Firm performance, corporate governance, and top executive turnover in Japan

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 38, Issue 1, 1995, Pages 29-58

  Kang, Jun Koo ^a   Shivdasani, Anil ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND   (United States)

^b MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Japanese corporate governance; Main bank system; Management turnover

Indexed keywords

EID: 58149363437     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0304-405X(94)00807-D     Document Type: Article

References (40)

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