would be no longer subservient to Washington, and would pursue its own agenda in international politics. It was naive, Kissinger said, to suppose that 'Europe would unite in order to share our burdens or that it would be content with a subordinate role once it had the means to implement its own views. Europe's main incentive to undertake a larger cooperative role in the West's affairs would be to fulfil its own distinctive purposes.' Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown 1982) p.131. Kissinger first made this point in a 1965 book on transatlantic relations, where he argued explicitly, that a united Europe would 'challenge American hegemony in Atlantic policy'. Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership: A Re-Appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (NY: McGraw-Hill 1965) p.40.
171. This ambivalence is deeply rooted. Henry Kissinger warned that while it might prove to be a price worth paying, the United States indeed would pay a price if Europe achieved political and economic unification. A unified Europe would be no longer subservient to Washington, and would pursue its own agenda in international politics. It was naive, Kissinger said, to suppose that 'Europe would unite in order to share our burdens or that it would be content with a subordinate role once it had the means to implement its own views. Europe's main incentive to undertake a larger cooperative role in the West's affairs would be to fulfil its own distinctive purposes.' Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown 1982) p.131. Kissinger first made this point in a 1965 book on transatlantic relations, where he argued explicitly, that a united Europe would 'challenge American hegemony in Atlantic policy'. Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership: A Re-Appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (NY: McGraw-Hill 1965) p.40.
172. See Joseph Fitchett, 'EU Takes Steps to Create a Military Force, Without Treading on NATO', International Herald Tribune, 1 March 2000 (online ed.); James Kitfield, 'European Doughboys', The National Journal, 26 Feb. 2000, pp.610-14; Carol J. Williams, 'Conference Highlights Flaws of NATO's Kosovo Campaign', Los Angeles Times, 6 Feb. 2000 (online ed.).
173. See Joseph Fitchett, 'EU Takes Steps to Create a Military Force, Without Treading on NATO', International Herald Tribune, 1 March 2000 (online ed.); James Kitfield, 'European Doughboys', The National Journal, 26 Feb. 2000, pp.610-14; Carol J. Williams, 'Conference Highlights Flaws of NATO's Kosovo Campaign', Los Angeles Times, 6 Feb. 2000 (online ed.).
174. See Joseph Fitchett, 'EU Takes Steps to Create a Military Force, Without Treading on NATO', International Herald Tribune, 1 March 2000 (online ed.); James Kitfield, 'European Doughboys', The National Journal, 26 Feb. 2000, pp.610-14; Carol J. Williams, 'Conference Highlights Flaws of NATO's Kosovo Campaign', Los Angeles Times, 6 Feb. 2000 (online ed.).
175. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, 'Press Conference at NATO Headquarters', US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, 8 Dec. 1998.
176. Slocombe, 'Partnership for Peace and NATO-Russian Relations' (note 65). Talbott has made the same point, stating that US support for ESDI would depend on the answer to a the key question: 'will it help keep the alliance together…?' As Talbott said, the United States does 'not want to see an ESDI that comes into being first within NATO but then grows out of NATO and finally grows away from NATO, since that would lead to an EDSO [European Defense and Security Organization] that initially duplicates NATO but that could eventually compete with NATO'. Talbott, 'Remarks at a Conference on the Future of NATO' (note 76).
177. Slocombe, 'Partnership for Peace and NATO-Russian Relations' (note 65). Talbott has made the same point, stating that US support for ESDI would depend on the answer to a the key question: 'will it help keep the alliance together…?' As Talbott said, the United States does 'not want to see an ESDI that comes into being first within NATO but then grows out of NATO and finally grows away from NATO, since that would lead to an EDSO [European Defense and Security Organization] that initially duplicates NATO but that could eventually compete with NATO'. Talbott, 'Remarks at a Conference on the Future of NATO' (note 76).
178. Albright, 'Press Conference at NATO Headquarters' (note 69).
179. NATO, Deputy National Security Advisor James Steinberg has declared, is the 'bedrock' of post-Cold War Europe's security, and 'underpins Europe's best hopes for a continent that is democratic, undivided and at peace'. He went on to note that while some in Europe perceive 'that US leadership is heavy handed', nevertheless the 'fact is, our leadership is essential in support of the larger cause of an integrated Europe'. James B. Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 'Remarks before European Institute', Mayflower Hotel, Washington DC, 15 Jan. 1998, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ WH/EOP/NSC/html/speeches/19980204-6020.html.
180. Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs, 'Address to the Secretary's Open Forum', 6 April 1999 (State Dept. website).
181. Strobe Talbott warns: 'If ESDI is misconceived, misunderstood, or mishandled, it could create the impression - which could eventually lead to the reality - that a new, European-only alliance is being born out of the old, trans-Atlantic one. If that were to happen, it would weaken, perhaps even break, those ties that I spoke of before - the ones that bind our security to yours'. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, 'Address at the Royal United Services Institute, London, UK', 10 March 1999 (State Dept website).
182. The most recent iteration of these points is Stephen Walt, 'The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart', National Interest, No.54 (Winter 1998-99) pp.3-11. Walt's analysis is compelling and builds on the work of such analysts as David Calleo, James Chace, Earl Ravenal, and Ronald Steel acutely identified the external and domestic factors that could ultimate cause the transatlantic alliance to fracture. By the mid-1980s, NATO's fraying was discernible, the result of: the contradictions imbedded in the alliance's tended deterrence strategy; the recrudescence of the German question; the attenuation of the Soviet military threat to Western Europe; the coming to power of successor generations on both sides of the Atlantic; and the divergence of interests between the United States and an economically resurgent Europe. There was also a strong argument to be made that the time had come for the United States to capitalize on the incipient multipolarity suggested by Western Europe's post-World War II recovery, and to contemplate disengagement from the Continent's security affairs. For discussions of these issues, see Layne, 'Superpower Disengagement' (note 3); Layne, 'Continental Divide' (note 14); Layne, 'Atlanticism Without NATO' (note 3); Layne, 'Toward German Reunification' (note 3); Layne, 'Ending the Alliance' (note 3). Also see Ted Galen Carpenter, 'Competing Agendas: America, Europe, and a Troubled NATO Partnership', in idem (ed.) NATO at 40: Confronting a Changing World (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books 1990) pp.29-44; and Carpenter, A Search for Enemies: America's Alliances after the Cold War (Washington DC: Cato Institute 1992) pp.11-46. Previously associated with strong support for NATO, Walt now concurs with my analysis of more than a decade ago that, because the alliance's disintegration is inevitable, the best course of action is for the United States and Western Europe to begin a process of gradual disengagement, rather than risk its precipitous rupture in a future transatlantic crisis. For his previous support of the US commitment to NATO, see Walt, 'The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing US Grand Strategy', International Security 14/1 (Spring 1989) pp.5-50.
183. The most recent iteration of these points is Stephen Walt, 'The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart', National Interest, No.54 (Winter 1998-99) pp.3-11. Walt's analysis is compelling and builds on the work of such analysts as David Calleo, James Chace, Earl Ravenal, and Ronald Steel acutely identified the external and domestic factors that could ultimate cause the transatlantic alliance to fracture. By the mid-1980s, NATO's fraying was discernible, the result of: the contradictions imbedded in the alliance's tended deterrence strategy; the recrudescence of the German question; the attenuation of the Soviet military threat to Western Europe; the coming to power of successor generations on both sides of the Atlantic; and the divergence of interests between the United States and an economically resurgent Europe. There was also a strong argument to be made that the time had come for the United States to capitalize on the incipient multipolarity suggested by Western Europe's post-World War II recovery, and to contemplate disengagement from the Continent's security affairs. For discussions of these issues, see Layne, 'Superpower Disengagement' (note 3); Layne, 'Continental Divide' (note 14); Layne, 'Atlanticism Without NATO' (note 3); Layne, 'Toward German Reunification' (note 3); Layne, 'Ending the Alliance' (note 3). Also see Ted Galen Carpenter, 'Competing Agendas: America, Europe, and a Troubled NATO Partnership', in idem (ed.) NATO at 40: Confronting a Changing World (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books 1990) pp.29-44; and Carpenter, A Search for Enemies: America's Alliances after the Cold War (Washington DC: Cato Institute 1992) pp.11-46. Previously associated with strong support for NATO, Walt now concurs with my analysis of more than a decade ago that, because the alliance's disintegration is inevitable, the best course of action is for the United States and Western Europe to begin a process of gradual disengagement, rather than risk its precipitous rupture in a future transatlantic crisis. For his previous support of the US commitment to NATO, see Walt, 'The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing US Grand Strategy', International Security 14/1 (Spring 1989) pp.5-50.
184. The most recent iteration of these points is Stephen Walt, 'The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart', National Interest, No.54 (Winter 1998-99) pp.3-11. Walt's analysis is compelling and builds on the work of such analysts as David Calleo, James Chace, Earl Ravenal, and Ronald Steel acutely identified the external and domestic factors that could ultimate cause the transatlantic alliance to fracture. By the mid-1980s, NATO's fraying was discernible, the result of: the contradictions imbedded in the alliance's tended deterrence strategy; the recrudescence of the German question; the attenuation of the Soviet military threat to Western Europe; the coming to power of successor generations on both sides of the Atlantic; and the divergence of interests between the United States and an economically resurgent Europe. There was also a strong argument to be made that the time had come for the United States to capitalize on the incipient multipolarity suggested by Western Europe's post-World War II recovery, and to contemplate disengagement from the Continent's security affairs. For discussions of these issues, see Layne, 'Superpower Disengagement' (note 3); Layne, 'Continental Divide' (note 14); Layne, 'Atlanticism Without NATO' (note 3); Layne, 'Toward German Reunification' (note 3); Layne, 'Ending the Alliance' (note 3). Also see Ted Galen Carpenter, 'Competing Agendas: America, Europe, and a Troubled NATO Partnership', in idem (ed.) NATO at 40: Confronting a Changing World (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books 1990) pp.29-44; and Carpenter, A Search for Enemies: America's Alliances after the Cold War (Washington DC: Cato Institute 1992) pp.11-46. Previously associated with strong support for NATO, Walt now concurs with my analysis of more than a decade ago that, because the alliance's disintegration is inevitable, the best course of action is for the United States and Western Europe to begin a process of gradual disengagement, rather than risk its precipitous rupture in a future transatlantic crisis. For his previous support of the US commitment to NATO, see Walt, 'The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing US Grand Strategy', International Security 14/1 (Spring 1989) pp.5-50.
185. The most recent iteration of these points is Stephen Walt, 'The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart', National Interest, No.54 (Winter 1998-99) pp.3-11. Walt's analysis is compelling and builds on the work of such analysts as David Calleo, James Chace, Earl Ravenal, and Ronald Steel acutely identified the external and domestic factors that could ultimate cause the transatlantic alliance to fracture. By the mid-1980s, NATO's fraying was discernible, the result of: the contradictions imbedded in the alliance's tended deterrence strategy; the recrudescence of the German question; the attenuation of the Soviet military threat to Western Europe; the coming to power of successor generations on both sides of the Atlantic; and the divergence of interests between the United States and an economically resurgent Europe. There was also a strong argument to be made that the time had come for the United States to capitalize on the incipient multipolarity suggested by Western Europe's post-World War II recovery, and to contemplate disengagement from the Continent's security affairs. For discussions of these issues, see Layne, 'Superpower Disengagement' (note 3); Layne, 'Continental Divide' (note 14); Layne, 'Atlanticism Without NATO' (note 3); Layne, 'Toward German Reunification' (note 3); Layne, 'Ending the Alliance' (note 3). Also see Ted Galen Carpenter, 'Competing Agendas: America, Europe, and a Troubled NATO Partnership', in idem (ed.) NATO at 40: Confronting a Changing World (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books 1990) pp.29-44; and Carpenter, A Search for Enemies: America's Alliances after the Cold War (Washington DC: Cato Institute 1992) pp.11-46. Previously associated with strong support for NATO, Walt now concurs with my analysis of more than a decade ago that, because the alliance's disintegration is inevitable, the best course of action is for the United States and Western Europe to begin a process of gradual disengagement, rather than risk its precipitous rupture in a future transatlantic crisis. For his previous support of the US commitment to NATO, see Walt, 'The Case for Finite Containment
186. The most recent iteration of these points is Stephen Walt, 'The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart', National Interest, No.54 (Winter 1998-99) pp.3-11. Walt's analysis is compelling and builds on the work of such analysts as David Calleo, James Chace, Earl Ravenal, and Ronald Steel acutely identified the external and domestic factors that could ultimate cause the transatlantic alliance to fracture. By the mid-1980s, NATO's fraying was discernible, the result of: the contradictions imbedded in the alliance's tended deterrence strategy; the recrudescence of the German question; the attenuation of the Soviet military threat to Western Europe; the coming to power of successor generations on both sides of the Atlantic; and the divergence of interests between the United States and an economically resurgent Europe. There was also a strong argument to be made that the time had come for the United States to capitalize on the incipient multipolarity suggested by Western Europe's post-World War II recovery, and to contemplate disengagement from the Continent's security affairs. For discussions of these issues, see Layne, 'Superpower Disengagement' (note 3); Layne, 'Continental Divide' (note 14); Layne, 'Atlanticism Without NATO' (note 3); Layne, 'Toward German Reunification' (note 3); Layne, 'Ending the Alliance' (note 3). Also see Ted Galen Carpenter, 'Competing Agendas: America, Europe, and a Troubled NATO Partnership', in idem (ed.) NATO at 40: Confronting a Changing World (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books 1990) pp.29-44; and Carpenter, A Search for Enemies: America's Alliances after the Cold War (Washington DC: Cato Institute 1992) pp.11-46. Previously associated with strong support for NATO, Walt now concurs with my analysis of more than a decade ago that, because the alliance's disintegration is inevitable, the best course of action is for the United States and Western Europe to begin a process of gradual disengagement, rather than risk its precipitous rupture in a future transatlantic crisis. For his previous support of the US commitment to NATO, see Walt, 'The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing US Grand Strategy', International Security 14/1 (Spring 1989) pp.5-50.
187. The most recent iteration of these points is Stephen Walt, 'The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart', National Interest, No.54 (Winter 1998-99) pp.3-11. Walt's analysis is compelling and builds on the work of such analysts as David Calleo, James Chace, Earl Ravenal, and Ronald Steel acutely identified the external and domestic factors that could ultimate cause the transatlantic alliance to fracture. By the mid-1980s, NATO's fraying was discernible, the result of: the contradictions imbedded in the alliance's tended deterrence strategy; the recrudescence of the German question; the attenuation of the Soviet military threat to Western Europe; the coming to power of successor generations on both sides of the Atlantic; and the divergence of interests between the United States and an economically resurgent Europe. There was also a strong argument to be made that the time had come for the United States to capitalize on the incipient multipolarity suggested by Western Europe's post-World War II recovery, and to contemplate disengagement from the Continent's security affairs. For discussions of these issues, see Layne, 'Superpower Disengagement' (note 3); Layne, 'Continental Divide' (note 14); Layne, 'Atlanticism Without NATO' (note 3); Layne, 'Toward German Reunification' (note 3); Layne, 'Ending the Alliance' (note 3). Also see Ted Galen Carpenter, 'Competing Agendas: America, Europe, and a Troubled NATO Partnership', in idem (ed.) NATO at 40: Confronting a Changing World (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books 1990) pp.29-44; and Carpenter, A Search for Enemies: America's Alliances after the Cold War (Washington DC: Cato Institute 1992) pp.11-46. Previously associated with strong support for NATO, Walt now concurs with my analysis of more than a decade ago that, because the alliance's disintegration is inevitable, the best course of action is for the United States and Western Europe to begin a process of gradual disengagement, rather than risk its precipitous rupture in a future transatlantic crisis. For his previous support of the US commitment to NATO, see Walt, 'The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing US Grand Strategy', International Security 14/1 (Spring 1989) pp.5-50.
188. The most recent iteration of these points is Stephen Walt, 'The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart', National Interest, No.54 (Winter 1998-99) pp.3-11. Walt's analysis is compelling and builds on the work of such analysts as David Calleo, James Chace, Earl Ravenal, and Ronald Steel acutely identified the external and domestic factors that could ultimate cause the transatlantic alliance to fracture. By the mid-1980s, NATO's fraying was discernible, the result of: the contradictions imbedded in the alliance's tended deterrence strategy; the recrudescence of the German question; the attenuation of the Soviet military threat to Western Europe; the coming to power of successor generations on both sides of the Atlantic; and the divergence of interests between the United States and an economically resurgent Europe. There was also a strong argument to be made that the time had come for the United States to capitalize on the incipient multipolarity suggested by Western Europe's post-World War II recovery, and to contemplate disengagement from the Continent's security affairs. For discussions of these issues, see Layne, 'Superpower Disengagement' (note 3); Layne, 'Continental Divide' (note 14); Layne, 'Atlanticism Without NATO' (note 3); Layne, 'Toward German Reunification' (note 3); Layne, 'Ending the Alliance' (note 3). Also see Ted Galen Carpenter, 'Competing Agendas: America, Europe, and a Troubled NATO Partnership', in idem (ed.) NATO at 40: Confronting a Changing World (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books 1990) pp.29-44; and Carpenter, A Search for Enemies: America's Alliances after the Cold War (Washington DC: Cato Institute 1992) pp.11-46. Previously associated with strong support for NATO, Walt now concurs with my analysis of more than a decade ago that, because the alliance's disintegration is inevitable, the best course of action is for the United States and Western Europe to begin a process of gradual disengagement, rather than risk its precipitous rupture in a future transatlantic crisis. For his previous support of the US commitment to NATO, see Walt, 'The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing US Grand Strategy', International Security 14/1 (Spring 1989) pp.5-50.
189. The most recent iteration of these points is Stephen Walt, 'The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart', National Interest, No.54 (Winter 1998-99) pp.3-11. Walt's analysis is compelling and builds on the work of such analysts as David Calleo, James Chace, Earl Ravenal, and Ronald Steel acutely identified the external and domestic factors that could ultimate cause the transatlantic alliance to fracture. By the mid-1980s, NATO's fraying was discernible, the result of: the contradictions imbedded in the alliance's tended deterrence strategy; the recrudescence of the German question; the attenuation of the Soviet military threat to Western Europe; the coming to power of successor generations on both sides of the Atlantic; and the divergence of interests between the United States and an economically resurgent Europe. There was also a strong argument to be made that the time had come for the United States to capitalize on the incipient multipolarity suggested by Western Europe's post-World War II recovery, and to contemplate disengagement from the Continent's security affairs. For discussions of these issues, see Layne, 'Superpower Disengagement' (note 3); Layne, 'Continental Divide' (note 14); Layne, 'Atlanticism Without NATO' (note 3); Layne, 'Toward German Reunification' (note 3); Layne, 'Ending the Alliance' (note 3). Also see Ted Galen Carpenter, 'Competing Agendas: America, Europe, and a Troubled NATO Partnership', in idem (ed.) NATO at 40: Confronting a Changing World (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books 1990) pp.29-44; and Carpenter, A Search for Enemies: America's Alliances after the Cold War (Washington DC: Cato Institute 1992) pp.11-46. Previously associated with strong support for NATO, Walt now concurs with my analysis of more than a decade ago that, because the alliance's disintegration is inevitable, the best course of action is for the United States and Western Europe to begin a process of gradual disengagement, rather than risk its precipitous rupture in a future transatlantic crisis. For his previous support of the US commitment to NATO, see Walt, 'The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing US Grand Strategy', International Security 14/1 (Spring 1989) pp.5-50.
190. The most recent iteration of these points is Stephen Walt, 'The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart', National Interest, No.54 (Winter 1998-99) pp.3-11. Walt's analysis is compelling and builds on the work of such analysts as David Calleo, James Chace, Earl Ravenal, and Ronald Steel acutely identified the external and domestic factors that could ultimate cause the transatlantic alliance to fracture. By the mid-1980s, NATO's fraying was discernible, the result of: the contradictions imbedded in the alliance's tended deterrence strategy; the recrudescence of the German question; the attenuation of the Soviet military threat to Western Europe; the coming to power of successor generations on both sides of the Atlantic; and the divergence of interests between the United States and an economically resurgent Europe. There was also a strong argument to be made that the time had come for the United States to capitalize on the incipient multipolarity suggested by Western Europe's post-World War II recovery, and to contemplate disengagement from the Continent's security affairs. For discussions of these issues, see Layne, 'Superpower Disengagement' (note 3); Layne, 'Continental Divide' (note 14); Layne, 'Atlanticism Without NATO' (note 3); Layne, 'Toward German Reunification' (note 3); Layne, 'Ending the Alliance' (note 3). Also see Ted Galen Carpenter, 'Competing Agendas: America, Europe, and a Troubled NATO Partnership', in idem (ed.) NATO at 40: Confronting a Changing World (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books 1990) pp.29-44; and Carpenter, A Search for Enemies: America's Alliances after the Cold War (Washington DC: Cato Institute 1992) pp.11-46. Previously associated with strong support for NATO, Walt now concurs with my analysis of more than a decade ago that, because the alliance's disintegration is inevitable, the best course of action is for the United States and Western Europe to begin a process of gradual disengagement, rather than risk its precipitous rupture in a future transatlantic crisis. For his previous support of the US commitment to NATO, see Walt, 'The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing US Grand Strategy', International Security 14/1 (Spring 1989) pp.5-50.